共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 187 毫秒
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利益相关者的水资源配置博弈 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
水资源的准公共产品属性及其在开发利用中存在的外部性使河流自然流态受到严重的扰动,本文基于非合作博弈博弈论,建立主从关系的用户博弈模型分析河流水资源分配,基于个体效益不能达到帕累托最优状态,采用合作博弈方法,建立水资源用户合作博弈模型。合作博弈增加了总效益,但使得上游用户的效益比非合作时减少,有必要对上游用户进行效益补偿:引入微观经济学的无差异曲线与合作联盟形成的条件构建合作效益分配的可行解集,并提出基于边际贡献的效益分配方法在可行解集中挑选唯一的效益分配解。研究结果表明,合作博弈总效益大于非合作博弈的总效益,达到帕累托最优状态;通过合作效益分配,处于先动优势的上游用户的分配效益大于非合作的效益,有利于行动占先者加入合作联盟。 相似文献
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流域水资源产权的基本特性与我国水权制度建设研究 总被引:6,自引:0,他引:6
水资源是一种具有多重特性的稀缺资源。它的外部效应特性、共有资源属性以及水资源使用者的长期合作博弈性质,要求将水资源的产权安排充分反映出来,并在此基础上建立水资源管理的基本制度——水权制度,以使水资源配置真正达到帕累托最优。 相似文献
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基于帕累托最优的新安江流域生态补偿标准 总被引:9,自引:1,他引:8
从福祉经济学的角度,借助边际价值的概念,认为由于生态环境保护活动存在的外部性,将会导致流域的经济、环境不能自动达到帕累托最优状态,因此需要对流域上游保护区进行补偿。分析了3种实现帕累托最优的方法:对上游给予补贴、在对上游给予补贴的同时对下游征税、谈判。以新安江流域为例,对1990—2004年流域上、下游环境保护投入和经济发展水平的数据进行计算,结果表明:当对上游给予补贴的同时对下游征税,为使上、下游地区达到各自利益的最大化,流域达到帕累托最优状态,上游地区应获补贴最小为5.2亿元,同等条件下下游地区缴税5.2亿元;通过谈判的方式实现新安江流域的生态补偿,则为使流域整体最优,上、下游可在5.2亿元以上选择合适的补偿量。建议采用谈判的方式在补偿方式和补偿额度上达成一致,使全流域的经济、环境达到帕累托最优状态。 相似文献
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水冲突协调中博弈论方法研究受到重视,针对水量冲突协调中较少考虑水质因素,本文以博弈论和最优化方法为指导,考虑冲突参与人的非合作与合作行为、水资源的量与质、水资源量的不确定性、河道最小生态需水要求,建立了二人博弈分析模型;并以官厅水库流域张家口市和北京市跨界的水量和水质冲突为例,探讨冲突过程中参与人决策的相互影响以及达到合作所需要的利益分配格局。研究结果表明:张家口和北京跨界水冲突的均衡结果是(非合作,非合作)的劣解;为改进到(合作,合作)的帕累托最优解,可对合作增加利益的公平分配实现;P=50%水文年型下,均衡结果的上游盈利为8.03×108元/a,下游为0×108元/a,通过下游给上游的旁支付10.41×108元/a,结果可改进到上游盈利为15.61×108元/a,下游为7.59×108元/a;P=95%水文年型下,下游给上游的旁支付为3.32×108元/a,合作后盈利分别改进到7.97×108元/a和0.28×108元/a。 相似文献
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水资源的竞争性和非排他性导致水库管理者基于个体利益进行发电调度,使得水库在满足个体利益的同时往往忽略了系统的整体效益。为了在保证个体利益的基础上实现系统总效益的最大化,建立了梯级水库群发电调度合作博弈模型;采用改进后的水循环算法对模型进行分层求解。以金沙江两库与三峡梯级构成的梯级水库群为研究对象,选取典型年进行实例计算。计算结果表明:梯级水库群发电调度的合作博弈模型在获得系统最大效益的同时使得个体利益达到Pareto最优状态,实现水库群总效益和单库个体效益的双赢,既优于联合优化调度模型又优于单库优化调度模型。该合作博弈模型及其新解法可为水库群调度决策分析开创一种新思路。 相似文献
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水库汛期运行水位协同浮动旨在不增加防洪风险前提下,挖掘中小洪水利用潜力,提升流域水资源利用水平和供水保障能力,已成为防洪与水资源高效利用领域的研究热点和难点。从防洪库容置换与风险防控出发,基于动态预见期和预泄能力约束,嵌套运用预泄预蓄法和库容补偿法,解析了梯级水库汛期运行水位协同浮动关系;考虑帕累托最优解集和最优前沿的动态变化特性,建立了面向动态多目标的梯级水库汛期运行水位协同浮动调度模型;把环境变化检测、随机再生种群和基于参考点的帕累托前沿预测策略引入智能算法,提出求解调度模型的动态多目标智能算法,基于风险效益评价指标以评估调度方案,为梯级水库汛期运行水位协同浮动运用提供技术支撑。 相似文献
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The impact of a water demand management plan on a water system and its users is investigated within a comprehensive cooperative water allocation framework. In particular, a demand management plan is incorporated into a two-step multi-period fair water allocation model. A modified cooperative game is designed for the sharing of additional net benefits under the scenario having water demand management. The results indicate that cooperation among water users can yield more net benefits, and a water demand management plan is able to lead to a further increase of the aggregated net benefits by means of water transfers from less productive users to more productive ones. By utilizing the modified cooperative game, fair sharing of additional net benefits ensures that every water user can expect to receive more net benefits and thereby water users are motivated by incentives to implement a water demand management plan which in turn improves water use efficiency. The results demonstrate that the demand management plan can be of great assistance in some arid and semi-arid regions. 相似文献
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A Fuzzy Variable Least Core Game for Inter-basin Water Resources Allocation Under Uncertainty 总被引:2,自引:1,他引:1
Keighobad Jafarzadegan Armaghan Abed-Elmdoust Reza Kerachian 《Water Resources Management》2013,27(9):3247-3260
