A disconfirmation bias in the evaluation of arguments.

Two experiments provided evidence for a disconfirmation bias in argument evaluation such that arguments incompatible with prior beliefs are scrutinized longer, subjected to more extensive refutational analyses, and consequently are judged to be weaker than arguments compatible with prior beliefs. The idea that people are unable to evaluate evidence independently of prior beliefs has been documented elsewhere, including in the classic study by C. G. Lord, L. Ross, and M. R. Lepper (see record 1981-05421-001) . The present findings contribute to this literature by specifying the processes by which prior beliefs affect the evaluation of evidence. The authors compare the disconfirmation model to several other models of how prior beliefs influence current judgments and present data that provide support for the disconfirmation model. Results indicate that whether a person's prior belief is accompanied by emotional conviction affects the magnitude and form of the disconfirmation bias. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Unspoken cultural influence: Exposure to and influence of nonverbal bias.

The authors examined the extent to which nonverbal behavior contributes to culturally shared attitudes and beliefs. In Study 1, especially slim women elicited especially positive nonverbal behaviors in popular television shows. In Study 2, exposure to this nonverbal bias caused women to have especially slim cultural and personal ideals of female beauty and to have especially positive attitudes toward slim women. In Study 3, individual differences in exposure to such nonverbal bias accounted for substantial variance in pro-slim attitudes, anti-fat attitudes, and personal ideals of beauty, even after controlling for several third variables. In Study 4, regional differences in exposure to nonverbal bias accounted for substantial variance in regional unhealthy dieting behaviors, even after controlling for several third variables. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Rumination, negative cognition, and their interactive effects on depressed mood.

Response styles theory posits that rumination represents a trait vulnerability to depression. Recent evidence has suggested that rumination predicts changes in depression more strongly among individuals with high levels of negative cognition. Three studies evaluated this model of interactive vulnerabilities. Study 1 provided empirical support for the distinction between rumination and negative cognitive content. The next 2 studies investigated the interactive model in the laboratory. Study 2 randomly assigned participants to either ruminate or distract following a sad mood induction. This study found that rumination was more strongly associated with dysphoria among individuals who report high levels of negative cognition. Similarly, Study 3 found that rumination and negative cognition interact to predict changes in dysphoria across a no-task delay period following a sad mood induction. These studies provide support for an interactive model in which rumination amplifies the deleterious effects of negative cognition. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Activities, self-referent memory beliefs, and cognitive performance: Evidence for direct and mediated relations.

In this study, the authors investigated the role of activities and self-referent memory beliefs for cognitive performance in a life-span sample. A factor analysis identified 8 activity factors, including Developmental Activities, Experiential Activities, Social Activities, Physical Activities, Technology Use, Watching Television, Games, and Crafts. A second-order general activity factor was significantly related to a general factor of cognitive function as defined by ability tests. Structural regression models suggested that prediction of cognition by activity level was partially mediated by memory beliefs, controlling for age, education, health, and depressive affect. Models adding paths from general and specific activities to aspects of crystallized intelligence suggested additional unique predictive effects for some activities. In alternative models, nonsignificant effects of beliefs on activities were detected when cognition predicted both variables, consistent with the hypothesis that beliefs derive from monitoring cognition and have no influence on activity patterns. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Chronic and temporarily activated causal uncertainty beliefs and stereotype usage.

In 3 studies, we examined the hypothesis that the effects of stereotype usage on target judgments are moderated by causal uncertainty beliefs and related accuracy goal structures. In Study 1, we focused on the role of chronically accessible causal uncertainty beliefs as predictors of a target's level of guilt for an alleged academic misconduct offense. In Study 2, we examined the role of chronic causal uncertainty reduction goals and a manipulated accuracy goal; in Study 3, we investigated the role of primed causal uncertainty beliefs on guilt judgments. In all 3 studies, we found that activation of causal uncertainty beliefs and accuracy concerns was related to a reduced usage of stereotypes. Moreover, this reduction was not associated with participants' levels of perceived control, depression, state affect, need for cognition, or personal need for structure. Results are discussed in terms of their implications for the model of causal uncertainty and, more generally, in terms of the motivational processes underlying stereotype usage. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Differential construal and the false consensus effect.

