Mental model organization.

Previous research (G. A. Radvansky and R. T. Zacks; see record 1992-04153-001) has shown that the fan effect is mediated not by the number of nominal associations paired with a concept but by the number of mental models into which related concepts are organized. Specifically, newly learned "facts" about different objects in one location are integrated into a single mental model and no fan effect is produced, whereas facts about one object in different locations are not integrated and a fan effect is produced. In 6 experiments the authors investigated several factors' influence on location-based organization preferences. No impact on either article type (definite or indefinite) or object transportability was found. However, animate sentence subjects (people) reduced preference for location-based organizations. A clear person-based organization emerged by using locations that typically contain only a single person (e.g., phone booth) to make location-based situations less plausible. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Fan effects reveal position-specific numerical concepts.

Examined associative interference (i.e., fan) effects to determine if the numerical concepts mediating numerical fact retrieval can be position specific. 21 Ss (aged 17-22 yrs) memorized 15 "diamond arithmetic" facts (J. Whalen, 1997) involving five different operands. Ignoring operand position (i.e., left vs. right), each operand appeared equally often across items (i.e., position-independent fan was constant). In contrast, position-specific fan values varied across items (e.g., 2 appeared five times as the left operand, but once in the right position; 3 appeared four times as the left operand, and twice as the right operand, etc). Thus, a fan effect was expected only if the concepts activated by arithmetic operands are position specific. Results indicated that position-specific fan was an excellent predictor of trials to criterion, error rate, and latency. The concepts mediating number fact retrieval can be position specific. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The fan effect: New results and new theories.

The fan effect (J. R. Anderson, see record 1975-06644-001) has been attributed to interference among competing associations to a concept. Recently, it has been suggested that such effects might be due to multiple mental models (G. A. Radvansky, D. H. Spieler, & R. T. Zacks, see record 1993-16287-001) or suppression of concepts (M. C. Anderson & B. A. Spellman, see record 1995-16174-001); A. R. A. Conway & R. W. Engle, see record 1994-08314-001). It was found that the Adaptive Control of Thought—Rational (ACT-R) theory, which embodies associative interference, is consistent with the results of G. A. Radvansky et-al. and that there is no evidence for concept suppression in a new fan experiment. The ACT-R model provides good quantitative fits to the results, as shown in a variety of experiments. The 3 key concepts in these fits are (a) the associative strength between 2 concepts reflects the degree to which one concept predicts the other, (b) foils are rejected by retrieving mismatching facts; and (c) participants can adjust the relative weights they give to various cues in retrieval. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Fact retrieval in younger and older adults: The role of mental models.

Using a fan effect paradigm, three experiments tested whether younger and older adults differ in the retrieval of integrated and nonintegrated facts, where integration refers to the development of a mental model. Earlier work by G. A. Radvansky and R. T. Zacks (see record 1992-04153-001) had found that as long as facts can be integrated into a single mental model, young adults show no increase in retrieval time or error rates as the size of the subset of related facts increases (i.e., no fan effect). The present studies show a similar pattern for older adults. By contrast, and in confirmation of our previous findings on age differences and the fan effect (L. D. Gerard et al; see record 1991-32781-001), older adults show an exaggerated fan effect, at least in their error rates, on subsets of related facts not easily integrated into a single mental model. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Metamemory cues and monitoring accuracy: Judging what you know and what you will know.

Three experiments examined metamemory for categorized lists of items. Judgments of learning (JOLs) were obtained from college students either immediately after study or following a brief (at least 30-s) delay. In contrast to past findings (e.g., T. O. Nelson & J. Dunlosky, 1991), no advantage was found for delayed JOLs in Experiment 1, using a standard, prediction-based metamemory cue. In Experiment 2, knowledge-based judgments were elicited, and delayed JOL accuracy improved significantly. The relative efficacy of 4 different metamemory cues was examined in Experiment 3. An interaction between the timing and phrasing of JOL cues was detected: Delayed JOLs were more accurate than immediate JOLs only when knowledge-based cues were used. These results are interpreted in A. Koriat's (1997) cue-utilization framework for JOL accuracy, and they show that the phrasing of metamemory cues can have a substantial impact on monitoring accuracy. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of number of facts studied on recognition versus sensibility judgments.