In this paper, a new solution concept, called Fuzzy Variable Least Core (FVLC), is developed for fuzzy cooperative games. The FVLC is able to incorporate fuzzy input variables and result in fuzzy benefit shares of players participating in a coalition. This solution concept is used for water and benefit allocation to water users in inter-basin water transfer systems considering the uncertainties associated with their benefit coefficients. In the proposed water allocation methodology, an Integrated Stochastic Dynamic Programming (ISDP) model is developed to obtain the water rights of players and economic water allocation policies. In the next step, the total net fuzzy benefit of the system is reallocated to water users in an equitable and rational way using a FVLC-based model. In this model, a new algorithm is proposed for converting a multilateral cooperative game with fuzzy variables to some fuzzy bilateral cooperative games, which are solved using the FLVC solution concept. The applicability and efficiency of the proposed methodology is examined by applying it to a large scale inter-basin water transfer project in Iran. 相似文献
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In recent years, uneven distribution of available water resources as well as increasing water demands and overexploiting the water resources have brought severe need for transferring water from basins having sufficient water to basins facing water shortages. Therefore, optimal allocation of shared water resources in water transfer projects, considering the utilities of different stakeholders, physical limitations of the system and socioeconomic criteria is an important task. In this paper, a new methodology based on crisp and fuzzy Shapley games is developed for optimal allocation of inter-basin water resources. In the proposed methodology, initial water allocations are obtained using an optimization model considering an equity criterion. In the second step, the stakeholders form crisp coalitions to increase the total net benefit of the system as well as their own benefits and a crisp Shapley Value game is used to reallocate the benefits produced in the crisp coalitions. Lastly, to provide maximum total net benefit, fuzzy coalitions are constituted and the participation rates of water users to fuzzy coalitions are optimized. Then, the total net benefit is reallocated to water users in a rational and equitable way using Fuzzy Shapley Value game. The effectiveness of this method is examined by applying it to a large scale case study of water transfer from the Karoon river basin in southern Iran to the Rafsanjan plain in central Iran. 相似文献
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Hydropower development may result in water conflicts among the riparian nations, which, however, can be resolved by benefit sharing. An optimization framework is proposed for a transboundary sub-basin following a cooperative game theoretical approach. A broad range of factors at different levels of cooperation between the riparian countries has been used in the optimization model. As an illustration, the framework is implemented in the Sesan and Sre Pok sub-basins of the Lower Mekong Basin. Higher levels of cooperation lead to greater total net benefits as well as greater benefits to individual countries. 相似文献
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Water and Pollution Discharge Permit Allocation to Agricultural Zones: Application of Game Theory and Min-Max Regret Analysis 总被引:3,自引:3,他引:0
Hamed Poorsepahy-Samian Reza Kerachian Mohammad Reza Nikoo 《Water Resources Management》2012,26(14):4241-4257
