| 企业、政府与公众公共健康提升激励机制演化分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 曲卫华,,颜志军.企业、政府与公众公共健康提升激励机制演化分析[J].智能系统学报,2017,12(2):237-243. |
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| 作者姓名： | 曲卫华 颜志军 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 太原学院 计算中心, 山西 太原 030032;2. 山西大学 管理与决策研究中心, 山西 太原 030006;3. 北京理工大学 管理与经济学院, 北京 100081 |
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| 摘 要： | 我国能源消费导致的环境污染严重影响公众的公共健康水平。在考虑公众公共健康损失赔偿的情况下，构建了企业、政府与公众的三方演化博弈模型以分析三方策略的选择机制及影响因素。演化博弈理论认为在三维空间区域内，三方没有收敛于某一结果的演化稳定策略。研究发现，在一定条件下，在三维空间的某一区域内，三方可收敛到理想的演化博弈稳定策略:{实行能源转型、企业监管、公众参与环境管理}。并用数值仿真展示了在理想演化博弈稳定策略情景下，不同政策决策参数对演化结果的影响。研究结果表明，在政府群体实行监管比例固定的条件下，公众群体参与环境管理比例越大或公众公共健康损失赔偿越大，企业群体演化与实行能源转型策略的速度越快。同时，讨论了政府补贴、税收减免、政府罚款对演化结果的影响，提出了相应的政策建议。
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| 关 键 词： | 能源消费 企业污染 政府监管 公众参与 博弈 |
Evolutionary analysis of incentive mechanisms for enterprises,governments, and the public to achieve environmental health improvements |
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| QU Weihua,,YAN Zhijun.Evolutionary analysis of incentive mechanisms for enterprises,governments, and the public to achieve environmental health improvements[J].CAAL Transactions on Intelligent Systems,2017,12(2):237-243. |
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| Authors: | QU Weihua YAN Zhijun |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Computer Center, Taiyuan University, Taiyuan 030032, China;2. Institute of Management and Decision, Shanxi University, Taiyuan 030006, China;3. School of Management and Economics, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing 100081, China |
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| Abstract: | The effects environmental pollution caused by energy consumption are having on public health in China are quickly becoming increasingly serious. In this paper, we establish an evolutionary game model for enterprises, governments, and the public to analyze selection mechanisms and impact factors of these three constituents, thus considering health damage compensation. From game theory, these three stakeholders fail to converge to an ideal evolutionary stable strategy in some domains of the given three-dimensional space; however, we have found that, under certain conditions, these three stakeholders can converge to an ideal evolutionary stable strategy in certain domains, i.e., implementing energy transformation, enterprise regulation, and public participation in environment control. We show the effects that the variety of decision-making parameters have on evolutionary results via numerical experiments. We found that when the proportion of influence that the government group exercises in terms of regulations remains fixed, the higher the proportion of public participation in environmental management (and therefore higher health damage compensation) and the faster the speed by which the enterprise group evolves and energy transformation is realized. We also discuss the effects that government subsidies, tax deductions and exemptions, and government fines have on the evolutionary results, making some suggestions for policymakers as part of our conclusions. |
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| Keywords: | energy consumption enterprise pollution government regulation public participation game theory |
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