放射性物质运输货包安全试验

介绍了中国放射性物质运输遵守的法规和中国辐射防护研究院用于放射性物质运输货包试验的下落试验设施、耐热试验设施和数据获取能力。试验设施根据IAEA的《放射性物质安全运输条例》（TS-R-1）和中国的《放射性物质安全运输规程》（GB 11806-2004）的要求建设。下落试验设施能用于13 t级以下的A型和B型货包的自由下落试验、贯穿试验、力学试验（自由下落试验Ⅰ、自由下落试验Ⅱ和自由下落试验Ⅲ）。耐热试验设施能完成B型货包的耐热试验。利用这些设施已进行了FCo70-YQ型货包、30A-HB-01型货包、SY-I型货包和XAYT-I型货包的遵章取证试验     

放射性物质内容物和货包的试验要求(第8章及附录C、D、E、F讲解)

1.特殊形式放射性物质的要求(8.2)8.2.1 条规定对含有特殊形式放射性内容物货包的运输,事故情况下,假设对于大多数情况放射性内容物不弥散出来。这个假设把吸入或食入放射性物质,或由于放射性物质污染引起的预期危害减低到了最小。由于这个原因,特殊形式放射性物质必须经受类似应用于B(U)型货包的力学试验和热试验,而没有过度的放射性物质损失或弥散。     

解读《放射性物质安全运输规程》GB 11806-2004中的货包试验

本文总结归纳了《放射性物质安全运输规程》GB 11806-2004中关于货包试验(包括货包试验的准备、货包试验的要求、货包试验结果的评定等)的内容,以期对理解和执行该《规程》有关货包试验部分有所帮助。     

遵循审批要求,规范审批程序,提高放射性物质运输安全

本文阐述了货包设计审批和装运审批的要求及其依据,对货包设计审批和装运审批,将IAEA TS-R-1《放射性物质安全运输条例》规定、国外一些国家的做法和我国现行的办法进行了对比,讨论了放射性物质过境运输的审批。建议根据我国《放射性物质安全运输规程》(报批稿)要求和实践的经验和具体情况,对货包设计审批和装运审批的程序,申请时应提交的材料及其形式进行研究,以《规程》的实施细则作出明确的规定,以加强放射性物质运输管理,提高放射性物质运输安全。     

IAEA发布了《放射性物质安全运输条例》

IAEA于2012年10月发布了IAEA No.SSR-6:2012《放射性物质安全运输条例》(特殊安全要求)。该条例适用于所有对放射性物质的运输途径,例如陆路、水路或空运,包括放射性物质的使用所带来的搬运。运输包括与放射性物质移动相关联并涉及那些移动的操作和条件,包括包装箱的设计、制造、维护和修理,放射性物质和包装箱货包的准备、托运、装载、包括在运和     

关于对放射性物质运输指数及放大系数的讨论

放射性物质运输过程中,运输指数是保证运输安全的重要指标,确定运输指数是一个关键的工作,而由于货包/包装的多样性,实际运输活动中,常常引起误解。本文结合实例对Ⅰ类表面污染物体及其放大系数进行了讨论,为更加合理使用运输指数及放大系数,保障放射性物质运输安全提供参考。     

放射源运输容器安全设计有限元分析方法

放射性物质运输容器力学试验是证明货包安全设计满足法规标准要求的重要工作之一。根据法规标准要求,应采用能够导致货包产生最严重损坏的姿态进行力学试验,评价力学试验后容器的安全性能。通过有限元分析来确定容器最严重损坏的姿态是目前国际上通常采用的方法,能够极大地节约时间和成本。本工作针对某型号放射源运输容器,通过分析容器力学有限元计算结果,确定容器最严重损坏的姿态,分析比较有限元计算结果和试验结果,证明放射源运输容器安全设计满足法规标准要求。     

