Causal Learning Across Domains.

Five studies investigated (a) children's ability to use the dependent and independent probabilities of events to make causal inferences and (b) the interaction between such inferences and domain-specific knowledge. In Experiment 1, preschoolers used patterns of dependence and independence to make accurate causal inferences in the domains of biology and psychology. Experiment 2 replicated the results in the domain of biology with a more complex pattern of conditional dependencies. In Experiment 3, children used evidence about patterns of dependence and independence to craft novel interventions across domains. In Experiments 4 and 5, children's sensitivity to patterns of dependence was pitted against their domain-specific knowledge. Children used conditional probabilities to make accurate causal inferences even when asked to violate domain boundaries. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Blickets and babies: The development of causal reasoning in toddlers and infants.

Previous research has suggested that preschoolers possess a cognitive system that allows them to construct an abstract, coherent representation of causal relations among events. Such a system lets children reason retrospectively when they observe ambiguous data in a rational manner (e.g., D. M. Sobel, J. B. Tenenbaum, & A. Gopnik, 2004). However, there is little evidence that demonstrates whether younger children possess similar inferential abilities. In Experiment 1, the authors extended previous findings with older children to examine 19- and 24-month-olds' causal inferences. Twenty-four-month-olds' inferences were similar to those of preschoolers, but younger children lacked the ability to make retrospective causal inferences, perhaps because of performance limitations. In Experiment 2, the authors designed an eye-tracking paradigm to test younger participants that eliminated various manual search demands. Eight-month-olds' anticipatory eye movements, in response to retrospective data, revealed inferences similar to those of 24-month-olds in Experiment 1 and preschoolers in previous research. These data are discussed in terms of associative reasoning and causal inference. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Why dogs have puppies and cats have kittens: the role of birth in young children's understanding of biological origins

Three studies examined young children's understanding of the biologically causal role of birth in determining animal properties and species kind identity. In Studies 1 and 2, 4- to 7-year-olds and adults were told stories in which a baby was born to an animal of one species (e.g., a horse) but was adopted and raised by an animal of another species (e.g., a cow). In Study 1, children were asked to judge which parent the baby would resemble on a set of physical properties and beliefs. The majority of children were unable to say that the baby would resemble the birth parent on physical properties but share the beliefs of the adoptive parent. These results indicate that children were not using domain-specific causal understandings to reason about the origins of these properties. In Study 2, however, when asked to explicitly predict the kind of the baby, even 5-year-olds were able to reliably judge that the baby would be of the same species kind as the birth parent rather than the adoptive parent. This result suggests that children do understand at some level that birth determines species kind. Study 3 examined further the extent to which knowledge about birth influenced children's inferences about properties. Five-year-olds were asked to judge whether a baby would share a set of physical and nonphysical properties with its mother or its father. The results showed that children who knew the factual information about where babies come from (i.e., inside mommies' tummies) were more likely to attribute the mother's properties to the baby than the father's, regardless of whether the properties were physical or nonphysical. But this finding was true only if the property of one of the parents was not inherently more desirable or true than that of the other parent. In sum, the results of these 3 studies indicate that knowledge of birth does play a role in children's inferential reasoning, even for 5-year-olds, but that that role is not domain-specific. The implications for children's understanding of biological inheritance are discussed.     

Cue competition effects and young children’s causal and counterfactual inferences.

The authors examined cue competition effects in young children using the blicket detector paradigm, in which objects are placed either singly or in pairs on a novel machine and children must judge which objects have the causal power to make the machine work. Cue competition effects were found in a 5- to 6-year-old group but not in a 4-year-old group. Equivalent levels of forward and backward blocking were found in the former group. Children’s counterfactual judgments were subsequently examined by asking whether or not the machine would have gone off in the absence of 1 of 2 objects that had been placed on it as a pair. Cue competition effects were demonstrated only in 5- to 6-year-olds using this mode of assessing causal reasoning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Children's use of triadic eye gaze information for "mind reading."

