Radioactive and nuclear material transport security: awareness and application of new recommendations

Abstract

Transport of radioactive and nuclear material is highly regulated and transport safety regulations have been in effect for decades. International nuclear material transport security has been governed for many years on the basis of a binding international convention, the 'Convention for the physical protection of nuclear material', and its supporting document 'The physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities' INFCIRC/225, revision 4 (corrected). On the other hand, transport security guidance for the radioactive material was published in 2008 by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as an implementing guide, 'Security in the transport of radioactive material', nuclear security series no. 9, and is just now being implemented in many countries. Experience in implementing the radioactive material transport security guidance is being gained by countries as they make decisions on which specific security provisions to require, provide training to their regulatory staff and licensees, and begin reviewing and approving transport security plans. This experience has led to the development of practical approaches that minimise impacts as the guidance is put into practice. The nuclear material transport security recommendations in INFCIRC/225 are in the process of being revised to update them to address the current threat environment and to incorporate recommendations based on the recent amendments made to the Convention. INFCIRC/225, revision 5 will be a recommendation level document in the IAEA nuclear security series of documents. The interface between the nuclear and radioactive material transport security documents is important in order to ensure that appropriate security measures, based on both the nuclear and radioactive properties of the material being transported, are defined and implemented. This paper provides up to date information on the development of the IAEA transport security documents and presents information on implementation of the radioactive material transport security recommendations. It explains how the documents interface with each other and provides examples of how they should both be used in defining transport security requirements for shipments.     

Chapter 6: Radiation Protection Regulations

Abstract

The basis for the radiation protection regulations that apply to the transport of radioactive materials are the Atomic Energy Act related provisions in the Radiation Protection Ordinance (StrlSchV) and the provisions of the Directives on the Transport of Hazardous Goods. The applicability of the Radiation Protection Ordinance is, however, limited as the provisions of §§ 29 to 80 do not apply to the transport of radioactive materials according to current legislation, with the exception of the principles of radiation protection contained in § 28 (e.g. minimisation principle).     

Guidance for Package Approvals in the United Kingdom

Abstract

Approval is required under the transport regulations for a wide range of package designs and operations, and applications for competent authority approval and validation are received from many sources, both in the UK and overseas. To assist package designers and applicants for approval, and to promote consistency in applications and their assessment, the UK Department for Transport issues guidance on the interpretation of the transport regulations and the requirements of an application for approval and its supporting safety case.The general guidance document, known as the Guide to an Application for UK Competent Authority Approval of Radioactive Material in Transport, has been issued for many years and updated to encompass the provisions of each successive edition of the IAEA transport regulations. The guide has been referred to in a number of international fora, including PATRAM, and was cited as a 'good practice' in the report of the IAEA TRANSAS appraisal of the UK in 2002. Specialist guides include the Guide to the Suitability of Elastomeric Seal Materials, and the Guide to the Approval of Freight Containers as Types IP-2 and IP-3 Packages. This paper discusses the guidance material and summarises the administrative and technical information required in support of applications for approval of package designs, special form and low-dispersible radioactive materials, shipments, special arrangements, modifications and validations.     

IAEA Transport Regulations—what has Changed in 40 years

Abstract

The IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials were first published in 1961. It was stated in the foreword of the first edition that the transport of increasing amounts of radioactive materials posed technical problems because of the hazards involved and it also stated that the procedures to be complied with should not be too complex and should apply to any mode of transport. The requirements for the packaging of radioactive materials for transport were expressed in terms of provisions and were described in general qualitative terms. Satisfying these requirements would provide safety for the transport of radioactive materials. Since 1961 the regulations have been revised on a number of occasions in order to add clarity and provide detail to the various requirements. These revisions have added a greater complexity to the provisions but the underlying principles used to provide for safe transport are still the fundamental bases for the regulations. This paper looks at some key requirements, as they first appeared, and their subsequent development.     

Plutonium Transport: Past,Present and Future

Abstract

The transport of radioactive materials dates back to the beginning of the nuclear industry. The development of nuclear plants and the international trade in fuel cycle services has led to a transport infrastructure to service the industry. Advances in radioactive material package design and technology have been led by increasing emphasis on safety assurance and compliance with transport regulations which in many cases exceed those applied to other dangerous goods. In the case of certain materials security during transport has equal emphasis with safety, and plutoniwn. in its many forms, attracts the most onerous security requirements during transport. BNFL has safely and efficiently transported plutonium both nationally and internationally for 30 years. The Company is committed to the continuation of maintaining such transports in a safe, secure and cost effective manner.     