The effect of memory representation on the ease of cognitive judgments can vary depending on the nature of the judgment required. In three experiments, subjects studied sets of sentences and in later phases made recognition judgments or sensibility judgments on these sentences and others constructed from the words in the sentences they had studied. In Experiments 1 and 2, the studied sentences were sensible, whereas in Experiment 3 the studied sentences were nonsensical. Judgment times varied with the fan of the concepts in the sentence (i.e., the number of facts known about each concept). Subjects were slowed by fan in retrieving a specific fact but speeded by fan in making a sensibility judgment. In all experiments, subjects were faster at making a judgment in conditions where judgments could be made either by a memory retrieval process or a semantic sensibility process. This implies that subjects can sometimes recognize that they have studied a sentence before they can judge its sensibility. This result calls into question the view that language processing is a faculty that occupies a place separate from memory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"The attentional blink reflects retrieval competition among multiple rapid serial visual presentation items: Tests of an interference model": Erratum.

Reports an error in "The attentional blink reflects retrieval competition among multiple rapid serial visual presentation items: Tests of an interference model" by Matthew I. Isaak, Kimron L. Shapiro and Jesse Martin (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 1999[Dec], Vol 25[6], 1774-1792). On p. 1778, the correct Figure 1 was inadvertently replaced in the production process with an erroneous figure. The erratum contains the corrected figure. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2000-15288-019.) When people respond to a target (T1) in a rapid serial visual presentation stream, their perception of a subsequent target (T2) is impaired if the intertarget stimulus onset asynchrony is between about 100 and 500 ms. Three experiments supported the interference model's (K. L. Shapiro, J. E. Raymond, & K. M. Arnell, 1994) claim that this attentional blink reflects competition for retrieval among multiple items in visual short-term memory. Experiments 1 and 2 revealed that items appearing during the blink are named as T2 on an above-chance proportion of trials when T2 must be identified. Experiment 3 demonstrated that both the size of the blink and sensitivity to T2 reflected the number of items competing for retrieval as T2; such competition, moreover, occurred at a conceptual or categorical level rather than at a purely visual one. The relationship between the interference and alternative models of the attentional blink is discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Exploring a mnemonic debiasing account of the underconfidence-with-practice effect.

Judgments of learning (JOLs) underestimate the increase in recall that occurs with repeated study (the underconfidence-with-practice effect; UWP). The authors explore an account in terms of a foresight bias in which JOLs are inflated when the to-be-recalled target highlights aspects of the cue that are not transparent when the cue appears alone and the tendency of practice to alleviate bias by providing learners with cues pertinent to recall. In 3 experiments the UWP effect was strongest for items that induce a foresight bias, but delaying JOLs reduced the debiasing effects of practice, thereby moderating the UWP effect. This occurred when delayed JOLs were prompted by the cue alone (like during testing), not when prompted by the cue-target pair (like during study). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Working-memory capacity as long-term memory activation: An individual-differences approach.

One explanation of the correlation often observed between working-memory span scores and reading comprehension is that individuals differ in level of activation available for long-term memory units. Two experiments used the fan manipulation to test this idea. In Exp 1, high- and low-working-memory Ss learned a set of unrelated sentences varying in the number of shared concepts (fans) and then performed speeded recognition for those sentences. Low-working-memory Ss showed a larger increase in recognition time as fan increased. When the slope of the fan effect was partialled out of the relationship between working-memory span and verbal abilities, the relationship was reduced to nonsignificance. In Exp 2, Ss learned thematically related sentences that varied in fan. Low-span Ss showed the positive fan effect typically found with thematically unrelated sentences, whereas high-span Ss showed a negative fan effect. The results are discussed in terms of a general capacity theory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Monitoring one's own knowledge during study: A cue-utilization approach to judgments of learning.

How do people monitor their knowledge during acquisition? A cue-utilization approach to judgments of learning (JOLs) is outlined, distinguishing 3 types of cues for JOLs: intrinsic, extrinsic, and mnemonic. In 4 experiments using paired-associates learning, item difficulty (intrinsic) exerted similar effects of JOLs and recall. In contrast, the extrinsic factors of list repetition, item repetition within a list, and stimulus duration affected JOLs less strongly than recall, supporting the proposition that extrinsic factors are discounted in making JOLs. Although practice impaired calibration, increasing underconfidence, it did improve resolution (i.e., the recall-JOL correlation). This improvement was seen to reflect a shift in the basis of JOLs with practice, from reliance on intrinsic factors, towards greater reliance on mnemonic-based heuristics. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Enhanced memory at delays: Why do judgments of learning improve over time?

