Modelling knowledge and action in distributed systems

We present a formal model that captures the subtle interaction between knowledge and action in distributed systems. We view a distributed system as a set ofruns, where a run is a function from time toglobal states and a global state is a tuple consisting of anenvironment state and alocal state for earch process in the system. This model is a generalization of those used in many previous papers.Actions in this model are associated with functions from global states to global states. Aprotocol is a function from local states to actions. We extend the standard notion of a protocol by definingknowledge-based protocols, ones in which a process' actions may depend explicitly on its knowledge. Knowledge-based protocols provide a natural way of describing how actions should take place in a distributed system. Finally, we show how the notion of one protocolimplementing another can be captured in our model. Joseph Y. Halpern received a B.Sc. in mathematics from the University of Toronto in 1975, and a Ph.D. in mathematics from Harvard University in 1981. In between, he spent two years as the head of the Mathematics Department at Bawku Secondary School, in Ghana. After a year as a visiting scientist at MIT, he joined IBM in 1982. He is currently the manager of the Mathematics and Related Computer Science Department at the IBM Almaden Research Center, and a consulting professor in the Computer Science Department at Stanford. His major research interests are reasoning about knowledge, distributed computation, and logics of programs. He was program chairman and organizer of the first conference of Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge, program chairman of the Fifth ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, and was the co-recipient (with Ronald Fagin) of the MIT Publisher's Prize for the Best Paper Paper at the 1985 International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Ronald Fagin is manager of the Foundations of Computer Science group at the IBM Almaden Research Center. He received his B.A. degree in mathematics from Dartmouth College in 1967 and his Ph.D. in mathematics, specializing in mathematical logic, from the University of California at Berkeley in 1973. He joined IBM in 1973 at the Thomas J. Watson Research Center. In 1975, he transferred to the San Jose Research Laboratory (now the IBM Almaden Research Center) where most of his research has centered on applications of logic to computer science. In particular, he has done research on the theory of relational databases and, more recently, on theories of knowledge and belief. He has received three IBM Outstanding Innovation Awards for his contributions to relational database theory, extendible hashing, and reasoning about knowledge. He was co-recipient (with Joe Halpern) of the MIT Press Publisher's Prize for the Best Paper at the 1985 International Joint Conference on Artificial Interlligence.Some material in this paper appeared in preliminary form in Halpern and Fagin (1985). An abridged version of the paper appeared in Vogt F (ed) Proceeding of Concurrency 88 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science Vol. 335) Springer-Verlag, 1988, pp 18–32     

The Expressive Power of Finitely Many Generalized Quantifiers

We consider extensions of first order logic (FO) and fixed point logic (FP) by means of generalized quantifiers in the sense of Lindström. We show that adding a finite set of such quantifiers to FP fails to capture PTIME, even over a fixed signature, strengthening earlier results. We also prove a stronger version of this result for PSPACE, which enables us to establish that PSPACE ≠ FO on any infinite class of ordered structures, a weak version of the ordered conjecture formulated by Ph. G. Kolaitis and M. Y. Vardi (Fixpoint logic vs. infinitary logic in finite-model theory, in "Proceedings, 7th IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science, 1992," pp. 46-57). These results are obtained by defining a notion of element type for bounded variable logics with finitely many generalized quantifiers. Using these, we characterize the classes of finite structures over which the infinitary logic L^ω_∞ω extended by a finite aw set of generalized quantifiers Q is no more expressive than first order logic extended by the quantifiers in Q.     

An Infinite Hierarchy of Temporal Logics over Branching Time

Many temporal logics have been suggested as branching time specification formalisms during the past 20 years. These logics were compared against each other for their expressive power, model checking complexity, and succinctness. Yet, unlike the case for linear time logics, no canonical temporal logic of branching time was agreed upon. We offer an explanation for the multiplicity of temporal logics over branching time and provide an objective quantified yardstick to measure these logics. We define an infinite hierarchy BTL_k of temporal logics and prove its strictness. We examine the expressive power of commonly used branching time temporal logics. We show that CTL* has no finite base, and that almost all of its many sublogics suggested in the literature are inside the second level of our hierarchy. We introduce new Ehrenfeucht–Fraissé games on trees and use them as our main tool to prove inexpressibility.     

