Strategy selection in causal reasoning: When beliefs and covariation collide.

Investigated how people combine covariation information with pre-existing beliefs when evaluating causal hypotheses. Ss were 752 college students (aged 17–52 yrs). Three experiments, using both within- and between-Ss designs, found that the use of covariation information and beliefs interacted, such that the effects of covariation were larger when people assessed hypotheses about believable than about unbelievable causal candidates. In Exp 2, this interaction was observed when Ss made judgments in stages (e.g., first evaluating covariation information about a causal candidate and then evaluating the believability of a candidate), as well as when the information was presented simultaneously. Exp 3 demonstrated that this pattern was also reflected in Ss' metacognitive judgments: Ss indicated that they weighed covariation information more heavily for believable than unbelievable candidates. Finally, Exps 1 and 2 demonstrated the presence of individual differences in the use of covariation- and belief-based views. That is, individuals who tended to base their causality judgments primarily on belief were less likely to make use of covariation information and vice versa. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

From Covariation to Causation: A Test of the Assumption of Causal Power.

How humans infer causation from covariation has been the subject of a vigorous debate, most recently between the computational causal power account (P. W. Cheng, 1997) and associative learning theorists (e.g., K. Lober & D. R. Shanks, 2000). Whereas most researchers in the subject area agree that causal power as computed by the power PC theory offers a normative account of the inductive process. Lober and Shanks, among others, have questioned the empirical validity of the theory. This article offers a full report and additional analyses of the original study featured in Lober and Shanks's critique (M. J. Buehner & P. W. Cheng, 1997) and reports tests of Lober and Shanks's and other explanations of the pattern of causal judgments. Deviations from normativity, including the outcome-density bias, were found to be misperceptions of the input or other artifacts of the experimental procedures rather than inherent to the process of causal induction. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Dissociation Between Judgments and Outcome-Expectancy Measures in Covariation Learning: A Signal Detection Theory Approach.

A number of studies using trial-by-trial learning tasks have shown that judgments of covariation between a cue c and an outcome o deviate from normative metrics. Parameters based on trial-by-trial predictions were estimated from signal detection theory (SDT) in a standard causal learning task. Results showed that manipulations of P(c) when contingency (ΔP) was held constant did not affect participants' ability to predict the appearance of the outcome (d') but had a significant effect on response criterion (c) and numerical causal judgments. The association between criterion c and judgment was further demonstrated in 2 experiments in which the criterion was directly manipulated by linking payoffs to the predictive responses made by learners. In all cases, the more liberal the criterion c was, the higher judgments were. The results imply that the mechanisms underlying the elaboration of judgments and those involved in the elaboration of predictive responses are partially dissociable. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Causal learning mechanisms in very young children: Two-, three-, and four-year-olds infer causal relations from patterns of variation and covariation.

Three studies investigated whether young children make accurate causal inferences on the basis of patterns of variation and covariation. Children were presented with a new causal relation by means of a machine called the "blicket detector." Some objects, but not others, made the machine light up and play music. In the first 2 experiments, children were told that "blickets make the machine go" and were then asked to identify which objects were "blickets." Two-, 3-, and 4-year-old children were shown various patterns of variation and covariation between two different objects and the activation of the machine. All 3 age groups took this information into account in their causal judgments about which objects were blickets. In a 3rd experiment, 3- and 4-year-old children used the information when they were asked to make the machine stop. These results are related to Bayes-net causal graphical models of causal learning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Predicting the intent to purchase unfamiliar and familiar cheeses: the effects of attitudes, expected liking and food neophobia

Five studies argue against claims that preschoolers understand a biological germ theory of illness. In Studies 1-3, participants were read stories in which characters develop symptoms (e.g., a bellyache) caused by germs, poisons, or events (e.g., eating too much candy) and were asked whether another character could catch the symptoms from the first. Few children made judgments in terms of germs as part of an underlying causal process linking the origin of a symptom to its subsequent transmission. Some children may have reasoned simply that certain kinds of symptoms are likely to be contagious. Studies 4 and 5 undermined the claim that preschoolers understand germs to be uniquely biological causal agents. Young children did not attribute properties to germs as they did for animate beings or for plants. It is suggested that children undergo conceptual reorganization in constructing a Western adult understanding of germs.     

On facts and conceptual systems: Young children's integration of their understandings of germs and contagion.

Five studies argue against claims that preschoolers understand a biological germ theory of illness. In Studies 1–3, participants were read stories in which characters develop symptoms (e.g., a bellyache) caused by germs, poisons, or events (e.g., eating too much candy) and were asked whether another character could catch the symptoms from the first. Few children made judgments in terms of germs as part of an underlying causal process linking the origin of a symptom to its subsequent transmission. Some children may have reasoned simply that certain kinds of symptoms are likely to be contagious. Studies 4 and 5 undermined the claim that preschoolers understand germs to be uniquely biological causal agents. Young children did not attribute properties to germs as they did for animate beings or for plants. It is suggested that children undergo conceptual reorganization in constructing a Western adult understanding of germs. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Mutability and propensity in causal selection.

