| 建设工程项目施工阶段参与主体管理行为三方演化博弈研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 马 力,于润泽,傅宏伟.建设工程项目施工阶段参与主体管理行为三方演化博弈研究[J].工程管理学报,2023,37(2):109-115. |
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| 作者姓名： | 马 力 于润泽 傅宏伟 |
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| 作者单位： | 大连理工大学 建设工程学部 |
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| 摘 要： | 施工阶段是建设工程项目全生命周期中最为关键的环节之一，腐败事件的发生将会引发项目质量下降、进度延误、费用超支等各类问题。为规范多方参与主体管理行为，构建施工单位、监理单位、建设单位三方参与主体的演化博弈模型，探究各方参与主体管理行为之间的相互影响。 结果表明，建设工程项目管理行为三方博弈系统或存在一个渐进稳定点， 增强建设单位奖励和惩罚力度及增加企业设租与寻租的合谋成本均有助于规范施工单位的生产行为。 基于此给出 3 点建议: 促进监理制度改革，推动行业转型升级；建立健全监督机制，优化项目监管成本；设置奖励惩罚机制，规范企业管理行为，从而最大程度地防范工程腐败。
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| 关 键 词： | 施工阶段 管理行为 三方演化博弈 仿真分析 |
Tripartite Evolutionary Game Study on Management Behaviors of Participantsat Construction Stage of Construction Project Considering Corruption |
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| MA Li,YU Runze,FU Hongwei.Tripartite Evolutionary Game Study on Management Behaviors of Participantsat Construction Stage of Construction Project Considering Corruption[J].Journal of Engineering Management,2023,37(2):109-115. |
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| Authors: | MA Li YU Runze FU Hongwei |
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| Affiliation: | Faculty of Infrastructure Engineering， Dalian University of Technology |
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| Abstract: | The construction stage is the most important part in the entire project life cycle, and the occurrence of corruption willlead to various problems, such as quality degradation, schedule delays and cost overruns． In order to standardize the managementbehavior of multi-participant subjects, the paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model considering supervisors, owners andcontractors. The interactions between the management behaviors of all parties involved are explored. The research results show thatthere may be an asymptotic stability point in the tripartite game system of construction project management behaviors. Enhancingboth reward and punishment and increasing the cost of collusion between enterprises in rent setting and seeking will help standardizethe production behavior of the contractors. Three suggestions are given based on the conclusion: Firstly, the reform of supervisionsystem and the transformation and upgrading of the industry needs to be promoted; Secondly, the supervision mechanism to optimizethe cost of project supervision needs to be established and improved; Thirdly, a reward and punishment mechanism to standardize themanagement behavior of enterprises is set up to prevent engineering corruption to the greatest extent. |
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| Keywords: | construction stage management behavior tripartite evolutionary game simulation analysis |
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