Self-awareness and other-awareness: Mirror self-recognition and synchronic imitation among unfamiliar peers.

A theoretical analysis of the cognitive capacities underlying self-awareness and other-awareness suggested that (1) self- and other-awareness are closely linked because both require a cognitive capacity for secondary representation, and (2) other-awareness facilitates the synchronic imitation of object use with an unfamiliar peer. The relation between mirror self-recognition and synchronic imitation was investigated in 56 dyads of unfamiliar 19-mo-old children who were systematically paired according to their mirror self-recognition status and who were observed during free play with sets of duplicate toys. Long phases of synchronic imitation occurred in nearly all dyads consisting of recognizers but in only 1 dyad of nonrecognizers; in mixed dyads these phases were shorter than in recognizer dyads. Discussion focuses on the synchrony of the development of self- and other-awareness. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Self recognition in primates: A comparative approach to the bidirectional properties of consciousness.

Describes a technique in which organisms are provided with extended exposure to mirrors and then given an explicit test of self-recognition (through the unobtrusive application of marks to facial features visually inaccessible without a mirror). Use of this procedure with chimpanzees and orangutans in a series of studies by the present author provided evidence of self-recognition, with patterns of self-directed behavior emerging after only 2–3 days. In support of the widely held view that the self-concept may develop out of social interaction with others, the capacity for self-recognition in chimpanzees appears to be influenced by early social experience. To date, however, attempts to demonstrate self-recognition in all other species except man have failed. The phyletic limits of this capacity may have important implications for claims concerning the evolutionary continuity of mental experience. (64 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Mental evolution and development: Evidence for secondary representation in children, great apes, and other animals.

Recent interest in the development and evolution of theory of mind has provided a wealth of information about representational skills in both children and animals. According to J. Perner (1991), children begin to entertain secondary representations in the 2nd year of life. This advance manifests in their passing hidden displacement tasks, engaging in pretense and means-ends reasoning, interpreting external representations, displaying mirror self-recognition and empathic behavior, and showing an early understanding of "mind" and imitation. New data show a cluster of mental accomplishments in great apes that is very similar to that observed in 2-year-old humans. It is suggested that it is most parsimonious to assume that this cognitive profile is of homologous origin and that great apes possess secondary representational capacity. Evidence from animals other than apes is scant. This analysis leads to a number of predictions for future research. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Absence of knowledge attribution and self-recognition in young chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes).

Mirror self-recognition in chimpanzees is typically delayed until 4.5–8 yrs of age. Also, species capable of mirror self-recognition may be capable of some forms of mental state attribution related to intentions and knowledge. Previous investigations of knowledge attribution by chimpanzees used adolescents and adults but did not explicitly test for self-recognition. The authors report an investigation of knowledge attribution in 6 young chimpanzees previously tested for self-recognition. Ss were required to discriminate between a person who had seen where food was hidden and another person who had not. Results are consistent with the proposition that most chimpanzees younger than 4.5 yrs show neither mirror self-recognition nor knowledge attribution. The results are also consistent with the idea that, just as in humans, development of self-recognition in chimpanzees may precede development of knowledge attribution. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Generalization of learning from picture books to novel test conditions by 18- and 24-month-old children.

Researchers know little about whether very young children can recognize objects originally introduced to them in a picture book when they encounter similar looking objects in various real-world contexts. The present studies used an imitation procedure to explore young children's ability to generalize a novel action sequence from a picture book to novel test conditions. The authors found that 18-month-olds imitated the action sequence from a book only when the conditions at testing matched those at encoding; altering the test stimuli or context disrupted imitation (Experiment 1A). In contrast, the 24-month-olds imitated the action sequence with changes to both the test context and stimuli (Experiment 1B). Moreover, although the 24-month-olds exhibited deferred imitation with no changes to the test conditions, they did not defer imitation with changes to the context and stimuli (Experiment 2). Two factors may account for the pattern of results: age-related changes in children's ability to utilize novel retrieval cues as well as their emerging ability to understand the representational nature of pictures. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

How imitation begets imitation and toddlers' generation of games.

