| 供应商一级密封报价博弈模型研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 卓翔芝,王旭,代应,王永宁.供应商一级密封报价博弈模型研究[J].计算机工程与应用,2009,45(15):213-215. |
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| 作者姓名： | 卓翔芝 王旭 代应 王永宁 |
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| 作者单位： | 1.重庆大学，重庆 400030 2.淮北煤炭师范学院，安徽 淮北 235000 |
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| 摘 要： | 在一个复杂的供应链系统中，由于供应商之间信息保密，那么供应商之间将会出现不完全信息竞争博弈。基于一级密封拍卖方式与供应链中供应商的投标报价的相似性，利用一级密封拍卖模型对供应商的竞争报价进行了研究，建立了供应商报价博弈模型，得到供应商的最优报价策略，定量地解决了报价中的信息不完全的问题，为供应商的报价决策提供参考。
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| 关 键 词： | 一级密封价格拍卖 供应商 报价博弈模型 |
| 收稿时间： | 2008-3-27 |
| 修稿时间： | 2008-6-13
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Bidding game model of suppliers based on first-price sealed auction |
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| ZHUO Xiang-zhi,WANG Xu,DAI Ying,WANG Yong-ning.Bidding game model of suppliers based on first-price sealed auction[J].Computer Engineering and Applications,2009,45(15):213-215. |
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| Authors: | ZHUO Xiang-zhi WANG Xu DAI Ying WANG Yong-ning |
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| Affiliation: | 1.Chongqing University，Chongqing 400030，China 2.Huaibei Coal Industry Teachers College，Huaibei，Anhui 235000，China |
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| Abstract: | In a complex supply chain system，because of confidential information between vendors，then there will be between suppliers incomplete information competition game.Based on the similarity between the first-price sealed auction and the suppliers’ bidding of the supply chain，this paper studies the suppliers’ competitive bidding by using the first-price sealed auction model.The suppliers’ bidding game model is established，and the optimal bidding strategies of the vendors are gained.It resolves quantificationally the problem of the bidding in the incomplete information，and provides reference for decision-making bid to the vendors. |
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| Keywords: | first-price sealed auction supplier bidding game model |
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