Security in transport of radioactive material

Abstract

The basis of safety regulation and practice in the handling (including transport) of radioactive materials has been the premise that any mishaps or accidents occur unintentionally, with a desire among all parties involved to avoid such incidents and to minimise their effects. The strategic importance of nuclear materials for military purposes has made these materials a potential target for unauthorised acquisition, however, and international conventions have been in place for many years to ensure the security of nuclear materials from theft and from interception during transport. Until recently, only nuclear materials were subject to such security measures, but concern over the consequences of incidents involving radioactive sources has led to a review of security measures for non-nuclear radioactive materials. The IAEA has encouraged governments to institute effective systems of control to ensure the security of radioactive materials and has published its 'Code of conduct on the safety and security of radioactive sources' and other guidance material. Three principal stages are recommended for the maintenance of security. The first and most important is the prevention of malevolent acts through the fostering of a security culture, the effective management of material within a regulated legal framework, the appropriate design of sources and the use of secure vehicles and physical means to deter unauthorised access. The second line of defence is the detection of any breach of security, by means of radiation monitoring, accounting checks and reports of unusual occurrences. The third stage, response, includes means to ensure that the effect of a breach of security on public safety is minimised, and to take steps to recover any material that has fallen outside secure control. Specific provisions for security have been added to the UN Model Regulations for the Transport of Dangerous Goods (the Orange Book) and these have been incorporated in the international modal regulations and enacted in the domestic legislation of individual states. The regulations include general provisions applicable to all dangerous goods including radioactive materials and additional provisions for 'high consequence dangerous goods', which include radioactive materials in quantities above 3000 A ₁ (special form radioactive material) or 3000 A ₂, in Type B(U), Type B(M) or Type C packages. Training in security, including the nature of risks and methods to address them is also required. The Department for Transport in the United Kingdom has produced guidance material in support of the regulatory security requirements for transport by rail and road. The rail transport guidance follows the structure of the regulations and the road transport guidance is grouped into three main aspects of security, namely people, procedures and assets. Therefore, the importance of ensuring a reliable and trustworthy workforce and the use of known and trusted contractors is stressed, together with assurance of adequate and verifiable standards of education and training. Procedural matters include the establishment of standards of responsibility, the supervision of contractors, the maintenance of contacts and risk assessment. The control of assets includes surveillance and access control of premises, and the secure storage of vehicles, which should be fitted with appropriate alarms and immobilisers. The guidance material is available from the Department for Transport and may be viewed on its website www.dft.gov.uk/security/dangerousgoods.     

Radioactive and nuclear material transport security: awareness and application of new recommendations

Abstract

Transport of radioactive and nuclear material is highly regulated and transport safety regulations have been in effect for decades. International nuclear material transport security has been governed for many years on the basis of a binding international convention, the 'Convention for the physical protection of nuclear material', and its supporting document 'The physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities' INFCIRC/225, revision 4 (corrected). On the other hand, transport security guidance for the radioactive material was published in 2008 by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as an implementing guide, 'Security in the transport of radioactive material', nuclear security series no. 9, and is just now being implemented in many countries. Experience in implementing the radioactive material transport security guidance is being gained by countries as they make decisions on which specific security provisions to require, provide training to their regulatory staff and licensees, and begin reviewing and approving transport security plans. This experience has led to the development of practical approaches that minimise impacts as the guidance is put into practice. The nuclear material transport security recommendations in INFCIRC/225 are in the process of being revised to update them to address the current threat environment and to incorporate recommendations based on the recent amendments made to the Convention. INFCIRC/225, revision 5 will be a recommendation level document in the IAEA nuclear security series of documents. The interface between the nuclear and radioactive material transport security documents is important in order to ensure that appropriate security measures, based on both the nuclear and radioactive properties of the material being transported, are defined and implemented. This paper provides up to date information on the development of the IAEA transport security documents and presents information on implementation of the radioactive material transport security recommendations. It explains how the documents interface with each other and provides examples of how they should both be used in defining transport security requirements for shipments.     

