带碳排放约束的闭环供应链企业合作减排决策

考虑碳排放约束且由制造商负责回收的低碳闭环供应链系统。构建了零售商不参与减排、零售商向制造商提供减排所增利润分享和减排成本分担3种不同模式的Stackelberg博弈模型,得到相应的最优利润分享和成本分担比例、最优减排水平和最优回收水平,以及成员最优利润值,并分析闭环供应链回收价格和碳排放约束等因素对减排水平和回收水平的影响。结果表明：减排成本分担合作减排的减排水平、回收水平和零售商利润最大,其次是减排所增利润分享合作减排,最后是零售商不参与减排;减排成本分担合作减排和减排所增利润分享合作减排下的制造商利润大小关系要依据零售商单位销售收益和制造商回收活动的投入成本来确定。闭环供应链回收价格等因素的变化对两种分成比例产生相反的影响。     

线性时变需求的二级供应链协调模型

考虑由一个供应商和一个零售商构成的二级供应链系统,在线性时变需求、产品的零售价格与其存储时间有关、货栈容量有限且不允许缺货的情形下,研究了供应商如何利用全数量折扣计划来激励零售商合作从而实现自身利润最大化和供应链系统完美协调的问题。从理论上证明和分析了模型最优解的存在性,同时提供了求解最优解的简单方法,并通过算例对上述结论进行佐证。     

限额与交易下考虑战略顾客行为的供应链决策与协调

研究由一个受限额与交易政策约束的制造商和一个面临同质战略顾客的零售商组成的两级供应链决策与协调问题. 分别研究得到了限额与交易政策下一体化(包括理性预期均衡和数量承诺两种情形) 和分散化供应链最优决策和最大期望利润, 并与不考虑限额与交易政策的情形进行对比分析, 发现限额与交易政策使得供应链最优产量降低、最优价格升高、碳排放量减少. 最后, 以数量承诺情形为基准, 基于收益分享合同设计了供应链协调策略.

     

需求依赖于产品价格和消费者时间偏好的定价与订货决策

研究产品的市场需求依赖于价格和消费者时间偏好情形下的供应链及其成员的最优定价与订货问题. 利用时间偏好因子刻画消费者的时间偏好, 利用产品市场需求关于零售价格的弹性指数反映消费者的价格敏感程度, 建立存在强势零售商、强势供应商和供需双方势力均衡3 种渠道权力结构下的定价与订货模型. 数值结果表明, 在3 种渠道权力结构下, 消费者的时间偏好和产品市场需求关于零售价格的弹性指数是供应链主导者最优定价、订货量和期望利润的单调减函数, 将其纳入定价与订货决策的影响因素予以考量能够增加供应链主导者的最大期望利润.

     

考虑风险容忍度的双渠道绿色供应链运营决策及协调研究

针对双渠道绿色供应链,在考虑各方不同风险容忍度的基础上,构建以制造商为主导的供应链博弈模型,利用均值方差法分析集中式决策和批发价格契约下参与方的运营决策和期望利润,并设计协调契约.研究发现:在批发价格契约下,产品绿色度与制造商风险容忍度正相关,与零售商风险容忍度无关;最优零售价格均与双方风险容忍度正相关,且线上价格基准系数与直销价格负相关,与零售价格正相关;当绿色产品对消费者需求影响较大时,零售商的期望利润与制造商风险容忍度正相关.带有转移支付的反向收益共享与成本分担组合契约可实现双渠道绿色供应链的协调.     

模糊需求下的闭环供应链协调机制研究

研究一个由制造商和零售商在模糊需求环境下的两级闭环供应链的协调机制问题。将市场需求视为模糊变量,建立模糊截集理论下的集中决策模型和收益-费用共享契约模型,给出模型中的最优策略,并以三角形模糊变量为例,对模型进行优化。通过数值算例对模型中的参数进行求解,并对分析结论进行验证。研究结果表明,在模糊需求环境下的闭环供应链中,零售商的最优订购量在模糊需求中心点的左、右浮动,并随着零售价格的提高而增加,通过改变收益-费用系数可以实现供应链成员之间的完美协调。     

基于不同交货期决策权下的供应链交货期和定价决策研究

基于对价格和交货期敏感的需求,针对一个制造商与一个零售商构成的两阶段供应链,以最大化期望利润为目标,分别建立供应链交货期由制造商和零售商控制的决策模型,以得到相应的最优解和最大期望利润.通过比较,探讨了不同交货期决策权对供应链最优交货期和最大期望利润的影响,得到了为实现期望利润最大化,针对顾客需求特性,供应链系统应在保证一定交货期服务水平的基础上选择由制造商控制供应链交货期的结论.     

