Intentionality and Moral Judgments in Commonsense Thought About Action.

The concept of intentional action occupies a central place in commonsense or folk psychological thought. This paper describes two psychological experiments designed by the author and Joshua Knobe. The experiments investigate further some questions that arose from Knobe's work on responsibility and intentionality beliefs in folk psychology. They show that there is reason to doubt that subjects' beliefs about the intentionality of side effects are simply a product of their beliefs about the agent's responsibility for these effects. The author also considers how the experimental results bear on Knobe's most recent views about the relation of subjects' value judgments about side effects and their intentionality judgments. What the experimental results suggest is that subjects do not simply use either their belief that a side effect is bad, or that the agent is responsible for it, to determine their view about the intentionality of its production. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Folk Intuitions, Asymmetry, and Intentional Side Effects.

An agent S wants to A and knows that if she A-s she will also bring about B. S does not care at all about B. S then A-s, also bringing about B. Did she intentionally bring B about? Joshua Knobe (2003b) has recently argued that, according to the folk concept of intentional action, the answer depends on B's moral significance. In particular, if B is reprehensible, people are more likely to say that S intentionally brought it about. Knobe defends this position with empirical facts about how ordinary people use the adjective 'intentionally.' Knobe's results are consistent with the thesis that the concept of intentional action is fundamentally evaluative. There is an alternative hypothesis, however, which can account for Knobe's data and which keeps the concept of intentional action within the purview of action theory. The current author suggests that the following conditions are jointly sufficient for a side effect E, produced by S's action A, being intentional: (i) S knows that E will (or is likely to) occur as a result of A-ing, (ii) bringing about E counts against A-ing (from the S's perspective), and (iii) S does not try to keep E from occurring. Known immoral side effects will always, from the folk's perspective, satisfy condition (ii) of this hypothesis. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Clinical monitoring for patients with severe craniocerebral injury

In references to an individual, agency refers to the capacity of the individual for meaningful action. Protecting and nurturing patient agency is a central feature of nursing work. The moral ideals and aim of nursing practice reflect a commitment to the patient that includes the patient as central to the determination of what happens to her or him. Whereas we most commonly think of the capacity to make these determinations as autonomy, I use the term agency because autonomy is a complicated and contested issue within philosophy and ethics. In an earlier issue, I suggested that an understanding of place is important to ethics. This is so because different places or institutions do different kinds of work, have different values, endow ethical concepts with different meanings, are structured by different visions, and are controlled and influenced by different kinds of knowledge and power. All these factors work together to determine a person's agency within a given place or environment. For example, home care providers cannot act in patients' homes in the same way they can act in a hospital, and providers cannot act in a school the way they act in a hospital. At the same time, patients' power to act is constrained in the hospital in ways that it is not in their homes. In the following narrative of an experienced home care nurse, I examine the ethical concern that can result from a commitment to patient agency by home care providers.     

Comment on "The Use of Human Subjects in Psychological Research".

While Irwin Berg's report on "The Use of Human Subjects in Psychological Research" (Amer. Psychologist, 1954, 9, pp. 108-111) places a salutary emphasis upon the precautions experimental psychologists should take both to protect the subjects' welfare and to prevent the public's wrath, other precautions need to be borne in mind lest a fear of being classed with the Nazi "doctors of infamy" causes an unhealthy swing to the other extreme of inactivity in particular areas of research. In many areas where research is desperately needed, few fruitful investigations could be conducted if the subjects were to have the advance knowledge the Nuremberg principles seem to demand. These medically oriented principles in general require considerable revision before they can be applied directly to the realm of psychology. Another factor that must be recognized is that an experiment conducted solely with voluntary subjects may suffer thereby a delimitation often disregarded. A sample of voluntary subjects may not be truly representative of the universe under scrutiny. Volunteers may differ from nonvolunteers in ways germane to experimental assumptions, hypotheses, and conclusions. From these considerations three suggestions are provided. 1. The Nuremberg principles should be translated into psychological terms through an accumulation of illustrative incidents and a resultant formulation of additional principles to be included under Section 4.3 of Ethical Standards of Psychologists. 2. Remove possible harmful side effects of ethical research. And, 3. Experimenters who rely on the use of volunteers should consider the possible influence upon their findings of the voluntary nature of the subjects and, where necessary, should qualify their conclusions accordingly. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Irreducible ethics: A defense of strenuousness and responsibility.

