Remember-Know and source memory instructions can qualitatively change old-new recognition accuracy: The modality-match effect in recognition memory.

Remember-Know (RK) and source memory tasks were designed to elucidate processes underlying memory retrieval. As part of more complex judgments, both tests produce a measure of old-new recognition, which is typically treated as equivalent to that derived from a standard recognition task. The present study demonstrates, however, that recognition accuracy can be qualitatively changed by a RK or source-retrieval orientation. Visual and auditory presentations of words were varied at encoding and at test. The memory test was either a standard (old-new) recognition test, the RK test, or a source (modality) test. No effect of modality match was found on standard recognition. However, recognition accuracy in the RK and modality tests was greater when study and test modalities matched—a result obtained for both 1-step (e.g., R, K, or new?) and 2-step (e.g., old-new decision followed by RK decision for items judged old) versions of these tests. Thus, the RK and source (modality) memory procedures produced a measure of old-new recognition that was qualitatively different than standard recognition, having a greater sensitivity to perceptual information. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Leakage of relevant information to innocent examinees in the GKT: An attempt to reduce false-positive outcomes by introducing target stimuli.

This study focused on the Guilty Knowledge Test (GKT)—a psychophysiological detection method based on a series of multiple-choice questions, each having one relevant and several neutral (control) alternatives. The study examined a new method designed to reduce false-positive outcomes due to leakage of relevant items to innocent suspects by introducing target items (i.e., items known to all examinees but unrelated to the crime) to which participants have to respond (e.g., by pressing a key) while answering the GKT questions. Informed innocent participants showed relatively larger electrodermal responses to the critical items than uninformed participants, but not as large as the responses made by guilty participants. No differences between informed and uninformed innocent participants were obtained with a respiration measure. The use of the target items tended to reduce the differences between informed and uninformed innocent participants. The results further demonstrated that electrodermal responding to the relevant items was correlated with memory of these items. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Specific- and Partial-Source Memory: Effects of Aging.

Normal aging can be associated with impairments in source memory (recollecting an event's context). This study examined the effects of aging on specific-source memory (e.g., remembering which of 4 people spoke a word) and partial-source memory (e.g., remembering the gender of the person who spoke the word). When young and older adults were matched in terms of old-new recognition, age-related deficits were observed on both specific- and partial-source recollection. When the groups were matched on partial-source performance, no disproportionate specific-source impairment was seen. The results suggest that aging does not differentially affect specific- versus partial-source memory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Bridging the gap: Transitive associations between items presented in similar temporal contexts.

In episodic memory tasks, associations are formed between items presented close together in time. The temporal context model (TCM) hypothesizes that this contiguity effect is a consequence of shared temporal context rather than temporal proximity per se. Using double-function lists of paired associates (e.g., A–B, B–C) presented in a random order, the authors examined associations between items that were not presented close together in time but that were presented in similar temporal contexts. After learning, across-pair associations fell off with distance in the list, as if subjects had integrated the pairs into a coherent memory structure. Within-pair associations (e.g., A–B) were strongly asymmetric favoring forward transitions; across-pair associations (e.g., A–C) showed no evidence of asymmetry. While this pattern of results presented a stern challenge for a heteroassociative mediated chaining model, TCM provided an excellent fit to the data. These findings suggest that contiguity effects in episodic memory do not reflect direct associations between items but rather a process of binding, encoding, and retrieval of a gradually changing representation of temporal context. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Sum-Difference Theory of Remembering and Knowing: A Two-Dimensional Signal-Detection Model.

In the remember-know paradigm for studying recognition memory, participants distinguish items whose presentations are episodically remembered from those that are merely familiar. A one-dimensional model postulates that remember responses are just high-confidence old judgments, but a meta-analysis of 373 experiments shows that the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves predicted by this model have the wrong slope. According to the new sum-difference Theory of remembering and knowing (STREAK), old items differ from new ones in both global and specific memory strength: The old-new judgment is based on a weighted sum of these dimensions, and the remember- know judgment is based on a weighted difference. STREAK accounts for the form of several novel kinds of ROC curves and for existing remember-know and item-recognition data. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

False Memories in Schizophrenia.