考虑成员企业风险态度的制造商资金约束闭环供应链定价与回收决策

针对制造商资金约束的闭环供应链,考虑制造商、零售商和回收商面对市场需求不确定性表现出不同的风险态度,研究闭环供应链如何确定其最优定价与回收决策.首先,依据均值-方差法给出制造商、零售商、回收商和闭环供应链的效用函数;然后,基于博弈论的思想分别确定集中式决策下闭环供应链的最优策略和效用,以及分散式决策下制造商、零售商和回收商的最优策略和效用;最后,分析相关参数对最优策略和效用的影响.研究结果表明,制造商、零售商和回收商的风险态度在很大程度上能够影响其最优批发价格、最优零售价格及最优回收率,进而影响其效用.贷款利率能够影响制造商、零售商、回收商和闭环供应链的效用,且对资金约束的制造商的效用影响最为显著.     

制造商的线上销售模式选择和合作广告研究

基于一个制造商和一个网络零售商组成的供应链，考虑零售价格和广告水平对需求的共同影响，依据销售模式的不同以及是否开展合作广告建立四种Stackelberg博弈模型。通过对比分析渠道成员在不同模型下的均衡利润，研究制造商的销售模式选择以及其与网络零售商的合作广告决策。研究发现：代销模式下，开展合作广告对制造商和网络零售商均有利；转销模式下，制造商应分担少于一半的广告费用来获得更多利润，而这将损害网络零售商的利润；无论是否开展合作广告，制造商选择代销模式可获得更多利润；不开展合作广告时，网络零售商在转销模式下获利更多，而开展合作广告时，网络零售商在何种销售模式下获利更大取决于广告投入分担率的大小。     

公平关切下零售商主导的闭环供应链决策模型

将公平关切性引入到零售商主导的闭环供应链中, 分别在零售商公平中性和公平关切下, 分析闭环供应链成员及整体的最优决策问题, 并对两种情形下的均衡结果进行比较. 研究表明, 主导零售商的公平关切性对其自身效用的最大化是有利的, 对制造商和第三方利润的最大化是不利的. 零售商公平关切程度相对较弱时, 其公平关切程度的增强对闭环供应链系统是不利的, 反之, 其公平关切程度的增强对闭环供应链系统是有利的.     

Two‐echelon manufacturer–retailer supply chain strategies with price,quality, and promotional effort sensitive demand

This study deals with the two‐layer supply chain model of one manufacturer and one retailer for a single commodity where market demand is assumed to be dependent on selling price, quality of the products, and promotional effort of the retailer. We investigate the behavior of the supply chain under centralized, manufacturer Stackelberg, conditional manufacturer Stackelberg, retailer Stackelberg, conditional retailer Stackelberg, and vertical Nash model structure. The nature of the above models provides great insights to a firm's manager for achieving optimal strategy in a competitive marketing system. Quite often, not all items produced in a firm are of perfect quality; some are perfect (conforming) quality and others are imperfect (nonconforming) quality. The nonconforming products are sold in a secondary shop or by other retailers. The procurement cost of finished products depends on the quality of the products due to more investment in advanced technology, better raw materials, and skilled labor, etc. The warranty policy for the products is also imposed to attract the customers to buy more. Here, both members (manufacturer and retailer) jointly share the cost of the warranty policy. The objective of this paper is to determine the optimal selling price and promotional effort of the retailer, while the optimal wholesale price and quality of the products are determined by the manufacturer so that the above strategies are maximized. Finally, numerical examples with sensitivity analysis of the key parameters are illustrated to investigate the proposed model.     

Supply chain financing with advance selling under disruption

We study a financing problem in a supply chain (SC) consisting of one supplier and one buyer under supply disruption. The supplier could face a disruption at its end which could effectively reduce its yield in case of disruption, thereby resulting in supply yield uncertainty. The retailer can finance the supplier using advance selling that can help mitigate the impact of disruption. We model this problem as a Stackelberg game, where the supplier as the leader announces the wholesale price and the retailer responds by deciding its optimal order quantity given stochastic demand and an exogenous fixed retail price. The supplier then commences production and a disruption can happen with a known probability. We assume that under disruption the quantity delivered is a fraction of the initial quantity ordered by the retailer. The retailer loses any unmet demand. We analyze three different scenarios of the Stackelberg game, namely no advance selling with disruption, advance selling without disruption, and advance selling with disruption. Our results indicate that advance selling can be used to mitigate the impact of supply disruption and at the same time could lead to an increase in the overall SC profit.     

供应链动态合作广告策略

研究产品信誉受广告投入水平影响的供应链合作广告问题,建立具有广告投入水平抑制作用的产品信誉动态模型.通过哈密顿-雅可比-贝尔曼方程分别得到制造商和零售商在分散决策和集中决策下的最优广告策略以及在分散决策下制造商的最优合作广告参与率,比较发现,集中决策下制造商和零售商的最优广告投入水平高于分散决策下的相应值.设计了双边补贴策略来协调供应链.数值仿真实验验证了所得结论的正确性.     