This paper critiques the reduction of the significance of human moral action to mere social construction and suggests two perspectives that resist this theoretical maneuver. It is argued that any school of thought within psychology that cannot provide an adequate account of ethics and moral action ultimately fails as a psychology. This paper examines the social constructionist claims of Kenneth Gergen and others, arguing that, because it undermines the possibility of a meaningful morality by ushering in a form of nihilism, social constructionism fails as an adequate school of thought for psychology. By way of an alternative capable of providing a more adequate account of moral action in psychology, this paper explores the contributions of William James and Emmanuel Levinas. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Construction defect in the Minnesota Clerical Test.

Discusses the Minnesota Clerical Test (MCT), which was published in 1933 and was constructed for selecting clerical employees and for advising persons seeking training in the clerical field. The test has been revised three times. This article highlights a defect in the test, which was previously pointed out by Kirkpatrick (1957), involving the 100 dissimilar pairs of the numerical subtest. The author argues that the defect is in the construction of the test booklet itself. The test booklet opens both ways: from right to left and from left to right. Because the manual's instructions do not specify which side to open, the subjects being tested decide which way they will do it. Because of the difference in time limits for each test, the scores obtained from those subjects who opened the book from the "wrong" side would have been totally distorted had the problem passed unnoticed. As a result the consequences for error in scoring are great. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Psychological stress does not affect plasma catecholamines in subjects with cardiovascular disorder

Whereas the effects of cardiac transplantation on the catecholamine response to physical exercise have been studied previously, the impact on psychological stress is unknown. Here, the arterial catecholamine response to the Stroop test of patients with an orthotopic heart transplant (OHT) was compared with that in subjects who had received a coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) or who were in heart failure and destined for a heart transplant (HF). Subjects were tested whilst sitting and their usual drug therapy was maintained. The Stroop test increased subjects' subjective tension but did not affect arterial concentrations of adrenaline or noradrenaline in any group of subjects. Also, the concentration of both catecholamines was significantly higher in OHT and CABG subjects than in the HF group, but their relative concentration was unaffected by cardiovascular status or stress. It is concluded that the absolute concentrations of arterial catecholamines, but not their relative concentrations, depend on clinical status. Moreover, under these test conditions, subjects with a history of cardiovascular disorder do not show the normal catecholamine response to psychological stress.     

From ecological to moral psychology: Morality and the psychology of Egon Brunswik.

Moral judgment and behavior are uniquely resistant to psychological analysis because morality generally is defined in terms that do not admit of psychological predication. Principal among these is the idea of freedom. An agent can act morally only on the condition that it is also free to do otherwise. The respective theoretical premises of C. Sunstein (1997) and E. Brunswik (1966) are contrasted in order to suggest that Brunswikian theory constitutes a distinct and highly promising new approach to the psychology of moral judgment. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

How preliminary data affect people's stated willingness to enter a hypothetical randomized controlled trial

PURPOSE: To explore how preliminary trial data affect the general public's stated willingness to enter a randomized clinical trial. METHODS: We asked 165 prospective jurors to imagine that their physicians wanted them to enroll in a clinical trial. We then presented them with scenarios portraying preliminary trial results--for example, 9 out of 10 patients get better with drug A and 5 out of 10 get better with drug B--and asked after each scenario, whether they would choose to be part of the trial. We designed the scenarios to test how stated willingness to enter the trial would be influenced by: 1) the difference in effectiveness of the 2 treatments based on the patients enrolled thus far; and 2) by the chance that the difference in effectiveness was random (i.e., the P value). The subjects' willingness to enter the trial at various decision points was analyzed using logistic regression. RESULTS: Fewer subjects were willing to enter the trial as preliminary data indicated either an increasing difference in the effectiveness of the two treatments or an increasing statistical significance of that difference. For example 75% of subjects were willing to enter the research trial before any preliminary data were presented, but this number fell to 49% when subjects were presented with preliminary data showing that 9 out of 10 patients improved with one treatment and 5 out of 10 with the other. Multivariable logistic regression revealed that higher P values (odds ratio = 4.29; P < 0.001; 95% CI: 2.22-8.28) and smaller differences in effectiveness (odds ratio = 0.02; P < 0.001; 95% CI: 0.00-0.07) implicit in preliminary data presented to subjects made subjects less likely to agree to enter clinical trials. After adjustment for other relevant variables, male gender was associated with increased willingness to enter the trial. CONCLUSION: A subjects' willingness to enter the hypothetical trial was influenced by preliminary data. Fewer subjects were willing to enter the trial as the differences in benefit between 2 treatment groups increased. However, the majority of subjects were willing to enter the hypothetical trial even when preliminary evidence strongly favored one treatment over another. Given the importance of informed consent in entering patients in clinical trials, these results should be confirmed in actual trial settings.     

