| 单机调度的非合作博弈建模与分析 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 王长军,席裕庚.单机调度的非合作博弈建模与分析[J].自动化学报,2005,31(4):516-522. |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 王长军 席裕庚 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 1.Institute of Automation, Shanghai Jiaotong University, Shanghai 200030 |
| |
| 基金项目： | SupportedbyNationalNaturalScienceFoundationofP.R.China(60274013,60474002)andShanghaiDevelop-mentFoundforScienceandTechnology(04DZ11008) |
| |
| 摘 要： | footnotesize Considering the independent optimization requirement for each demander of modern manufacture, we explore the application of noncooperative game in production scheduling research, and model scheduling problem as competition of machine resources among a group of selfish jobs. Each job has its own performance objective. For the single machine, multi-jobs and non-preemptive scheduling problem, a noncooperative game model is established. Based on the model, many problems about Nash equilibrium solution, such as the existence, quantity, properties of solution space, performance of solution and algorithm are discussed. The results are tested by numerical example.
|
| 关 键 词： | Single machine scheduling game theory Nash equilibrium job/qk/90250X/200504/16142018.html2003-6-28http://www.aas.net.cn:80/article/id/13317http://www.aas.net.cn/cn/article/id/13317WANG Chang-Jun XI Yu-Genghttp://www.aas.net.cn/CN/abstract/abstract13317.shtml'$s performance objective |
| 收稿时间： | 2003-6-28 |
| 修稿时间： | 2003年7月28日 |
Modeling and Analysis of Single Machine Scheduling Based on Noncooperative Game Theory |
| |
| WANG Chang-Jun,XI Yu-Geng.Modeling and Analysis of Single Machine Scheduling Based on Noncooperative Game Theory[J].Acta Automatica Sinica,2005,31(4):516-522. |
| |
| Authors: | WANG Chang-Jun XI Yu-Geng |
| |
| Affiliation: | 1.Institute of Automation, Shanghai Jiaotong University, Shanghai 200030 |
| |
| Abstract: | Considering the independent optimization requirement for each demander of modernmanufacture, we explore the application of noncooperative game in production scheduling research,and model scheduling problem as competition of machine resources among a group of selfish jobs.Each job has its own performance objective. For the single machine, multi-jobs and non-preemptivescheduling problem, a noncooperative game model is established. Based on the model, many prob-lems about Nash equilibrium solution, such as the existence, quantity, properties of solution space,performance of solution and algorithm are discussed. The results are tested by numerical example. |
| |
| Keywords: | Single machine scheduling game theory Nash equilibrium job s performance objective |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
| 点击此处可从《自动化学报》浏览原始摘要信息 |
|
点击此处可从《自动化学报》下载全文 |
