基于LA型供应商的易逝品供应链价格补贴契约

针对由单个损失厌恶型供应商和单个风险中性型零售商组成的供应链系统,在前景理论框架下,研究了存在缺货损失下的基于批发价格契约和价格补贴契约的易逝品供应链协调问题。首先分析了分散化供应链系统在批发价格契约下供应商和零售商的最优决策,并将供应商的最优生产量与集中化供应链系统下的最优生产量进行了比较;从理论上严格证明了当供应商的最优生产量小于集中化供应链系统下的最优生产量时,供应商不能通过批发价格契约使得自己的生产量为集中化供应链的生产量。然后分析了在缔结政府提供的价格补贴契约下供应商和零售商的最优决策。研究结果表明,损失厌恶型供应商在批发价格契约下的最优生产量可能偏离系统最优生产量,这时政府可以通过价格补贴契约来协调整个供应链。     

需求不确定性对混合条件风险价值约束供应链系统的影响

运用随机占优研究风险偏好和需求不确定性对混合条件风险价值约束供应链系统的影响.证明在批发价和收益共享契约下零售商的最优订货量和利润随风险偏好系数的增加而减小;只有在零售商为风险追求型时,批发价契约才能实现供应链协调;无论零售商的风险偏好如何,收益共享契约都能实现供应链协调.在收益共享契约下,随机大需求将导致零售商获得较高的最优利润;当零售商为风险中性或风险厌恶时,其最优利润随需求可变性的增加而减少.     

Supply chain model with price- and trade credit-sensitive demand under two-level permissible delay in payments

This article develops a single-manufacturer and single-retailer supply chain model under two-level permissible delay in payments when the manufacturer follows a lot-for-lot policy in response to the retailer's demand. The manufacturer offers a trade credit period to the retailer with the contract that the retailer must share a fraction of the profit earned during the trade credit period. On the other hand, the retailer provides his customer a partial trade credit which is less than that of the manufacturer. The demand at the retailer is assumed to be dependent on the selling price and the trade credit period offered to the customers. The average net profit of the supply chain is derived and an algorithm for finding the optimal solution is developed. Numerical examples are given to demonstrate the coordination policy of the supply chain and examine the sensitivity of key model-parameters.     

基于延迟定价策略的供应链分散与集中决策

针对消费者市场需求不确定性大的特征, 采用延迟定价策略应对需求波动和实现产品售罄. 基于供应商和零售商的两级供应链, 探讨最优零售价格的确立, 分别建立分散决策下的零售商利润函数模型和集中决策下的供应链系统利润函数模型, 通过函数单峰性分析证明最优订货量的存在性和唯一性, 并求得最优解. 比较和数值分析表明, 在分散决策下, 采用延迟定价策略虽然未必能达到集中决策时的供应链系统最优, 但相比固定售价, 可以显著提高供应链的总利润.

     

模糊闭环供应链的定价与销售努力决策

从期望利润最大化的角度研究了单周期两级模糊闭环供应链的定价与销售努力最优决策问题。分析了包含一个制造商和一个零售商的闭环供应链中的模糊不确定性及需求依赖于零售价格和零售商销售努力的性质,分别建立了集中式决策模型和零售商主导的Stackelberg 博弈模型并进行了求解。数值算例验证了模型的有效性,结论表明：考虑销售努力时产品的最优零售价格、批发价格分别高于不考虑销售努力情形下的相应价格;考虑销售努力时零售商和系统的最大期望利润分别大于不考虑销售努力情形下的最大期望利润。     

Coordinating decisions by supply chain partners in a vendor-managed inventory relationship

We look into the linked decision making in the vendor-managed inventory (VMI) relationship. It is a supply chain management model, where the retailer decides the retail price while the vendor determines its capacity commitment. In this model, the retailer and the vendor should coordinate their decisions in order to maximize their individual profit or the total profit combining the two participants together. The vendor has to take into account the demand pattern throughout the product life cycle (PLC) when it decides its capacity commitment, which will affect its inventory management cost during the PLC, while the retailer should change the retail price over the PLC so as to maximize the revenues and minimize the inventory cost at the same time. Employing a system dynamics simulation approach based on differential game theory, which also takes into account the product characteristics such as the demand’s innovation and imitation effects, we analyze and confirm the dynamic coordination of key decision variables by the supply chain partners in the VMI relationship.     