24-month-old toddlers were observed interacting with a programmed adult partner to assess how being imitated leads to imitative acts by toddlers and the generation of social games. For 8 toddlers, the partner imitated the toddler's actions on objects; for 8 others, she performed a different, parallel action on the same play material. The former reaction approximates conditions after repeated imitation of one another emerges in peer interaction around 24 months of age—the latter, conditions of the immediately prior developmental period. When imitated, toddlers were more likely to (a) continue to act on the object, (b) repeat their same action on that object given that they continued, (c) generate games, especially imitation games, and (d) look at the partner's face. These social influence processes are thought to operate in naturally occurring peer interactions and to contribute to the new forms of behavioral organization seen around 24 months of age. The study illustrates a dynamic systems approach to behavioral organization and development. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Self-recognition in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes): Distribution, ontogeny, and patterns of emergence.

Investigations of mirror self-recognition (SR) in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) have had small samples and divergent methods. In Exp 1, 105 chimpanzees (aged 10 mo to 40 yrs) were observed for signs of SR across 5 days of continuous mirror exposure. In Exps 2 and 3, negative SR adult and adolescent Ss were saturated with mirror exposure in efforts to facilitate SR, and a longitudinal study was conducted with a number of young Ss. In Exp 4, mark tests were administered to groups of positive SR, negative SR, and ambiguous SR Ss. Exp 5 explored whether previous positive SR reports in young chimpanzees were artifacts of increased arousal during mirror exposure. Results suggest that SR typically emerges at 4.5–8 yrs of age, at the population level the capacity declines in adulthood, and in group settings SR typically occurs within minutes of an S's exposure to a mirror. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Tracking responses related to self-recognition: A frequency comparison of responses to mirrors, photographs, and videotapes by cotton top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus).

The frequency of responses cotton top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus) emitted indicative of self-recognition to a mirror was compared with the frequencies of responses emitted to digitized photographs of tamarins (Experiment 1) and to videotapes of real-time or prior tamarin action (Experiment 2). Results indicated more attentional responses toward the mirror in both studies, but behavioral indices of self-recognition were not consistently generated by the mirror. The 2 experiments confirmed that real-time self-reflection is a condition that generates heightened attention and ram examples of particular mirror-specific behaviors in tamarins. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Do humans ape? Or do apes human? Imitation and intention in humans (Homo sapiens) and other animals.

A. Whiten, D. M. Custance, J.-C. Gomez, P. Teixidor, and K. A. Bard (1996) tested chimpanzees' (Pan troglodytes) and human children's (Homo sapiens) skills at imitation with a 2-action test on an "artificial fruit." Chimpanzees imitated to a restricted degree; children were more thoroughly imitative. Such results prompted some to assert that the difference in imitation indicates a difference in the subjects' understanding of the intentions of the demonstrator (M. Tomasello, 1996). In this experiment, 37 adult human subjects were tested with the artificial fruit. Far from being perfect imitators, the adults were less imitative than the children. These results cast doubt on the inference from imitative performance to an ability to understand others' intentions. The results also demonstrate how any test of imitation requires a control group and attention to the level of behavioral analysis. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Development of self-recognition in the infant.

A hypothesized 5-stage developmental sequence of self-recognition behaviors was tested in 48 infants between 6 and 24 mo of age, and the self-recognition sequence was compared to the development of object permanence. The predicted self-recognition sequence consisted of 5 tasks that Ss performed in front of the mirror, with later-developing tasks requiring the coordination of a larger number of behaviors relating to S's mirror image than earlier-developing tasks. The development of object permanence was assessed with the Uzgiris-Hunt scale, and the object-permanence items were assigned to stages that structurally paralleled the 5 stages of self-recognition. The self-recognition tasks formed an almost perfect Guttman scale, with 46 out of 48 Ss fitting the predicted developmental sequence precisely. This finding thus resolves most of the disagreements in previous research on the development of self-recognition: Previous studies examined different behaviors, which develop at distinct stages in the sequence. Object permanence and self-recognition showed a strong correlation, but there was no consistent relationship between the 2 skills across age groups. (18 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Acquisition of automatic imitation is sensitive to sensorimotor contingency.