The Eyes,Ears and Collective Voice for Nuclear Transport

Abstract

Transport is a vital part of the nuclear industry and the safety record of radioactive materials transport across the world is excellent. This record is due primarily to well-founded regulations developed by such intergovernmental organisations as the International Atomic Energy Agency and the International Maritime Organization. It is due, also, to the professionalism of those in the industry. Attitudes to nuclear transport are important. They have the potential, if not heeded or responded to sensitively and convincingly, to make life very much more difficult for those committed to the safe, reliable and efficient transport of nuclear materials. What is required is a balanced situation, which takes account both of the public's attitudes and industry's need for an efficient operation. The voices of the nuclear transport industry and those who value the industry need to be heard. The World Nuclear Transport Institute was established to provide the nuclear transport industry with the collective eyes, ears and voice in the key intergovernmental oganisations which are so important to it. The nuclear transport industry has a safety record which could be regarded as a model for the transport of dangerous goods of all types. The industry is situated within a comprehensive and strict regime of national and international standards and regulations. That is the message to be disseminated, and is the commitment of the World Nuclear Transport Institute as it works to protect and to promote the safe, efficient and reliable transport of radioactive materials.     

The French Nuclear Safety Authority's Experience with Radioactive Transport Inspection

Abstract

About 300,000 radioactive material packages are transported annually in France. Most consist of radioisotopes for medical, pharmaceutical or industrial use, but the nuclear industry deals with the transport of fuel cycle materials (uranium, fuel assemblies, etc.) andwaste from power plants, reprocessing plants and research centres. France is also a transit country for shipments such as spent fuel packages from Switzerland or Germany, which are bound for Sellafield in the United Kingdom. The French nuclear safety authority(DGSNR, Directorate General for Nuclear Safety and Radioprotection) has since 1997 been responsible for the safety of radioactive material transport. This paper presents DGNSR's experience with transport inspection: a feedback of key points based on 300 inspections achieved during the past 5 years is given.     

The Foratom Transport Working Group

Abstract

Based in Brussels, the European atomic forum FORATOM is the trade association of the European nuclear industry which was established in the early 1960s to promote nuclear power and to facilitate relations with the European institutions. One of the main mechanisms which FORATOM uses, in its dealings with the European Commission and other international organisations, is the involvement of several working groups bringing together groups of experts drawn from the industrial companies in order to identify the issues and to develop the widest possible common views on which the industry must express its representative, substantial and deliverable opinion. The Transport Working Group (TWG) has the objective of dealing with transport of radioactive material, especially nuclear materials. The TWG usually meets three times a year in Brussels or another selected location. It has strong links with the European Commission which are evidenced by the fact that it officially represents the European nuclear industry, with the status of observer, at the meetings of the Standing Working Group on Safe Transport of Radioactive Material which was set up in 1982, upon a request of the European Parliament, to advise the European Commission in the field of safe transport of radioactive materials. The Standing Working Group (SWG) assists the European Union's Member States in the revision process of IAEA recommendations and helps a correct and harmonious application of these recommendations within the European Union. In previous years, the Standing Working Group has proposed over 40 different studies, fmanced by the European Commission, on important transport issues. The FORATOM TWG encourages its member organisations to participate in studies proposed by the Commission and has been cooperating for many years with the Commission in the field of many studies aimed to improve the application of transport regulations. The need to maintain the safe and reliable operation of plants that generate 35% of the electricity in western Europe is taking on growing importance at a time when it is becoming clear that nuclear power has definite advantages in terms of economics, security of supply and environment protection. The prospect of new countries joining the European Union in the foreseeable future is also enhancing these concerns. Transport is an essential link in the nuclear industry and safe transport of radioactive material is a major issue because any disruption of transport has serious consequences for the management of the power generation. The challenges are double, on the one hand to maintain the economic and safe operation of nuclear transport, on the other to ensure that the community and its leaders fully appreciate the contribution of the industry in this field. Both are part of the tasks of the FORATOM Transport Working Group.     

Transport of MOX fuel: continuous challenge

Abstract

For 45 years TN International has been involved in the radioactive materials transportation field. Since the beginning the spent nuclear fuel transportation has been its core business. During all these years TN International, now part of AREVA, has been able to anticipate and fulfil the needs for new transport or storage casks design to fit the nuclear industry evolutions. A whole fleet of casks able to transport all the materials of the nuclear fuel cycle has been developed. This paper focuses on the casks used to transport the fresh and used mix oxide (MOX) fuel. To transport the fresh MOX boiling water reactor and pressurised water reactors fuel, TN International has developed two designs of casks: the MX 6 and the MX 8. These casks are and have been used to transport MOX fuel for French, German, Swiss and in a near future Japanese nuclear power plants. A complete set of baskets have been developed to optimise the loading in terms of integrated dose and also of course capacity. Mixed oxide used fuel has now its dedicated cask: the TN 112 which certificate of approval has been obtained in July 2008. This cask is able to transport 12 MOX spent fuel elements with a short cooling time. The first loading of the cask has been performed in September 2008 in the Electricité de France nuclear power plant of Saint-Laurent-des-Eaux. By its continuous involvement in the nuclear transportation field, TN International has been able to face the many challenges linked to the radioactive materials transportation especially talking of MOX fuel. TN International will also have to face the increasing demand linked to the nuclear renaissance.     