Apparent mental causation: Sources of the experience of will.

The experience of willing an act arises from interpreting one's thought as the cause of the act. Conscious will is thus experienced as a function of the priority, consistency, and exclusivity of the thought about the action. The thought must occur before the action, be consistent with the action, and not be accompanied by other causes. An experiment illustrating the role of priority found that people can arrive at the mistaken belief that they have intentionally caused an action that in fact they were forced to perform when they are simply led to think about the action just before its occurrence. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

USSR: optimizing the teaching of health education in higher medical training institutions

The promotion of medical and health knowledge among the population is an integral aspect of the work of all physicians in the U.S.S.R. The coordination of different aspects of teaching on health education within the general training of the future physician is particularly important. A comprehensive interdisciplinary study was conducted by the Central Institute for Scientific Research in Health Education in several medical schools during the last 5 years in order to develop the preparedness of medical students for their future activities in health education. An experimental method on the "involvement of subjects in real-life situations" was used to evaluate the subjects' degree of preparedness. The experiment included 469 6th year medical students from 5 schools in the country. The results revealed that the students possessed a sufficient volume of knowledge in the field of health education, but the majority were unable to apply this knowledge in medical practice since they were not convinced of its necessity. An experimental educational scheme based on the findings of pedagogical and psychological studies aimed at improving teaching methods was worked out. The experimental training program included the development of scientific thinking, drawing up of a specially designed system of exercises for use as a teaching tool in developing the required intellectual skills, and application of programmed learning. The training scheme was experimentally tested with 211 students from the same 5 medical schools; the control group consisted of 235 students. The experimental training considerably improved the preparedness of students for health education activities. Most of the subjects developed the ability to act in various situations of medical practice and to select and apply proper educational treatment. This had not been the case before training. In the control group no significant difference was observed between the results obtained at the diagnostic stage and those of the control tests.     

Folk Psychology and Moral Evaluation.

Assessments of an action done intentionally, as we might expect, influence judgments of moral responsibility. What we don't expect is the converse--judgments of moral responsibility influencing assessments of whether an action was done intentionally. Yet this is precisely how people decide, according to Knobe (2003, 2004) and Mendlow (2004) and Nadelhoffer (2004a). I evaluate whether the studies actually support this biasing effect. I argue that the studies are at best inconclusive and that even if they demonstrated that people fall under the biasing effect, such tendencies ought to have no bearing upon philosophical analyses of the concept of intentional action. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Unintentionally Biasing the Data: Reply to Knobe.

Knobe (2003) wants to help adjudicate the philosophical debate concerning whether and under what conditions we normally judge that some side effect was brought about intentionally. His proposal for doing so is perhaps an obvious one--simply elicit the intuitions of "The Folk" directly on the matter and record the results. Knobe concludes that people's judgment that a side effect was brought about intentionally apparently rests, at least in part, upon how blameworthy they find the agent responsible for it. Knobe's appreciably straightforward approach to this question does not settle the matter, however. Simply raising that question can itself affect our evaluation of the side effect in question as either something good or something bad. As a result, Knobe's experiments effectively bias subjects' responses toward judging the given side effects more negatively than they might have otherwise. Subjects failed to assign a high level of praise for good side effects because taking into account whether they were brought about intentionally or unintentionally makes them suspect. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Hand use and gestural communication in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes).

Hand use in gestural communication was examined in 115 captive chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Hand use was measured in subjects while they gestured to food placed out of their reach. The distribution of hand use was examined in relation to sex, age, rearing history, gesture type, and whether the subjects vocalized while gesturing. Overall, significantly more chimpanzees, especially females and adults, gestured with their right than with their left hand. Foods begs were more lateralized to the right hand than pointing, and a greater prevalence of right-hand gesturing was found in subjects who simultaneously vocalized than those who did not. Taken together, these data suggest that referential, intentional communicative behaviors, in the form of gestures, are lateralized to the left hemisphere in chimpanzees. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Depression and mental control: The resurgence of unwanted negative thoughts.

