政府补贴和增值税退税政策的闭环供应链决策

基于政府补贴和增值税退税政策,通过Stackelberg博弈方法,建立由制造商、回收商和消费者组成的4种闭环供应链决策模型,得出相应的最优价格、补贴和退税政策.进一步,比较并分析4种不同模型下的回收价格、回收量、企业利润以及社会福利,得出政府和企业的最优决策选择.研究发现:1)4种情形下的社会福利均随着消费者环保意识的增加而递增.对政策制定者而言,若消费者环保意识较低,则政府补贴政策最优;若消费者环保意识较高,则政府补贴和增值税退税并存政策最优.2)在绿色消费者市场上,制造商选择高低两种不同定价策略受绿色细分市场规模和政府政策力度大小两方面因素的影响.     

基于回收质量不确定与政府双参与的再制造闭环供应链定价策略研究

基于回收质量不确定的现实考虑,运用Stackelberg博弈论方法研究政府补贴和碳税双参与的再制造闭环供应链的定价问题,采用数值仿真的方法量化分析补贴额度和碳税率对再制造闭环供应链定价策略、供应链各成员利润、供应链碳排放量的影响,以及回收质量对再制造闭环供应链的影响。研究发现：政府补贴和碳税的双参与改善了由政府征收碳税而引起的市场不活跃现象,促进了闭环供应链的回收再制造,比单纯补贴或碳税更有效地引导了再制造闭环供应链;无论哪种手段参与,提高废旧产品的回收质量都有助于提高废旧产品的回收量、制造商的利润、第三方回收商的利润以及供应链的总利润,也有助于降低供应链的碳排放。     

考虑消费者环保意识的WEEE 双渠道回收模型

在考虑消费者环保意识的基础上,建立基于不同消费者群体行为的WEEE双渠道回收模型,采用博弈论比较两条渠道在竞争情形与合作情形下的决策.研究表明,在不同的市场环境下,消费者的环保意识以及环保消费者的比例对两条渠道的合作策略有不同程度的影响.当两条渠道相互合作时,供应链的利润随着普通消费者环保意识的增加而增大,随环保消费者比例的增大而减小.在一般情况下,两条渠道合作时的回收价格和回收量小于竞争情形时的回收量和回收价格,但网络回收平台的单位期望收益远大于流动商贩的单位期望收益的情形除外.当消费者的环保意识、环保消费者的比例以及两条渠道的回收产品的单位利润满足一定条件时,双方合作才会对整个回收产业起到积极作用.最后,对模型中的各参数进行了敏感性分析,并用算例验证了模型的有效性.     

两周期双寡头竞争环境中再制造影响

针对两周期双寡头竞争市场,分别构建单个企业实施再制造和两个企业实施再制造的产量决策模型,探讨再制造对双寡头竞争市场的产品供应、产品价格、企业利润、消费者福利以及环境污染的影响.研究表明:1)当且仅当再制造补贴与再制造成本节约之和满足一定条件时,双寡头才会进入再制造市场.2)再制造可增加企业利润、提高消费者剩余,并在一定条件下降低环境污染;当再制造成本优势明显时,再制造企业会扩大第1周期的新产品供给.3)若只有一个企业具备再制造条件,则再制造能帮助企业提高市场份额,当再制造成本优势明显时,再制造企业可在第1周期实现对新产品的完全垄断,从而改变市场竞争格局.     

碳交易环境下再制造企业生产及减排投资决策

基于碳限额交易政策,对再制造企业生产和减排投资决策进行研究.在碳交易环境背景下,利用非线性凸优化理论,首先分析不减排投资时再制造企业的最优生产决策,然后研究再制造企业对生产新产品或再制造品减排投资时的情形.通过比较,探讨再制造企业进行减排投资时制造/再制造策略的调整,并分析减排投资对社会福利各因素(包括再制造企业利润、消费者剩余和环境影响)的影响.研究表明:对新产品(再制造品)减排将导致新产品(再制造品)产量的增加和再制造品(新产品)产量的降低;减排投资使再制造企业利润和消费者剩余均增加,但是环境影响(碳排放总量)则取决于单位再制造的碳排放量.最后,通过算例分析验证了以上结论.     

