模糊需求环境下的多级供应链库存协调策略

研究一个由制造商、分销商和零售商组成的三级供应链系统在模糊需求环境下的库存策略及协调机制。将市场需求预测视为一个三角模糊数,利用模糊数学工具计算得到了供应链成员企业在面对模糊需求时最优决策的具体表达式。通过一个数值分析表明,在模糊需求环境下,转移支付同样可以实现供应链中各成员间库存的协调。     

基于模糊需求的三级供应链库存协调策略

以一个制造商、一个分销商和一个零售商组成的三级供应链系统为研究对象,将市场需求预测视为一个三角模糊数,利用模糊数学工具和运筹学计算得到了无协调机制情况下供应链成员企业面对模糊需求时最优决策的具体表达式。然后,在此基础之上,通过构建一个关于分销商的目标规划问题建立了基于转移支付的三级供应链库存协调模型。为了验证模型的有效性和可行性,设计了一个应用算例。算例分析表明:在模糊需求环境下,利用转移支付协调机制,制造商和零售商的收益不变,但分销商和供应链的总收益增加了。     

汽车租赁闭环供应链的回购策略及激励问题

研究由单个制造商和单个租赁商构成的汽车租赁闭环供应链的回购合同设置问题。发现在汽车租赁商的维护成本与旧车返回率具有相关性的前提下,单纯的回购合同无法实现供应链协调。提出了奖惩策略,结果表明,在回购合同中引入该策略后,占主导地位的制造商可以对租赁商的订购数量和旧车返回率实施控制和引导,从而实现汽车租赁闭环供应链的协调。     

保税港区出口集运三级供应链博弈分析

基于随机需求,针对出口集运模型下一个国内供应商、一个国内分销商和一个国外零售商组成的三级供应链,运用博弈理论的逆向归纳法,定量比较分析有无保税港区情形下供应链上各成员的最优利润。结果表明：有保税港区后,供应链上成员达到了三方共赢;国外消费者的消费福利提高;供应商可获单位价值退税额与分销商可获单位价值利益的增加,有利于供应链三方利润的增加和消费者福利的提高。     

三级短生命周期产品供应链退货协调研究

以由一个制造商、一个分销商和一个零售商构成的三级供应链为对象,研究退货契约在供应链协调中的应用.首先对集中控制情况下的决策进行分析,得出了整个供应链系统的最优生产量.然后分析了分散控制下参与成员的订购量和利润,以及供应链的总体利润,在此基础上建立了基于退货契约的供应链协调模型.研究得出对三级供应链实行退货契约不仅增加供...     

基于线性时变需求的鲜活农产品三级供应链协调

针对一个供应商-分销商-零售商构成的鲜活农产品三级供应链,基于线性时变需求,利用时间折扣契约实现了供应链的协调,并求出了使供应链各节点企业达到共赢的契约参数的取值范围。同时对产品变质率的变化率θ和需求量的变化率b进行了敏感性分析,提出在时间折扣契约的基础上,零售商通过加强库存管理也可以有效延长供应链的最优订货周期。     

基于均值-CVaR的回购契约供应链创新协调机制

为了研究制造商创新情形下回购契约供应链的订货及协调机制,构建了回购契约Stackelberg博弈模型,运用均值-CVaR的方法探讨了回购契约供应链创新协调问题。研究表明,均值-CVaR方法比CVaR度量准则更能提高零售商的订货量,指出零售商的风险规避程度影响供应链的创新和需求。当零售商喜好风险,将使制造商的创新投入度增大,供应链渠道的总需求增加。考虑到零售商过度订购的潜在风险,通过对回购商品数量的限制,改进制造商创新投入回购契约供应链,结果表明,改进的制造商创新投入回购契约能够降低零售商的订货量,同时,在一定条件下能够使供应链协调。最后通过数值算例分析了β和λ对最优订货量和创新投入度的影响。     

信息不对称下具有损失规避者参与的供应链决策与协调

在市场需求不确定下,假设制造商和零售商之间关于风险态度的信息不对称,研究由单个风险中性制造商和损失规避零售商组成的两级供应链系统。运用Stackelberg博弈分析分散系统下的决策行为,并用收益共享契约来实现集中系统下的供应链协调。研究结果表明,在分散决策系统下,双方风险态度信息的不对称导致供应链效率在“双边际效应”的基础上进一步损失;集中系统下收益共享契约可以消除信息不对称的影响,从而提高损失规避型零售商的最优订购量。算例分析显示,信息共享可以有效提高供应链参与双方的期望效用.     