RY-Ⅰ型乏燃料运输容器研究试验

RY-Ⅰ型乏燃料运输容器是按GB11806《放射性物质安全运输规定》和IAEA安全标准《放射性物质安全运输规程》中的B(U)F型Ⅲ级(黄)货包的规定而设计研究试验的,本文论述了它的结构特点,特殊的搪铅和灌铅工艺,特定条件下的测试方案与方法。试验结果表明,该容器性能达到国家和IAEA的标准。可推广应用于其他研究堆乏燃料运输。     

Ry—I型乏燃料运输容器设计,试验概况

本文介绍按《放射性物质安全运输规定》(GB11806-89)和IAEA6号安全丛书《放射性物质安全运输规程》B(U)货包的规定,对RY-I乏燃料运输容器的设计性能、安全分析,以及为保证运输安全必须满足的检验。     

放射性物质运输货包力学试验评价技术

放射性物质运输容器是放射性物质安全运输的唯一物理屏障,运输容器需能抵抗可能的碰撞事故,GB 11806和IAEA的SSR-6针对碰撞事故情景规定了相应的力学试验项目。本文结合GB 11806和SSR-6规定的试验要求,介绍了中国辐射防护研究院自由下落冲击力学试验装置和应力、加速度、形变、影像测量系统。针对3m3六氟化铀运输容器、XAYT-Ⅰ型医用伽马刀治疗头及密封放射源运输容器、ZHQY-QG-001型退役辐照源运输容器,采用试验和有限元仿真计算相结合的方法,分别研究了容器关键部件的形变、应力、加速度数据在容器安全性能评价中的应用。结果表明,综合应用有限元仿真计算与试验技术,采集和分析影像、应力、加速度、形变等数据,可分析货包结构失效模式和评价货包安全性能。     

The relevance of IAEA tests to severe accidents in nuclear fuel cycle transport

Abstract

The design and performance standards for packages used for the transport of nuclear fuel cycle materials are defined in the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials, TS-R-1, in order to ensure safety under both normal and accident conditions of transport. The underlying philosophy is that safety is vested principally in the package and the design and performance criteria are related to the potential hazard. Type B packages are high-duty packages which are used for the transport of the more radioactive materials, notably spent fuel and vitrified high-level waste (VHLW). Tests are specified in the IAEA regulations to ensure the integrity of these packages in potential transport accidents involving impacts, fires or immersion in water. The mechanical tests for Type B packages include drop tests onto an unyielding surface without giving rise to a significant release of radioactivity. The objects which could impact upon a package in real-life transport accidents, such as concrete roads, bridge abutments and piers, will yield to some extent and absorb some of the energy of the moving package. Impact tests onto an unyielding surface are therefore relevant to impacts onto real-life objects at much higher speeds. The thermal test specifies that Type B packages must be able to withstand a fully engulfing fire of 800°C for 30 min without significant release of radioactivity, and this has to be demonstrated, for example, by analytical studies backed up by experimental tests. The regulations also specify immersion tests for Type B packages of 15 m for 8 h without significant release of radioactivity; and in addition for spent fuel and VHLW packages, 200 m for 1 h without rupture of the containment. There is a large body of evidence to show that the current IAEA Type B test requirements are severe and cover all the situations which can be realistically envisaged in the transport of spent fuel, VHLW and other fuel cycle materials. Any proposals for more severe tests, which have little technical justification, should therefore be treated with caution since this could result in a loss of public confidence in the current regulations, and the ratcheting up of design requirements which could not be justified on quantitative safety grounds.     

Safety considerations during transport of radioactive material

Abstract

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regulations establish requirements that must be satisfied to ensure safety and to protect people, property and the environment from the effects of ionisation radiation during the transport of radioactive material (RAM). The package types A and B most frequently used for the transport of RAM in Romania are subjected to various qualification tests in accordance with the National Regulations and IAEA recommendations; these tests are carried out by the Reliability and Testing Laboratory of the Institute for Nuclear Research, Pitesti. These tests include the evaluation of non-fixed contamination, as is described in the present paper. Regulatory requirements related to contamination for packages used for transport and storage of RAM and the method used to monitor the evaluation of the surface contamination of packages are also presented. These test requirements are performed under a strict quality assurance programme based on specific procedures given prior approval by the Romanian Nuclear Regulatory Body (National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control).     