随机需求和奖惩机制下的闭环供应链决策模型

研究新产品和再制造产品需求均为不确定下的闭环供应链系统。通过比较两种产品的消费者WTP(willing to pay)差异性,构建三种政府奖惩机制条件下的闭环供应链模型。深入分析不同制造商主导的博弈模型及其数值实验。结果表明:无论是基于回收率还是回收量的政府奖惩机制,第三方回收模式下回收率最高,制造商利润最高,制造商回收模式下零售商利润最高;消费者对再制造产品WTP差异增加时,制造商利润、零售商利润及渠道总利润先减少后增加;政府奖惩机制变化时,第三方回收模式的回收率随政府奖惩的增加而增幅最大。     

碳税下多周期闭环混合系统的补贴策略模型

在考虑新产品和再制造品碳排放差异的情况下,建立了制造商回收模式下的多周期混合制造/再制造系统的最优运作及补贴策略模型。假设回收品质量水平服从指数分布,回收成本、回收率和再制造成本是回收品质量水平的负指数函数,建立包含碳税的平均总成本函数,并采用遗传算法（GA）和粒子群算法（PSO）验证模型的信度和效度。结果表明：无补贴情况下,企业可对回收品质量水平为0.28~0.84的产品进行再制造;考虑补贴情况下,政府可对回收品质量水平为0.28~0.42的产品采取补贴机制,达到引导企业回收再制造的目的。该研究为政府制定合理的补贴政策及企业权衡碳排放因素降低总成本提供理论依据。     

专利保护下闭环供应链碳减排及协调决策

考虑政府征收碳税及再制造专利保护,建立原制造商和第三方再制造商不同决策情形的博弈模型,探讨碳税、碳减排对制造/再制造决策的影响.研究结果表明:碳税使原制造商收益受损,当再制造产品接受度大于再制造碳排放比率时,碳税使再制造商利润增加;碳减排使新产品产量增加,原制造商利润增加;碳减排使再制造专利许可费提高,不利于废旧产品回收,再制造商利润不一定增加;集中决策下废旧产品的回收率和供应链总利润均高于分散决策,当满足碳税促进再制造的条件时,集中决策具有更好的环境绩效;针对分散决策的效率损失,原制造商收取适当专利许可费,再制造商分担部分减排成本,能够实现闭环供应链的协调.最后,运用数值仿真验证以上结论,并进一步分析碳税和碳排放比率对减排率的影响.     

考虑市场细分的闭环供应链生产与定价策略

基于市场细分建立闭环供应链模型,分析了决策变量随外生变量的变化规律,并比较了闭环供应链与不回收再制造情形的决策.结果表明:新制造和再制造产品的批发价随回购价的增加而增加,随回收价的增加而减少,零售价随回收价和回收努力程度的增加而增加;产品总量随消费者偏好系数的增加而增加,随再制造成本、回收努力程度及回收价的增加而减少;闭环供应链的新制造产品批发价和零售价均比不回收再制造时高;消费者偏好系数高于临界值时,回收再制造对于闭环供应链有利.     

考虑政府补贴及环境设计的再制造闭环供应链生产决策

在外包及授权再制造模式下,研究考虑政府补贴及制造商环境设计的再制造闭环供应链生产决策问题.构建4种闭环供应链决策模型,分析政府补贴及环境设计水平对制造商与再制造商竞合关系、闭环供应链绩效以及环境的影响.研究发现,制造商可以通过调节单位再制造外包费或专利许可费实现与再制造商共享政府补贴,因此政府不同补贴策略不会对闭环供应链最优生产决策及绩效产生影响.政府补贴与消费者对再制造产品的认知程度,并不总是有利于提高制造商环境设计水平,但均有助于促进再制造产品销售.制造商总是有动机进行环境设计,而再制造商只有在环境设计能为再制造产品带来更多成本节约时,才有动力接受制造商的环境设计方案.相比于授权再制造,制造商及再制造商均在外包再制造下获得更多的利润.另外,政府补贴与环境设计并不一定总能起到减少产品环境总影响程度的作用.     