The Transport System Approval Concept

Abstract

The needs for, and merits of, a new concept for the safety assessment and approval of shipments of radioactive materials is introduced and discussed. The purpose of the new concept is to enable and encourage integration of analysis and review of transport safety with similar safety analysis and review of the handling operations involving the radioactive material at the despatching and receiving ends of a shipment. Safety contributing elements or functions of the means of transport (the Transport System) can thus readily be taken into account in the assessment. The objective is to avoid constraints — experienced or potential — introduced by the package functional provisions contained in the transport regulations, whilst maintaining safety during transport, as well as during facility handling operations, at least at the level currently established.     

Revised guidelines for the procedure for approval of package designs in Germany

Abstract

The IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material TS-R-1 are applied in Germany through the implementation of the Dangerous Goods Transport Regulations for Class 7 of the International Modal Organisations (ADR, RID, IMDG-Code, ICAO-TI). Based on this the procedures for the approval of package designs used in Germany are in compliance with the provisions of TS-R-1. BfS is the competent authority for the approval of Type B(U), Type B(M) and Type C packages and all packages containing fissile material, and BAM is the competent authority for approval of H(U)/H(M) packages for UF6, special form and low-dispersible radioactive material. The basis for the procedure for approval of package design in Germany are the R 003 guidelines, first issued by the Ministry of Transport, Building and Housing (BMVBW) in 1991. These guidelines have been reviewed and revised to reflect the latest developments in the regulations as well as in regulatory practice. In particular they have been extended to the procedures for approval of Type C packages and packages subject to transitional arrangements, special form and low-dispersible radioactive material, and provide more detailed information to the applicant about the requested documentation. This paper gives an overview of the main parts and provisions of the revised R 003 guidelines issued in December 2004 including scope, responsibilities, application, documentation, evaluation and certification for the various approval procedures.     

Regulations Relevant to the Transport of Radioactive Materials in Switzerland

Abstract

As is the case in many countries, the transport of radioactive materials in Switzerland is primarily regulated by the national regulations for the transport of dangerous goods. Currently these regulations, in the case of radioactive material, incorporate the 1985 IAEA Safety Series 6 Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (As amended 1990). However, as is also the case in some other countries, consignors, shippers and carriers of radioactive materials must also comply with additional laws when shipping radioactive materials. The most important of these other laws and their accompanying regulations are those concerned with radiation protection (import, export and carriers licences) and nuclear power (import, export, inland transport and transit licences). This paper sets out to describe the collective requirements resulting from all three of these sets of regulations.     

Transport of radioactive materials: the need for radiation protection programmes

Abstract

The increase in the use of radioactive materials worldwide requires that these materials be moved from production sites to the end user, or in the case of radioactive waste, from the waste generator to the repository. Tens of millions of packages containing radioactive material are consigned for transport each year throughout the world. The amount of radioactive material in these packages varies from negligible quantities in shipments of consumer products to very large quantities in shipments of irradiated nuclear fuel. Transport is the main way in which the radioactive materials being moved get into the public domain. The public is generally unaware of the lurking danger when transporting these hazardous goods. Thus radiation protection programmes are important to assure the public of the certainty of their safety during conveyance of these materials. Radioactive material is transported by land (road and rail), inland waterways, sea/ocean and air. These modes of transport are regulated by international 'modal' regulations. The international community has formulated controls to reduce the number of accidents and mitigate their consequences should they happen. When accidents involving the transport of radioactive material occur, it could result in injury, loss of life and pollution of the environment. In order to ensure the safety of people, property and the environment, national and international transport regulations have been developed. The appropriate authorities in each state utilise them to control the transport of radioactive material. Stringent measures are required in these regulations to ensure adequate containment, shielding and the prevention of criticality in all spheres of transport, i.e.routine, minor incidents and accident conditions. Despite the extensive application of these stringent safety controls, transport accidents involving packages containing radioactive material have occurred and will continue to occur. When a transport accident occurs, it is unlikely to result in a significant release of radioactive material, loss of shielding or loss of criticality control.     

