Exemplar-based model of social judgment.

As an alternative to algebraic and schematic models of social judgment, a new exemplar-based model holds that representations of specific individuals influence judgments about persons and groups. (1) As the perceiver encounters or thinks about an individual, a representation of that exemplar as interpreted by the perceiver is stored in memory. (2) When a target person is encountered later, known attributes of similar exemplars from memory influence judgments about the target. Similarity is modulated by the perceiver's attention to stimulus dimensions. (3) Social and motivational factors, including perceiver self-schemata, social context, and in-group/out-group dynamics, influence social judgment by affecting perceivers' attention to dimensions. Computer simulations show how the model accounts for social influences on exemplar access and use, and therefore, on the content of social judgments. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Errors and mistakes: Evaluating the accuracy of social judgment.

Laboratory research on "error" in social judgment has largely supplanted research that addresses accuracy issues more directly. Moreover, this research attracts a great deal of attention because of what many take to be its dismal implications for the accuracy of human social reasoning. These implications are illusory, however, because an error is not the same thing as a "mistake." An error is a judgment of an experimental stimulus that departs from a model of the judgment process. If this model is normative, then the error can be said to represent an incorrect judgment. A mistake, by contrast, is an incorrect judgment of a real-world stimulus and therefore more difficult to determine. Although errors can be highly informative about the process of judgment in general, they are not necessarily relevant to the content or accuracy of particular judgments, because errors in a laboratory may not be mistakes with respect to a broader, more realistic frame of reference and the processes that produce such errors might lead to correct decisions and adaptive outcomes in real life. Several examples are described in this article. Accuracy issues cannot be addressed by research that concentrates on demonstrating error in relation to artificial stimuli, but only by research that uses external, realistic criteria for accuracy. These criteria might include the degree to which judgments agree with each other and yield valid predictions of behavior. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Dissociation Between Judgments and Outcome-Expectancy Measures in Covariation Learning: A Signal Detection Theory Approach.

A number of studies using trial-by-trial learning tasks have shown that judgments of covariation between a cue c and an outcome o deviate from normative metrics. Parameters based on trial-by-trial predictions were estimated from signal detection theory (SDT) in a standard causal learning task. Results showed that manipulations of P(c) when contingency (ΔP) was held constant did not affect participants' ability to predict the appearance of the outcome (d') but had a significant effect on response criterion (c) and numerical causal judgments. The association between criterion c and judgment was further demonstrated in 2 experiments in which the criterion was directly manipulated by linking payoffs to the predictive responses made by learners. In all cases, the more liberal the criterion c was, the higher judgments were. The results imply that the mechanisms underlying the elaboration of judgments and those involved in the elaboration of predictive responses are partially dissociable. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The effect of frequency of judgement and the type of trials on covariation learning.

This study showed that accuracy of the estimated relationship between a fictitious symptom and a disease depends on the interaction between the frequency of judgment and the last trial type. This effect appeared both in positive and zero contingencies (Experiment 1), and judgments were less accurate as frequency increased (Experiment 2). The effect can be explained neither by interference of previous judgments or memory demands (Experiment 3), nor by the perceptual characteristics of the stimuli (Experiments 4 and 5), and instructions intended to alter processing strategies do not produce any reliable effect. The interaction between frequency and trial type on covariation judgment is not predicted by any model (either statistical or associative) currently used to explain performance in covariation detection. The authors propose a belief-revision model to explain this effect as an important response mode variable on covariation learning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Methods of assessing strategies for judging covariation between events.

Investigated method of assessment as one possible source of the poor agreement in research about strategies people use to assess covariation between events. A set of problems was developed in such a way that different judgment rules would produce different decisions about the relationships between events. 116 college students (aged 18–32 yrs) judged these problems and were then asked to explain their judgment strategy. In addition, they were shown model strategies and asked to choose the one like their own strategy and the model that would be the best strategy. Ss whose judgments indicated use of the most sophisticated strategy were quite accurate in reporting their judgment rules. Ss using the less accurate rules most commonly reported using strategies that could not have produced the obtained pattern of problem solutions. These findings suggest that self-report is a weak basis for conclusions about sources of error in covariation judgment. (30 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Social judgment theory and academic advisement.

13 advisors in a university student development program each made a large number of judgments concerning appropriate course selection for profiles of students based on archival data. These judgments were analyzed via regression analysis, and the judgment policy of each S was "captured." Three Ss (the director of counseling, a professional counselor, and a "peer" counselor) are described as examples of the potential use of the lens model in investigating curriculum advisement behavior. The power and limitations of this research model are briefly reviewed. Implications of the results, and of the findings of the social judgment literature in general, are explored. (11 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Optimal integration of auditory and vibrotactile information for judgments of temporal order.

