| 基于公平偏好的公共文化 PPP 项目政府补偿研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 郑 弦,杨春莉,罗纯熙,胡 晓,王颖林,陈嘉滢.基于公平偏好的公共文化 PPP 项目政府补偿研究[J].工程管理学报,2022,36(6):90-096. |
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| 作者姓名： | 郑 弦 杨春莉 罗纯熙 胡 晓 王颖林 陈嘉滢 |
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| 作者单位： | 1,4,6. 中南财经政法大学 金融学院；2. 中国人民银行十堰市中心支行；5. 福建农林大学 交通与土木工程学院 |
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| 摘 要： | 鉴于公共文化 PPP 项目收益性弱、对私人部门吸引力不足的特点，将私人部门公平偏好引入公共文化 PPP 项目的政府补偿机制设计，构建了以政府为主导的两阶段公私 Stackelberg 博弈模型。 以柳州某文化广场 PPP 项目为例分析了私人部门公平偏好对其初始投资决策、最优投资决策及政府补偿的影响。结果表明:博弈的第一阶段中政府初步许诺的运营期补偿力度较小，私人部门公平偏好与其初始决策投资呈正比；第二阶段确定补偿力度时，政府承诺收入率与私人部门期望收入率之差超过其参照点时，若私人部门公平偏好越高，要求政府最优运营期补偿力度越大，项目最优投资规模亦越大。研究结果可为公共文化 PPP 项目的补偿设计提供理论依据。
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| 关 键 词： | 公共文化项目 PPP 公平偏好 政府补偿 主从博弈 |
Research on the Government Compensation of Public Cultural PPPProjects Based on Fairness Preference |
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| ZHENG Xian,YANG Chun-li,LUO Chun-xi,HU xiao,WANG Ying-lin,CHEN Jia-ying.Research on the Government Compensation of Public Cultural PPPProjects Based on Fairness Preference[J].Journal of Engineering Management,2022,36(6):90-096. |
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| Authors: | ZHENG Xian YANG Chun-li LUO Chun-xi HU xiao WANG Ying-lin CHEN Jia-ying |
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| Affiliation: | 1,4,6. School of Finance， Zhongnan University of Economics and Law;2. People’s Bank of China Shiyan Branch;5. School of Transportation and Civil Engineering，Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University |
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| Abstract: | The public cultural PPP projects are characterized by low profitability and less attractive to private capital. The fairnesspreference of private capital is introduced into the design of government compensation mechanism of public cultural PPP project.Specifically， a government-led two-stage public-private stackelberg game model is first established. Then the impact of a privatesector’s fairness preference， government compensation and optimal investment decision has been taken into account in the gamemodel based on a typical public cultural PPP project in Liuzhou， China. The results show that in the first stage when the governmentmakes a preliminary promise， with a low government compensation level， the fairness preference of private sector promotes its initialdecision investment. In the second stage when the gap between the government promised revenue rate and the private sector expectedrevenue rate exceeds its reference point， meanwhile private sectors’ fairness preference is high， greater optimal governmentcompensation during the operation period indicates larger optimal investment scale of the private sector. |
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| Keywords: | public cultural projects public-private partnership fairness preference government compensation stackelberg game |
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