We examined differences in causal ratings of 1 factor depending on the mutability (defined as the ease with which a factor can be imagined to be different) and causal propensity (defined as the likelihood that the event would occur in the presence of a factor) of another factor that conjoined to produce the event. In 3 studies, causal ratings of the target factor depended on the interaction of mutability and propensity of the other factor. When the other factor was high in mutability, ratings of the target decreased as the propensity of the contributing factor increased, but when the other was low in mutability, ratings of the target increased as the propensity of the contributing factor increased. Mediation analysis indicated that mutability and propensity affected causal ratings by determining the comparison against which the event was considered. Comparison judgments also mediated beliefs about which factor should have adjusted to the other. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Awareness of influences on one's own judgments: The roles of covariation detection and attention to the judgment process.

Forty-eight actor participants examined profiles of target persons and judged how much they would like each target. Initial-attention actors were instructed before judging any of the profiles to attend to how target factors influenced their liking judgments. Delayed-attention actors received these instructions after judging the first block of profiles and before judging the second. No-attention actors did not receive these instructions at all. After judging the target profiles, actors estimated how each of several target factors had influenced their liking judgments. Access to covariation information greatly increased the accuracy of observers' causal reports. Covariation detection appeared to make less of a contribution, however, to actors' own causal reports, which displayed a substantial level of accuracy even after we controlled statistically for the possible contributions of covariation detection and shared theories. Contrary to expectations, the attention instructions actually decreased the accuracy of actors' self-reports for the first block of judgments but had no effect on accuracy for the second block of judgments. Results show that some form of privileged self-knowledge contributed to the accuracy of actors' causal reports. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Causal processing: Origins and development.

Reviews evidence on the origins and development of causal processing. Research suggests that causal processing first occurs around 3 months of age, in perception of motion continuity across two objects, as in one ball colliding with another. The temporal integration limit to the perception of continuity and, hence, causal relation may be set by the temporal integration function of iconic processing. Events of this kind may form the basis for the use of cues of temporal contiguity, spatial contiguity, temporal order, and similarity in causal processing at later ages and higher levels. The same cues underlie causal processing of event relations made for functional reasons between plans or intentions and behavioral outcomes. Causal processing is probably automatic, rather than controlled, to begin with. Other suggestions for the origins of causal processing include concrete, familiar event sequences; human intended action; generative relations; and observation of regularity and covariation. Evidence suggests that each of these plays a role in the development of causal processing. Perception of generative relations may be the most basic of them, and observation of regularity and covariation is probably the last of the four, developmentally, to be used in causal processing. Virtually nothing is known about how different types of causal processing may be developmentally linked or how they originate and develop. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Development of infants' use of continuity cues in their perception of causality.

Two experiments investigated the role of continuity cues in infants' perception of launching events as causal. Exp 1 showed that 7-mo-old infants can use spatial and temporal contiguity to perceive causality: Infants who were habituated to a causal event dishabituated to novel noncausal events, in which either spatial or temporal contiguity was violated, and those who were habituated to a noncausal event dishabituated to a novel causal but not a novel noncausal event. Experiment 2 showed that 10-mo-olds, but not 7-mo-olds, perceived the causality of launching events in which the objects moved along dissimilar paths. Thus, younger infants do not appear to attend to causality when the objects move along different paths. Results are discussed in terms of the development of the use of continuity cues in causal judgments. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Heuristics and biases in the "eyeballing" of data: the effects of context on intuitive correlation assessment

For a wide variety of real-world decisions, people must examine numerical tables and intuitively assess the correlations that exist among meaningful variables. The normative properties of correlation coefficients suggest that such decisions should be unaffected by perceptual factors (e.g., changes in row and column locations), semantic factors (e.g., the referents of the numbers), or certain transformations of the variables (e.g., adding a constant or multiplying by a constant). Four experiments demonstrated that judgments based on perceived correlations violate these normative properties. A general model of intuitive covariation assessment was proposed to explain the observed biases. Estimation of this model at the aggregate and individual levels suggested that no single heuristic is consistent with all of the results. Instead, the existence of several qualitatively different types of heuristics was supported. The distribution of individual-level decision rules across types of heuristics was systematically related to contextual factors.     

Mechanisms of predictive and diagnostic causal induction.

In predictive causal inference, people reason from causes to effects, whereas in diagnostic inference, they reason from effects to causes. Independently of the causal structure of the events, the temporal structure of the information provided to a reasoner may vary (e.g., multiple events followed by a single event vs. a single event followed by multiple events). The authors report 5 experiments in which causal structure and temporal information were varied independently. Inferences were influenced by temporal structure but not by causal structure. The results are relevant to the evaluation of 2 current accounts of causal induction, the Rescorla-Wagner (R. A. Rescorla & A. R. Wagner, 1972) and causal model theories (M. R. Waldmann & K. J. Holyoak, 1992). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The effects of assessment type on verbal ratings of conditional stimulus valence and contingency judgments: Implications for the extinction of evaluative learning.

