Aging and Conditional Probability Judgments: A Global Matching Approach.

Age differences in bias in conditional probability judgments were investigated based on predictions derived from the Minerva-Decision Making model (M. R. P. Dougherty, C. F. Gettys, & E. E. Ogden, 1999), a global matching model of likelihood judgment. In this study, 248 younger and older adults completed frequency judgment and conditional probability judgment tasks. Age differences in the frequency judgment task are interpreted as an age-related deficit in memory encoding. Older adults' stronger biases in the probability judgment task point to age differences in criterion setting. Age-related biases were eliminated when age groups were equated on memory encoding by means of study time manipulation. The authors conclude that older adults' stronger judgment biases are a function of memory impairment. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Rational learning and information sampling: On the “naivety” assumption in sampling explanations of judgment biases.

Recent research has argued that several well-known judgment biases may be due to biases in the available information sample rather than to biased information processing. Most of these sample-based explanations assume that decision makers are “naive”: They are not aware of the biases in the available information sample and do not correct for them. Here, we show that this “naivety” assumption is not necessary. Systematically biased judgments can emerge even when decision makers process available information perfectly and are also aware of how the information sample has been generated. Specifically, we develop a rational analysis of Denrell's (2005) experience sampling model, and we prove that when information search is interested rather than disinterested, even rational information sampling and processing can give rise to systematic patterns of errors in judgments. Our results illustrate that a tendency to favor alternatives for which outcome information is more accessible can be consistent with rational behavior. The model offers a rational explanation for behaviors that had previously been attributed to cognitive and motivational biases, such as the in-group bias or the tendency to prefer popular alternatives. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reducing the effects of juror bias.

Proposes a theoretical framework for relating bias to a juror's ultimate judgment. In this framework, bias, in the sense of positivity or negativity of a prejudgmental disposition, is integrated with the degree of guilt appearance of the evidential information. The 2 components, bias and evidence, are inversely weighted, so that increasing the importance of one decreases the effective importance of the other. In 2 experiments with 192 undergraduates, the effects of trait biases in simulated jurors, selected for their harshness or leniency toward criminals, were reduced by conditions that increased the reliability and trustworthiness of trial evidence. Situational biases were induced in a 3rd experiment with 96 undergraduates by trial conditions designed to annoy jurors, but their effects were ameliorated by a short period of deliberation. These bias-reducing procedures are interpreted as indirectly dealing with bias by increasing the salience of the information taken into account in judgment formation. Some implications regarding trial conditions that facilitate or inhibit manifestation of bias are discussed. (28 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Hindsight bias: A by-product of knowledge updating?

With the benefit of feedback about the outcome of an event, people's recalled judgments are typically closer to the outcome of the event than their original judgments were. It has been suggested that this hindsight bias may be due to a reconstruction process of the prior judgment. A model of such a process is proposed that assumes that knowledge is updated after feedback and that reconstruction is based on the updated knowledge. Consistent with the model's predictions, the results of 2 studies show that knowledge after feedback is systematically shifted toward feedback, and that assisting retrieval of the knowledge prior to feedback reduces hindsight bias. In addition, the model accounts for about 75% of cases in which either hindsight bias or reversed hindsight bias occurred. The authors conclude that hindsight bias can be understood as a by-product of an adaptive process, namely the updating of knowledge after feedback. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Statement verification: A stochastic model of judgment and response.

Presents a stochastic judgment model (SJM) as a framework for addressing a wide range of issues in statement verification and probability judgment. The SJM distinguishes between covert confidence in the truth of a proposition and the selection of an overt response. A series of experiments demonstrated the model's validity and yielded new results: Binary true–false responses were biased toward true relative to underlying judgment. Underlying judgment was also biased in that direction. Also, in a domain about which Ss had some knowledge, they discriminated true and false statements better when they compared complementary pairs before judging individual statements than when they performed those tasks in the opposite order. The results are interpreted in terms of the SJM and are discussed with respect to implications for theories of statement verification and for research on the accuracy of probability judgments. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On believing what we remember.

Conducted 4 experiments with 303 undergraduates to examine the relationship between the rated truth of statements and prior study of parts of those statements. Findings from the 1st 2 experiments show that new details about familiar topics are rated truer than new details about unfamiliar topics. Consequently, recognition of a topic as familiar disposes Ss to accept new details as true. Results from the 3rd and 4th experiments show that statements initially studied under an affirmative bias are rated truer than statements originally studied under a negative bias. However, since even the negatively biased statements are rated truer than new ones, it is contended that Ss are not remembering the bias. Rather, different biases during study affect the probability that details will be encoded into memory. In contrast to differential biases, different study processes affect the likelihood that Ss will remember having studied the statements, but do not affect truth. Results are discussed in terms of the hypothesis that remembered factual details are the criterion of certitude against which tested statements are assessed. (French abstract) (38 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Exaggerating the differences between relatively successful and unsuccessful groups: Identity orientation as a perceptual lens.