Large Package Tests for Normal Conditions of Transport

Abstract

The IAEA Regulations (1985) for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material specify requirements for packagings and packages (Section 5). These include tests for normal conditions of transport (Paras 619–625) and accident conditions for packages containing larger quantities of activity (Paras 626–633). The tests for normal conditions include drop tests from heights which vary with the package mass (Para 622). The ‘Explanatory Material’ (1987) describes these drop-tests as ‘a falloff the platform of a vehicle’ after which ‘packages would continue the journey’. There is clear implication that any damage which obviously degrades important functions of the packaging system results from ‘accident’ damage rather than ‘normal conditions of transport’. The important functions include containment, criticality control, shielding, impact protection and fire protection. Large packages, such as ISO containers, may exceed 6 m in length and when subject to a corner drop of 1 m or less, the centre of gravity will fall more than 3 m. The secondary impact will be much more severe than the initial impact. Neither the corner drop nor the secondary impact simulate normal conditions of transport. An alternative specification for normal condition drop testing of large containers is proposed, avoiding the more severe damage resulting from secondary impacts.     

Demonstration of structural performance of IP-2 packages by advanced analytical simulation and full-scale drop test

Two new types of IP-2 (Industrial Package Type 2) to transport low and intermediate level radioactive waste (LILW) steel drums from nuclear power plants to a disposal facility have been developed in accordance with the IAEA and Korean regulations for radioactive materials. According to the regulations, both packages must preserve their structural performance after they are subjected to 0.9 m free drop tests, which are prescribed as normal conditions.In this study, an advanced analytical simulation and an evaluation process using the finite element (FE) method have been developed for the design assessment of the newly developed IP-2s. Then, analytical simulations for the various drop orientations were performed to evaluate the structural performance of the packages and demonstrate their compliance with the regulatory requirements. Also, full-scale drop tests were carried out to verify the numerical tools and modeling methodology used in the analyses and to confirm the performance of the IP-2s. In addition, parametric studies are carried out to investigate the sensitivity of the analytical variables, such as the material model and modeling methodology.In addition, this paper intends to provide basic guidance on the analytical simulation and evaluation process specifically for Korean types of transport packages, because numerous transport packages must now be developed for the various kinds of LILW that have accumulated in temporary storage facilities in Korea.     

Methodological aspects for finite element modelling of lid systems for Type B(U) transport packages

Abstract

The regulatory compliance of the containment system is of essential importance for the assessment process of Type B(U) transport packages. The requirements of the International Atomic Energy Agency safety standards for transport conditions imply high loading on the containment system. The integrity of the containment system has to be ensured in mechanical and thermal tests. The containment system of German spent nuclear fuel and high level waste transport packages usually includes bolted lids with metal gaskets. The finite element (FE) method is recommended for the analysis of lid systems according to the guideline BAM-GGR 012 for the assessment of bolted lid and trunnion systems. The FE analyses provide more accurate and detailed information about loading and deformation of such kind of structures. The results allow the strength assessment of the lid and bolts as well as the evaluation of relative displacements between the lid and the cask body in the area of the gasket groove. This paper discusses aspects concerning FE simulation of lid systems for type B(U) packages for the transport of spent nuclear fuel and high level waste. The work is based on the experiences of the BAM Federal Institute for Materials Research and Testing as the German competent authority for the mechanical design assessment of such kind of packages. The issues considered include modelling strategies, analysis techniques and interpretation of results. A particular focus of this paper is on the evaluation of the results with regard to FE accuracy, influence of the FE contact formulation and FE modelling techniques to take the metallic gasket into account.     