In prior studies, it was observed that patients with schizophrenia show abnormally high knowledge corruption (i.e., high-confident errors expressed as a percentage of all high-confident responses were increased for schizophrenic patients relative to controls). The authors examined the conditions under which excessive knowledge corruption occurred using the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm. Whereas knowledge corruption in schizophrenia was significantly greater for false-negative errors relative to controls, no group difference occurred for false-positive errors. The groups showed a comparable high degree of confidence for false-positive recognition of critical lure items. Similar to findings collected in elderly participants, patients, but not controls, showed a strong positive correlation between the number of recognized studied items and false-positive recognition of the critical lure. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Adult age differences in recall of performed and nonperformed items.

Memory for performed cognitive activities (e.g., psychometric tests of intelligence), for performed brief actions (e.g., hand wave), and for nonperformed items (e.g., written words) was assessed for 102 older and 101 younger adults. Although enactment improved recall, the beneficial effects of enactment were the same for both age groups. In fact, more than 80% of the age-related variance in memory for performed items was shared with memory for nonperformed items. Working memory and perceptual speed were important to the age differences in memory for both types of items. Performed and nonperformed items showed different serial position effects. However, the correlation between memory for the 2 types of items was high, especially for older adults, suggesting that the 2 types of memory share many common processes. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Cue strength as a moderator of the testing effect: The benefits of elaborative retrieval.

The current study explored the elaborative retrieval hypothesis as an explanation for the testing effect: the tendency for a memory test to enhance retention more than restudying. In particular, the retrieval process during testing may activate elaborative information related to the target response, thereby increasing the chances that activation of any of this information will facilitate later retrieval of the target. In a test of this view, participants learned cue–target pairs, which were strongly associated (e.g., Toast: Bread) or weakly associated (e.g., Basket: Bread), through either a cued recall test (Toast: _____) or a restudy opportunity (Toast: Bread). A final test requiring free recall of the targets revealed that tested items were retained better than restudied items, and although strong cues facilitated recall of tested items initially, items recalled from weak cues were retained better over time, such that this advantage was eliminated or reversed at the time of the final test. Restudied items were retained at similar rates on the final test regardless of the strength of the cue–target relationship. These results indicate that the activation of elaborative information—which would occur to a greater extent during testing than restudying—may be one mechanism that underlies the testing effect. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Social Recognition Memory: The Effect of Other People's Responses for Previously Seen and Unseen Items.

When people discuss their memories, what one person says can influence what another person reports. In 3 studies, participants were shown sets of stimuli and then given recognition memory tests to measure the effect of one person's response on another's. The 1st study (n=24) used word recognition with participant-confederate pairs and found that the effect of confederate responses on participant responses was larger for previously unseen items than for previously seen items (ωp=.23). This finding was replicated in the 2nd study, which used photographs of cars (n=24). In the 3rd study (n=54), which used photographs of faces with participant pairs, the effect was also larger for unseen items. Results indicate that people rely more on other people's memories for unremembered objects than for remembered objects. This is important for both theories of memory and applications (e.g., witnesses talking, students studying together). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Aging, metamemory, and high-confidence errors: A misrecollection account.

Two experiments showed that older adults were worse than younger adults at judging the accuracy of their responses on source identification (i.e., who said what) and cued-recall tests. It is important to note that this age-related metamonitoring impairment occurred even after older and younger adults were matched on overall source accuracy and cued-recall accuracy. By contrast, older and younger adults showed comparable metamonitoring capacities when assessing the likely accuracy of old-new recognition judgments and responses to questions about general knowledge. These experiments are consistent with the misrecollection account of cognitive aging, which suggests that age-related memory impairments are due to older adults' vulnerability to making high-confidence errors when answering questions that require memory for specific details about recently learned events. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On the difference between strength-based and frequency-based mirror effects in recognition memory

According to the standard signal-detection model of recognition memory, confidence judgments for recognition responses are reached in much the same way that old-new decisions are reached (i.e., on the basis of criteria situated along the strength-of-evidence axis). The question investigated here is how the confidence criteria shift when recognition accuracy is manipulated across conditions. Although several theories assume that the old-new decision criterion shifts when recognition accuracy changes, less is known about how the confidence criteria move. An analysis of data previously reported by R. Ratcliff, G. McKoon, and M. Tindall (1994) and some new data reported here suggest that the confidence criteria fan out on the decision axis as d' decreases. This result is qualitatively consistent with the predictions of a likelihood ratio model, although the data did not support the stronger quantitative predictions of this account.     