Infinitary logics and 0–1 laws

We investigate the infinitary logic L_∞ω^ω, in which sentences may have arbitrary disjunctions and conjunctions, but they involve only finite numbers of distinct variables. We show that various fixpoint logics can be viewed as fragments of L_∞ω^ω, and we describe a game-theoretic characterization of the expressive power of the logic. Finally, we study asymptotic probabilities of properties expressible in L_∞ω^ω on finite structures. We show that the 0–1 law holds for L_∞ω^ω, i.e., the asymptotic probability of every sentence in this logic exists and is equal to either 0 or 1. This result subsumes earlier work on asymptotic probabilities for various fixpoint logics and reveals the boundary of 0–1 laws for infinitary logics.     

An Until Hierarchy and Other Applications of an Ehrenfeucht–Fraïssé Game for Temporal Logic

We prove there is a strict hierarchy of expressive power according to the Until depth of linear temporal logic (LTL) formulas: for each k, there is a natural property, based on quantitative fairness, that is not expressible with k nestings of Until operators, regardless of the number of applications of other operators, but is expressible by a formula with Until depth k+1. Our proof uses a new Ehrenfeucht–Fraïssé (EF) game designed specifically for LTL. These properties can all be expressed in first-order logic with quantifier depth and size (log k), and we use them to observe some interesting relationships between LTL and first-order expressibility. We note that our Until hierarchy proof for LTL carries over to the branching time logics, CTL and CTL*. We then use the EF game in a novel way to effectively characterize (1) the LTL properties expressible without Until, as well as (2) those expressible without both Until and Next. By playing the game “on finite automata,” we prove that the automata recognizing languages expressible in each of the two fragments have distinctive structural properties. The characterization for the first fragment was originally proved by Cohen, Perrin, and Pin using sophisticated semigroup-theoretic techniques. They asked whether such a characterization exists for the second fragment. The technique we develop is general and can potentially be applied in other contexts.     

Reasoning about Minimal Knowledge in Nonmonotonic Modal Logics

We study the problem of embedding Halpern and Moses's modal logic of minimal knowledge states into two families of modal formalism for nonmonotonic reasoning, McDermott and Doyle's nonmonotonic modal logics and ground nonmonotonic modal logics. First, we prove that Halpern and Moses's logic can be embedded into all ground logics; moreover, the translation employed allows for establishing a lower bound (3p) for the problem of skeptical reasoning in all ground logics. Then, we show a translation of Halpern and Moses's logic into a significant subset of McDermott and Doyle's formalisms. Such a translation both indicates the ability of Halpern and Moses's logic of expressing minimal knowledge states in a more compact way than McDermott and Doyle's logics, and allows for a comparison of the epistemological properties of such nonmonotonic modal formalisms.     

A Syntactic Framework with Probabilistic Beliefs and Conditionals for the Analysis of Strategic Form Games

In this paper, I develop a syntactic framework for the analysis ofstrategic form games that is based on a straightforward combination ofstandard systems of doxastic, probabilistic and conditionalpropositional logic. In particular, for the probabilistic part I makeuse of the axiomatization provided in Fagin and Halpern (1994). The use ofconditionals allows to represent a strategic form game by a logicalformula in a very natural way. Also expected utility maximization can benaturally captured. I use this framework to prove a version of a resulton Nash equilibrium conjectures first presented in Aumann and Brandenburger (1995).     

Probabilistic Dynamic Epistemic Logic

In this paper I combine the dynamic epistemic logic ofGerbrandy (1999) with the probabilistic logic of Fagin and Halpern (1994). The resultis a new probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic, a logic for reasoning aboutprobability, information, and information change that takes higher orderinformation into account. Probabilistic epistemic models are defined, and away to build them for applications is given. Semantics and a proof systemis presented and a number of examples are discussed, including the MontyHall Dilemma.     