Judgments of learning (JOLs) made after a 5-min delay are almost perfectly accurate: the "delayed-JOL effect" (T. O. Nelson & J. Dunlosky, 1991). The mechanisms underlying this phenomenon have been the subject of debate. This study examined the effects of delays and short-term memory (STM) distraction on memory and metamemory (JOLs). STM distraction (2.5–30 s) immediately following encoding increased both JOL accuracy and mean cued recall. However, JOLs made after longer delays (4–5 min) were even more accurate. In addition, making a JOL at longer delays improved cued-recall performance. Conditional probabilities of cued recall (given successful initial retrieval) also increased over time and with interference, indicating that delayed JOLs may alter what they assess. Finally, increased confidence was associated with shorter JOL latencies only at delays. The results are consistent with an accessibility view of metamemory (e.g., A. Koriat, 1993). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Enhanced metamemory at delays: why do judgments of learning improve over time?

Judgments of learning (JOLs) made after a 5-min delay are almost perfectly accurate: the "delayed-JOL effect" (T. O. Nelson & J. Dunlosky, 1991). The mechanisms underlying this phenomenon have been the subject of debate. This study examined the effects of delays and short-term memory (STM) distraction on memory and metamemory (JOLs). STM distraction (2.5-30 s) immediately following encoding increased both JOL accuracy and mean cued recall. However, JOLs made after longer delays (4-5 min) were even more accurate. In addition, making a JOL at longer delays improved cued-recall performance. Conditional probabilities of cued recall (given successful initial retrieval) also increased over time and with interference, indicating that delayed JOLs may alter what they assess. Finally, increased confidence was associated with shorter JOL latencies only at delays. The results are consistent with an accessibility view of metamemory (e.g., A. Koriat, 1993).     

Does Retrieval Fluency Contribute to the Underconfidence-With-Practice Effect?

Judgments of learning (JOLs) made during multiple study-test trials underestimate increases in recall performance across those trials, an effect that has been dubbed the underconfidence-with-practice (UWP) effect. In 3 experiments, the authors examined the contribution of retrieval fluency to the UWP effect for immediate and delayed JOLs. The UWP effect was demonstrated with reliable underconfidence on Trial 2 occurring for both kinds of JOL. However, in contrast to a retrieval-fluency hypothesis, fine-grained analyses indicated that the reliance of JOLs on retrieval fluency contributed minimally to the UWP effect. Our discussion focuses on the status of the retrieval-fluency hypothesis for the UWP effect. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Learning of nondomain facts in high- and low-knowledge domains.

Research on expertise has repeatedly documented that experts learn new information better than do novices, but only when the information is relevant to the expert's domain. It was found in Experiment 1 that participants showed superior learning and recall of a large quantity of new, non-domain-relevant facts about concepts within their domain of high knowledge than about concepts for which they had low domain knowledge. Experiment 2 investigated whether the participants' superior recall of new facts related to concepts within their domain of high knowledge was due to the number of prior facts associated with the concept or to the prior frequency of repetition of those concepts. It was found that participants' recall of new facts was better for concepts with 5 prior associated facts than for concepts with a single prior association but that the number of previous repetitions of each concept did not affect the level of recall for the new facts. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The roles of competition, target accessibility, and cue familiarity in metamemory for word pairs.

Two experiments examined metamemory ratings following differing amounts of retroactive interference for paired associates. Participants made both feeling of knowing (FOK) ratings and judgments of learning (JOLs) for first-list responses after learning different types of second lists. Both types of ratings were higher when stimuli were repeated and responses were associates across two lists than when stimuli were repeated and responses were different. Repetition of either the stimuli or the responses across lists produced lower ratings than nonrepetition, especially for recalled responses. The results provided support for competition as an important factor in JOLs and FOKs following interference. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Lack of Pervasiveness of the Underconfidence-With-Practice Effect: Boundary Conditions and an Explanation Via Anchoring.