Radioactive material transport risk management initiative: AREVA’s extensive approach to operations safety

Abstract

Since 2006, when AREVA mandated its Logistics Business Unit to handle ‘Transport Risk Management’, the Unit has executed or has, at least, ensured the proper management of shipments of radioactive material, which involve particular risks. This mission is fully complementary to the strict implementation of national and international regulations regarding the safety of radioactive material transport. Taking these regulations as a starting point, the AREVA Transport Risk Management Initiative develops general principles of risk management appropriate to operations that are sensitive by nature. By applying the Transport Risk Management Initiative to the shipment of radioactive materials, AREVA has widened the precautionary principle beyond the field of safety and radioprotection: accomplishing safe transport necessarily implies the identification and management of all risks inherent in these operations (safety, physical protection, media pressure, geopolitics, etc.). The guiding principles currently in use by AREVA and the organisation and resources that have enabled the concretisation of this ambition at the operational level are outlined: shipments executed each year by the AREVA Logistics Business Unit, as well as shipments subcontracted by the AREVA group to external shipping companies, fall within the scope of this initiative, and one of the stakes is to manage suppliers, often in an international environment.     

Radioactive Transportation,Clarity and Consensus: IBC Conference, 5–6 October 2006, London,UK

Abstract

It is believed that there will be shipments of radioactive material and waste, as the nuclear industry moves into maturity, which may not be well accommodated within the current transport regulations. Although these shipments could be made under Special Arrangement approvals, the regulatory system would be better served if more formal requirements and criteria were included in the regulations and the shipments were considered in accordance with the regulations. A Special Arrangement approval is now defined as authorising transport of a shipment which does not satisfy all the applicable requirements of the regulations. This paper proposes the Transport System approach to regulating these types of shipments, where operational restrictions or other packaging provisions could compensate for the absence or inadequacy of packaging or other associated requirements. These shipments would require Competent Authority approval, and acceptance criteria would be included in terms of limits on probability, consequences and risk. The process would be limited to those types of shipments where the package system does not work well. The advantages of including Transport System approval within the regulations include reduction in the time required to obtain an approval, greater efficiency of decontamination and decommissioning operations, and assurance of an equivalent level of safety.     

Transport of low-level NORM – a case for consistency and practicality

Abstract

In 1996 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) adopted a system for exemption of lowlevel radioactive material from transport regulations based on the principle that exemption values should be commensurate with the risk posed by the material as represented by the maximum potential radiation dose to individuals. For many naturally occurring radionuclides the derived dose-based, radionuclide-specific exemption concentrations were substantially lower than the previous radionuclide-independent definition of radioactive material (70 Bq g^–1) [1900 pCi g^–1] due to the stringent dose criterion applied. It was recognised that this would bring large quantities of previously unregulated naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) handled in industry into the scope of the transport regulations. To minimise the economic impact of the dose-based values, a special provision was included to provide for a 10-fold increase in exemption values for radionuclides in natural material provided the material is not intended to be, and has not previously been, processed for recovery of its radionuclides (the wording regarding previous use was added in 2003). This '10 times' or '10×' provision for certain natural material reflects a second concept underlying IAEA guidance, namely, that a dose criterion may be relaxed within cautious bounds to achieve a balance between practical issues and radiological concerns. On the other hand, restriction of the provision on the basis of past or intended use of the material is inconsistent with the basic principle underlying the Transport Regulations in that there is no risk basis for assigning different exemption values to identical materials on the basis of their past or anticipated use. In fact, the same material can move in and out of the scope of regulatory control as its anticipated use changes. As a practical matter, safety guidelines for potentially hazardous material should be based on measurable properties of the material and not the whims of human intentions. To improve the practicality as well as the consistency of the Transport Regulations as applied to NORM, the 10× provision should be revised to apply to all natural materials, regardless of their intended use.     

New Basic Safety Regulations for Radioactive Material Transport in Russia

Abstract

In this paper the system of standards regulating the transport of radioactive material in Russia, the basic principles and provisions of the new Russian regulations and some deviations from IAEA rules and regulations are briefly considered. The problems connected with putting into force the new transport regulations, including problems with the use of packages designed and manufactured prior to these regulations, are also considered.     