Transport of UF6 in compliance with TS-R-1

Abstract

The IAEA Regulations TS-R-1 (ST-1, Revised) 1996 Edition include requirements for packages containing uranium hexafluoride (UF₆); these are the first and only substance-specific requirements in the IAEA regulations. These requirements have already particularly affected, and will further affect, the transport of non-fissile and fissile excepted UF₆ and the packages used for these transports. Non-fissile and fissile excepted UF₆ (ASTM C 787) has been transported worldwide for decades in a safe and reliable manner, using internationally standardised packages. Under the auspices of the World Nuclear Transport Institute (WNTI), an industry working group has been evaluating the existing packages against the requirements in TS-R-1. As new requirements came into effect, there were new challenges for the use of these standard packages, including the free drop test and the thermal requirements. In close cooperation with the WNTI HEXT Industry Working Group, a consortium of UF₆ producers/users has worked together on the design and development, testing and certification of technical solutions for modification and optimisation of the existing packages to comply with TS-R-1. This paper reviews the existing standard packages against the requirements in TS-R-1. An update is also given describing the enhancements to the standard packages that have been designed and developed recently. The paper also describes how these solutions have been tested and certified, as well as the status of implementation. Finally, a review is made of the options that are available internationally to transport UF₆ in compliance with TS-R-1.     

TRANSPORT OF MOX FUEL

Abstract

The regulatory framework which governs the transport of MOX fuel is set out, including packages, transport modes and security requirements. Technical requirements for the packages are reviewed and BNFL's experience in plutonium and MOX fuel transport is described. The safety of such operations and the public perception of safety are described and the question of gaining public acceptance for MOX fuel transport is addressed. The paper concludes by emphasising the need for proactive programmes to improve the public acceptance of these operations.     

An overview of 20 years' Romanian experience on packaging and components testing according to national and international regulations

Abstract

More than 20 years ago, the Institute for Nuclear Research (INR) Pitesti in Romania, through its Reliability and Testing Laboratory, was licensed by the Romanian Nuclear Regulatory Body – CNCAN to carry out qualification tests for packages intended for the transport and storage of radioactive materials. The radioactive material is placed in packaging which are designed in accordance with national and the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) Regulations for safe transport to the disposal centre. A broad range of verification and certification tests are performed at INR on radioactive material packages or component sections, such as packages used for the transport of radioactive sources to be used for industrial or medical purposes. This paper describes some of the various tests, which have been performed, and how they relate to normal conditions and minor mishaps during transport. Quality assurance and quality control measures taken in order to meet technical specification provided by design there are also presented.     

Type A shipping package harmonic assessment methodologies

Response to incident vibrations is a design aspect assessed during the development of Type A fissile shipping packages. Not only are expected transport induced vibrations evaluated for package structural integrity, but also to ensure the integrity of the unirradiated fuel assembly. Such incident vibrations include, but are not limited to, expected transport induced vibrations, and single pulse shock inputs occurring at relatively high frequencies. The regulatory requirement to ensure that there is no deterioration in the effectiveness of any closure devices or in the structural integrity of a Type A fissile shipping package is governed by TS-R-1 as well as 10CFR71·71. In addition to regulatory requirements, the fissile Type A contents, more specifically the fresh fuel assembly, have design specifications that require shipping and handling acceleration loads remain below a design threshold. Other structural design considerations include supplemental vibration damping system(s) tuned for package design features and transport conveyance interfaces which may induce vibrations. A test program was developed and executed to fully assess the Westinghouse Traveller fresh fuel shipping package harmonic characteristics considering regulatory and fuel assembly requirements. Road course testing, vibration shaker table testing and port handling simulation/drop tests with production Traveller shipping packages were utilised for evaluation. The testing also provided valuable data to determine the proper material selection for shock mitigating materials, their configuration within the shipping package, and identifying resonance frequencies associated with the shipping package design structure. Once an in-depth understanding of the packaging and fuel assembly’s harmonic response to shipping and handling induced vibrations and single pulse shocks was established, an optimised suspension system design configuration to dampen those incident vibrations was realised.