模糊环境下考虑零售商风险偏好的绿色供应链博弈模型

在模糊需求环境下绿色供应链运作系统中,研究由单一制造商和单一零售商组成的两级绿色供应链.首先,引入创新成本,分别建立风险中性制造商为主导者,具有中性、悲观和乐观等风险偏好的零售商为跟随者的两级绿色供应链Stackelberg博弈模型;然后,推导出最优决策的期望值和机会约束规划模型,并进行算例分析,比较产品绿色度、批发价格及零售价格与不同置信水平之间的相互影响,探讨具有不同风险偏好的零售商对模糊绿色供应链中制造商、零售商及供应链整体运作绩效的影响.研究结果表明:悲观决策模型中,伴随置信水平的增加,产品的绿色度水平、批发价格及创新成本逐步下降,零售价格、制造商、零售商及绿色供应链整体利润逐步上升;在乐观决策模型中,结论相反.     

带有订单转保理的供应链金融的收益共享博弈模型

当作为供应商的中小企业出现了严重的财务困境问题时,急需有效融资工具和创新管理模式加以解决.订单转保理可以令资质良好的零售商为资金短缺的供应商提供融资担保,有效解决供应商的订单减少和融资难的问题.然而,分散决策的订单转保理融资模式,使得做担保的零售商的收益降低,不能明显改善供应链效率.针对此问题,研究订单转保理模式下的供应链协调模型,并重点研究由供应商与零售商组成的二级供应链的订单转保理收益共享模型.研究发现:收益共享决策模型供应链总收益小于集中决策供应链总收益,大于分散决策的供应链总收益,表明供应链成员相互合作程度越高,越有利于供应链发展,从而表明协调在供应链中发挥重要作用.然而,集中决策模型只能得到供应链最优总收益,无法得到供应商和零售商的最优收益.收益共享模型不仅能够提高产品订货量,降低产品批发价格,增加供应商和零售商的收益,而且通过最优的收益共享系数可以得到供应商和零售商的最优收益.收益共享机制能够为供应商和零售商共赢协调发展提供新的运作管理模式.     

Optimal pricing decisions in a fuzzy dual-channel supply chain

This paper analyzes the pricing decisions of a dual-channel supply chain including one retailer and one manufacturer who produces a product and sells it to the end customer through retailer or directly. Both the manufacturing cost and the customer demand are considered as fuzzy variables. Two pricing models, including centralized decision model and manufacturer-leader Stackelberg game, with consideration of different market power structures are adopted. Optimal decisions on wholesale price and retail prices are determined using game theoretical approach and fuzzy set theory for each model. Finally, a numerical example is solved to illustrate the effectiveness of models and provide some managerial insights from analysis.     

Optimal production lot size and reorder point of a two-stage supply chain while random demand is sensitive with sales teams' initiatives

The paper develops a production-inventory model of a two-stage supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer to study production lot size/order quantity, reorder point sales teams’ initiatives where demand of the end customers is dependent on random variable and sales teams’ initiatives simultaneously. The manufacturer produces the order quantity of the retailer at one lot in which the procurement cost per unit quantity follows a realistic convex function of production lot size. In the chain, the cost of sales team's initiatives/promotion efforts and wholesale price of the manufacturer are negotiated at the points such that their optimum profits reached nearer to their target profits. This study suggests to the management of firms to determine the optimal order quantity/production quantity, reorder point and sales teams’ initiatives/promotional effort in order to achieve their maximum profits. An analytical method is applied to determine the optimal values of the decision variables. Finally, numerical examples with its graphical presentation and sensitivity analysis of the key parameters are presented to illustrate more insights of the model.     

Supply chain coordination with risk sensitive retailer under target sales rebate

Target sales rebate (TSR) contracts have been shown to be useful in coordinating supply chains with risk-neutral agents. However, there have been few studies on the cases with risk sensitive agents. As a result, based on the classic Markowitz portfolio theory in finance, we carry out in this paper a mean–variance (MV) analysis of supply chains under TSR contracts. We study a supply chain with a single supplier and a single risk averse retailer. We propose TSR contracts for achieving coordination. We demonstrate how TSR contracts can coordinate the supply chain which takes into consideration the degree of risk aversion of the retailer. We find that the supplier can coordinate the channel with flexible TSR contracts. In addition, we extend the supply chain model to include sales effort decision of the retailer. Conditions for TSR contracts to coordinate the supply chain with sales effort of retailer are also derived.     

Supply chain model with price- and trade credit-sensitive demand under two-level permissible delay in payments

This article develops a single-manufacturer and single-retailer supply chain model under two-level permissible delay in payments when the manufacturer follows a lot-for-lot policy in response to the retailer's demand. The manufacturer offers a trade credit period to the retailer with the contract that the retailer must share a fraction of the profit earned during the trade credit period. On the other hand, the retailer provides his customer a partial trade credit which is less than that of the manufacturer. The demand at the retailer is assumed to be dependent on the selling price and the trade credit period offered to the customers. The average net profit of the supply chain is derived and an algorithm for finding the optimal solution is developed. Numerical examples are given to demonstrate the coordination policy of the supply chain and examine the sensitivity of key model-parameters.