资金约束下的低碳供应链决策研究

以制造商占优的两级供应链为研究对象,分析资金约束下低碳供应链的决策问题。首先应用回购契约建立基本模型,得到资金约束下低碳供应链实现协调的条件,然后引入减排成本分担机制建立减排模型,讨论低碳供应链各方决策。研究表明,资金约束下,制造商可以通过调整回购契约,使零售商利润函数为供应链利润函数的仿射函数,实现供应链协调;制造商融资减排后可以修改回购契约以达到供应链协调,且供应链最优订货量大于减排之前;分析了零售商与制造商的各项决策参数。算例表明,当碳排放配额交易价格较高,制造商融资减排后的碳排放总量小于减排之前。     

汽车租赁供应链中汽车制造商的回购定价策略

研究了在汽车租赁供应链中,当汽车制造商为Stackelberg博弈的领导者而租赁商为追随者时.汽车制造商向租赁商提供回购合同时的回购定价策略,分析了租赁商产品维护水平和二手市场对供应链决策的影响.结果表明,与汽车制造商不提供回购合同的情形相比,汽车制造商在一定条件下通过实施回购合同可以有效实现汽车租赁供应链的协调.     

不同供应链合同的最优订货策略及适用性比较

针对由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的单一易逝品供应链,在随机库存问题报童模型基础上,推导了回购、收入分享和数量折扣合同下,零售商的最优订货策略、零售商和制造商的期望利润,给出了不同供应链合同的适用条件。通过一个皮衣生产、销售供应链的案例,对不同供应链合同下的最优订货策略、合同适用性及原因进行了分析、比较。为理解不同供应链合同的适用性提供了数理依据和案例解释。     

基于顾客现状偏好的供应链无理由退货策略

首次将顾客现状偏好因素引入到供应链无理由退货策略中,主要研究了当制造商和零售商之间存在回扣契约或销售折扣契约时,供应链及其成员的最优无理由退货策略问题。文中通过对供应链无理由退货策略进行建模分析,分别得出了在不同契约中供应链整体和零售商的最优退货价格以及二者的双边际效益情况,并且发现了部分契约可以通过调整契约参数来消除这种矛盾边际效益现象,以此来实现供应链的协调。     

Contract negotiation and risk preferences in dual-channel supply chain coordination

This study employs profit-sharing contracts to coordinate dual-channel supply chains and examines the selection of profit-sharing parameters and the allocation of extra system profit gained from coordination. We characterise the Pareto-optimal contracts for the two- and three-stage dual-channel supply chains, by developing and maximising system utility function related to risk preferences and negotiating power. Under the optimal profit-sharing parameter in a two-stage supply chain, both members are reluctant to cooperate; however, in a three-stage supply chain, under the optimal two profit-sharing parameters selected by optimising the system utility function, the retailer is always reluctant to cooperate, but the distributor or the supplier may have incentives to deviate from cooperation. In this case, the distributor and the supplier will negotiate again as in a two-stage supply chain so that all three members can benefit from coordination with profit-sharing contracts. Besides acting independently, the distributor, in the process of contract negotiation, may choose to form an alliance with the upstream supplier or the downstream retailer, which means the relationship among the three members involving profit allocation after coordination is quite different from that for a two-stage supply chain and is not necessarily interest-contrary. In the contract negotiation, in any kind of scenario, risk aversion and negotiation power have a significant impact on the selection of optimal profit-sharing parameters and the allocation of extra system profit. One member’s risk aversion or its negotiation power may be advantageous to the other. Mathematical examples are illustrated to clarify the contract negotiation process.     