Pricing strategies for tied digital contents and devices

Media companies are increasingly offering digital content to consumers. Many of these companies are tying digital content with their proprietary digital devices. In this study, we develop a consumer demand model for digital device and digital content based on a constant elasticity demand function. In modeling consumer valuation of the digital device, we take consumer surplus on digital content into account. We further derive equilibrium prices for digital devices based on an oligopoly competition model with horizontal product differentiation. We analyze the equilibrium prices and how prices affect firm profits. We find product differentiation and the level of product substitutability affect prices. We also find that content price plays a significant role in affecting the price of the digital device. Content price can either increase or decrease the tied digital device price depending on the profit margin and demand elasticity of the digital content. We further analyze how content and device prices affect their respective profits and the overall profit of the firm. We extend our model to vertical product differentiation and find vertical product differentiation and the level of product quality affect prices.     

零售电商和回收政策对闭环供应链的影响研究

构建第三方回收下的双渠道闭环供应链模型,考虑了三种不同的决策情形来探讨零售电商参与和处理基金政策对供应链中决策、利润、需求和消费者剩余的影响。结果表明：零售电商参与使得传统零售商的产品价格和利润水平降低,制造商可以通过调整对零售电商的批发价格来提高其利润;第三方回收商的回收决策和最优利润不受到零售电商参与的影响,处理基金政策可以有效地提高产品回收数量,但也会使得正向供应链中企业的定价提高;零售电商会蚕食制造商原有的市场份额,但产品总需求量不发生变化。当进一步考虑处理基金政策时,市场总需求量出现下降的趋势;此外,零售电商参与和处理基金政策都会造成供应链中消费者总剩余的减少。     

Analysis of two-tier public service systems under a government subsidy policy

Some public service systems such as healthcare systems consist of both free public service provider with a long wait time and paid private service provider with a short wait time. Such service systems are often called a two-tier service system. In general, more customers will choose the free service provider (SP). To reduce the congestion in the free system, the government may encourage customers to use the pay system by offering them a subsidy. This paper studies whether such a subsidy can reduce the free system’s waiting time and improves the social welfare. While the objective of the free system is to maximize its own total customers’ utility, the objective of the pay system is to maximize its profit. We develop a mixed duopoly game to analyze the Nash equilibrium for the competition between the free and toll systems. Two scenarios with unregulated and regulated prices are considered. When the pay system price is unregulated (the private SP can set prices freely), we find that if customers are less sensitive to the service delay, the subsidy policy can effectively reduce the expected waiting time for the free system and increase the customer utility surplus of the entire two-tier system. However, if customers are more sensitive to the service delay, the subsidy policy may have the opposite effect. When the pay system price is regulated (the price determined by government), the subsidy policy can effectively reduce the expected waiting time for the free system and improve the social welfare of the two-tier system. And there exists an optimal regulated price to maximize the social welfare of the entire public service system.     

Name-Your-Own-Price seller’s information revelation strategy with the presence of list-price channel

This study examines the Name-Your-Own-Price (NYOP) retailer’s information revelation strategy when competing with list-price channel. We propose an integrated economic framework focusing on the comparison of expected consumer surplus from bidding at NYOP auction and guaranteed consumer surplus from buying at a list price. We then conduct an empirical study to examine the effects of seller-supplied price information on NYOP bidding outcome (especially on expected winning probability and the number of bidders). The results of our study strongly indicate the effects of seller-supplied information on expected winning probability (as well as the expected consumer surplus) in a NYOP auction. We also illustrate the strategic implications of seller-supplied price information via a revenue simulation for the NYOP seller. Our results suggest that NYOP seller may increase his expected revenue by (1) provide only the upper bound of its threshold price when list price is high (low expected consumer surplus from buying at list price); (2) provide only the lower bound of its threshold price when list price is low (high expected consumer surplus from buying at list price); (3) provide both the upper and lower bound of its threshold price when consumer surplus of buying at list price is unknown.     