Dangerous Goods Regulations in Europe: Inland Navigation and Other Modes of Transport

Abstract

For thousands of years trade has moved goods allover Europe, and once gunpowder had been invented, this trade included dangerous goods. As early as 1831 regulations were introduced for the Rhine river - the world's busiest inland waterway today - to cover the transport of those goods. Another mode of transport was added in 1890 when the foundation for the International Regulations concerning the Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Rail was laid with the Convention for the Carriage of Goods by Rail at Berne, Switzerland. Today these regulations are known as the RID. Air transport, road transport and carriage by sea, each followed during the 1950s. These international regulatory regimes have been supplemented by national regulations; in Germany alone, for example, these amount to some 4000+ pages. Because dangerous goods regulations have been developed separately for each mode of transport, there now exist several different regulatory regimes. For Europe, these uncoordinated regulations pose a serious problem. Carriage of radioactive materials had not reached significant volumes until approximately 1950 and in 1961 the International Atomic Energy Agency published their Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material for the first time. This meant that, at least as far as radioactive materials were concerned, a single umbrella covering all modes of transport was available. It is due to these IAEA regulations that a unified set of rules governs radioactive materials transport allover Europe, and indeed the whole world. Accordingly hardly any problems exist. The IAEA regulations and the United Nations Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods are discussed as well as the international conventions based upon them (International Civil Aviation Organisation - Technical Instructions, International Air Transport Association - Dangerous Goods Regulations, International Maritime Dangerous Goods - Code, RID, ADR, ADN and ADNR). Special emphasis is placed on the rules for inland navigation in Europe, since these are bound to gain importance after two of Europe's large inland waterways, the Rhine and Donau rivers, were connected by canal on September 25, 1992.     

Development of international guidelines for shipment security of radioactive materials

Abstract

In October 2003 a weeklong IAEA Technical Meeting developed a set of guidelines for providing security to consignments of radioactive materials in transport. These guidelines will be published in an IAEA TECDOC Security in the Transport of Radioactive Material. The guidelines produced reflect consideration of many influences and concerns that currently revolve around the potential for terrorist use of radioactive material for malevolent ends. The influences discussed here include: public perception of hazard and concern that new requirements will further limit global shipping capability, international efforts to control sealed sources, national efforts to increment protection on selected materials, the basis for exemption of materials, concern for cost impacts of overly broad requirements, questions on how to adjust requirements for a national threat assessment and issues relating to consistency within the international community on security needs.     

The Eyes,Ears and Collective Voice for Nuclear Transport

Abstract

Transport is a vital part of the nuclear industry and the safety record of radioactive materials transport across the world is excellent. This record is due primarily to well-founded regulations developed by such intergovernmental organisations as the International Atomic Energy Agency and the International Maritime Organization. It is due, also, to the professionalism of those in the industry. Attitudes to nuclear transport are important. They have the potential, if not heeded or responded to sensitively and convincingly, to make life very much more difficult for those committed to the safe, reliable and efficient transport of nuclear materials. What is required is a balanced situation, which takes account both of the public's attitudes and industry's need for an efficient operation. The voices of the nuclear transport industry and those who value the industry need to be heard. The World Nuclear Transport Institute was established to provide the nuclear transport industry with the collective eyes, ears and voice in the key intergovernmental oganisations which are so important to it. The nuclear transport industry has a safety record which could be regarded as a model for the transport of dangerous goods of all types. The industry is situated within a comprehensive and strict regime of national and international standards and regulations. That is the message to be disseminated, and is the commitment of the World Nuclear Transport Institute as it works to protect and to promote the safe, efficient and reliable transport of radioactive materials.     

Feedback from IAEA TranSAS appraisal mission in France

Abstract

In 2002, France requested the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to organise a mission to assess its organisation for the control of transport of radioactive materials and its implementation of international regulations. The Transport Safety Appraisal Service (TranSAS) mission was conducted in 2004 by a team composed of thirteen independent experts. The scope of the appraisal was broad and covered all aspects of the implementation of regulations for the safe transport of radioactive materials. The main conclusion is that the implementation of the Transport Regulations is performed in accordance with IAEA requirements. Nevertheless, this mission issued three recommendations and sixteen suggestions. It led France to strengthen its control of non-competent authority approved. Moreover, the findings include twelve good practices that can serve as a model for other competent authorities, in particular in the area of maritime transport. The present paper presents the French Nuclear Safety Authority's feedback from this mission, in order to reach a high safety level in the field of transports.     