People's own beliefs, values, and habits tend to bias their perceptions of how widely they are shared. The present research examined whether this "false consensus effect" is partly due to people's failure to recognize that their choices are not solely a function of the "objective" response alternatives, but of their subjective construal of those alternatives. Study 1 provided initial support for the importance of differential construal in people's consensus estimates by showing that larger false consensus effects tend to be obtained on items that permit the most latitude for subjective construal. Study 2 replicated this effect experimentally by asking Ss either a general or specific version of the same question. Larger false consensus effects were obtained on the general version that offered more latitude for construal. Studies 3 & 4 provided further support by showing that (a) Ss who made different choices tended to interpret the response alternatives in ways that reflected the choices they made and (b) subjects who were led to construe the alternatives in the same way tended to make the same choices. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Asymmetries in predictive and diagnostic reasoning.

In this article, we address the apparent discrepancy between causal Bayes net theories of cognition, which posit that judgments of uncertainty are generated from causal beliefs in a way that respects the norms of probability, and evidence that probability judgments based on causal beliefs are systematically in error. One purported source of bias is the ease of reasoning forward from cause to effect (predictive reasoning) versus backward from effect to cause (diagnostic reasoning). Using causal Bayes nets, we developed a normative formulation of how predictive and diagnostic probability judgments should vary with the strength of alternative causes, causal power, and prior probability. This model was tested through two experiments that elicited predictive and diagnostic judgments as well as judgments of the causal parameters for a variety of scenarios that were designed to differ in strength of alternatives. Model predictions fit the diagnostic judgments closely, but predictive judgments displayed systematic neglect of alternative causes, yielding a relatively poor fit. Three additional experiments provided more evidence of the neglect of alternative causes in predictive reasoning and ruled out pragmatic explanations. We conclude that people use causal structure to generate probability judgments in a sophisticated but not entirely veridical way. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Empirical validation of affect, behavior, and cognition as distinct components of attitude.

Evaluated the validity of a prevalent model of attitude structure that specifies 3 components: affect, behavior, and cognition. Five conditions needed for properly testing the 3-component distinction were identified. Consideration of the tripartite model's theoretical basis indicated that the most important validating conditions are (a) the use of nonverbal, in addition to verbal, measures of affect and behavior; and (b) the physical presence of the attitude object. Study 1—in which 138 undergraduates attitudes toward snakes were examined, through the use of measures such as the Mood Adjective Check List, semantic differential, and distance of approach—indicated very strong support for this tripartite model. The model was statistically acceptable, its relative fit was very good, and the intercomponent correlations were moderate. Study 2, with 105 Ss, was a verbal report analog of Study 1. Results from Study 2 indicate that higher intercomponent correlations occurred when attitude measures derived solely from verbal reports and when the attitude object was not physically present. (74 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The effect of normative beliefs on anticipated emotions.

In 3 experiments, Ss were asked how they would or should make hypothetical decisions and how they would react emotionally to the options or outcomes. The choices were those in which departures from proposed normative models had previously been found: omission bias, status quo bias, and the person–causation effect. These effects were found in all judgments, including judgments of anticipated emotion. Arguments against the departures affected judgments of anticipated emotion as well as decisions, even though the arguments were entirely directed at the question of what should be done. In all but one study, effects of these arguments on anticipated emotion were as strong as their effects on decisions or normative beliefs. Thus, in many situations, people think that their emotional reactions will fall into line with their normative beliefs. In other situations, some people think that their emotional reactions have a life of their own. It is suggested that both normative beliefs and anticipated emotions affect decisions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Preschoolers' use of desires to solve theory of mind problems in a pretense context

K. Bartsch and H. M. Wellman (1995) have suggested that 3-year-old children's preference to construe behavior in terms of desire may interfere with their ability to reason according to belief in standard false belief tasks. Other researchers have suggested that young children fail typical measures of theory of mind because they have a reality bias (e.g., P. Mitchell, 1994). Study 1 demonstrates that even young children are able to correctly attribute a false belief to an agent when that belief is about the status of a pretense. Study 2 shows that children find it easier to attribute a false belief when the desires of the agent are eliminated. However, Study 3 suggests that a reality bias also influences children's ability to consider beliefs. Implications for recent accounts of theory of mind development are discussed.     

From automatic antigay prejudice to behavior: The moderating role of conscious beliefs about gender and behavioral control.