Five experiments examined children's use of eye gaze information for "mind-reading" purposes, specifically, for inferring another person's desire. When presented with static displays in the first 3 experiments, only by 4 years of age did children use another person's eye direction to infer desires, although younger children could identify the person's focus of attention. Further, 3-year-olds were capable of inferring desire from other nonverbal cues, such as pointing (Experiment 3). When eye gaze was presented dynamically with several other scaffolding cues (Experiment 4), 2- and 3-year-olds successfully used eye gaze for desire inference. Scaffolding cues were removed in Experiment 5, and 2- and 3-year-olds still performed above chance in using eye gaze. Results suggest that 2-year-olds are capable of using eye gaze alone to infer about another's desire. The authors propose that the acquisition of the ability to use attentional cues to infer another's mental state may involve both an association process and a differentiation process. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Causal relations and feature similarity in children's inductive reasoning.

Four experiments examined the development of property induction on the basis of causal relations. In the first 2 studies, 5-year-olds, 8-year-olds, and adults were presented with triads in which a target instance was equally similar to 2 inductive bases but shared a causal antecedent feature with 1 of them. All 3 age groups used causal relations as a basis for property induction, although the proportion of causal inferences increased with age. Subsequent experiments pitted causal relations against featural similarity in induction. It was found that adults and 8-year-olds, but not 5-year-olds, preferred shared causal relations over strong featural similarity as a basis for induction. The implications for models of inductive reasoning and development are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The development of bases for trait attribution: Children's understanding of traits as causal mechanisms based on desire.

Two studies investigated 4- to 7-year-old children's understanding that traits can be causal mechanisms based on desires, as well as mere summaries of behavioral regularities. In Experiment 1, children made predictions given trait information. Children from 5 years made different emotion predictions about the same situation for actors with different traits, thus appreciating traits as psychological causes. For behavior prediction, children over age 4 generalized across situations. In Experiment 2, accurate emotion prediction by 3- to 7-year-olds was linked to understanding desire as a subjective mental property. The results suggest that children change from viewing traits as behavioral regularities to understanding them as internal mediators, and that advances in understanding desire underlie this change. These changes in understanding traits extend research on theory of mind beyond the basic concepts of desire and belief. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Dispositional Attribution: Multiple Inferences About Motive-Related Traits.

This research views dispositional inference as a process whereby perceivers integrate multiple inferences about a target person's motives and traits. The findings suggest that although perceived motives may stimulate extra attributional processing (S. Fein, 1996), the content of the inferred motive is important as well. Perceivers learned about situational forces implying that a target person had free choice, no choice, or an ulterior motive for helpful behavior. Inferences about the target's helpfulness differed depending on whether the target's behavior was attributed to an obedience motive (no-choice condition) or to a selfish motive (ulterior-motive condition). In general, inferences about motives were more predictive of dispositional inferences than were global causal attributions (to situational vs. dispositional forces) or base rate assumptions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Causal learning mechanisms in very young children: Two-, three-, and four-year-olds infer causal relations from patterns of variation and covariation.

Three studies investigated whether young children make accurate causal inferences on the basis of patterns of variation and covariation. Children were presented with a new causal relation by means of a machine called the "blicket detector." Some objects, but not others, made the machine light up and play music. In the first 2 experiments, children were told that "blickets make the machine go" and were then asked to identify which objects were "blickets." Two-, 3-, and 4-year-old children were shown various patterns of variation and covariation between two different objects and the activation of the machine. All 3 age groups took this information into account in their causal judgments about which objects were blickets. In a 3rd experiment, 3- and 4-year-old children used the information when they were asked to make the machine stop. These results are related to Bayes-net causal graphical models of causal learning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Learning and retention through predictive inference and classification.

