基于双边道德风险的逆向供应链回收激励契约

针对制造商和零售商共同努力回收废旧品过程中的双边道德风险问题,引入努力弹性系数,运用委托代理理论,设计了一个基于双边道德风险的线性契约。理论和数值分析结果表明,制造商和零售商努力水平之比和边际利润之比均等于二者努力效率之比,零售商固定费用与制造商努力效率成正比,与产出系数负相关,与努力成本系数正相关。因此,制造商和零售商应根据努力弹性系数决定努力水平,制造商在制定价格合同时,应当充分考虑回收产出和努力成本等因素,最大程度地消除双边道德风险对逆向供应链系统效率的影响,以提高逆向供应链整体绩效。     

考虑竞争和信息不对称的低碳供应链协调策略研究

在制造商进行生产减排的低碳供应链中,零售商之间存在促销竞争以及促销成本系数为零售商私有信息的情况。分别构建了考虑零售商竞争的低碳供应链集中决策模型和信息不对称决策模型,对制造商减排率以及零售商促销水平进行求解,并通过引入由批发价和成本共担组成的联合契约对供应链进行协调。研究发现:联合契约的引入可以激励零售商在保证自身利益的前提下选择与制造商共享私有信息,不对称信息造成的利润损失得以挽回;随着零售商之间竞争程度的增加,集中决策和信息不对称情形下的供应链利润差减小,用以揭示私有信息的联合契约越有效;制造商减排成本系数的提高降低了供应链成员的利润;零售商促销成本系数越高,制造商在揭示私有信息过程中付出的信息租金越少,对制造商越有利。     

考虑搭便车和风险规避的零售商定价、渠道选择策略

针对一个风险规避型零售商和一个风险中性制造商组成的供应链,考虑消费者服务“搭便车”行为,构建单渠道和零售商双渠道下零售商主导的均值-方差模型。通过逆向求解,得到并对比供应链成员的最优决策。最后通过算例分析验证表明,零售商双渠道价格与零售商的风险态度和市场需求波动呈反比,制造商批发价格变化则相反;零售商风险规避程度在一定范围内时,集中决策下的期望效用比分散决策下的高;零售商在“搭便车”下开通网络渠道不一定总是有利的,且存在搭便车比例、促销努力系数和风险规避度的取值区间使得零售商开通网络渠道有利可图;相反,在最优区间之外时,则会对利润造成负增长,因此企业应合理地控制自身风险规避程度和成本系数才能更好地在双渠道模式下获得超额利润。     

双方不完全信息下政府引导的逆向供应链协调研究

讨论双方不完全信息下政府引导一个制造商和两个零售商组成的逆向供应链的协调问题。运用信号甄别和委托代理理论,分别从政府不参与、政府奖励零售商和政府奖励制造商三个方面得到零售商和制造商的协调策略。研究表明:定价合同可有效避免逆向选择,实现逆向供应链协调;高市场需求状态下低成本零售商获得收益较高;政府对企业的合理奖励,尤其是对零售商的奖励,可以促进逆向供应链协调,提高收益。     

考虑政府奖惩的逆向供应链定价策略研究

探讨一个制造商和多个零售商组成的逆向供应链定价策略问题,以再制品市场需求信息不完全为前提,运用博弈论和委托代理理论研究分析政府不参与逆向供应链运作、政府对制造商实施奖惩措施和政府对零售商实施奖惩措施三种情形下逆向供应链各主体的定价策略.并通过数值仿真验证了定价策略分别与市场需求和奖惩力度的关系.研究表明:成本较高的零售商期望收益较小;在两种奖惩力度相同的情况下,政府对制造商实施奖惩措施后逆向供应链的整体收益更大,而政府对零售商实施奖惩措施后制造商会更倾向于不传递真实市场信息的信号.     