Research has demonstrated that individuals' degree of social identification influences social judgment when participants are affiliated with the groups about which they make their judgments. Two experiments are reported in which participants were not members of the groups involved in their judgments. Nevertheless, high-collective-identity participants saw especially large differences in the competency skills and achievement related activities of a successful versus an unsuccessful group. These results were not driven by self-serving biases. Rather, contrast can be driven merely by a person's general attitude toward the importance that he or she assigns to group membership. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Judgments about forces in described interactions between objects.

In 4 experiments, participants made judgments about forces exerted and resistances put up by objects involved in described interactions. Two competing hypotheses were tested: (1) that judgments are derived from the same knowledge base that is thought to be the source of perceptual impressions of forces that occur with visual stimuli, and (2) that judgments are generated using simple models or heuristics for deriving force judgments from kinematic information. The results show some similarities with perceptual impression research, particularly that an active object is judged to exert more force on an inactive object than the latter exerts on the former. However, most of the available kinematic information had little or no effect on judgment, supporting the hypothesis that force judgments are generated according to simple rules. Presentation of information about damage to the objects resulted in use of all available kinds of information; this could reflect greater imageability of damage information than kinematic information. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Beware of samples! A cognitive-ecological sampling approach to judgment biases.

A cognitive-ecological approach to judgment biases is presented and substantiated by recent empirical evidence. Latent properties of the environment are not amenable to direct assessment but have to be inferred from empirical samples that provide the interface between cognition and the environment. The sampling process may draw on the external world or on internal memories. For systematic reasons (proximity, salience, and focus of attention), the resulting samples tend to be biased (selective, skewed, or conditional on information search strategies). Because people lack the metacognitive ability to understand and control for sampling constraints (predictor sampling, criterion sampling, selective-outcome sampling, etc.), the sampling biases carry over to subsequent judgments. Within this framework, alternative accounts are offered for a number of judgment biases, such as base-rate neglect, confirmation bias, illusory correlation, pseudocontingency, Simpson's paradox, outgroup devaluation, and pragmatic-confusion effects. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Quality of group judgment.

Examined the quality of group judgment in situations in which groups have to express an opinion in quantitative form. To provide a measure for evaluating the quality of group performance (which is defined as the absolute value of the discrepancy between the judgment and the true value), 4 baseline models are considered. These models provide a standard for evaluating how well groups perform. The 4 models are: (a) randomly picking a single individual; (b) weighting the judgments of the individual group members equally (the group mean); (c) weighting the 'best' group member (i.e., the one closest to the true value) totally where the best is known, a priori , with certainty; (d) weighting the best member totally where there is a given probability of misidentifying the best and getting the 2nd, 3rd, etc, best member. These 4 models are examined under varying conditions of group size and "bias." Bias is defined as the degree to which the expectation of the population of individual judgments does not equal the true value (i.e., there is systematic bias in individual judgments). A method is then developed to evaluate the accuracy of group judgment in terms of the 4 models. The method uses a Bayesian approach by estimating the probability that the accuracy of actual group judgment could have come from distributions generated by the 4 models. (25 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Physician judgment in clinical settings: methodological influences and cognitive performance

Understanding the quality of physicians' intuitive judgments is essential in determining the appropriate use of their judgments in medical decision-making (vis-a-vis analytical or actuarial approaches). As part of this process, the quality of physicians' predictions must be assessed because prediction is fundamental to common clinical tasks: determining diagnosis, prognosis, and therapy; establishing monitoring intervals; performing screening and preventive maneuvers. Critical evaluation of predictive capabilities requires an assessment of the components of the prediction process: the data available for prediction, the method used for prediction, and the accuracy of prediction. Although variation in and uncertainty about the underlying data elements are often acknowledged as a source of inaccurate predictions, prediction also can be confounded by both methodological and cognitive limitations. During the past two decades, numerous factors have been recognized that may bias test characteristics (sensitivity and specificity). These same factors may also produce bias in intuitive judgments. The use of cognitive processes to simplify judgment tasks (e.g., the availability and representativeness heuristics) and the presence of certain biases in the judgment process (e.g., ego, regret) may present obstacles to accurate estimation of probabilities by physicians. Limitations on the intuitive use of information (cognitive biases) have been demonstrated in both medical and nonmedical decision-making settings. Recent studies have led to a deepening understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of intuitive and analytical approaches to decision making. Here, many aspects of the basis for this understanding are reviewed.     

Decomposing the hindsight bias: A multinomial processing tree model for separating recollection and reconstruction in hindsight.

