Folk Intuitions, Asymmetry, and Intentional Side Effects.

An agent S wants to A and knows that if she A-s she will also bring about B. S does not care at all about B. S then A-s, also bringing about B. Did she intentionally bring B about? Joshua Knobe (2003b) has recently argued that, according to the folk concept of intentional action, the answer depends on B's moral significance. In particular, if B is reprehensible, people are more likely to say that S intentionally brought it about. Knobe defends this position with empirical facts about how ordinary people use the adjective 'intentionally.' Knobe's results are consistent with the thesis that the concept of intentional action is fundamentally evaluative. There is an alternative hypothesis, however, which can account for Knobe's data and which keeps the concept of intentional action within the purview of action theory. The current author suggests that the following conditions are jointly sufficient for a side effect E, produced by S's action A, being intentional: (i) S knows that E will (or is likely to) occur as a result of A-ing, (ii) bringing about E counts against A-ing (from the S's perspective), and (iii) S does not try to keep E from occurring. Known immoral side effects will always, from the folk's perspective, satisfy condition (ii) of this hypothesis. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Moral identity and the experience of moral elevation in response to acts of uncommon goodness.

Four studies using survey and experimental designs examined whether people whose moral identity is highly self-defining are more susceptible to experiencing a state of moral elevation after being exposed to acts of uncommon moral goodness. Moral elevation consists of a suite of responses that motivate prosocial action tendencies. Study 1 showed that people higher (vs. lower) in moral identity centrality reported experiencing more intense elevating emotions, had more positive views of humanity, and were more desirous of becoming a better person after reading about an act of uncommon goodness than about a merely positive situation or an act of common benevolence. Study 2 showed that those high in moral identity centrality were more likely to recall acts of moral goodness and experience moral elevation in response to such events more strongly. These experiences were positively related to self-reported prosocial behavior. Study 3 showed a direct effect on behavior using manipulated, rather than measured, moral identity centrality. Study 4 replicated the effect of moral identity on the states of elevation as well as on self-reported physical sensations and showed that the elevation mediates the relationship between moral identity, witnessing uncommon goodness, and prosocial behavior. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Moral hypocrisy: Addressing some alternatives.

Two studies addressed alternative explanations for 3 pieces of evidence supporting the existence of moral hypocrisy. In Study 1, no support was found for the idea that low salience of social standards accounts for falsifying the result of a coin flip to assign oneself a more desirable task. In Study 2, no support was found for the idea that responses of those who honestly win the flip account for the higher ratings of morality of their action by participants who assign themselves the more desirable task after flipping the coin. Also, no support was found for the idea that responses of those who honestly win the flip account for the inability of personal moral responsibility measures to predict moral action. Instead, results of both studies provided additional evidence of moral hypocrisy. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

How power influences moral thinking.

The authors conducted 5 studies to test the idea that both thinking about and having power affects the way in which people resolve moral dilemmas. It is shown that high power increases the use of rule-based (deontological) moral thinking styles, whereas low power increases reliance on outcome-based (consequentialist) moral thinking. Stated differently, in determining whether an act is right or wrong, the powerful focus on whether rules and principles are violated, whereas the powerless focus on the consequences. For this reason, the powerful are also more inclined to stick to the rules, irrespective of whether this has positive or negative effects, whereas the powerless are more inclined to make exceptions. The first 3 experiments show that thinking about power increases rule-based thinking and decreases outcome-based thinking in participants’ moral decision making. A 4th experiment shows the mediating role of moral orientation in the effect of power on moral decisions. The 5th experiment demonstrates the role of self-interest by showing that the power–moral link is reversed when rule-based decisions threaten participants’ own self-interests. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Exploring the psychological underpinnings of the moral mandate effect: Motivated reasoning, group differentiation, or anger?

When people have strong moral convictions about outcomes, their judgments of both outcome and procedural fairness become driven more by whether outcomes support or oppose their moral mandates than by whether procedures are proper or improper (the moral mandate effect). Two studies tested 3 explanations for the moral mandate effect. In particular, people with moral mandates may (a) have a greater motivation to seek out procedural flaws when outcomes fail to support their moral point of view (the motivated reasoning hypothesis), (b) be influenced by in-group distributive biases as a result of identifying with parties that share rather than oppose their moral point of view (the group differentiation hypothesis), or (c) react with anger when outcomes are inconsistent with their moral point of view, which, in turn, colors perceptions of both outcomes and procedures (the anger hypothesis). Results support the anger hypothesis. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Folk Psychology and Folk Morality: Response to Critics.

The author's studies of the distinction people draw between intentional and unintentional behavior indicate that people's intuitions as to whether or not a behavior was performed intentionally can be influenced by their beliefs about the moral status of the behavior itself. Criticisms of the author's work raise a number of important questions, and, in this paper, the author hopes to show that the technical insights of his critics actually bear on issues of quite broad importance that go beyond the concept of intentional action specifically. Along the way, the author points to a number of unsolved problems. He presents some preliminary ideas about how to address a few of these problems, but others are more elusive. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Moral attentiveness: Who pays attention to the moral aspects of life?