Two experiments tested whether the relation between automatic prejudice and discriminatory behavior is moderated by 2 conscious processes: conscious egalitarian beliefs and behavioral control. The authors predicted that, when both conscious processes are deactivated, automatic prejudice would elicit discriminatory behavior. When either of the 2 processes is activated, behavioral bias would be eliminated. The authors assessed participants' automatic attitudes toward gay men, conscious beliefs about gender, behavioral control, and interactions with gay confederates. In Experiment 1, men's beliefs about gender were heterogeneous, whereas women's beliefs were mostly egalitarian; men's responses supported the predictions, but women's responses did not. In Experiment 2, the authors recruited a sample with greater diversity in gender-related beliefs. Results showed that, for both sexes, automatic prejudice produced biased behavior in the absence of conscious egalitarian beliefs and behavioral control. The presence of either conscious process eliminated behavioral bias. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Why do high school students lack motivation in the classroom? Toward an understanding of academic amotivation and the role of social support.

The present series of studies sought to develop and conceptually validate a taxonomy of reasons that give rise to academic amotivation and to investigate its social antecedents and academic consequences. In Study 1 (N = 351), an exploratory factor analysis offered preliminary support for an academic amotivation taxonomy comprising four dimensions: ability beliefs, effort beliefs, characteristics of the task, and value placed on the task. In Study 2 (N = 349), the proposed taxonomy was further corroborated through 1st- and 2nd-order confirmatory factor analyses, and its discriminant validity and construct validity were documented. Study 3 (N = 741) offered evidence for a model of the relationships among social support (from parents, teachers, and friends), amotivation, and academic outcomes (e.g., achievement, academic self-esteem, intention to drop out). Results are considered in terms of an increased conceptual understanding of academic amotivation, and implications for curricula and interventions are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Individual differences in beliefs about groups.

The current research examined individual differences in peoples' positive versus negative beliefs about groups. Three studies were conducted to develop and validate a 16-item Beliefs About Groups (BAG) scale. Factor analyses in Studies 1 and 2 identified and replicated a 4-factor solution, with factors reflecting preferences for group versus individual work, positive group performance beliefs, negative group performance beliefs, and beliefs that others will work hard on group tasks. Study 2 also provided evidence for convergent and divergent validity, and explored relationships between the Big Five personality dimensions and group beliefs. Study 3 provided evidence for test–retest reliability. Across these 3 studies, the BAG scale had total score alphas ranging from .83 to .88. Implications of beliefs about groups for member motivation and group performance, as well as for future research and practice, are highlighted. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Feeling validated versus being correct: A meta-analysis of selective exposure to information.

A meta-analysis assessed whether exposure to information is guided by defense or accuracy motives. The studies examined information preferences in relation to attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors in situations that provided choices between congenial information, which supported participants’ pre-existing attitudes, beliefs, or behaviors, and uncongenial information, which challenged these tendencies. Analyses indicated a moderate preference for congenial over uncongenial information (d = 0.36). As predicted, this congeniality bias was moderated by variables that affect the strength of participants’ defense motivation and accuracy motivation. In support of the importance of defense motivation, the congeniality bias was weaker when participants’ attitudes, beliefs, or behaviors were supported prior to information selection; when participants’ attitudes, beliefs, or behaviors were not relevant to their values or not held with conviction; when the available information was low in quality; when participants’ closed-mindedness was low; and when their confidence in the attitude, belief, or behavior was high. In support of the importance of accuracy motivation, an uncongeniality bias emerged when uncongenial information was relevant to accomplishing a current goal. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Can self-determination theory explain what underlies the productive, satisfying learning experiences of collectivistically oriented Korean students?

Recognizing recent criticisms concerning the cross-cultural generalizability of self-determination theory (SDT), the authors tested the SDT view that high school students in collectivistically oriented South Korea benefit from classroom experiences of autonomy support and psychological need satisfaction. In Study 1, experiences of autonomy, competence, and relatedness underlaid Korean students’ most satisfying learning experiences, and experiences of low autonomy and low competence underlaid their least satisfying learning experiences. In Study 2, psychological need satisfaction experiences were associated with productive (achievement and engagement) and satisfying (intrinsic motivation and proneness to negative affect) student outcomes. Study 3 replicated and extended Study 2’s structural equation modeling findings by showing that the hypothesized model explained students’ positive outcomes even after controlling for cultural and parental influences, including the collectivistic value orientation. Study 4 replicated the earlier cross-sectional findings with a semester-long prospective 3-wave design. The authors discuss how the findings support the motivation theory’s cross-cultural generalizability. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Implicit negotiation beliefs and performance: Experimental and longitudinal evidence.