公平偏好下基于Stackelberg博弈的回购契约研究

引入公平偏好,构建了供应商与零售商进行Stackelberg博弈的回购契约模型,采用逆向归纳法分析了批发价的制定、回购契约的协调性以及供应链成员的公平偏好行为对批发价的影响。研究表明：无论是否考虑公平偏好,回购契约都不能实现供应链协调且公平偏好行为不会影响零售商的最优订购量。此外,供应商提供的批发价随着零售商公平偏好系数的增加而降低,但随供应商公平偏好的增加而升高。     

基于碳信息不对称的两级供应链谎报行为

为研究供应链上下游企业间面临碳信息不对称风险时的最优谎报决策,运用Stackelberg博弈理论探讨制造商为主导的二级供应链博弈行为。结合碳排放交易机制下的新型利润模型,采用逆向求解法求解供应链参与者最优决策,并定性分析制造商和零售商的谎报行为以及谎报行为对供应链绩效的影响。研究表明,碳信息谎报与成本信息不对称情形具有明显差异。制造商不论是否谎报碳信息均能最大化自身利润,而零售商将低报碳排量信息。相比零售商不谎报情形,谎报反而能提高制造商与零售商利润,但此时供应链总利润仍低于供应链最优利润。制造商可通过收益共享契约协调供应链,且最优收益共享系数与谎报情形下零售商利润正相关。     

不对称信息下逆向供应链契约设计

制造商对废旧产品的回收积极性在很大程度上影响逆向供应链的实施和协调.运用委托代理理论和甄别博弈的显示性原理,探讨不对称信息下逆向供应链契约设计问题.分别基于政府不参与逆向供应链运作、政府对制造商实施奖励、政府对制造商实施奖惩三种前提,建立决策模型,得到不同模型下制造商提供给零售商的契约设计策略.三种契约比较分析显示:政...     

风险厌恶下基于收入共享契约的供应链协调策略

在收入共享契约下,借助条件风险值理论研究风险规避零售商和风险中性供应商组成的二级供应链协调定价模型,推导出随机需求受价格影响的零售商最优零售价格、库存因子以及供应商最优批发价格。讨论风险规避系数、市场弹性系数和收入共享系数对分散供应链系统以及各成员运作绩效的影响。最后,进行数值算例,数值结果表明,随着零售商风险规避程度的增加,零售商和供应商运作绩效呈递减趋势,但采用收入共享契约可以有效的减少供应链系统以及各成员独立运作的绩效损失;当收入共享系数一定时,需求价格弹性系数越大,供应商和零售商运作绩效越小;然而零售商和供应商运作绩效并不受成本比例系数的影响。     

基于Nash谈判的三级逆向供应链合作利益分配模型

逆向供应链的顺利实施需要各方的共同努力以及合理的利益分配,针对由制造商、零售商和第三方物流服务商组成的三级逆向供应链系统,应用Stakelberg博弈模型研究三级逆向供应链的合作问题,并考虑合作各方参与逆向供应链的地位权重,运用Nash谈判模型对总体利益进行两次分配.研究结果表明,逆向供应链的合作及合理的利益分配可提高...     

电子产品三级逆向供应链定价与激励机制研究

研究了由制造商、维修中心和零售商构成的三级逆向供应链模型的定价策略与激励机制.模型扩展了正规维修中心的职能,使其作为回收处理中心参与到逆向供应链中,负责分类处理零售商回收的废旧电子产品,一方面将其中可再利用部分经过维修销售到二级市场中.另一方面将可再制造部分由制造商进行再制造成新产品.应用博弈论得到模型的Stackelberg均衡解和合作机制下的最优解,并设计了线性分成机制和基于不对称Nash协商模型的激励机制.最后,通过数值仿真验证结论并讨论了价格弹性系数和可再制造率.研究结果表明,回收价格和系统收益均与弹性系数成正比,且较高的可再制造率可得到较高的回收价格和收益.该研究对逆向供应链的运营实践具有很好的指导意义和参考价值.     