网购环境下提供退款保证时的决策模型研究

研究了不同供应链成员提供退款保证策略及其优化选择问题。考虑了由单个制造商和单个零售商组成的单条供应链,共考虑了三种退款保证策略,即制造商和零售商均不提供退款保证、仅零售商提供退款保证以及仅制造商提供退款保证策略。分别求解得到相应的最优消费者需求量、零售价格、批发价格以及利润的联合决策。研究发现：零售商的商品销售价格、制造商的批发价格、消费者的需求量以及零售商和制造商的利润都与是否提供退款保证服务有关。发现只要当供应链成员提供退款保证服务时商品残值满足一定条件,提供退款保证不仅不会使供应链成员利润降低,反而会提高他们的利润水平;当制造商提供退款保证时商品残值与零售商提供退款保证时商品残值的差值满足一定的条件,供应链中制造商和零售商提供退款保证服务都有可能给供应链带来更高的利润水平。     

Supply chain financing with advance selling under disruption

We study a financing problem in a supply chain (SC) consisting of one supplier and one buyer under supply disruption. The supplier could face a disruption at its end which could effectively reduce its yield in case of disruption, thereby resulting in supply yield uncertainty. The retailer can finance the supplier using advance selling that can help mitigate the impact of disruption. We model this problem as a Stackelberg game, where the supplier as the leader announces the wholesale price and the retailer responds by deciding its optimal order quantity given stochastic demand and an exogenous fixed retail price. The supplier then commences production and a disruption can happen with a known probability. We assume that under disruption the quantity delivered is a fraction of the initial quantity ordered by the retailer. The retailer loses any unmet demand. We analyze three different scenarios of the Stackelberg game, namely no advance selling with disruption, advance selling without disruption, and advance selling with disruption. Our results indicate that advance selling can be used to mitigate the impact of supply disruption and at the same time could lead to an increase in the overall SC profit.     

A cooperative advertising collaboration policy in supply chain management under uncertain conditions

Many industries are facing big challenges to design supply chains in a way to maximize the profit and meet the heightened expectations of the customer. This new era entirely relies on the dynamic advantages of competition and the role played by the collaboration policy. A global economy and increasing demand have put a huge pressure on supply chain partners to build a collaboration policy based on price, order quantity, and advertising. Companies are adopting the idea of ”shaking hands” to obtain more profit instead of taking risks through competition. Cooperative (co-op) advertising is a significant policy of centralized supply chain management (SCM) to boost the revenues generated by the supplier, manufacturer, and retailers. The uncertain costs associated with the supply chain management also create obstacles in economic analysis and feasibility. These uncertainties are associated with the basic costs of all supply chain partners, which are represented using a signed distance formula. This paper develops the concept of co-op advertising among the supplier, manufacturer, and retailers with a variable demand driven by selling price and advertising costs, where all basic costs are considered as fuzzy. The profit is optimized by considering variable cycle time, shipments, pricing and advertising costs for the decision support system of the supply chain management. The optimal results of the co-op advertisement ensured an increase in the revenue of whole supply chain.     

基于不同交货期决策权下的供应链交货期和定价决策研究

基于对价格和交货期敏感的需求,针对一个制造商与一个零售商构成的两阶段供应链,以最大化期望利润为目标,分别建立供应链交货期由制造商和零售商控制的决策模型,以得到相应的最优解和最大期望利润.通过比较,探讨了不同交货期决策权对供应链最优交货期和最大期望利润的影响,得到了为实现期望利润最大化,针对顾客需求特性,供应链系统应在保证一定交货期服务水平的基础上选择由制造商控制供应链交货期的结论.     

Contract analysis: A performance measures and profit evaluation within two-echelon supply chains

Coordination is regarded as key in managing dependencies between distinctive members of a supply chain through the benefits of coordination mechanisms. Such coordination mechanisms are contracts, implemented to increase total supply chain profit, reduce costs and share risk among supply chain members. However, by contract implementation the retailer is constrained in his purchase by bearing the entire risk of holding the inventory (wholesale price contract) or by limited risk allocated to the supplier (buyback, revenue sharing and quantity flexibility contracts). By implementing an advanced purchase system the risk of inventory is fairly divided between the supplier and the retailer. In order to observe inventory implications on the supply chain bottom line, this article is directed towards the evaluation of performance measures and supply chain profit behavior under buyback, revenue sharing, quantity flexibility and advanced purchase discount contracts versus no coordination and wholesale price systems.     

基于损失厌恶型零售商的易逝品供应链价格补贴契约研究

在前景理论框架下,探讨了存在缺货损失下的由损失厌恶型零售商和风险中性型供应商组成的供应链价格补贴契约设计,研究了供应商为风险中性时,损失厌恶型零售商分别在批发价格契约和价格补贴契约下的订货行为.研究结果表明,损失厌恶型的零售商在批发价格契约下的订货可能偏离系统最优订货,供应商通过价格补贴契约可以协调整个供应链.最后通过算例分析,验证了价格补贴契约在协调供应链中的有效性.     

考虑延迟交货风险的易逝品供应链回购契约研究

考虑供应商延迟交货对终端顾客需求的影响,基于回购契约建立考虑延迟交货的供应链订货模型,并分析了延迟交货风险和需求风险的分担.研究表明:在供应商延迟交货的情况下实现协调的回购价格低于无延迟的情形;在实现协调的条件下,对于供应商而言,回购价格高而延迟交货罚金低的回购策略更有利;对于零售商而言则相反.供应商和零售商都愿意承担更多的需求不确定风险而承担较少的延迟交货风险.算例分析进一步验证了该研究结论.     