This research draws from social cognitive theory to develop a construct known as moral attentiveness, the extent to which an individual chronically perceives and considers morality and moral elements in his or her experiences, and proposes that moral attentiveness affects a variety of behaviors. A series of 5 studies with undergraduates, MBA students, and managers were conducted to create and validate a reliable multidimensional scale and to provide evidence that moral attentiveness is associated with (a) the recall and reporting of self- and others' morality-related behaviors, (b) moral awareness, and (c) moral behavior. Results of the studies suggest that moral attentiveness has a significant effect on how individuals understand and act in their moral worlds. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Abstraction, Inference, and Acceptance in Children's Processing of an Adult Model's Moral Judgments.

The effects of a common dimension within a model's performance on different aspects of observational learning were examined in two experiments. Children observed an adult female make a series of choices between alternative solutions to hypothetical moral dilemma situations. In the common-dimension conditions, the model either selected behavioral options that consistently reflected some form of social responsibility or picked solutions that consistently reflected the motive of avoiding harm to self. In the no-common-dimension condition, the model chose half social responsibility and half harm-avoidance answers. In Experiment 1 we tested children's ability to recall the model's moral judgments given the presence or absence of a common dimension. In Experiment 2 we examined children's attributions concerning the unobserved behavior of the model and their acceptance of the rule governing her responses as a guide for their own choices. As predicted, the presence of a common dimension facilitated recall of the model's choices, led children to infer that similar consistency would be found in her judgments about other moral issues, and resulted in modifications of the children's own responses to a test of moral reasoning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Vicarious moral licensing: The influence of others' past moral actions on moral behavior.

This article investigates the effect of others' prior nonprejudiced behavior on an individual's subsequent behavior. Five studies supported the hypothesis that people are more willing to express prejudiced attitudes when their group members' past behavior has established nonprejudiced credentials. Study 1a showed that participants who were told that their group was more moral than similar other groups were more willing to describe a job as better suited for Whites than for African Americans. In Study 1b, when given information on group members' prior nondiscriminatory behavior (selecting a Hispanic applicant in a prior task), participants subsequently gave more discriminatory ratings to the Hispanic applicant for a position stereotypically suited for majority members (Whites). In Study 2, moral self-concept mediated the effect of others' prior nonprejudiced actions on a participant's subsequent prejudiced behavior such that others' past nonprejudiced actions enhanced the participant's moral self-concept, and this inflated moral self-concept subsequently drove the participant's prejudiced ratings of a Hispanic applicant. In Study 3, the moderating role of identification with the credentialing group was tested. Results showed that participants expressed more prejudiced attitudes toward a Hispanic applicant when they highly identified with the group members behaving in nonprejudiced manner. In Study 4, the credentialing task was dissociated from the participants' own judgmental task, and, in addition, identification with the credentialing group was manipulated rather than measured. Consistent with prior studies, the results showed that participants who first had the opportunity to view an in-group member's nonprejudiced hiring decision were more likely to reject an African American man for a job stereotypically suited for majority members. These studies suggest a vicarious moral licensing effect. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

The effects of moral judgment and moral identity on moral behavior: An empirical examination of the moral individual.

Recognizing limitations in classic cognitive moral development theory, several scholars have drawn from theories of identity to suggest that moral behavior results from both moral judgments and moral identity. The authors conducted 2 survey-based studies with more than 500 students and managers to test this argument. Results demonstrated that moral identity and moral judgments both independently influenced moral behavior. In addition, in situations in which social consensus regarding the moral behavior was not high, moral judgments and moral identity interacted to shape moral behavior. This interaction effect indicated that those who viewed themselves as moral individuals pursued the most extreme alternatives (e.g., never cheating, regularly cheating)--a finding that affirms the motivational power of a moral identity. The authors conclude by considering the implications of this research for both theory and practice. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Disgust sensitivity predicts intuitive disapproval of gays.

Two studies demonstrate that a dispositional proneness to disgust (“disgust sensitivity”) is associated with intuitive disapproval of gay people. Study 1 was based on previous research showing that people are more likely to describe a behavior as intentional when they see it as morally wrong (see Knobe, 2006, for a review). As predicted, the more disgust sensitive participants were, the more likely they were to describe an agent whose behavior had the side effect of causing gay men to kiss in public as having intentionally encouraged gay men to kiss publicly—even though most participants did not explicitly think it wrong to encourage gay men to kiss in public. No such effect occurred when subjects were asked about heterosexual kissing. Study 2 used the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2006) as a dependent measure. The more disgust sensitive participants were, the more they showed unfavorable automatic associations with gay people as opposed to heterosexuals. Two studies demonstrate that a dispositional proneness to disgust (“disgust sensitivity”) is associated with intuitive disapproval of gay people. Study 1 was based on previous research showing that people are more likely to describe a behavior as intentional when they see it as morally wrong (see Knobe, 2006, for a review). As predicted, the more disgust sensitive participants were, the more likely they were to describe an agent whose behavior had the side effect of causing gay men to kiss in public as having intentionally encouraged gay men to kiss publicly—even though most participants did not explicitly think it wrong to encourage gay men to kiss in public. No such effect occurred when subjects were asked about heterosexual kissing. Study 2 used the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2006) as a dependent measure. The more disgust sensitive participants were, the more they showed unfavorable automatic associations with gay people as opposed to heterosexuals. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The moral emotions: A social–functionalist account of anger, disgust, and contempt.

