| 基于微分对策的闭环供应链中制造商合作策略选择 |
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| 引用本文： | 张敏,李思雨,石纯来,廖治通.基于微分对策的闭环供应链中制造商合作策略选择[J].工业工程,2020,23(3):19-29. |
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| 作者姓名： | 张敏 李思雨 石纯来 廖治通 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 西华大学 管理学院，四川 成都 610039;2. 西南交通大学 经济管理学院，四川 成都 610031 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71572156)；中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(2682018WQN16)；西南交通大学“双一流”建设资助项目(交通软科学类)(JDSYLYB2018016) |
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| 摘 要： | 以动态环境为背景,研究了存在第三方的闭环供应链中制造商合作策略选择。分别建立了制造商与回收商和零售商三方共同合作,制造商仅与回收商或零售商其中一方合作,以及三方均不合作等4种合作模型,利用微分对策理论对模型进行求解得到不同合作策略下的最优控制策略。研究发现:制造商总是存在与零售商或回收商合作的动机,制造商与零售商和回收商均合作时供应链利润以及消费者福利最高,制造商与其均不合作时供应链利润和消费者福利最低。但制造商仅与零售商合作时供应链利润是否高于其与回收商合作时的供应链利润依赖于旧产品回收效率和再制造所节约成本等。
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| 关 键 词： | 闭环供应链 再制造 合作策略 微分对策 开环控制策略 |
| 收稿时间： | 2019-03-18 |
Selection of Manufacturers' Cooperative Strategies in Closed-Loop Supply Chain Based on Differential Games |
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| ZHANG Min,LI Siyu,SHI Chunlai,LIAO Zhitong.Selection of Manufacturers' Cooperative Strategies in Closed-Loop Supply Chain Based on Differential Games[J].Industrial Engineering Journal,2020,23(3):19-29. |
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| Authors: | ZHANG Min LI Siyu SHI Chunlai LIAO Zhitong |
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| Affiliation: | 1. School of Management, Xihua University, Chengdu 610039, China;2. School of Economics and Management, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610031, China |
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| Abstract: | Based on the dynamic environment, the selection of manufacturers' cooperation strategies in closed-loop supply chains with third parties were studied. Four cooperation strategies were established: manufacturers only cooperate with recyclers or retailers; manufacturers cooperate with recyclers and retailers; and they do not cooperate. Differential game theories were used to solve the four models to get the optimal control strategy under different cooperation strategies. Several results were conclused. 1) When manufacturers, retailers and recyclers all cooperate, consumer welfare is the highest of the four models. 2) When manufacturers, retailers and recyclers do not cooperate, the retail price of the product is the highest among the four modes. 3) When manufacturers, retailers, and recyclers all cooperate, recycling efforts are the greatest. When manufacturers, retailers, and recyclers do not cooperate, recycling efforts are minimal, when manufacturers and retailers cooperate and when manufacturers work with recyclers, the size of the recycling effort is related to the payment price paid by the manufacturer to the recycler. 4) There is a possibility of cooperation between the manufacturer and the retailer or recycler. 5) When manufacturers, retailers, and recyclers work together, the total profits of the supply chain are the greatest, and the total profits of the supply chain are the smallest when manufacturers, retailers, and recyclers have no cooperation. The total profit of the supply chain is related to the transfer payment, the recovery cost coefficient and the unit cost of remanufacturing savings. |
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| Keywords: | closed-loop supply chain remanufacturing cooperation strategy differential games open-loop control strategy |
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