考虑企业社会责任和公平偏好的绿色供应链决策

考虑制造商的公平中性和公平偏好,研究制造商公平偏好程度和企业社会责任(CSR)水平对绿色供应链决策和收益的影响.研究发现:1)制造商的公平偏好行为有利于绿色产品批发价格和零售价格的降低,提高绿色度水平、市场需求和零售商利润,但该行为会在一定程度上损害其自身经济效益,供应链系统利润随制造商公平偏好程度的变化趋势受企业CSR水平的影响;2)制造商分担的系统CSR比例越大,绿色产品的批发价格和制造商利润越低,零售商利润越高,但其CSR行为对产品零售价格、绿色度水平、市场需求、系统利润、消费者剩余及社会福利的影响会因制造商公平偏好程度的不同而不同;3)制造商的公平偏好程度和CSR水平并非越高越好,制造商需在保障自身一定企业盈利的前提下考虑实施公平偏好行为,并将自身公平偏好度与CSR水平控制在合理范围内,不仅有利于产品绿色度水平和系统效率的提高,也有助于实现消费者利益和社会总福利的最优化.     

需求依赖于产品价格和消费者时间偏好的定价与订货决策

研究产品的市场需求依赖于价格和消费者时间偏好情形下的供应链及其成员的最优定价与订货问题. 利用时间偏好因子刻画消费者的时间偏好, 利用产品市场需求关于零售价格的弹性指数反映消费者的价格敏感程度, 建立存在强势零售商、强势供应商和供需双方势力均衡3 种渠道权力结构下的定价与订货模型. 数值结果表明, 在3 种渠道权力结构下, 消费者的时间偏好和产品市场需求关于零售价格的弹性指数是供应链主导者最优定价、订货量和期望利润的单调减函数, 将其纳入定价与订货决策的影响因素予以考量能够增加供应链主导者的最大期望利润.

     

考虑消费者效用的电商平台信用支付决策研究

考虑由两个生产不同质量产品的制造商和一个电商平台组成的供应链,基于消费者剩余理论,研究电商平台的信用支付服务决策问题。基于消费者选择不同支付方式购买产品的消费者效用,建立电商平台收益模型,进一步分析得到平台的信用支付服务决策。研究表明,当消费者对质量一般产品的接受程度较高、信用支付服务对消费者带来的负效应较大时,推出信用支付可以提高平台收益,增加消费者剩余;当消费者对质量一般产品的接受程度较低、信用支付服务的负效应较小时,推出信用支付服务且设置较长的延迟支付期可提高平台收益,增加消费者剩余,否则将产生较大资金成本,使平台利益受损。电商平台可通过制定合理的信用支付策略提高平台收益。     

Subsidy strategy for reserving flexible capacity of emergency supply production

This paper investigates a government's subsidy strategy for motivating a manufacturer to set up a flexible production line for emergency supplies. Four subsidy strategies are proposed to ensure a desired service level in case of an emergency: zero subsidy, a fixed subsidy, a marginal subsidy, and a hybrid subsidy. We develop a game theoretical model to examine how the government can induce a manufacturer to set up a flexible production line that can respond promptly to an emergency, based on the manufacturer's cost structure (fixed and marginal costs). We find that when the marginal profit of an emergency product is higher than that of the manufacturer's regular product, a fixed (marginal) subsidy is the dominant strategy if the manufacturer's fixed (marginal) cost is high, while a hybrid subsidy strategy is dominant if both costs are high. When the marginal profit of an emergency product is lower than that of the manufacturer's regular product, neither a fixed subsidy nor a zero subsidy will be the dominant strategy. We also find that a marginal subsidy can ensure the effectiveness of the strategy, while a fixed subsidy helps improve strategy efficiency. We use government subsidy strategies implemented for Chinese COVID-19 emergency supplies as examples to demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of the subsidy strategies under the proposed framework. We also extend the discussion by considering the manufacturer's social consciousness.