The associative sequence learning model proposes that the development of the mirror system depends on the same mechanisms of associative learning that mediate Pavlovian and instrumental conditioning. To test this model, two experiments used the reduction of automatic imitation through incompatible sensorimotor training to assess whether mirror system plasticity is sensitive to contingency (i.e., the extent to which activation of one representation predicts activation of another). In Experiment 1, residual automatic imitation was measured following incompatible training in which the action stimulus was a perfect predictor of the response (contingent) or not at all predictive of the response (noncontingent). A contingency effect was observed: There was less automatic imitation indicative of more learning in the contingent group. Experiment 2 replicated this contingency effect and showed that, as predicted by associative learning theory, it can be abolished by signaling trials in which the response occurs in the absence of an action stimulus. These findings support the view that mirror system development depends on associative learning and indicate that this learning is not purely Hebbian. If this is correct, associative learning theory could be used to explain, predict, and intervene in mirror system development. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Observations on the behavior of gibbons (Hylobates leucogenys, H. gabriellae, and H. lar) in the presence of mirrors.

Three captive gibbons (Hylobates leucogenys, H. gabriellae, and H. lar) were videotaped in the course of longitudinal exposure to mirrors introduced into their familiar cage or island housing situation. The gibbons, which differed in age, sex, species, and rearing condition, exhibited great individual difference in their behavioral reactions to mirrors, spanning from a minimal reaction dominated by social response to a dramatic sequence of progressive behavioral change that featured a variety of contingency testing behaviors and included mirror-mediated, self-directed behavior. Additional information on the mirror competence of gibbons was provided by modified mark tests and a hidden object task. The results are discussed in relation to current criteria for self-recognition in primates and factors involved in individual and species differences in reactions to mirror exposure. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Imitation in newborn infants: Exploring the range of gestures imitated and the underlying mechanisms.

This study evaluated the psychological mechanisms underlying imitation of facial actions in young infants. A novel aspect of the study was that it used a nonoral gesture that had not been tested before (head movement), as well as a tongue-protrusion gesture. Results showed imitation of both displays. Imitation was not limited to the intervals during which the experimenter's movements were displayed; Ss also imitated from memory after the display had stopped. The results established that newborn imitation is not constrained to a few privileged oral movements. The findings support Meltzoff and Moore's hypothesis that early imitation is mediated by an active cross-modal matching process. A common representational code may unite the perception and production of basic human acts. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Constraints on great apes' imitation: Model and action selectivity in rehabilitant orangutan (Pongo pygmaeus) imitation.

We discuss selectivity in great ape imitation, on the basis of an observational study of spontaneous imitation in free-ranging rehabilitant orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus). Research on great ape imitation has neglected selectivity, although comparative evidence suggests it may be important. We observed orangutans in central Indonesian Borneo and assessed patterns in the models and actions they spontaneously imitated. The patterns we found resembled those reported in humans. Orangutans preferred models with whom they had positive affective relationships (e.g., important caregiver or older sibling) and actions that reflected their current competence, were receptively familiar, and were relevant to tasks that faced them. Both developmental and individual variability were found. We discuss the probable functions of imitation for great apes and the role of selectivity in directing it. We also make suggestions for more effective elicitation of imitation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Influence of multiple models on the behavior of institutionalized retarded children: increased generalization to other models and other behaviors

After being pretested to determine base levels of imitation, 32 9-14 yr old retarded children were reinforced for imitating a model in 9 training sessions. Ss in a single model condition were reinforced by the same model across all sessions, whereas Ss in a multiple model condition were reinforced by 3 different models (3 sessions per model). A posttest to assess levels of imitation was then conducted by a model with whom the Ss had not had contact and who demonstrated a new set of behaviors. Results during training sessions show that (a) Ss learned to imitate, and this learning was not inhibited by multiple models; and (b) Ss generalized and imitated nonreinforced behaviors, and this response generalization was facilitated by multiple models. Most importantly, pre-posttest comparisons indicated that generalized use of the new response class (imitation) with new models was 8 times greater for Ss trained with multiple as opposed to single models. Implications for the maintenance and generalized effectiveness of social intervention programs are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Development of self-recognition in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes).