Work in category learning addresses how humans acquire knowledge and, thus, should inform classroom practices. In two experiments, we apply and evaluate intuitions garnered from laboratory-based research in category learning to learning tasks situated in an educational context. In Experiment 1, learning through predictive inference and classification were compared for fifth-grade students using class-related materials. Making inferences about properties of category members and receiving feedback led to the acquisition of both queried (i.e., tested) properties and nonqueried properties that were correlated with a queried property (e.g., even if not queried, students learned about a species' habitat because it correlated with a queried property, like the species' size). In contrast, classifying items according to their species and receiving feedback led to knowledge of only the property most diagnostic of category membership. After multiple-day delay, the fifth-graders who learned through inference selectively retained information about the queried properties, and the fifth-graders who learned through classification retained information about the diagnostic property, indicating a role for explicit evaluation in establishing memories. Overall, inference learning resulted in fewer errors, better retention, and more liking of the categories than did classification learning. Experiment 2 revealed that querying a property only a few times was enough to manifest the full benefits of inference learning in undergraduate students. These results suggest that classroom teaching should emphasize reasoning from the category to multiple properties rather than from a set of properties to the category. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The role of causal models in analogical inference.

Computational models of analogy have assumed that the strength of an inductive inference about the target is based directly on similarity of the analogs and in particular on shared higher order relations. In contrast, work in philosophy of science suggests that analogical inference is also guided by causal models of the source and target. In 3 experiments, the authors explored the possibility that people may use causal models to assess the strength of analogical inferences. Experiments 1-2 showed that reducing analogical overlap by eliminating a shared causal relation (a preventive cause present in the source) from the target increased inductive strength even though it decreased similarity of the analogs. These findings were extended in Experiment 3 to cross-domain analogical inferences based on correspondences between higher order causal relations. Analogical inference appears to be mediated by building and then running a causal model. The implications of the present findings for theories of both analogy and causal inference are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Inference and action in early causal reasoning.

Two experiments investigated whether a simple-to-embedded-rules account can explain the change in causal reasoning in children between 3 and 4 years of age. A marble-and-ramp apparatus that operated in 2 distinct configurations of straight and across was used throughout. In Experiment 1, 3-year-olds were able to predict the path of the marble when there was only 1 input hole (a simple if-then rules task), whereas only 4-year-olds could solve the 2-input version (an embedded or conjoint conditional if-then rules task). Experiment 2 found the same 3- to 4-year age difference when children chose where to insert the marble in the 2-input version, indicating that the same rules may underlie causal action as well as causal prediction for the more complicated task. The results of the 2 experiments are discussed in relation to previous findings on causal reasoning, children's theory of mind, and a theory of cognitive complexity in the preschool period. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Conditional probability versus spatial contiguity in causal learning: Preschoolers use new contingency evidence to overcome prior spatial assumptions.

This study examines preschoolers' causal assumptions about spatial contiguity and how these assumptions interact with new evidence in the form of conditional probabilities. Preschoolers saw a toy that activated in the presence of certain objects. Children were shown evidence for the toy's activation rule in the form of patterns of probability: The toy was more likely to activate either when objects made contact with its surface (on condition) or when objects were several inches above its surface (over condition). In Experiment 1, 61 three-year-olds saw a deterministic activation rule. In Experiments 2 and 3, 48 four-year-olds saw an activation rule that was probabilistic. In Experiment 4, 30 four-year-olds saw a screening-off pattern of activation. In all 4 experiments, children used new evidence in the form of patterns of probability to make accurate causal inferences, even in the face of conflicting prior beliefs about spatial contiguity. However, children were more likely to make correct inferences when causes were spatially contiguous, particularly when faced with ambiguous evidence. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Preschoolers' understanding of others' desires: Fulfilling mine enhances my understanding of yours.

We developed a gift-giving task requiring children to identify their mother's desire, when her desire differed from theirs. We found a developmental change: 3- and 4-year-olds performed more poorly than 5-year-olds (Experiment 1). A modified version of this task (Experiment 2) revealed that 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds whose desires had been fulfilled chose an appropriate gift for their mothers significantly more often than children whose desires were unfulfilled. Children who merely anticipated desire fulfillment also outperformed children whose desires were unfulfilled. Analysis of children's verbal explanations provides converging evidence that desire fulfillment enhanced children's tendency to adopt the perspective of their mother and justify their choices by referencing her desires. Discussion focuses on why desire fulfillment enhances children's ability to consider the desires of others. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Analogical and category-based inference: A theoretical integration with Bayesian causal models.