Thirty-Five Years Experience of Transport Accidents and Incidents Involving Radioactive Materials

Abstract

A database has been established containing 451 events up to the end of 1992 involving radioactive materials during transport in the UK. These events have been categorised and infonnation obtained pertinent to future legislation and relevant to lessons learnt. The record is very good for the nuclear industry but there are improvements that can be made particularly in the areas of quality assurance and of training and information.     

Regulations Relevant to the Transport of Radioactive Materials in Switzerland

Abstract

As is the case in many countries, the transport of radioactive materials in Switzerland is primarily regulated by the national regulations for the transport of dangerous goods. Currently these regulations, in the case of radioactive material, incorporate the 1985 IAEA Safety Series 6 Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (As amended 1990). However, as is also the case in some other countries, consignors, shippers and carriers of radioactive materials must also comply with additional laws when shipping radioactive materials. The most important of these other laws and their accompanying regulations are those concerned with radiation protection (import, export and carriers licences) and nuclear power (import, export, inland transport and transit licences). This paper sets out to describe the collective requirements resulting from all three of these sets of regulations.     

Training of Personnel in the Field of Radioactive Materials Transport

Abstract

Training of personnel in the whole nuclear fuel cycle and also in the other fields of the use of radioactivity is one of the essentials with respect to compliance assurance. The transport of radioactive material is the only activity that takes place outside a facility: on roads, on railways, on the sea or in the air. A high level of safety is therefore an absolute requirement for all transport operations. To ensure this high level the training of the personnel involved in these activities plays an important role. Many studies show that most of the incidents in radioactive materials transport are caused by man-made errors; even so there have been no events with serious radiological consequences anywhere worldwide. There are many requirements in the various national and international regulations for the safe transport of radioactive material with regard to training. An overview is given of the special regulations, e.g. for road transport drivers, for safety advisers in the whole field of the transport of dangerous goods, for specially educated personnel in sea and air transport. In addition, the newest developments in the European Community in this field are discussed. An evaluation of the present regulations and proposals for further rules are also given.     

Transport of radioactive materials: the need for radiation protection programmes

Abstract

The increase in the use of radioactive materials worldwide requires that these materials be moved from production sites to the end user, or in the case of radioactive waste, from the waste generator to the repository. Tens of millions of packages containing radioactive material are consigned for transport each year throughout the world. The amount of radioactive material in these packages varies from negligible quantities in shipments of consumer products to very large quantities in shipments of irradiated nuclear fuel. Transport is the main way in which the radioactive materials being moved get into the public domain. The public is generally unaware of the lurking danger when transporting these hazardous goods. Thus radiation protection programmes are important to assure the public of the certainty of their safety during conveyance of these materials. Radioactive material is transported by land (road and rail), inland waterways, sea/ocean and air. These modes of transport are regulated by international 'modal' regulations. The international community has formulated controls to reduce the number of accidents and mitigate their consequences should they happen. When accidents involving the transport of radioactive material occur, it could result in injury, loss of life and pollution of the environment. In order to ensure the safety of people, property and the environment, national and international transport regulations have been developed. The appropriate authorities in each state utilise them to control the transport of radioactive material. Stringent measures are required in these regulations to ensure adequate containment, shielding and the prevention of criticality in all spheres of transport, i.e.routine, minor incidents and accident conditions. Despite the extensive application of these stringent safety controls, transport accidents involving packages containing radioactive material have occurred and will continue to occur. When a transport accident occurs, it is unlikely to result in a significant release of radioactive material, loss of shielding or loss of criticality control.     

Movements of radioactive material on nuclear licensed sites

Abstract

The regulations governing the transport of radioactive materials are prepared by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and then introduced into modal regulations and national legislation. These regulations are based on a graded approach to contents limits for packages and conveyances and to performance standards applied to package designs depending upon the hazard of the radioactive contents.

They apply to the transport of radioactive material in the public domain in which the packages can be conveyed by road, rail, sea, inland waterways or air transport modes and may share transport routes with movements of people and cargoes in close proximity.