Chimpanzees demonstrate the ability to recognize themselves in mirrors, yet investigations of the development of self-recognition in chimpanzees are sparse. 12 young chimpanzees, grouped by age, were given mirror exposure and tested for self-recognition and contingent movement. All 6 juveniles, 4 and 5 yrs old, exhibited mirror-guided, mark-directed behavior and clear evidence of self-recognition. In contrast, among the infants, only the oldest group of 2.5-yr-olds exhibited clear evidence of self-recognition. All chimpanzees exhibited both self-directed behaviors and contingent movements. These results suggest that self-recognition occurs at a slightly older age in chimpanzees than in human infants. In humans, self-recognition is linked with other cognitive abilities. The results conform to the general pattern that great apes exhibit many cognitive skills comparable to those of 2-yr-old humans. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Transmission of aggression through imitation of aggressive models.

In a previous study (see 37: 856) children imitated the behavior of a model in the presence of the model. The present study investigated the degree of imitation when the model was not present. Degree to which like-sexed model behavior would be followed was also studied. Nursery school children exposed to aggressively behaving models tended to imitate not only their aggressiveness but other behavior as well. There was some confirmation of like-sex imitation. The results were related to the psychoanalytic theory of identification. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The diverging force of imitation: Integrating cognitive science and hermeneutics.

Recent research on infant and animal imitation and on mirror neuron systems has brought imitation back in focus in psychology and cognitive science. This topic has always been important for philosophical hermeneutics as well, focusing on theory and method of understanding. Unfortunately, relations between the scientific and the hermeneutic approaches to imitation and understanding have scarcely been investigated, to the loss of both disciplines. In contrast to the cognitive scientific emphasis on sharing and convergence of representations, the hermeneutic analysis emphasizes the indeterminacy and openness of action understanding due to preunderstanding, action configuration, and the processual nature of understanding. This article discusses empirical evidence in support of these aspects and concludes that hermeneutics can contribute to the scientific investigation of imitation and understanding. Since, conversely, some grounding--and constraining--aspects of hermeneutics may be derived from cognitive science, both should be integrated in a multilevel explanation of imitation and understanding. This holds also for explanations that are largely based on mirror neuron systems, since these appear to be sensitive to developmental and experiential factors, too. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Imitation in the interest of social influence.

Tested the possibility that imitation may be used as a means of social influence among 40 5th- and 6th-grade boys and girls. One member of each pair served as the model and the other as the S. Ss who were given an induction designed to motivate them to influence the model imitated the model significantly more than Ss who received no induction. Looking and smiling at the model was positively correlated with imitation for the social influence Ss, but not for the control Ss. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Automatic imitation.

“Automatic imitation” is a type of stimulus-response compatibility effect in which the topographical features of task-irrelevant action stimuli facilitate similar, and interfere with dissimilar, responses. This article reviews behavioral, neurophysiological, and neuroimaging research on automatic imitation, asking in what sense it is “automatic” and whether it is “imitation.” This body of research reveals that automatic imitation is a covert form of imitation, distinct from spatial compatibility. It also indicates that, although automatic imitation is subject to input modulation by attentional processes, and output modulation by inhibitory processes, it is mediated by learned, long-term sensorimotor associations that cannot be altered directly by intentional processes. Automatic imitation provides an important tool for the investigation of the mirror neuron system, motor mimicry, and complex forms of imitation. It is a new behavioral phenomenon, comparable with the Stroop and Simon effects, providing strong evidence that even healthy adult humans are prone, in an unwilled and unreasoned way, to copy the actions of others. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)