| 网购供应链质量控制的策略研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 范定祥,李重莲.网购供应链质量控制的策略研究[J].工业工程,2020,23(1):104-111. |
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| 作者姓名： | 范定祥 李重莲 |
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| 作者单位： | 湖南工业大学 1. 经贸学院;2. 商学院, 湖南 株洲 412007 |
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| 基金项目： | 教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金资助项目(18TJA630001) |
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| 摘 要： | 针对网购供应链中频繁出现的假冒伪劣等产品质量问题，考虑了由电商平台、平台销售企业和消费者3个理性群体组成的网购供应链，通过构建三方博弈的混合纳什均衡模型，求出了该混合策略纳什均衡解。在此基础上，进一步分析了网购供应链中各因素对相关主体行为概率的影响，得到了各主体的期望收益。运用Matlab R2017a软件对模型影响因素进行了数值仿真分析。研究结果表明，网购供应链质量博弈中存在着混合策略纳什均衡，且各主体的行为概率与惩罚、伪造、检验成本、收益、平台注册费用、后悔值、庆幸值等因素相关。为使各主体的期望收益同时趋于理想状态，电商企业应增加惩罚值和平台注册费用到区间中值，而消费者须增大后悔值、庆幸值到区间最大值。
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| 关 键 词： | 网购供应链 质量控制 三方博弈 混合策略纳什均衡 |
| 收稿时间： | 2019-03-06 |
A Research on Quality Control Strategy of Online Shopping Products from the Perspective of Supply Chain |
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| FAN Dingxiang,LI Chonglian.A Research on Quality Control Strategy of Online Shopping Products from the Perspective of Supply Chain[J].Industrial Engineering Journal,2020,23(1):104-111. |
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| Authors: | FAN Dingxiang LI Chonglian |
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| Affiliation: | 1. School of Economics and Business, Hunan University of Technology, Zhuzhou 412007, China;2. Business School, Hunan University of Technology, Zhuzhou 412007, China |
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| Abstract: | Aiming at the quality problems of counterfeit and shoddy products in the online shopping supply chain, the online shopping supply chain consisting of three rational groups of e-commerce platform, platform sales enterprise and the consumer is considered. By constructing a mixed Nash equilibrium model of three-party game, the hybrid strategy Nash equilibrium solution is found. Furthermore, the influence of various factors on the behavior probability of related subjects in the online shopping supply chain is analyzed, and the expected returns of each subject are obtained. Finally, a numerical simulation analysis of the influencing factors of the model is carried out by using Matlab2017a software. The research results show that there is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in the online shopping supply chain quality game, and the behavioral probability of each subject is related to the factors such as punishment, forgery, inspection cost, income, platform registration fee, regret value, and happiness value. The penalty value and the platform registration fee of the e-commerce enterprise should be increased to the median interval. At the same time, the consumer should increase the regret value and the lucky value to the maximum value of the interval, so that the expected returns of each subject can reach the ideal state at the same time. |
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| Keywords: | online shopping supply chain quality control three-party game mixed strategy Nash equilibrium |
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