不确定需求下制造商渠道入侵与信息收集披露激励

研究单个零售商和制造商组成的二级供应链,零售商通过调查获取市场不确定需求信息,而制造商可能建立直销渠道与零售商展开销售竞争。分别在集中决策和分散决策下刻画零售商最优收集、披露策略以及制造商的最优入侵策略;在此基础上设计了促进零售商收集并且披露需求信息的固定报酬激励机制。研究表明:当收集成本、渠道替代率以及固定入侵成本处于合适阈值区间时,需求信息收集和披露会改善双方收益;零售商信息披露可以影响制造商的入侵决策;制造商入侵在一定条件下有利于供应链整体收益,但总是不利于零售商;在制造商率先决定入侵时,零售商接受激励政策可以实现双方共赢。最后通过算例验证了理论的正确性和有效性。     

含风险规避者的供应链收益共享契约机制研究

提出了具有风险规避者加盟的供应链协作收益共享机制,分别给出了零售商为风险中性及风险规避者时收益共享系数协商区间.采用数值实验方法,对所提出的收益共享机制进行了分析.结果表明,供应商采用收益共享机制可使整个供应链得到协调;在收益共享契约机制中供应商制定的批发价格要低于它的生产成本,而且当零售商为风险规避者时,它将期望供应商给予较低的批发价格,而宁愿让供应商获取较大的供应链销售收入份额.     

信息分享对企业社会责任承担的影响

研究了零售商信息分享对制造商承担企业社会责任（CSR）的影响,借助动态博弈论,构建了双方的Stackelberg博弈模型,并利用逆向归纳法解析得到供应链成员的信息分享及社会责任承担策略。研究发现,制造商承担CSR策略受到消费者对企业承担CSR行为的敏感程度、信息分享策略的影响。当消费者CSR敏感度较高或较低时,信息分享策略均不会影响制造商承担CSR的行为;当消费者CSR敏感度适中时,零售商会主动分享较大的不确定需求信息,引导制造商承担CSR,但竞争会削弱零售商分享信息的动机。     

Forecasting errors and the value of information sharing in a supply chain

The paper investigates the impact of forecasting errors and information sharing on the performance of a supply chain. It also examines the impact of forecasting errors on the value of information sharing between retailers and a supplier. Analyses of the simulation outputs show that while information sharing can bring tremendous benefits to the supplier and the entire supply chain, it hurts the retailers under most conditions. Demand pattern and forecasting error distributions faced by the retailers significantly influence the magnitudes of the cost savings as a result of information sharing. The expected bias in forecast errors has a much more significant impact on supply chain performance and the value of information sharing than the standard deviation of forecasting errors and its pattern of deterioration over time. A slight positive bias in the retailer's forecast can actually increase the benefit of sharing information for the supplier and the entire supply chain. However, it can also increase the cost for retailers. The demand pattern faced by retailers also significantly influences the impact of forecasting accuracy on the value of the information sharing. These findings will motivate companies to share information, and will help to design incentive schemes to encourage information-sharing and justify investment in information-sharing projects. The findings can also be used to minimize the negative impact of forecasting errors on supply chain performance.     

收益共享的供应链协作契约机制研究

建立了由制造商与零售商组成的两级供应链,研究了供应链分散决策与协调决策下的双方收益问题,发现协调决策下整条供应链收益大于分散决策时整个供应链收益,但整条供应链的收益增加并不能保证合作方的收益均能增加,因此需要通过利益协调来激励供应链上的各方积极参与合作.为此,提出了基于收益共享的供应链协作激励机制.通过案例分析验证了这种模型的有效性.     

An equilibrium analysis of linear, proportional and uniform allocation of scarce capacity

In many industries a supplier's total demand from the retailers she supplies frequently exceeds her capacity. In these situations, the supplier must allocate her capacity in some manner. We consider three allocation schemes: proportional, linear and uniform. With either proportional or linear allocation a retailer receives less than his order whenever capacity binds. Hence, each retailer has the incentive to order strategically; retailers order more than they desire in an attempt to ensure that their ultimate allocation is close to what they truly want. Of course, they will receive too much if capacity does not bind. In the capacity allocation game, each retailer must form expectations on how much other retailers actually desire (which is uncertain) and how much each will actually order, knowing that all retailers face the same problem. We present methods to find Nash equilibria in the capacity allocation game with either proportional or linear allocation. We find that behavior in this game with either of those allocation rules can be quite unpredictable, primarily because there may not exist a Nash equilibrium. In those situations any order above one's desired quantity can be justified, no matter how large. Consequently, a retailer with a high need may be allocated less than a retailer with a low need; clearly an ex post inefficient allocation. However, we demonstrate that with uniform allocation there always exists a unique Nash equilibrium. Further, in that equilibrium the retailers order their desired amounts, i.e., there is no order inflation. We compare supply chain profits across the three allocation schemes.     