Recent research on causal learning found (a) that causal judgments reflect either the current predictive value of a conditional stimulus (CS) or an integration across the experimental contingencies used in the entire experiment and (b) that postexperimental judgments, rather than the CS's current predictive value, are likely to reflect this integration. In the current study, the authors examined whether verbal valence ratings were subject to similar integration. Assessments of stimulus valence and contingencies responded similarly to variations of reporting requirements, contingency reversal, and extinction, reflecting either current or integrated values. However, affective learning required more trials to reflect a contingency change than did contingency judgments. The integration of valence assessments across training and the fact that affective learning is slow to reflect contingency changes can provide an alternative interpretation for researchers' previous failures to find an effect of extinction training on verbal reports of CS valence. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Event memory: Temporal-order judgments of personal life experiences.

Three experiments with undergraduate subjects investigated the mental representations that people form when they recall and chronologically order their personal experiences. Subjects in each study first recalled five events that occurred to them in two general periods of their life (e.g., high school and college). Later, they saw pairs of these events and judged the order in which they occurred. It typically took less time to compare events that occurred in different time periods than events that occurred in the same period. However, response times depended on the serial positions of the compared events in each time period, and the distance between them, in ways that varied over the three experiments. These effects were interpreted in terms of a model of event memory and judgment proposed by Wyer, Shoben, Fuhrman, and Bodenhausen (1985). Specifically, subjects appear to organize the events they are asked to recall into categories defined by the periods of life in which they occurred and assign temporal codes to these categories. However, they do not perform a more detailed temporal coding of the events they recall unless a coherent temporal representation of these events is difficult to construct. A direct comparison between judgments of personal experiences and judgments of others' experiences suggested that people may make more detailed temporal coding of others' experiences than they do of their own. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Judgment of covariation by social perceivers.

Judgments about relationships or covariations between events are central to several areas of research and theory in social psychology. In the present article, the normative, or statistically correct, model for making covariation judgments is outlined in detail. Six steps of the normative model, from deciding what data are relevant to the judgment to using the judgment as a basis for predictions and decisions, are specified. Potential sources of error in social perceivers' covariation judgments are identified at each step, and research on social perceivers' ability to follow each step in the normative model is reviewed. It is concluded that statistically naive individuals have a tenuous grasp of the concept of covariation, and circumstances under which covariation judgments tend to be accurate or inaccurate are considered. Finally, implications for research on attribution theory, implicit personality theory, stereotyping, and perceived control are discussed. (137 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Methods of assessing strategies for judging covariation between events.

Investigated method of assessment as one possible source of the poor agreement in research about strategies people use to assess covariation between events. A set of problems was developed in such a way that different judgment rules would produce different decisions about the relationships between events. 116 college students (aged 18–32 yrs) judged these problems and were then asked to explain their judgment strategy. In addition, they were shown model strategies and asked to choose the one like their own strategy and the model that would be the best strategy. Ss whose judgments indicated use of the most sophisticated strategy were quite accurate in reporting their judgment rules. Ss using the less accurate rules most commonly reported using strategies that could not have produced the obtained pattern of problem solutions. These findings suggest that self-report is a weak basis for conclusions about sources of error in covariation judgment. (30 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Event category learning.

This research investigated the learning of event categories, in particular, categories of simple animated events, each involving a causal interaction between 2 characters. Four experiments examined whether correlations among attributes of events are easier to learn when they form part of a rich correlational structure than when they are independent of other correlations. Event attributes (e.g., state change, path of motion) were chosen to reflect distinctions made by verbs. Participants were presented with an unsupervised learning task and were then tested on whether the organization of correlations affected learning. Correlations forming part of a system of correlations were found to be better learned than isolated correlations. This finding of facilitation from correlational structure is explained in terms of a model that generates internal feedback to adjust the salience of attributes. These experiments also provide evidence regarding the role of object information in events, suggesting that this role is mediated by object category representations. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Developmental differences in the use of distinctiveness, consensus, and consistency information for making causal attributions.

Examined developmental differences in the use of distinctiveness, consensus, and consistency information for making causal attributions. 144 1st, 3rd and 6th graders and college students were presented with brief story pairs consisting of an act manifested by an agent toward a target person. Each story in a pair was accompanied by a different level of a particular type of information (e.g., high consensus for one and low consensus for the other). Ss were asked to make causal inferences about both the agents and the targets. Results reveal significant age-related differences in the ability to use each type of information. Young children's use of distinctiveness information yielded the predicted agent attributions significantly more often than it yielded the predicted target attributions, while the reverse was true for consensus information. Findings are interpreted in terms of causal principles: Information was used in the predicted manner at a younger age when a covariation principle was required than when a discounting principle was required. (22 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)