In contrast, the movement of radioactive materials on nuclear sites is a much more controlled operation. Normally, only road or rail transport is involved, there are much lower volumes of other traffic and any hazards during the movement are generally less severe than the test conditions in the IAEA transport regulations representing accident conditions of transport.

Furthermore, there is no internationally accepted set of design standards applicable to packages intended purely for onsite movements.

In the UK, suitable safety cases need to be prepared to demonstrate the acceptability of the onsite movement of radioactive material to the regulator, the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII). The safety case includes engineering substantiation against appropriate design standards. However, the criteria in the design standards do not need to be as demanding as those in the IAEA transport regulations because of the controlled environment within which onsite movements take place.

The principles of the graded approach in the IAEA transport regulations can be applied to onsite movements of radioactive material. However, the high level of safety resulting from compliance with these regulations can be achieved for movements of radioactive material packages on a nuclear licensed site by amending limits and test criteria to take account of the stringent onsite controls and environment. Examples of this are increasing the package contents limits for a particular package type, reducing the package test requirements or a combination of the two.

There are also general requirements in the IAEA transport regulations for all packagings and packages, and aspects of these can be applicable for packages used for onsite movements of radioactive material. However, there are aspects of these where the detailed implementation can be relaxed for onsite movements, such as the acceleration values experienced at the typically low speeds of onsite movements and the limited ambient temperature and pressure ranges for a specific site.

The present paper discusses various differences between transport of radioactive material in the public domain and on nuclear licensed sites.     

IAEA assistance and training programme for transport security

Abstract

The International Atomic Energy Agency's Office of Nuclear Security is working cooperatively with the US Department of Energy's Global Threat Reduction Initiative, the European Union and Australia to provide transport security assistance to countries throughout the world. Assistance is available to countries in reviewing and upgrading their transport security programmes at all levels:

? national level (regulatory and other government agencies)

? operator level (shippers and carriers).

Assistance is directed at implementing a consistent level of security throughout the life cycle of radioactive material (i.e. the same level of security during transport as when in a fixed facility). Upgrade assistance can include:

? expert advisory missions to provide advice and guidance

? training courses for regulatory, governmental and industry personnel

? transport security awareness

? detailed training on designing and implementing transport security programmes

? planning to identify and prioritise needs (developing security approaches and plans)

? developing model security plans and procedures

? equipment (vehicles, packages, command and control equipment, etc.).

Country visits are now being scheduled to initiate transport security cooperative activities. A training course has been developed to assist countries in developing and implementing transport security programmes. The training course has been given as a national training course (three times) and as a regional training course (three times). The course addresses recommended security provisions for the transport of all radioactive material.     

Abstract

Abstract

This article is aimed at summarising the activities related to the transport of radioactive materials carried out in Argentina and, especially, with regard to the transport of radioactive wastes. In particular, the legislation applicable within the national territory is described. Additionally, figures are provided on the features and amounts of transported radioactive materials, including radioactive wastes, concerning both the nuclear fuel cycle and activities related to their industrial and medical applications.     

Development of international guidelines for shipment security of radioactive materials

Abstract

In October 2003 a weeklong IAEA Technical Meeting developed a set of guidelines for providing security to consignments of radioactive materials in transport. These guidelines will be published in an IAEA TECDOC Security in the Transport of Radioactive Material. The guidelines produced reflect consideration of many influences and concerns that currently revolve around the potential for terrorist use of radioactive material for malevolent ends. The influences discussed here include: public perception of hazard and concern that new requirements will further limit global shipping capability, international efforts to control sealed sources, national efforts to increment protection on selected materials, the basis for exemption of materials, concern for cost impacts of overly broad requirements, questions on how to adjust requirements for a national threat assessment and issues relating to consistency within the international community on security needs.     

The Industry Commitment to Global Transport Safety Standards

Abstract

Standards and regulations have no intrinsic practical effect without taking into account those who are the object of such standards and regulations. Standards and regulations do not become operationally effective until they are implemented by the entities which are subject to them. Accordingly, there is a necessary synergy between the regulator and the regulated— the regulators whose task it is to make and enforce the rules for safe, efficient and reliable transport, and those whose job it is to transport within the rules. One has no full meaning without the other. Harmonisation issues which can impede efficient and timely implementation of regulations can occur at any stage of the process, starting with the timely publication of the IAEA regulations, incorporation by the modal organisations, adoption by national competent authorities and finally, rendered operational by industrial transport organisations. Both the regulator and the transporter can be more effective in achieving their purposes when they co-operate in the interest of mutual understanding. PATRAM provides one excellent opportunity for such exchange between the regulator and the regulated—there are other important opportunities within the IAEA and international modal organisations. It is suggested, however, that more could be done between the regulators and the regulated collectively to share real-life experiences with actually implementing the regulations and operating within them, and to draw appropriate lessons.