The Better Bubbling Lemma

BCD [Barendregt, Henk, Mario Coppo and Mariangiola Dezani-Ciancaglini, A filter lambda model and the completeness of type assignment, JSL 48 (1983), 931–940] relies for its modeling of λ calculus in intersection type filters on a key theorem which I call BL (for the Bubbling Lemma, following someone). This lemma has been extended in [Castagna, Giuseppe, and Alain Frisch. A gentle introduction to semantic subtyping. In PPDP05, ACM Press (full version) and ICALP05, LNCS volume 3580, Springer-Verlag (summary), 2005. Joint ICALP-PPDP keynote talk; Dezani-Ciancaglini, M., A. Frisch, E. Giovannetti and Y. Motohama, 2002. The Relevance of Semantic Subtyping, Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 70 No. 1, 15pp] to encompass Boolean structure, including specifically union types; this extended lemma I call BBL (the Better Bubbling Lemma). There are resonances, explored in [Dezani-Ciancaglini, M., R.K. Meyer and Y. Motohama, The semantics of entailment omega, NDJFL 43 (2002), 129–145] and [Dezani-Ciancaglini, M., A. Frisch, E. Giovannetti and Y. Motohama, 2002. The Relevance of Semantic Subtyping, Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 70 No. 1, 15pp], between intersection and union type theories and the already existing minimal positive relevant logic B+ of [Routley, Richard, and Robert K. Meyer, The semantics of entailment III, JPL 1 (1972), 192–208]. (Indeed [Pal, Koushik, and Robert K. Meyer. 2005. Basic relevant theories for combinators at levels I and II, AJL 3, http://www.philosophy.unimelb.edu.au/2005/2003_2.pdf, 19 pages] applies BL and BBL to get further results linking combinators to relevant theories and propositions.) On these resonances the filters of algebra become the theories of logic. The semantics of [Meyer, Robert K., Yoko Motohama and Viviana Bono, Truth translations of relevant logics, in B. Brown and F. Lepage, eds., “Truth and Probability: Essays in Honour of Hugues Leblanc,” pages 59–84, College Publications, King's College, London, 2005] yields here a new and short proof of BBL, which takes account of full Boolean structure by encompassing not only B+ but also its conservative Boolean extension CB [Routley, Richard, and Robert K. Meyer, The semantics of entailment III, JPL 1 (1972), 192–208; Meyer, Robert K., 1995. Types and the Boolean system CB+, cslab.anu.edu.au/ftp/techreports/SRS/1995/TR-SRS-5-95/meyer.ps.gz; Meyer, Robert K., Yoko Motohama and Viviana Bono, Truth translations of relevant logics, in B. Brown and F. Lepage, eds., “Truth and Probability: Essays in Honour of Hugues Leblanc,” pages 59–84, College Publications, King's College, London, 2005.].     

A Logic for Reasoning About Knowledge of Unawareness

In the most popular logics combining knowledge and awareness, it is not possible to express statements about knowledge of unawareness such as “Ann knows that Bill is aware of something Ann is not aware of”—without using a stronger statement such as “Ann knows that Bill is aware of \(p\) and Ann is not aware of \(p\) ”, for some particular \(p\) . In Halpern and Rêgo (Proceedings of KR 2006; Games Econ Behav 67(2):503–525, 2009b) Halpern and Rêgo introduced a logic in which such statements about knowledge of unawareness can be expressed. The logic extends the traditional framework with quantification over formulae, and is thus very expressive. As a consequence, it is not decidable. In this paper we introduce a decidable logic which can be used to reason about certain types of unawareness. Our logic extends the traditional framework with an operator expressing full awareness, i.e., the fact that an agent is aware of everything, and another operator expressing relative awareness, the fact that one agent is aware of everything another agent is aware of. The logic is less expressive than Halpern’s and Rêgo’s logic. It is, however, expressive enough to express all of the motivating examples in Halpern and Rêgo (Proceedings of KR 2006; Games Econ Behav 67(2):503–525, 2009b). In addition to proving that the logic is decidable and that its satisfiability problem is PSPACE-complete, we present an axiomatisation which we show is sound and complete.     