Decision rules for recognition memory confidence judgments.

According to the standard signal-detection model of recognition memory, confidence judgments for recognition responses are reached in much the same way that old-new decisions are reached (i.e., on the basis of criteria situated along the strength-of-evidence axis). The question investigated here is how the confidence criteria shift when recognition accuracy is manipulated across conditions. Although several theories assume that the old-new decision criterion shifts when recognition accuracy changes, less is known about how the confidence criteria move. An analysis of data previously reported by R. Ratcliff, G. McKoon, and M. Tindall (1994) and some new data reported here suggest that the confidence criteria fan out on the decision axis as d' decreases. This result is qualitatively consistent with the predictions of a likelihood ratio model, although the data did not support the stronger quantitative predictions of this account. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Relationship between priming and recognition in deterministic and probabilistic sequence learning.

Exposure to a repeating sequence of target stimuli in a speeded localization task can support both priming of sequence-consistent responses and recognition of sequence components. In 3 experiments with both deterministic and probabilistic sequences, the authors used a novel procedure in which measures of priming and recognition were taken concurrently and asked whether these measures can be dissociated. In all of these experiments, both measures were above chance at the group level and no evidence of dissociation was found. Item-level analyses of the data in Experiment 3 did reveal dissociations in that (a) recognition judgments were affected by response speed independently of old-new status and (b) items that were not discriminated in recognition nonetheless showed priming. However, the authors show that these data, together with the group-level results, are compatible with a formal model in which priming and recognition are based on a single common memory variable. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Direct-comparison judgments: When and why above- and below-average effects reverse.

Above-average and below-average effects appear to be common and consistent across a variety of judgment domains. For example, several studies show that individual items from a high- (low-) quality set tend to be rated as better (worse) than the other items in the set (e.g., E. E. Giladi & Y. Klar, 2002). Experiments in this article demonstrate reversals of these effects. A novel account is supported, which describes how the timing of the denotation of the to-be-judged item influences attention and ultimately affects the size or direction of comparative biases. The authors discuss how this timing account is relevant for many types of referent-dependent judgments (e.g., probability judgments, resource allocations) and how it intersects with various accounts of comparative bias (focalism, generalized-group, compromise between local and general standards [LOGE]). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Attributing study effort to data-driven and goal-driven effects: Implications for metacognitive judgments.

In self-paced learning, when the regulation of effort is goal driven (e.g., allocated to different items according to their relative importance), judgments of learning (JOLs) increase with study time. When it is data driven (i.e., determined by the ease of committing the item to memory), JOLs decrease with study time (Koriat, Ma’ayan, & Nussinson, 2006). Because the amount of effort invested in different items is conjointly determined by data-driven and goal-driven regulation, an attribution process must be postulated in which variations in effort are attributed by the learner to data-driven or goal-driven regulation before the implications for metacognitive judgments are determined. To support the reality of this process, the authors asked learners to adopt a facial expression that creates a feeling of effort and induced them to attribute that effort either to data-driven or to goal-driven regulation. This manipulation was found to determine the direction in which experienced effort affected metacognitive judgment. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The ups and downs of memory.

Ever since the classic work of Ebbinghaus (1885/1964), the default view in scientific psychology has been that memory declines over time. Less well-known clinical and laboratory traditions suggest, however, that memory can also increase over time. Ballard (1913) demonstrated that, actually, memory simultaneously increases and decreases over time and thus has not 1 but 2 tendencies. When more than 1 recall test is administered, a later test invariably shows loss of some items remembered earlier (oblivescence), but later tests also invariably show that previously unremembered items are recovered in later tests (reminiscence). Depending on a number of factors (e.g., the stimulus used), the overall balance between reminiscence and oblivescence may be positive (hypermnesia) or negative (amnesia). Modern multitrial recall studies have extensively documented hypermnesic memory in single laboratory sessions and, also, although less frequently, over periods of days, weeks, and even months. With hypermnesic memory now established, hypnosis has been shown not to add anything to regular hypermnesia. This article presents an integration of the scattered literatures, which now, after a century of experimental and clinical effort, coheres into a solid empirical picture, with numerous implications (e.g., for the recovered memory controversy, eyewitness testimony, repression, and subliminal perception). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The perception of assimilation in newly learned novel words.