In the case of the international transport safety regulatory regime, it is the nuclear transport industry, such as represented by the World Nuclear Transport Institute (WNTI), which is, of course, the object of transport safety standards and regulations. And as such, the nuclear transport industry is a principal stakeholder in the regime.

Regulatory compliance is a cornerstone of the nuclear transport industry. The international nature of the fuel cycle mandates transnational movement of radioactive materials on a regular basis; this means that a single shipment may fall under the jurisdiction of numerous regional, national and local regulatory schemes as well as the overarching international system. That is why, in the interest of safe and efficient transport, it is important to strive for maximum harmonisation.     

Ten years of Romanian experience on risk assessment owing to radioactive materials transport in Romania

Abstract

The transport of radioactive materials is a very important problem considering the potential risks and radiological consequences in carrying out the present activity. Based on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)'s Safety Standard TS-R-1 (1996 edition, as amended 2003), Romanian National Nuclear Regulatory Body – Romanian National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control (CNCAN) was adopted and implemented by act no. 374/October 2001, the safety regulations for the transport of radioactive materials in Romania under the title 'Fundamental regulations for a safe transport of radioactive materials, in Romania'. The present paper will present the main sources of radioactive materials in Romania, their transport routes with a particular interest paid to the radioactive wastes. Hypothetical scenarios for specific problems related to the identification and evaluation of the risks and potential radiological consequences associated with the transport of radioactive materials in Romania, for all these situations: routine transport (incident free) and possible accidents.     

Transport of radioactive material in Bangladesh: a regulatory perspective

Abstract

Radioactive material is transported in Bangladesh in various types of packages and by different modes of transport. The transport of radioactive materials involves a risk both for the workers and members of the public. The safe transport of radioactive material is ensured in Bangladesh by compliance with Nuclear Safety and Radiation Control (NSRC) Act-93 and NSRC Rules-97. The Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission is the competent authority for the enforcement of the NSRC act and rules. The competent authority has established regulatory control at each stage to ensure radiation safety to transport workers, members of the general public and the environment. An overview is presented of the activities related to the transport of radioactive material in Bangladesh. In particular, the applicable legislation, the scope of authority and the regulatory functions of the competent authority are discussed. The categories of radioactive materials transported and the packaging requirements for the safe transport of these radioactive materials are also described.     

Emergency Response Arrangements for the Transport of Radioactive Materials

Abstract

Response arrangements are required for the transport of radioactive materials, under both transport and health and safety legislation, to safeguard persons, property and the environment in the event of incidents and emergencies. Responsibilities fall on both government and industry. Government is responsible for ensuring public safety and providing information and reassurance. This responsibility is discharged for each type of incident by a nominated 'lead department', supported as appropriate by other government departments and agencies. For their part, operators are obliged to have arrangements in place for dealing with the practicalities of any reasonably foreseeable incident, including recovery and onward transport of a package, and any required clean-up or restoration of the environment. This paper outlines both the government and industry arrangements in Great Britain. The principles of response and intervention are discussed, together with the lead department concept, regulatory requirements and the plans developed by the transport industry to ensure a nationwide response capability.     

INES Scale: French Application to Radioactive Material Transport

Abstract

After gaining control of radioactive material transport in June 1997, the French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) decided to apply the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES scale) to transport events. The Directorate General for Nuclear Safety and Radioprotection (DGSNR) requests that radioactive material package consignors declare any event occurring during transport, and has introduced the use of the INES scale adapted to classify transport events in order to inform the public and to have feedback. The INES scale is applicable to events arising in nuclear installations associated with the civil nuclear industry andevents occurring during the transport of radioactive materials to and from them. The INES scale consists of seven levels. It is based on the successive application of threetypes of criterion (off-site impact, on-site impact and degradation of defence in depth) and uses the maximum level to determine the rating of an accident. As the transport in questiontakes place on public thoroughfares, only the off-site impact criteria and degradation ofdefence in-depth criteria apply. This paper deals with DGSNR's feedback during the past 7 years concerning the French application of the INES scale. Significant events that occurred during transport are presented. The French experience was used by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to develop a draft guide in 2002 and the IAEA asked countries to use a new draft for a trial period in July 2004.