A fundamental issue for theories of human induction is to specify constraints on potential inferences. For inferences based on shared category membership, an analogy, and/or a relational schema, it appears that the basic goal of induction is to make accurate and goal-relevant inferences that are sensitive to uncertainty. People can use source information at various levels of abstraction (including both specific instances and more general categories), coupled with prior causal knowledge, to build a causal model for a target situation, which in turn constrains inferences about the target. We propose a computational theory in the framework of Bayesian inference and test its predictions (parameter-free for the cases we consider) in a series of experiments in which people were asked to assess the probabilities of various causal predictions and attributions about a target on the basis of source knowledge about generative and preventive causes. The theory proved successful in accounting for systematic patterns of judgments about interrelated types of causal inferences, including evidence that analogical inferences are partially dissociable from overall mapping quality. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Theories of Conditional Reasoning: A Developmental Examination of Competing Hypotheses.

Children and adolescents were presented with problems that contained deontic (i.e., if action p is taken, then precondition q must be met) or causal (i.e., if event p occurs, then event q will transpire) conditionals and that varied in the ease with which alternative antecedents could be activated. Results showed that inferences were linked to the availability of alternative antecedents and the generation of "disabling" conditions (claims that the conditionals were false under specific circumstances). Age-related developments were found only on problems involving indeterminate inferences. Correlations among inferences differed for children and adolescents. The findings provide stronger support for domain-general theories than for domain-specific theories of reasoning and suggest, under some conditions, age-related changes in the roles of implicit and explicit processing. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Causal inferences in reading: From immediate activation to long-term memory.

Three different tasks were used to investigate the time course of drawing causal inferences. Participants read passages that contained a causal coherence break that could be resolved by reactivating a concept presented earlier in the passage. In Experiment 1, participants named a probe word that represented the earlier mentioned cause more quickly after encountering the causal coherence break, suggesting that the causal concept had quickly been reactivated. In Experiment 2, participants were slow to read a sentence after the causal coherence break that contradicted the intended inference indicating that the inference had been encoded and retained in working memory. In Experiment 3, the results of a recall task indicated that the causal link was also included in the long-term memory representation of the text. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

What counts as by? Young children's use of relative distance to judge nearbyness.

The authors investigated how 3- and 4-year-old children and adults use relative distance to judge nearbyness. Participants judged whether several blocks were by a landmark. The absolute and relative distance of the blocks from the landmark varied. In Experiment 1, judgments of nearbyness decreased as the distance from the landmark increased, particularly for 4-year-olds and adults. In Experiment 2, 4-year-olds and adults were more likely to judge objects at an intermediate distance as by the landmark when intervening objects were absent than when intervening objects were present. In Experiment 3, participants of all ages were more likely to judge objects at a short distance as by the landmark when intervening objects were absent. Reliance on relative distance to judge nearbyness becomes more systematic and applicable to larger spatial extents across development. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The Natural Emergence of Reasoning About the Afterlife as a Developmental Regularity.

Participants were interviewed about the biological and psychological functioning of a dead agent. In Experiment 1, even 4- to 6-year-olds stated that biological processes ceased at death, although this trend was more apparent among 6- to 8-year-olds. In Experiment 2, 4- to 12-year-olds were asked about psychological functioning. The youngest children were equally likely to state that both cognitive and psychobiological states continued at death, whereas the oldest children were more likely to state that cognitive states continued. In Experiment 3, children and adults were asked about an array of psychological states. With the exception of preschoolers, who did not differentiate most of the psychological states, older children and adults were likely to attribute epistemic, emotional, and desire states to dead agents. These findings suggest that developmental mechanisms underlie intuitive accounts of dead agents' minds. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)