Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning.

This article outlines a theory of naive probability. According to the theory, individuals who are unfamiliar with the probability calculus can infer the probabilities of events in an extensional way: They construct mental models of what is true in the various possibilities. Each model represents an equiprobable alternative unless individuals have beliefs to the contrary, in which case some models will have higher probabilities than others. The probability of an event depends on the proportion of models in which it occurs. The theory predicts several phenomena of reasoning about absolute probabilities, including typical biases. It correctly predicts certain cognitive illusions in inferences about relative probabilities. It accommodates reasoning based on numerical premises, and it explains how naive reasoners can infer posterior probabilities without relying on Bayes's theorem. Finally, it dispels some common misconceptions of probabilistic reasoning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Culture and systems of thought: Holistic versus analytic cognition.

The authors find East Asians to be holistic, attending to the entire field and assigning causality to it, making relatively little use of categories and formal logic, and relying on "dialectical" reasoning, whereas Westerners, are more analytic, paying attention primarily to the object and the categories to which it belongs and using rules, including formal logic, to understand its behavior. The 2 types of cognitive processes are embedded in different naive metaphysical systems and tacit epistemologies. The authors speculate that the origin of these differences is traceable to markedly different social systems. The theory and the evidence presented call into question long-held assumptions about basic cognitive processes and even about the appropriateness of the process–content distinction. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Propositional reasoning by model.

Describes a new theory of propositional reasoning, that is, deductions depending on if, or, and, and not. The theory proposes that reasoning is a semantic process based on mental models. It assumes that people are able to maintain models of only a limited number of alternative states of affairs, and they accordingly use models representing as much information as possible in an implicit way. They represent a disjunctive proposition, such as "There is a circle or there is a triangle," by imagining initially 2 alternative possibilities: one in which there is a circle and the other in which there is a triangle. This representation can, if necessary, be fleshed out to yield an explicit representation of an exclusive or an inclusive disjunction. The theory elucidates all the robust phenomena of propositional reasoning. It also makes several novel predictions, which were corroborated by the results of 4 experiments. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Toward a strong phonological theory of visual word recognition: true issues and false trails

A strong phonological theory of reading is proposed and discussed. The first claim of this article is that current debates on word recognition are often based on different axioms regarding the cognitive structures of the mental lexicon rather than conflicting empirical evidence. These axioms lead to different interpretations of the same data. It is argued that once the implicit axioms of competing theories in visual word recognition are explicated, a strong phonological model presents a viable and coherent approach. The assumptions underlying a strong phonological theory of reading are outlined, and 4 theoretical questions are examined: Is phonological recoding a mandatory phase of print processing? Is phonology necessary for lexical access? Is phonology necessary for accessing meaning? How can phonology be derived from orthographic structure? These issues are integrated into a general theory that is constrained by all of the findings.     

The need for new single-case design structure in applied cognitive psychology.

Examines the current domination of intra-S methodology by applied operant psychology. The fusion of operant theory and N?=?1 methodology is analyzed in terms of 4 implicit assumptions that govern the structure of most applied intensive research today. These assumptions focus on the interrelationships between dependent and independent variables and on the effects of outside events on those variables. It is asserted that these structural assumptions are inadequate for the investigation of cognitive psychological phenomena. A relevant sample of applied cognitive research is reviewed. Variables appropriate for use by single-S researchers to formulate new, nonoperant designs and a structure for applied cognitive research are presented. (73 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Priming a New Identity: Self-Monitoring Moderates the Effects of Nonself Primes on Self-Judgments and Behavior.

When a construct is primed, people often act in construct-consistent ways. Several accounts for this effect have been offered, including ideomotor theory and a social functional perspective. The authors tested an additional perspective, the Active-Self account, whereby primes can temporarily alter self-perceptions. In Study 1, non-African American participants reported feeling more aggressive on an implicit measure following an African American prime. In Study 2, participants reported feeling luckier on an implicit measure following a number 7 (vs. 13) prime. In both studies, these effects were obtained only for low self-monitors, who are more likely to change self-conceptions in response to diagnostic self-information and to use their internal states in guiding behavior. Study 3 showed that low self-monitors also show larger behavioral effects of primes. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Advancing disciplinary practice through critical thinking: A rejoinder to Bensley.