The present study investigated the mechanisms underlying perceptual compensation for assimilation in novel words. During training, participants learned canonical versions of novel spoken words (e.g., decibot) presented in isolation. Following exposure to a second set of novel words the next day, participants carried out a phoneme monitoring task. Here, the novel words were presented with final alternations (e.g., decibop) in carrier sentences that either licensed assimilation (viable context: Our decibop behaved badly) or did not (unviable context: Our decibop does very well). Listeners had to monitor for the underlying form of the assimilated consonant (e.g., /t/ in decibop). Results showed more responses corresponding to the underlying form in viable than in unviable contexts. This viability effect was equivalent for novel words learned on the same day and on the previous day but was absent for unexposed control items. The processing difference between exposed and control novel words supports the idea that compensation for assimilation interacts with newly acquired phonological information and suggests that contextual compensation for assimilation is enhanced by lexical knowledge. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Episodic priming and memory for temporal source: Event-related potentials reveal age-related differences in prefrontal functioning.

Event-related potentials (ERPs) were recorded from young (M?=?25) and older (M?=?71) adults during a recognition memory paradigm that assessed episodic priming. Participants studied two temporally distinct lists of sentences (each with two unassociated nouns). At test, in response to the nouns, participants made old–new, followed by remember (context)–know (familiarity) and source (i.e., list) judgments. Both young and older adults showed equivalent episodic priming effects. However, compared to the young adults, the older adults showed a greater source performance decrement than item memory performance decrement. Both age groups showed equivalent posterior-maximal old-new ERP effects. However, only the young produced a frontal-maximal, late onset old-new effect that differed as a function of subsequent list attribution. Because source memory is thought to be mediated by prefrontal cortex, we conclude that age-related memory differences may be due to a deficit in a prefrontal cortical system that underlies source memory and are not likely to be due to an age-related decline in episodic priming. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Strategies in study time allocation: Why is study time sometimes not effective?

Five experiments were conducted to explore the effect of task constraints on memorability ratings and on study time allocation strategies and to examine the conditions under which an item labor-in-vain effect is found (i.e., items studied for a long time that are not recalled equally or better than items studied for a short time). Results show that the strategy of time allocation was influenced by the outcome of a previous memory test (Exp 1), by the final memory test (Exp 4), and by the total available time (Exp 5). None of these manipulations eliminated the labor-in-vain effect, which is not due to the Ss' inability to manage the study time (Exp 3) and which disappeared only when the time was experimenter paced (Exp 2). Results are discussed in terms of a cost–benefit strategy. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Evidence for proactive interference in the focus of attention of working memory.

Proactive interference (PI) occurs when an earlier item interferes with memory for a newer item. Whereas some researchers (e.g., Surprenant & Neath, 2009a) argue that PI can be observed in all memory systems, some multiple systems theorists (e.g., Cowan, 1999) propose that items in the focus of attention of working memory are immune to PI. Two experiments tested whether PI occurs when the to-be-remembered items are assumed, by multiple-systems theorists, to be held in the focus of attention. In each experiment, subjects saw four trials in a row with the same type of to-be-remembered items, followed by four trials in a row with a different type of material. On each trial, only 3 stimuli were shown, which is below the capacity limit of the focus of attention, and subjects were asked if a probe item was one of those 3 items seen. In both experiments, response time increased from Trial 1 to Trial 4, suggesting that items from the earlier trials interfered with memory on the later trials. In addition, release from PI was shown in that response times decreased with a change of materials. The results replicate those first reported by Hanley and Scheirer (1975), and pose a problem for theorists who argue that parts of short-term memory are immune to PI. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)