The impact of small lot ordering on traffic congestion in a physical distribution system

In recent years, some managers and researchers have advocated reducing lot sizes by decreasing setup costs, arguing that smaller lot sizes improve quality while reducing inventory levels and associated holding costs. However, smaller lot sizes result in an increased number of shipments which, in turn, exacerbates traffic congestion. This results in longer delivery times and, thereby, higher inventory levels. In this paper we study the relation between lot sizes and traffic congestion by constructing a model with numerous retailers who share a common congested delivery road. Using a numerical example, we illustrate the model's managerial implications with respect to several factors, including lot sizes, traffic congestion, and inventory levels. Our findings suggest that in a physical distribution system, if there are a relatively large number of retailers, no single retailer has an incentive to increase batch sizes because one retailer's effect on reducing traffic congestion will be negligible. If all retailers increase their lotsizes, however, traffic congestion will be reduced and all retailers will experience lower costs.     

Inventory competition and incentives to back-order

In this paper we consider the issue of inventory control in a multi-period environment with competition on product availability. Specifically, when a product is out of stock, the customer often must choose between placing a back-order or turning to a competitor selling a similar product. We consider a competition in which customers may switch between two retailers (substitute) in the case of a stock-out at the retailer of their first choice. In a multi-period setting, the following four situations may arise if the product is out of stock: (i) sales may be lost; (ii) customers may back-order the product with their first-choice retailer; (iii) customers may back-order the product with their second-choice retailer; or (iv) customers may attempt to acquire the product according to some other more complex rule. The question we address is: how do the equilibrium stocking quantities and profits of the retailers depend on the customers' back-ordering behaviors? In this work we consider the four alternative back-ordering scenarios and formulate each problem as a stochastic multi-period game. Under appropriate conditions, we show that a stationary base-stock inventory policy is a Nash equilibrium of the game that can be found by considering an appropriate static game. We derive conditions for the existence and uniqueness of such a policy and conduct a comparative statics analysis. Analytical expressions for the optimality conditions facilitate managerial insights into the effects of various back-ordering mechanisms. Furthermore, we recognize that often a retailer is willing to offer a monetary incentive to induce a customer to back-order instead of going to the competitor. Therefore, it is necessary to coordinate incentive decisions with operational decisions about inventory control. We analyze the impact of incentives to back-order the product on the optimal stocking policies under competition and determine the conditions that guarantee monotonicity of the equilibrium inventory in the amount of the incentive offered. Our analysis also suggests that, counterintuitively, companies might benefit from making their inventories “visible” to competitors' customers, since doing so reduces the level of competition, decreases optimal inventories and simultaneously increases profits for both players.     

近断层地震动下摇摆-自复位桥墩地震反应分析

为讨论摇摆-自复位（Rocking Self-Centering,RSC）桥墩在近断层地震动下的地震反应,基于OpenSees数值分析平台建立了RSC桥墩抗震分析模型。同时建立了普通钢筋混凝土（Reinforced Concrete,RC）桥墩,配置竖向无粘结预应力筋（Unbonded Prestressed Reinforced Concrete,PRC）桥墩的抗震分析模型作为对比。对各模型输入近断层地震动记录,进行增量动力分析。以墩顶最大位移角、残余位移角、预应力筋最大应力为考察目标,对比分析了不同墩高（剪跨比分别为2、4和6）、不同桥墩类型（RSC、RC和PRC桥墩）时各桥墩的地震反应。结果表明:随着耗能钢筋配筋率增加,RSC桥墩墩顶最大位移角和预应力筋最大应力均减小;RSC和PRC桥墩均可有效减少桥墩震后残余位移角。耗能钢筋配筋率与PRC桥墩纵筋配筋率接近的RSC桥墩,两者的最大墩顶位移角、残余位移角和预应力筋应力水平均接近。无论是RSC桥墩还是PRC桥墩,当剪跨比大于等于6.0时,易发生预应力筋失效。为避免预应力筋失效引起RSC桥墩产生过大的墩顶残余变形,RSC桥墩中耗能钢筋配筋率不宜低于0.75%。