CVaR准则下双渠道供应链订货与信息搭便车行为

研究双渠道供应链中生产商负责的网上直销渠道对零售商负责的传统零售渠道的信息服务搭便车行为。假定产品需求随机且依赖于零售商信息服务水平,利用条件风险值准则和均衡分析方法建立了生产商与零售商均为风险厌恶者时双渠道供应链的集中式决策模型和分散式决策模型,利用合同理论给出了协调供应链的回购加信息服务补贴契约,利用数值仿真方法验证了模型的合理性和协调契约的有效性。研究表明,增加直销渠道对供应链而言是把“双刃剑”,既可吸引潜在需求,也应避免需求由零售渠道向直销渠道的大规模转移;直销渠道的信息服务搭便车行为有利于供应链各方;决策者越厌恶风险,其订货量越低,此时生产商、零售商和供应链的利润都将下降;当风险厌恶因子等于1时,决策者风险厌恶时双渠道供应链的决策与决策者风险中性时一致。     

Inventory misplacement and demand forecast error in the supply chain: profitable RFID strategies under wholesale and buy-back contracts

We investigate RFID adoption strategies under wholesale price and buy-back contracts in a supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer who faces inventory misplacement and demand forecast error. RFID can alleviate the misplacement problem, and can reduce demand forecast error by shortening order lead time. By a newsvendor model, we characterise the optimal contract terms in the supply chain without and with RFID adoption, respectively. We further analyse how the contract terms depend on RFID-related parameters (e.g. salable rate and demand forecast error). We find that both without and with RFID, the wholesale price contract will lead to the double marginalisation problem, while the buy-back contract can coordinate the supply chain. We show that the supply chain adopts RFID if and only if the tagging cost is below a threshold; the threshold is in negative correlation to the demand forecast error. The supply chain is more willing to adopt RFID under the buy-back contract than under the wholesale price contract. RFID adoption can sometimes lessen the double marginalisation problem under the wholesale price contract, improving the supply chain efficiency. A smaller RFID tagging cost or a reduced forecast error do not necessarily lead to higher supply chain efficiency.     

Return policy and supply chain coordination with network-externality effect

The benefits of a consumer return policy have been extensively studied in extent literature. This paper explores the potentially damaging impact of a return policy on the retailer. We develop an analytical framework and examine the economic impact of consumer return among consumers, retailer and supply chain. We distinguish three network-externality (NE) cases: no network externality, fixed network-externality and variable network-externality contingent on return amount to discuss the retailer’s selling price, refund and inventory policies. Our analysis derives the optimal policies and shows that they take the form of contingence model in which the policies depend on consumer initial return and NE return. We also examine the influence of the consumer return NE effect on buy-back contracts of the supply chain and show that while the traditional buy-back contract fails to coordinate the supply chain, the NE effect does not render the differentiated buy-back contract less effective. Finally, we extend our study to a heterogeneous consumer case.     

Integrated product design,shelf-space allocation and transportation decisions in green supply chains

In this paper, we examine a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and retailer where the manufacturer undertakes greening efforts in terms of pack-size reduction and transportation cost reduction. The retailer decides on shelf-space allocation for the product. Both the players benefit from the greening efforts of the manufacturer. In such a setting, we examine strategic decisions of the players and compare and contrast the performance of the decentralised supply chain with the centralised supply chain. We also examine the effect of collaborative mechanisms by modelling two contracts in which the retailer offers a transportation cost reduction effort based contract and a two-part tariff contract. We find that the decentralised supply chain leads to lower greening efforts and shelf-space allocation decisions. We also find that the contracts improve pack-size reduction effort, transportation cost reduction effort and shelf-space allocation, while also improving the profitability of individual players. The findings demonstrate a scope for supply chain collaboration between manufacturer–retailer pairs in this setting. The paper uniquely combines three critical elements in supply chains, namely, product design, transportation and retailing decisions, and aims to provide insights into the decision making of players considering environmental waste and pollution. The paper also reflects consumer behavior and trade-offs that the supply chain players face.     

Coordination and performance analysis for a three-echelon supply chain with a revenue sharing contract

This paper focuses on a three-echelon supply chain composed of a manufacturer, a distributor and a retailer for a single selling period. Based on a revenue sharing contract, the coordination of the decentralised supply chain with the simultaneous move game or the leader–follower game is analysed. It is determined that the revenue sharing contract can coordinate the decentralised supply chain with the simultaneous move game. Our analysis reveals that the revenue sharing contract cannot coordinate the decentralised three-echelon supply chain with the leader–follower game except for a special situation. However, this result provides an opportunity to develop methodology and results that measure the potential improvement in supply chain performance that can be gained from utilising the revenue sharing contract. This is an important aspect of this paper.