Recent research that assessed spatial judgments about multisensory stimuli suggests that humans integrate multisensory inputs in a statistically optimal manner by weighting each input by its normalized reciprocal variance. Is integration similarly optimal when humans judge the temporal properties of bimodal stimuli? Twenty-four participants performed temporal order judgments (TOJs) about 2 spatially separated stimuli. Stimuli were auditory, vibrotactile, or both. The temporal profiles of vibrotactile stimuli were manipulated to produce 3 levels of precision for TOJs. In bimodal conditions, the asynchrony between the 2 unimodal stimuli that comprised a bimodal stimulus was manipulated to determine the weight given to touch. Bimodal performance on 2 measures—judgment uncertainty and tactile weight—was predicted with unimodal data. A model relying exclusively on audition was rejected on the basis of both measures. A second model that selected the best input on each trial did not predict the reduced judgment uncertainty observed in bimodal trials. Only the optimal maximum-likelihood-estimation model predicted both judgment uncertainties and weights; the model’s validity is extended to TOJs. Alternatives for modeling the process of event sequencing based on integrated multisensory inputs are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Driven by power? Probe question and presentation format effects on causal judgment.

It has been proposed that causal power (defined as the probability with which a candidate cause would produce an effect in the absence of any other background causes) can be intuitively computed from cause-effect covariation information. Estimation of power is assumed to require a special type of counterfactual probe question, worded to remove potential sources of ambiguity. The present study analyzes the adequacy of such questions to evoke normative causal power estimation. The authors report that judgments to counterfactual probes do not conform to causal power and that they strongly depend on both the probe question wording and the way that covariation information is presented. The data are parsimoniously accounted for by an alternative model of causal judgment, the Evidence Integration rule. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The utility of theories in intuitive statistics: The robustness of theory-based judgments.

Research on human judgment demonstrates that people's theories often bias their evaluation of evidence and suggests that people might be more accurate if they were unbiased by prior beliefs. In 2 studies using the covariation estimation problem and the t-test problem, judgments made by Ss who had potentially biasing prior information about data were compared to those made by Ss who were not biased by prior information. 265 undergraduates served as Ss in Study 1; 201 undergraduates were Ss in Study 2. The quality of the data was varied to present Ss with data that were either well-behaved or contaminated with outliers. In both studies, Ss' judgments approximated robust statistical measures rather than the conventional measures typically used as normative criteria. The usual biasing effects of prior beliefs were found, along with an advantage for Ss who had prior theories—even incorrect ones—over Ss who were completely "objective." Potentially biasing beliefs both enhanced Ss' sensitivity to the bulk of the data and reduced the influence atypical scores had on their estimates. Evidence is provided that this robustness results from the fact that prior theories make judgment problems more meaningful. (40 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Mood and judgment: The affect infusion model (AIM).

Evidence for the role of affective states in social judgments is reviewed, and a new integrative theory, the affect infusion model (AIM), is proposed as a comprehensive explanation of these effects. The AIM, based on a multiprocess approach to social judgments, identifies 4 alternative judgmental strategies: (a) direct access, (b) motivated, (c) heuristic, and (d) substantive processing. The model predicts that the degree of affect infusion into judgments varies along a processing continuum, such that judgments requiring heuristic or substantive processing are more likely to be infused by affect than are direct access or motivated judgments. The role of target, judge, and situational variables in recruiting high- or low-infusion judgmental strategies is considered, and empirical support for the model is reviewed. The relationship between the AIM and other affect-cognition theories is discussed, and implications for future research are outlined. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A constant error approach to the study of dimensions of social perception.

"A method was described for use in the study of dimensions of social perception which consisted of the factor analysis of intercorrelations between trait judgments of photographs where each judgment was made of a different stimulus." 4 factors were isolated, and the findings were related to other research on social perception and personality. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Beyond smile dynamics: Mimicry and beliefs in judgments of smiles.

The judgment that a smile is based on “true,” usually positive, feelings affects social interaction. However, the processes underlying the interpretation of a smile as being more or less genuine are not well understood. The aim of the present research was to test predictions of the Simulation of Smiles Model (SIMS) proposed by Niedenthal, Mermillod, Maringer, and Hess (2010). In addition to the perceptual features that can guide the judgment of a smile as genuine, the model identifies the conditions that the judgments rely on: (a) the embodiment of the facial expression and its corresponding state, and (b) beliefs about the situations in which genuine smiles are most often expressed. Results of two studies are consistent with the model in that they confirm the hypotheses that facial mimicry provides feedback that is used to judge the meaning of a smile, and that beliefs about the situations in which a smile occurs guides such judgments when mimicry is inhibited. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Accuracy and awareness in the perception and categorization of male sexual orientation.