After having received feedback about the correct answer to a question, a memory judgment about one's own past answer, the original judgment (OJ), is often biased toward the feedback. The authors present a multinomial model that explains this hindsight bias effect in terms of both memory impairments and reconstruction biases for nonrecollected OJs. The model was tested in 4 experiments. As predicted, the parameters measuring OJ recollection could be influenced selectively by contrasting items whose OJs were or were not retrieved successfully earlier (Experiment 1). Increasing the feedback-recall delay reduced reconstruction biases exclusively (Experiment 2), whereas discrediting the feedback enhanced recollection of the OJs to feedback items (Experiment 3). In Experiment 4, the model's guessing parameters, but no other parameters, varied as a function of the number of response alternatives. The authors discuss implications for hindsight bias theories. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Models for biases in judging sensory magnitude.

Category ratings and magnitude judgments are affected by 4 range biases, the centering bias, the stimulus and response equalizing biases, and the contraction bias; by 3 nonlinear biases, the local contraction bias, the stimulus spacing bias, and the logarithmic bias; and by bias from transfer. Models of the biases are described. The biases are most marked in sensory dimensions that students are not taught to handle, such as loudness and brightness. Avoiding all the biases requires exceedingly rigorous investigations. (77 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Bias in judgment: Comparing individuals and groups.

The relative susceptibility of individuals and groups to systematic judgmental biases is considered. An overview of the relevant empirical literature reveals no clear or general pattern. However, a theoretical analysis employing J. H. Davis's (1973) social decision scheme (SDS) model reveals that the relative magnitude of individual and group bias depends upon several factors, including group size, initial individual judgment, the magnitude of bias among individuals, the type of bias, and most of all, the group-judgment process. It is concluded that there can be no simple answer to the question, "Which are more biased, individuals or groups?," but the SDS model offers a framework for specifying some of the conditions under which individuals are both more and less biased than groups. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Sex bias in judgements of occupational suitability.

Discusses 2 forms of sex bias that are based on denigration of women and on sex-role congruence. Studies are reviewed documenting the existence of both forms of bias, but the latter form seems to be prevalent when studies are properly designed. It is argued that the apparent absence of bias in several recent studies was due to the substantial amount of information available about stimulus persons. Investigations directly examining the effects of type and amount of information have shown that relevant information significantly reduces or eliminates bias. A social cognition model of occupational suitability judgments is presented according to which social category information (e.g., sex) is important when little relevant information for the judgment is available. Personal information takes precedence over and obviates the need for category information. Implications for role theory and the division of labor in the work force are discussed. (French abstract) (56 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Experts' and novices' abilities to detect children's high-stakes lies of omission.

We investigated adults' abilities to detect lies told by 3- to 6-year-old children. Expert forensic interviewers and novices watched videotapes of children who either lied or told the truth about their parent's transgression, rendered a dichotomous judgment of whether the child lied, rated their confidence in that judgment, and rated the children on various characteristics. Adults detected lies with greater than chance—but not impressive—accuracy, regardless of expertise level. Older children's lies were more detectable by experts than were younger children's. Adults were more confident in their judgments about older than younger children. Confidence in lie/truth judgments was not significantly correlated with actual lie detection accuracy. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Person memory and judgment.

Two general types of information about a person are considered in this article: One pertains to specific behaviors a person had manifested, and the other refers to more abstract personality dispositions or behavioral tendencies. A theoretical model of person memory that incorporates both types of information is developed. The model accounts for a large number of factors that are known to affect the recall of social information, the making of interpersonal judgments, and the relation between what is recalled and the judgments that are made. A major strength of the model is its applicability to a wide range of person memory and judgment phenomena that are observed in several different experimental paradigms. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Personality, mood, and the evaluation of affective and neutral word pairs.

Four studies bridged the areas of personality–mood and mood–cognition relations by investigating the effects of Extraversion and Neuroticism on the evaluation of affectively pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral word pairs. Specifically measured were affectivity ratings, categorization according to affect, judgments of associative strength, and response latencies. A strong, consistent cognitive bias toward affective as opposed to neutral stimuli was found across participants. Although some biases were systematically related to personality and mood, effects of individual differences were present only under specific conditions. The results are discussed in terms of a personality–mood framework and its implications for cognitive functioning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Biases in Social Comparative Judgments: The Role of Nonmotivated Factors in Above-Average and Comparative-Optimism Effects.

Biases in social comparative judgments, such as those illustrated by above-average and comparative-optimism effects, are often regarded as products of motivated reasoning (e.g., self-enhancement). These effects, however, can also be produced by information-processing limitations or aspects of judgment processes that are not necessarily biased by motivational factors. In this article, the authors briefly review motivational accounts of biased comparative judgments, introduce a 3-stage model for understanding how people make comparative judgments, and then describe how various nonmotivational factors can influence the 3 stages of the comparative judgment process. Finally, the authors discuss several unresolved issues highlighted by their analysis, such as the interrelation between motivated and nonmotivated sources of bias and the influence of nonmotivated sources of bias on behavior. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)