In three experiments we examined depressed individuals' mental control abilities and strategies. Experiment 1 revealed that although depressed college students were initially successful in suppressing negative material, they eventually experienced a resurgence of unwanted negative thoughts. Analysis of subjects' stream-of-consciousness reported indicated that this resurgence was associated with the use of negative thoughts as distracters from the unwanted item. In Experiment 2 depressed subjects acknowledged that positive distracters were more effective than negative ones in suppressing negative thoughts. This acknowledgment suggests that depressed subjects in Experiment 1 did not deliberately focus on negative distracters but that depressed subjects' use of positive distracters could be increased somewhat when we provided such distracters and made them easily accessible. Taken together, the findings suggest that depression involves an enhanced accessibility of interconnected negative thoughts that can undermine mental control efforts. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Moral identity and the experience of moral elevation in response to acts of uncommon goodness.

Four studies using survey and experimental designs examined whether people whose moral identity is highly self-defining are more susceptible to experiencing a state of moral elevation after being exposed to acts of uncommon moral goodness. Moral elevation consists of a suite of responses that motivate prosocial action tendencies. Study 1 showed that people higher (vs. lower) in moral identity centrality reported experiencing more intense elevating emotions, had more positive views of humanity, and were more desirous of becoming a better person after reading about an act of uncommon goodness than about a merely positive situation or an act of common benevolence. Study 2 showed that those high in moral identity centrality were more likely to recall acts of moral goodness and experience moral elevation in response to such events more strongly. These experiences were positively related to self-reported prosocial behavior. Study 3 showed a direct effect on behavior using manipulated, rather than measured, moral identity centrality. Study 4 replicated the effect of moral identity on the states of elevation as well as on self-reported physical sensations and showed that the elevation mediates the relationship between moral identity, witnessing uncommon goodness, and prosocial behavior. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Awareness of errors in naturalistic action after traumatic brain injury

A prospective study was performed to develop a method for assessing "on-line" error detection and correction during performance of naturalistic action, to determine whether traumatic brain injury (TBI) affects error detection and correction, and to compare actual task performance with verbal self-ratings of performance. Participants included 18 persons who had sustained severe TBI from 34 to 186 days prior to study and who were comparable to controls in their rate of naturalistic action error, along with 18 control subjects chosen to be demographically comparable to subjects with TBI. Subjects performed two different tests of naturalistic action in which they completed everyday activities (eg, wrapping a gift, making toast) at different levels of complexity, as manipulated by the addition of distractor objects, the number of tasks that had to be completed per trial, and other demands on planning and working memory. Using a specially developed coding system, each error on these tasks was scored as to whether the subject corrected it and whether the subject otherwise demonstrated awareness of the error. Error scores were also compared to subjects' responses to a questionnaire in which they rated their own performance on the most challenging level of the naturalistic action test. In general, subjects with TBI corrected and showed awareness of proportionally fewer of their errors when compared to controls. Qualitative patterns for some error types also differed between groups. Despite making more errors than control subjects on the most challenging task, subjects with TBI did not rate themselves as performing more poorly with respect to its cognitive demands. However, for subjects with TBI, the number of errors was correlated with performance ratings on certain questionnaire items. This study showed that error detection and correction can be reliably measured during naturalistic action and appear to be impaired in severe TBI even when the base rate of error is controlled. TBI may affect error detection and correction by reducing, or impairing the allocation of, attentional resources needed for the simultaneous execution and monitoring of routine action.     

Influence of adult prohibition style on moral judgments of children.

Examined the effects of act- and outcome-oriented adult prohibitions on the moral judgments of 7- and 9-yr-old children. Moral dilemmas portraying children in hospital settings were presented to 32 Ss aged 6.0–9.11 yrs. The stimulus presentation contained an audiotaped adult prohibition directed at the portrayed target children: one prohibition condition (act oriented) emphasized a desired action, while the other (outcome oriented) emphasized a desired outcome. In line with predictions, the direction of moral judgments made by 7-yr-olds was influenced by the nature of the antecedent adult prohibition, with intentional judgments made under the act-oriented condition and consequential judgments under the outcome-oriented condition. Nine-yr-olds gave intentional judgments in both conditions. The results provide some support for a cognitive-developmental view of child discipline. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)