The authors respond to Bensley’s (see record 2009-12731-009) comment on their alternative formulation of critical thinking in psychology (see record 2008-11592-004). They argue that Bensley’s defense of the traditional critical thinking approach—which they term scientific analytic reasoning (SAR)—fails to address their main objections to SAR and their reasons for presenting an alternative. In particular, the openness, fairness, and generativity that Bensley references as strengths of SAR are themselves informed by scientific analytic assumptions and values, which, they argue, illustrates their original contention—that SAR offers an insular and insufficiently critical approach to critical thinking. The authors conclude by calling for future developments in critical thinking that are not driven by an implicit SAR agenda. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A measurement-theoretic analysis of the fuzzy logic model of perception.

The fuzzy logic model of perception (FLMP) is analyzed from a measurement-theoretic perspective. FLMP has an impressive history of fitting factorial data, suggesting that its probabilistic form is valid. The authors raise questions about the underlying processing assumptions of FLMP. Although FLMP parameters are interpreted as fuzzy logic truth values, the authors demonstrate that for several factorial designs widely used in choice experiments, most desirable fuzzy truth value properties fail to hold under permissible rescalings, suggesting that the fuzzy logic interpretation may be unwarranted. The authors show that FLMP's choice rule is equivalent to a version of G. Rasch's (1960) item response theory model, and the nature of FLMP measurement scales is transparent when stated in this form. Statistical inference theory exists for the Rasch model and its equivalent forms. In fact, FLMP can be reparameterized as a simple 2-category logit model, thereby facilitating interpretation of its measurement scales and allowing access to commercially available software for performing statistical inference. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Progress toward a viable interface between social and clinical-counseling psychology.

This article examines the history of the relation between social psychology and clinical-counseling psychology. The authors discuss the barriers that traditionally have impeded close collaboration between the fields and the ways in which these barriers have eroded recently to allow for the emergence of a viable interface between social and clinical-counseling psychology. They describe the current social-clinical-counseling domain, discuss the implicit assumptions underlying the interface, assess the impact of this movement on academic and professional psychology, and make suggestions for further improving the working relations among these fields. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Probability distributions and compartment boundaries in the development of Drosophila

Clone analysis and fate mapping probe several properties of development. Here it is shown that data on fate mapping support a probabilistic model of cell commitment in Drosophila blastoderms. Adult cells have a distribution of possible ancestors, as W. Baker (1978b) inferred from the theory of compartment-boundary development (Garcia-Bellido, Ripoll and Morata 1973). Fate-map data are used here to describe quantitatively the ancestry distributions on the blastoderm fate map. The properties of the distributions are sensitive to, and probes of, developmental events, such as relative time of cellularization and time of commitment. The theory of this analysis shows first how the meaningful interpretation of the stage represented by a fate map depends on the assumptions made in mapping. A general mapping model described below makes it possible to evaluate several interpretations. Interestingly, the data require a 3-dimensional map, and it is argued that this must be due to an effect of the preblastoderm nuclear synctial stage. Second, the theory shows how compartment boundaries affect ancestry distribution and why they have no observable effect on mapping. Third, the variability implied by ancestry variance does not create too much "noise" to make meaningful maps of small areas; rather, oddly enough, it tends to magnify the apparent distances within small areas to make them more resolvable. Empirical results include probabilistic maps of the Drosophila blastoderm. These results argue that time of commitment varies even for cells in the same compartment, demonstrating the need for a more complex model of early development than that proposed in the compartment model. The results also help to evaluate the significance of compartment boundaries in respect to developmental commitment.