| PPP项目政府激励与社会资本努力的演化博弈与仿真 |
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| 引用本文： | 刘珈琪,刘继才,雷晓莹.PPP项目政府激励与社会资本努力的演化博弈与仿真[J].工业工程,2021,24(2):77-84. |
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| 作者姓名： | 刘珈琪 刘继才 雷晓莹 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 西南交通大学 经济管理学院，四川 成都，610031;2. 成都理工大学工程技术学院资源勘查与土木工程系, 四川 乐山, 614000 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71571149)；成都理工大学工程技术学院院级基金资助项目(C122017012) |
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| 摘 要： | 在PPP项目中，政府的激励策略是抑制社会资本不努力行为的重要机制。研究建立政府激励策略与社会资本努力行为互动的支付矩阵及动态演化博弈模型，分析双方在决策互动中的复制动态和进化稳定性。研究表明，(不激励，不努力)、(不激励，努力)、(激励，努力)策略在不同的参数设置下均有可能成为稳定策略，且个体决策行为对群体行为决策具有一定的影响。Matlab数值仿真结果显示，当社会资本不努力时，政府方一定不会给予激励；而且政府在激励策略中更加偏好事后奖励的激励方式。因此，政府方应该注重具有弹性的事后奖励带来的激励价值。研究结果为合理地设置PPP项目激励机制提供建议。
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| 关 键 词： | PPP项目 政府激励 社会资本努力 演化博弈 仿真 |
| 收稿时间： | 2019-10-28 |
Evolution Game and Simulation on Government Incentive and Social Capital Effort in PPP Project |
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| LIU Jiaqi,LIU Jicai,LEI Xiaoying.Evolution Game and Simulation on Government Incentive and Social Capital Effort in PPP Project[J].Industrial Engineering Journal,2021,24(2):77-84. |
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| Authors: | LIU Jiaqi LIU Jicai LEI Xiaoying |
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| Affiliation: | 1. School of Economics and Management, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610031, China;2. Department of Resource Exploration and Civil Engineering, The Engineering & Technical College of Chengdu University of Technology, Leshan 614000, China |
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| Abstract: | In PPP projects, the government's incentive strategy is an important mechanism to restrain the social capital's speculation that does not pay effort. To analyze the replication dynamics and evolutionary stability of both sides in the decision-making interaction, and improve the incentive mechanism of the government in the PPP project, based on the game theory, the payoff matrix and the dynamic evolutionary game model of the interaction between the strategy of government incentive and social capital effort behavior are constructed. Through the discussion of model parameters and Matlab numerical simulation, it is found that strategies (not giving incentive, and not making effort), (not giving incentive, but making effort), (giving incentive, and making effort) may become evolutionary stable strategy, when the different parameter is set in the system, reflecting individual behavior of decision-making has a certain influence on group's behavior decision. The results of numerical simulation show that when the social capital does not pay effort, the government will not definitely give an incentive, and the government prefers the incentive method of afterwards reward in the incentive strategy. Therefore, in the process of PPP project operation, the government should give appropriate incentives to social capital before the behavior occurs, so as to make social capital willing to make efforts, and in the later decision-making process, according to the level of efforts and performance of social capital, the incentive method of afterwards reward is adopted to supervise social capital. The research findings provide suggestions for setting up the incentive mechanism of PPP project reasonably. |
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| Keywords: | PPP project government incentive social capital effort evolution game simulation |
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