Recent research has highlighted the important role of emotion in moral judgment and decision making (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Haidt, 2001). What is less clear is whether distinctions should be drawn among specific moral emotions. Although some have argued for differences among anger, disgust, and contempt (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999), others have suggested that these terms may describe a single undifferentiated emotional response to morally offensive behavior (Nabi, 2002). In this article, we take a social–functionalist perspective, which makes the prediction that these emotions should be differentiable both in antecedent appraisals and in consequent actions and judgments. Studies 1–3 tested and found support for our predictions concerning distinctions among antecedent appraisals, including (a) a more general role for disgust than has been previously been described, (b) an effect of self-relevance on anger but not other emotions, and (c) a role for contempt in judging incompetent actions. Studies 4 and 5 tested and found support for our specific predictions concerning functional outcomes, providing evidence that these emotions are associated with different consequences. Taken together, these studies support a social–functionalist account of anger, disgust, and contempt and lay the foundation for future research on the negative interpersonal emotions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.

Research on moral judgment has been dominated by rationalist models, in which moral judgment is thought to be caused by moral reasoning. The author gives 4 reasons for considering the hypothesis that moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached. The social intuitionist model is presented as an alternative to rationalist models. The model is a social model in that it deemphasizes the private reasoning done by individuals and emphasizes instead the importance of social and cultural influences. The model is an intuitionist model in that it states that moral judgment is generally the result of quick, automatic evaluations (intuitions). The model is more consistent than rationalist models with recent findings in social, cultural, evolutionary, and biological psychology, as well as in anthropology and primatology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Dual processing and organizational justice: The role of rational versus experiential processing in third-party reactions to workplace mistreatment.

The moral perspective of justice proposes that when confronted by another person's mistreatment, third parties can experience a deontic response, that is, an evolutionary-based emotional reaction that motivates them to engage in retribution toward the transgressor. In this article, we tested whether the third party's deontic reaction is less strong when a rational (vs. experiential) processing frame is primed. Further, we tested whether third parties high (vs. low) in moral identity are more resistant to the effects of processing frames. Results from a sample of 185 French managers revealed that following an injustice, managers primed to use rational processing reported lower retribution tendencies compared with managers primed to use experiential processing. Third parties high in moral identity, however, were less affected by the framing; they reported a high retribution response regardless of processing frame. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The Emotional Dog Gets Mistaken for a Possum.

H. D. Saltzstein and T. Kasachkoff (2004) (see record 2004-21519-004) critique the social intuitionist model (J. Haidt, 2001) (see record 2001-18918-008), but the model they critique is a stripped-down version that should be called the "possum" model. They make 3 charges about the possum model that are not true about the social intuitionist model: that it includes no role for reasoning, that it reduces social influence to compliance, and that it does not take a developmental perspective. After a defense of the honor of the social intuitionist model, this article raises 2 areas of legitimate dispute: the scope and nature of moral reasoning and the usefulness of appealing to innate ideas, rather than to learning and reasoning, as the origin of moral knowledge. This article presents 3 clusters of innate moral intuitions, related to sympathy, hierarchy, and reciprocity. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Knowledge, moral praise, and moral side effects.

Thomas Nadelhoffer (2004) claims that a morally praiseworthy agent cannot knowingly produce a morally positive side effect. I claim that the argument Nadelhoffer uses to establish this claim has two false premises. The two false premises are: (1) If something is a side effect, then it is not desired or intended; and (2) If agent S is morally praiseworthy and knows that her performing p will produce a morally positive q, then q forms part of S's reason for p-ing. I offer a counterexample that shows the falsity of (1) and (2). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The role of anticipated regret in escalation of commitment.

This research tests the general proposition that people are motivated to reduce future regret under escalation situations. This is supported by the findings that (a) escalation of commitment is stronger when the possibility of future regret about withdrawal is high than when this possibility is low (Studies 1a and 1b) and (b) escalation of commitment increases as the net anticipated regret about withdrawal increases (Studies 2a and 2b). Furthermore, the regret effects in the 4 studies were above and beyond the personal responsibility effects on escalation. This research indicates that people in escalation situations are simultaneously influenced by the emotions they expect to experience in the future (e.g., anticipated regret) and by events that have happened in the past (e.g., responsibility for the initiating previous decision). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)