For clear and unambiguous social categories, person perception occurs quite accurately from minimal cues. This article addresses the perception of an ambiguous social category (male sexual orientation) from minimal cues. Across 5 studies, the authors examined individuals' actual and self-assessed accuracy when judging male sexual orientation from faces and facial features. Although participants were able to make accurate judgments from multiple facial features (i.e., hair, the eyes, and the mouth area), their perceived accuracy was calibrated with their actual accuracy only when making judgments based on hairstyle, a controllable feature. These findings provide evidence that suggests different processes for extracting social category information during perception: explicit judgments based on obvious cues (hairstyle) and intuitive judgments based on nonobvious cues (information from the eyes and mouth area). Differences in the accuracy of judgments based on targets' controllability and perceivers' awareness of cues provides insight into the processes underlying intuitive predictions and intuitive judgments. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Awareness of influences on one's own judgments: The roles of covariation detection and attention to the judgment process.

Forty-eight actor participants examined profiles of target persons and judged how much they would like each target. Initial-attention actors were instructed before judging any of the profiles to attend to how target factors influenced their liking judgments. Delayed-attention actors received these instructions after judging the first block of profiles and before judging the second. No-attention actors did not receive these instructions at all. After judging the target profiles, actors estimated how each of several target factors had influenced their liking judgments. Access to covariation information greatly increased the accuracy of observers' causal reports. Covariation detection appeared to make less of a contribution, however, to actors' own causal reports, which displayed a substantial level of accuracy even after we controlled statistically for the possible contributions of covariation detection and shared theories. Contrary to expectations, the attention instructions actually decreased the accuracy of actors' self-reports for the first block of judgments but had no effect on accuracy for the second block of judgments. Results show that some form of privileged self-knowledge contributed to the accuracy of actors' causal reports. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The role of typical diagnosticity in stereotype-based judgments.

The relative impact that categorical information and nondiagnostic individuating information each have on stereotype-based judgments was examined. Three experiments tested and found consistent support for the hypothesis that the impact of Ss' stereotypes on their judgments of target individuals would be diluted significantly more by the presence of individuating information that was nondiagnostic for the judgment task at hand but was relatively high in typical diagnosticity (i.e., useful across many social judgment tasks) than by individuating information that was nondiagnostic for the judgment task at hand and was relatively low in typical diagnosticity (i.e., useful across few social judgment tasks). The authors conclude that the typical diagnosticity of individuating information is an important, although previously overlooked, factor in social perception. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

MINERVA-DM: A memory processes model for judgments of likelihood.

This article describes an integration of most of the disparate likelihood judgment phenomena in behavioral decision making using a mathematical memory model. A new theory of likelihood judgments based on D. L. Hintzman's (1984, 1988) MINERVA2 memory model is described. The model, MINERVA-DM (DM?=?decision making), accounts for a wide range of likelihood judgment phenomena including frequency judgments, conditional likelihood judgments, conservatism, the availability and representativeness heuristics, base-rate neglect, the conjunction error, the validity effect, the simulation heuristic, and the hindsight bias. In addition, the authors extend the model to expert probability judgment and show how MINERVA-DM can account for both good and poor calibration (overconfidence) as a function of varying degrees of expertise. The authors' work is presented as a case study of the advantages of applying memory theory to study decision making. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

A quantum theoretical explanation for probability judgment errors.

A quantum probability model is introduced and used to explain human probability judgment errors including the conjunction and disjunction fallacies, averaging effects, unpacking effects, and order effects on inference. On the one hand, quantum theory is similar to other categorization and memory models of cognition in that it relies on vector spaces defined by features and similarities between vectors to determine probability judgments. On the other hand, quantum probability theory is a generalization of Bayesian probability theory because it is based on a set of (von Neumann) axioms that relax some of the classic (Kolmogorov) axioms. The quantum model is compared and contrasted with other competing explanations for these judgment errors, including the anchoring and adjustment model for probability judgments. In the quantum model, a new fundamental concept in cognition is advanced—the compatibility versus incompatibility of questions and the effect this can have on the sequential order of judgments. We conclude that quantum information-processing principles provide a viable and promising new way to understand human judgment and reasoning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Integration of contingency information in judgments of cause, covariation, and probability.

Integration of contingency information underlies many cognitive tasks including causal, covariational, and probability judgments. The authors' feature-analytic approach was used to account for the findings that people differentially weight specific types of conjunctive information in causal (Experiment 1) and noncausal (Experiment 2) contingency judgments. These findings were explained in terms of positive-test and sufficiency-test biases, which were found in both judgment domains. The same biases, however, were not observed in normative conditional-probability judgments (Experiment 3). The authors argue that this discrepancy is owing to the differential clarity of normative criteria in these domains. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)