International Working Group for Sabotage Concerns of Transport and Storage Casks

Abstract

The International Working Group for Sabotage Concerns of Transport and Storage Casks (IWGSTSC), gathers multiple organisations from different countries (for US party Department of Energy, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and Sandia National Laboratories; for German party Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit and Fraunhofer Institut; for the French party Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire). The goal of the IWGSTSC is to continue cooperation to improve the analytic capabilities, through information sharing and collaborative research and development plus modelling, to understand the potential adverse public health effects and environmental impacts of radiological sabotage directed at or associated with the transport and storage of civilian nuclear material or other civilian radioactive materials. The Parties may also undertake collaborative research and development in other areas of the physical protection of civilian nuclear materials or other radioactive materials. Since 2000, the IWGSTSC has conducted an extensive test programme for the assessment of the aerosol source term produced in the case of spent fuel transport sabotage by a high energy density device, after having examined several scenarios. The major goal of this programme is to produce an accurate estimate of the so called spent fuel ratio in the domain of respirable, aerosol particles produced. All the reports prepared by Sandia National Laboratories have precisely emphasised the important efforts they have made from the beginning and the amount of work already accomplished. In parallel, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), assisted by technical experts from different countries, has provided a draft document promised to become guidance for the security of radioactive or nuclear materials during transport. The IAEA document contains general guidance addressed to anyone who intends to implement or improve the security of material transports, but the text is, as of today, limited to rather general recommendations. Based on all the knowledge accumulated from past experiments and also based on the work carried out in Vienna at the IAEA, the IWGSTSC members have decided to work on the development of a method for the evaluation of the vulnerability and the source term. So for doing that, joint projects for the research, development, testing and evaluation of the consequences of the malevolent actions during transport are being pursued and are described in this paper.     

The Foratom Transport Working Group

Abstract

Based in Brussels, the European atomic forum FORATOM is the trade association of the European nuclear industry which was established in the early 1960s to promote nuclear power and to facilitate relations with the European institutions. One of the main mechanisms which FORATOM uses, in its dealings with the European Commission and other international organisations, is the involvement of several working groups bringing together groups of experts drawn from the industrial companies in order to identify the issues and to develop the widest possible common views on which the industry must express its representative, substantial and deliverable opinion. The Transport Working Group (TWG) has the objective of dealing with transport of radioactive material, especially nuclear materials. The TWG usually meets three times a year in Brussels or another selected location. It has strong links with the European Commission which are evidenced by the fact that it officially represents the European nuclear industry, with the status of observer, at the meetings of the Standing Working Group on Safe Transport of Radioactive Material which was set up in 1982, upon a request of the European Parliament, to advise the European Commission in the field of safe transport of radioactive materials. The Standing Working Group (SWG) assists the European Union's Member States in the revision process of IAEA recommendations and helps a correct and harmonious application of these recommendations within the European Union. In previous years, the Standing Working Group has proposed over 40 different studies, fmanced by the European Commission, on important transport issues. The FORATOM TWG encourages its member organisations to participate in studies proposed by the Commission and has been cooperating for many years with the Commission in the field of many studies aimed to improve the application of transport regulations. The need to maintain the safe and reliable operation of plants that generate 35% of the electricity in western Europe is taking on growing importance at a time when it is becoming clear that nuclear power has definite advantages in terms of economics, security of supply and environment protection. The prospect of new countries joining the European Union in the foreseeable future is also enhancing these concerns. Transport is an essential link in the nuclear industry and safe transport of radioactive material is a major issue because any disruption of transport has serious consequences for the management of the power generation. The challenges are double, on the one hand to maintain the economic and safe operation of nuclear transport, on the other to ensure that the community and its leaders fully appreciate the contribution of the industry in this field. Both are part of the tasks of the FORATOM Transport Working Group.     

EDF Waste Packages Transport and Compliance with Regulations: Prediction of Retention of Radionuclides by Cementitious Materials

Abstract

Different concrete waste packages have been designed by Electricite de France (EDF) for the long-term storage of radioactive Low Level Waste (LLW). Their main function is to confine radionuclides from the biosphere for three hundred years in a near-surface disposal. According to the transport regulation, a Type B package is needed for some waste like water filters. The water filters from EDF nuclear power plants are encapsulated in mortar and placed in a concrete container. Transport regulations for these containers have required the development of a methodology for safety assessment. The reference scenario of container degradation during transport considers a 9 m drop and a 800°C fire for 30 min. First, the different chemical and physical processes involved in the containment of radionuclides are analysed. In particular, the radionuclide transport mechanisms in cement-based materials have been reviewed. Secondly, the effects of a container drop on the mortar and concrete retention are discussed. Thirdly, in order to prove compliance with the regulations, a simplified model is proposed to predict the radionuclides release with time. It is concluded that cement-based materials offer high performance as a mechanical and chemical barrier to radionuclide releases for Type B packages.