Probabilistic logic programming

Of all scientific investigations into reasoning with uncertainty and chance, probability theory is perhaps the best understood paradigm. Nevertheless, all studies conducted thus far into the semantics of quantitative logic programming have restricted themselves to non-probabilistic semantic characterizations. In this paper, we take a few steps towards rectifying this situation. We define a logic programming language that is syntactically similar to the annotated logics of Blair et al., 1987 and Blair and Subrahmanian, 1988, 45–73) but in which the truth values are interpreted probabilistically. A probabilistic model theory and fixpoint theory is developed for such programs. This probabilistic model theory satisfies the requirements proposed by Fenstad (in “Studies in Inductive Logic and Probabilities” (R. C. Jeffrey, Ed.), Vol. 2, pp. 251–262, Univ. of California Press, Berkeley, 1980) for a function to be called probabilistic. The logical treatment of probabilities is complicated by two facts: first, that the connectives cannot be interpreted truth-functionally when truth values are regarded as probabilities; second, that negation-free definite-clause-like sentences can be inconsistent when interpreted probabilistically. We address these issues here and propose a formalism for probabilistic reasoning in logic programming. To our knowledge, this is the first probabilistic characterization of logic programming semantics.     

A Temporal Logic for Proving Properties of Topologically General Executions

We present a generalization of the temporal propositional logic of linear time which is useful for stating and proving properties of the generic execution sequence of a parallel program or a non-deterministic program. The formal system we present is exactly that same as the third of three logics presented by Lehmann and Shelah (Information and Control53, 165–198 (1982)), but we give it a different semantics. The models are tree models of arbitrary size similar to those used in branching time temporal logic. The formulation we use allows us to state properties of the “co-meagre” family of paths, where the term “co-meagre” refers to a set whose complement is of the first category in Baire's classification looking at the set of paths in the model as a metric space. Our system is decidable, sound, and, complete for models of arbitrary size, but it has the finite model property; namely, every sentence having a model has a finite model.     

Topological Perspective on the Hybrid Proof Rules

We consider the non-orthodox proof rules of hybrid logic from the viewpoint of topological semantics. Topological semantics is more general than Kripke semantics. We show that the hybrid proof rule BG is topologically not sound. Indeed, among all topological spaces the BG rule characterizes those that can be represented as a Kripke frame (i.e., the Alexandroff spaces). We also demonstrate that, when the BG rule is dropped and only the Name rule is kept, one can prove a general topological completeness result for hybrid logics axiomatized by pure formulas. Finally, we indicate some limitations of the topological expressive power of pure formulas. All results generalize to neighborhood frames.     

A Dynamic Logic of Agency II: Deterministic $${\mathcal{DLA}}$$ , Coalition Logic,and Game Theory

We continue the work initiated in Herzig and Lorini (J Logic Lang Inform, in press) whose aim is to provide a minimalistic logical framework combining the expressiveness of dynamic logic in which actions are first-class citizens in the object language, with the expressiveness of logics of agency such as STIT and logics of group capabilities such as CL and ATL. We present a logic called DDLA{\mathcal{DDLA}} (Deterministic Dynamic logic of Agency) which supports reasoning about actions and joint actions of agents and coalitions, and agentive and coalitional capabilities. In DDLA{\mathcal{DDLA}} it is supposed that, once all agents have selected a joint action, the effect of this joint action is deterministic. In order to assess DDLA{\mathcal{DDLA}} we prove that it embeds Coalition Logic. We then extend DDLA{\mathcal{DDLA}} with modal operators for agents’ preferences, and show that the resulting logic is sufficiently expressive to capture the game-theoretic concepts of best response and Nash equilibrium.     

Using counterfactuals in knowledge-based programming

This paper adds counterfactuals to the framework of knowledge-based programs of Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi [3,4]. The use of counterfactuals is illustrated by designing a protocol in which an agent stops sending messages once it knows that it is safe to do so. Such behavior is difficult to capture in the original framework because it involves reasoning about counterfactual executions, including ones that are not consistent with the protocol. Attempts to formalize these notions without counterfactuals are shown to lead to rather counterintuitive behavior.Received: 15 November 2001, Accepted: 15 April 2004, Published online: 13 July 2004Joseph Y. Halpern: Work supported in part by NSF under grant IRI-96-25901, IIS-0090145, and CTC-0208535, by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research under grant F49620-96-1-0323 and F48620-02-1-0101, and by ONR under grants N00014-00-1-03-41, N00014-01-1-0795, and by the DoD Multidisciplinary University Research Initiative (MURI) program administered by the ONR under grant N00014-01-1-0795.)A preliminary version of this paper appeared in the Proceedings of the Seventh Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK), 1998.     