The authors argue that implicit negotiation beliefs, which speak to the expected malleability of negotiating ability, affect performance in dyadic negotiations. They expected negotiators who believe negotiating attributes are malleable (incremental theorists) to outperform negotiators who believe negotiating attributes are fixed (entity theorists). In Study 1, they gathered evidence of convergent and discriminant validity for the implicit negotiation belief construct. In Study 2, they examined the impact of implicit beliefs on the achievement goals that negotiators pursue. In Study 3, they explored the causal role of implicit beliefs on negotiation performance by manipulating negotiators' implicit beliefs within dyads. They also identified perceived ability as a moderator of the link between implicit negotiation beliefs and performance. In Study 4, they measured negotiators' beliefs in a classroom setting and examined how these beliefs affected negotiation performance and overall performance in the course 15 weeks later. Across all performance measures, incremental theorists outperformed entity theorists. Consistent with the authors' hypotheses, incremental theorists captured more of the bargaining surplus and were more integrative than their entity theorist counterparts, suggesting implicit theories are important determinants of how negotiators perform. Implications and future directions are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The truth and bias model of judgment.

We present a new model for the general study of how the truth and biases affect human judgment. In the truth and bias model, judgments about the world are pulled by 2 primary forces, the truth force and the bias force, and these 2 forces are interrelated. The truth and bias model differentiates force and value, where the force is the strength of the attraction and the value is the location toward which the judgment is attracted. The model also makes a formal theoretical distinction between bias and moderator variables. Two major classes of biases are discussed: biases that are measured with variables (e.g., assumed similarity) and directional bias, which refers to the extent to which judgments are pulled toward 1 end of the judgment continuum. Moderator variables are conceptualized as variables that affect the accuracy and bias forces but that do not affect judgments directly. We illustrate the model with 4 examples. We discuss the theoretical, empirical, methodological, measurement, and design implications of the model. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Gender differences in the functional linkage between androgyny, social cognition, and competence.

In Study 1 with 251 male and 389 female undergraduates, androgynous females reported higher self-esteem and were more competent in the judgment of others (Adjective Check List) than any other sex-role type. Study 2 (48 males and 86 females) hypothesized that superior social cognition (Chapin Social Insight Test) mediates the adaptive value of androgyny, allowing effective deployment of expanded sex-role potential across situations. It was found that androgynous males demonstrated the highest social cognition among the 4 sex types. In Study 3 androgynous males were the least well-defended and androgynous females the most highly defended relative to the other sex types. This is proposed as 1 basis for enhanced competence of androgynous females and the unexceptional competence of their male counterparts despite social cognition differences. (55 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

God and the government: Testing a compensatory control mechanism for the support of external systems.

The authors propose that the high levels of support often observed for governmental and religious systems can be explained, in part, as a means of coping with the threat posed by chronically or situationally fluctuating levels of perceived personal control. Three experiments demonstrated a causal relation between lowered perceptions of personal control and the defense of external systems, including increased beliefs in the existence of a controlling God (Studies 1 and 2) and defense of the overarching socio-political system (Study 4). A 4th experiment (Study 5) showed the converse to be true: A challenge to the usefulness of external systems of control led to increased illusory perceptions of personal control. In addition, a cross-national data set demonstrated that lower levels of personal control are associated with higher support for governmental control (across 67 nations; Study 3). Each study identified theoretically consistent moderators and mediators of these effects. The implications of these results for understanding why a high percentage of the population believes in the existence of God, and why people so often endorse and justify their socio-political systems, are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Graphing the order of the sexes: Constructing, recalling, interpreting, and putting the self in gender difference graphs.

Graphs seem to connote facts more than words or tables do. Consequently, they seem unlikely places to spot implicit sexism at work. Yet, in 6 studies (N = 741), women and men constructed (Study 1) and recalled (Study 2) gender difference graphs with men’s data first, and graphed powerful groups (Study 3) and individuals (Study 4) ahead of weaker ones. Participants who interpreted graph order as evidence of author “bias” inferred that the author graphed his or her own gender group first (Study 5). Women’s, but not men’s, preferences to graph men first were mitigated when participants graphed a difference between themselves and an opposite-sex friend prior to graphing gender differences (Study 6). Graph production and comprehension are affected by beliefs and suppositions about the groups represented in graphs to a greater degree than cognitive models of graph comprehension or realist models of scientific thinking have yet acknowledged. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)