This paper presents a new game theoretic methodology for water and discharge permit allocation to agricultural zones in shared rivers. The methodology consists of four main steps: (1) initial allocation of water rights and pollutant discharge permits, (2) forming possible coalitions and optimal water and discharge permit reallocation to water users participating in a coalition to increase their total net benefit, (3) equitable benefit reallocation by utilizing some solution concepts in cooperative game theory, and (4) identifying the best water and pollutant discharge permit allocation strategies by minimizing the maximum regret in the system. A new linear form for crop water production function is used in the objective function of the water allocation optimization models. To show the efficiency and applicability of the methodology, it is applied to the Karoon-Dez river system in Iran. 相似文献
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Water Resources Allocation Using Solution Concepts of Fuzzy Cooperative Games: Fuzzy Least Core and Fuzzy Weak Least Core 总被引:5,自引:5,他引:0
In this paper, two new solution concepts for fuzzy cooperative games, namely Fuzzy Least Core and Fuzzy Weak Least Core are
developed. They aim for optimal allocation of available water resources and associated benefits to water users in a river
basin. The results of these solution concepts are compared with the results of some traditional fuzzy and crisp games, namely
Fuzzy Shapley Value, Crisp Shapley Value, Least Core, Weak Least Core and Normalized Nucleolus. It is shown that the proposed
solution concepts are more efficient than the crisp games. Moreover, they do not have the limitation of Fuzzy Shapley Value
in satisfying the group rationality criterion. This paper consists of two steps. In the first step, an optimization model
is used for initial water allocation to stakeholders. In the second step, fuzzy coalitions are defined and participation rates
of water users (players) in the fuzzy coalitions are optimized in order to reach a maximum net benefit. Then, the total net
benefit is allocated to the players in a rational and equitable way using Fuzzy Least Core, Fuzzy Weak Least Core and some
traditional fuzzy and crisp games. The effectiveness and applicability of the proposed methodology is examined using a numerical
example and also applying it to the Karoon river basin in southern Iran. 相似文献
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Common pool water resources management considering a regulator interference: A game theory approach to derive managerial policies for Urmia lake,Iran 下载免费PDF全文
An increased need for water, combined with a scarcity of water resources, has resulted in serious challenges regarding water resource management. Those issues have always been a major concern of most research regarding the management and operation of water resources. Various qualitative and quantitative methods, Game Theory (GT) being an example, have been proposed for managing common pool water resources. This study adopts GT to address a case of common pool water resource management, including consideration of the interference of a regulator. Urmia lake in north‐western Iran was chosen as an illustration of a common source of water shared between two provinces acting as littoral stakeholders to the lake. Due to a non‐cooperative behaviour of the stakeholders, the lake is most likely to dry up. To change the game situation, a regulator was inserted into the game as a third player. The game among players is investigated in terms of two static and dynamic game methods. Two strategies are defined for each player. The equilibrium point will be achieved according to the strategies adopted by the players. For static games, a low‐level equilibrium under non‐cooperation conditions is obtained. Dynamic games among players are more likely to occur, rather than static games. The equilibrium of high‐level productivity will be obtained under cooperative conditions among the players. 相似文献
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黄河水资源配置博弈均衡模型 总被引:4,自引:2,他引:2
本文以黄河流域水资源配置为案例,通过构建水资源配置博弈均衡模型,运用非合作博弈理论证明了由于制度的缺陷和个体理性的存在,开放式用水仍然是现状流域各省区的自主选择;并根据流域用水存在的合作潜力,利用合作博弈理论对未来黄河水资源配置提出初步的制度安排。 相似文献