Expressiveness and complexity of graph logic

We investigate the complexity and expressive power of a spatial logic for reasoning about graphs. This logic was previously introduced by Cardelli, Gardner and Ghelli, and provides the simplest setting in which to explore such results for spatial logics. We study several forms of the logic: the logic with and without recursion, and with either an exponential or a linear version of the basic composition operator. We study the combined complexity and the expressive power of the four combinations. We prove that, without recursion, the linear and exponential versions of the logic correspond to significant fragments of first-order (FO) and monadic second-order (MSO) Logics; the two versions are actually equivalent to FO and MSO on graphs representing strings. However, when the two versions are enriched with μ-style recursion, their expressive power is sharply increased.Both are able to express PSPACE-complete problems, although their combined complexity and data complexity still belong to PSPACE.     

Relativizations for the Logic-Automata Connection

BDDs and their algorithms implement a decision procedure for Quantified Propositional Logic. BDDs are a kind of acyclic automata. But unrestricted automata (recognizing unbounded strings of bit vectors) can be used to decide monadic second-order logics, which are more expressive. Prime examples are WS1S, a number-theoretic logic, or the string-based logical notation of introductory texts. One problem is that it is not clear which one is to be preferred in practice. For example, it is not known whether these two logics are computationally equivalent to within a linear factor, that is, whether a formula ϕ of one logic can be transformed to a formula %phis;′ of the other such that %phis;′ is true if and only if ϕ is and such that ϕ′ is decided in time linear in that of the time for ϕ.Another problem is that first-order variables in either version are given automata-theoretic semantics according to relativizations, which are syntactic means of restricting the domain of quantification of a variable. Such relativizations lead to technical arbitrations that may involve normalizing each subformula in an asymmetric manner or may introduce spurious state space explosions.In this paper, we investigate these problems through studies of congruences on strings. This algebraic framework is adapted to language-theoretic relativizations, where regular languages are intersected with restrictions. The restrictions are also regular languages. We introduce ternary and sexpartite characterizations of relativized regular languages. From properties of the resulting congruences, we are able to carry out detailed state space analyses that allow us to address the two problems.We report briefly on practical experiments that support our results. We conclude that WS1S with first-order variables can be robustly implemented in a way that efficiently subsumes string-based notations.Dedicated to the memory of Bob Paige and his contributions to automata algorithmsSome of the material in this paper appeared in Computer Aided Verification, CAV ‘99, LNCS 1633, 1999, under the title “A theory of restrictions for logics and automata.” This work was carried out while the author was with AT&T Labs–Research; itwas also supported in part by grant CCR-0341658 from the National Science Foundation.     

The dark side of interval temporal logic: marking the undecidability border

Unlike the Moon, the dark side of interval temporal logics is the one we usually see: their ubiquitous undecidability. Identifying minimal undecidable interval logics is thus a natural and important issue in that research area. In this paper, we identify several new minimal undecidable logics amongst the fragments of Halpern and Shoham’s logic HS, including the logic of the overlaps relation, over the classes of all finite linear orders and all linear orders, as well as the logic of the meets and subinterval relations, over the classes of all and dense linear orders. Together with previous undecidability results, this work contributes to bringing the identification of the dark side of interval temporal logics very close to the definitive picture.     

Limitations of the Program Memory and the Expressive Power of Dynamic Logics

For a dynamic logic L we study dynamic logics L_n for which programs allowed in formulas cannot use more than n variables. We prove that there exists a structure A of a finite signature such that for a wide class of dynamic logics L and for every natural number n the logic L_n+1 is more expressive over A than L_n. This result is based on a construction of some canonical form for the formulas of L_n over a free one-generated groupoid.     

Logical formalisms for representing bipolar preferences

Bipolar preferences distinguish between negative preferences inducing what is acceptable by complementation and positive preferences representing what is really satisfactory. This article provides a review of the main logics for preference representation. Representing preferences in a bipolar logical way has the advantage of enabling us to reason about them, while increasing their expressive power in a cognitively meaningful way. In the article, we first focus on the possibilistic logic setting and then discuss two other logics: qualitative choice logic and penalty logic. Finally, an application of bipolar preferences querying systems is outlined. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.