The authors investigated whether underconfidence in judgments of learning (JOLs) is pervasive across multiple study-test trials as suggested by A. Koriat, L. Sheffer, and H. Ma'ayan (2002) or whether underconfidence with practice (UWP) might be a kind of anchoring-and-adjustment effect, such that the occurrence or nonoccurrence of the UWP effect depends on whether recall is above a psychological anchor. Participants studied normatively difficult items or normatively easy items and made immediate JOLs or delayed JOLs. The UWP effect occurred for easy items, but for difficult items an overconfidence-with-practice (OWP) effect occurred for delayed JOLs and no bias occurred for immediate JOLs. The systematic occurrence of all 3 outcomes establishes boundary conditions for the UWP effect and confirms the hypothesis that underconfidence (or the lack thereof) may arise at least in part from an anchoring-and-adjustment mechanism. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Delaying students' metacognitive monitoring improves their accuracy in predicting their recognition performance.

The accuracy of students' judgments of learning (JOLs) in predicting recognition vs recall was investigated in 4 experiments. Students studied paired associates and made JOLs, which occurred either immediately after an item had been studied or shortly after an item had been studied. Students then received tests of associative recognition or paired-associate recall. JOL accuracy was greater for delayed JOLs than immediate JOLs, and the accuracy of JOLs was lower in predicting recognition than recall. The latter finding occurred (1) regardless of whether students had anticipated a recall test or a recognition test when making JOLs and (2) regardless of whether JOLs had been cued by only the stimulus of an item or by the entire stimulus-response pair. Correct guessing was shown to contribute to the lower accuracy of students' predictions of recognition. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Familiarity and retrieval processes in delayed judgments of learning.

Two processes are postulated to underlie delayed judgments of learning (JOLs)--cue familiarity and target retrievability. The two processes are distinguishable because the familiarity-based judgments are thought to be faster than the retrieval-based processes, because only retrieval-based JOLs should enhance the relative accuracy of the correlations between the JOLs and criterion test performance, and because only retrieval-based judgments should enhance memory. To test these predictions, in three experiments, the authors either speeded people's JOLs or allowed them to be unspeeded. The relative accuracy of the JOLs in predicting performance on the criterion test was higher for the unspeeded JOLs than for the speeded JOLs, as predicted. The unspeeded JOL conditions showed enhanced memory as compared with the speeded JOL conditions, as predicted. Finally, the unspeeded JOLs were sensitive to manipulations that modified recallability of the target, whereas the speeded JOLs were selectively sensitive to experimental variations in the familiarity of the cues. Thus, all three of the predictions about the consequences of the two processes potentially underlying delayed JOLs were borne out. A model of the processes underlying delayed JOLs based on these and earlier results is presented. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Empirical analysis of the intrinsic–extrinsic distinction of judgments of learning (JOLs): Effects of relatedness and serial position on JOLs.

A. Koriat's (1997) cue-utilization framework provided a significant advance in understanding how people make judgments of learning (JOLs). A major distinction is made between intrinsic and extrinsic cues. JOLs are predicted to be sensitive to intrinsic cues (e.g., item relatedness) and less sensitive to extrinsic cues (e.g., serial position) because JOLs are comparative across items in a list. The authors evaluated predictions by having people make JOLs after studying either related (poker flush) or unrelated (dog-spoon) items. Although some outcomes confirmed these predictions, others could not be readily explained by the framework. Namely, relatedness influenced JOLs even when manipulated between participants, primacy effects were evident on JOLs, and the order in which blocks of items were presented (either all related items first or all unrelated items first) influenced JOLs. The authors discuss the framework in relation to these and other outcomes. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The role of memory for past test in the underconfidence with practice effect.

According to the Memory for Past Test (MPT) heuristic, judgments of learning (JOLs) may be based, in part, on memory for the correctness of answers on a previous test. The authors explored MPT as the source of the underconfidence with practice effect (UWP; A. Koriat, L. Sheffer, & H. Ma'ayan, 2002), whereby Trial 1 overconfidence switches to underconfidence by Trial 2. Immediate and delayed JOLs were contrasted because only immediate JOLs demonstrate UWP. Consistent with MPT for immediate JOLs, Trial 1 test performance better predicted Trial 2 JOLs than did Trial 2 test performance. Delayed JOLs showed the reverse. Furthermore, items forgotten on Trial 1 but remembered on Trial 2 contributed disproportionately to UWP, but only with immediate JOLs. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)