基于区块链的游戏软件产品版权保护研究

目前关于区块链应用场景和理念设计的研究较多,但基于供应链协调视角揭示区块链应用的影响仍较缺乏。以游戏软件产品供应链为例,探讨了区块链场景下在线渠道消费者购买效用折扣系数和盗版用户效用折扣系数对均衡价格、均衡利润的影响。结果表明,供应商的利润提高幅度最大,提高量弥补了零售商的损失量,因此供应链整体利润得到优化。此外,通过构建并求解区块链场景下某类仿制软件供应链均衡价格和均衡利润模型,发现仿制软件供应商的价格优势不再明显,甚至消失。最后,考虑到零售商在区块链场景下均衡利润减少的事实,针对性地提出各成员基于供应链协调分配利润角度的相关对策建议。     

线性时变需求的二级供应链协调模型

考虑由一个供应商和一个零售商构成的二级供应链系统,在线性时变需求、产品的零售价格与其存储时间有关、货栈容量有限且不允许缺货的情形下,研究了供应商如何利用全数量折扣计划来激励零售商合作从而实现自身利润最大化和供应链系统完美协调的问题。从理论上证明和分析了模型最优解的存在性,同时提供了求解最优解的简单方法,并通过算例对上述结论进行佐证。     

Coordination-based inventory management for deteriorating items in a two-echelon supply chain with profit sharing

This study develops a model for inventory management consisting of a two-echelon supply chain (SC) with profit sharing and deteriorating items. The retailer and the supplier act as the leader and follower, in which the supplier faces a huge setup cost and economic order quantity ordering strategy. The market demand is affected by the sale price of the product, and the inventory has a deterioration rate following a Weibull distribution. The retailer executes three profit-sharing mechanisms to motivate the supplier to participate in SC optimisation and to extend the life cycle of the product. A search algorithm is developed to determine the solutions as using the profit-sharing mechanisms. The outcomes from numerical experiments demonstrate the profitability of the proposed model.     

Supply chain coordination based on return contracts with a threshold ordering quantity

Return contracts are commonly used by companies selling products with short life cycles and highly uncertain demand. Current research on return contracts assumes suppliers are responsible for all surplus products. In practice, retailers tend to order more than necessary and leave suppliers with large after‐season returns. To mitigate the problem, a new type of return contract with a threshold ordering quantity has been developed by some enterprises. Under these contracts, suppliers specify a threshold for retailers’ ordering quantity. They buy back only the portion in excess of the threshold. In this paper, we show that this new type of contract can achieve two objectives: (a) the supply chain is coordinated, and (b) both the supplier and the retailer can gain more profit than they can gain under a wholesale‐price‐only contract. The new contract does not require any manipulation of wholesale prices. This makes it more acceptable in practice by supply chain members. We also illustrate our findings in a numerical example.     

互惠偏好下的闭环供应链系统定价决策分析

研究制造商和零售商互惠偏好行为下的最优定价策略和利润, 以及这种互惠偏好对决策行为和渠道效率的影响. 研究发现, 双方的互惠偏好程度对制造商废旧品回收比例呈正面影响; 零售商互惠偏好程度对制造商产品批发价格呈负面影响; 双方互惠偏好程度增加会导致零售商产品售价降低, 从而产品市场需求量增加; 系统成员的互惠偏好程度增加会导致自身收益减少和对方收益增加; 互惠偏好行为有利于闭环供应链系统收益和渠道效率的提高.

     

模糊环境下考虑零售商风险偏好的绿色供应链博弈模型

在模糊需求环境下绿色供应链运作系统中,研究由单一制造商和单一零售商组成的两级绿色供应链.首先,引入创新成本,分别建立风险中性制造商为主导者,具有中性、悲观和乐观等风险偏好的零售商为跟随者的两级绿色供应链Stackelberg博弈模型;然后,推导出最优决策的期望值和机会约束规划模型,并进行算例分析,比较产品绿色度、批发价格及零售价格与不同置信水平之间的相互影响,探讨具有不同风险偏好的零售商对模糊绿色供应链中制造商、零售商及供应链整体运作绩效的影响.研究结果表明:悲观决策模型中,伴随置信水平的增加,产品的绿色度水平、批发价格及创新成本逐步下降,零售价格、制造商、零售商及绿色供应链整体利润逐步上升;在乐观决策模型中,结论相反.     

考虑制造商公平关切的强势零售商自有品牌导入策略研究

研究了制造商公平关切下强势零售商的自有品牌导入策略,在有强势零售商存在的供应链中,考虑弱势一方制造商的公平关切对供应链决策的影响。将零售商是否导入自有品牌以及制造商是否具有公平关切行为进行组合,得到了四种情景,分析了四种情景下的供应链博弈模型,得到均衡策略、利润以及相应自有品牌的导入条件;进一步对模型进行比较分析,探讨自有品牌导入以及制造商公平关切对供应链成员决策以及利润的影响。研究发现,制造商的公平关切会使其批发价格和利润提高;零售商导入自有品牌会使零售商和供应链的利润增加,当自有品牌产品替代率较大时也会有利于制造商利润水平的提高。