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1.
利益相关者的水资源配置博弈   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
水资源的准公共产品属性及其在开发利用中存在的外部性使河流自然流态受到严重的扰动,本文基于非合作博弈博弈论,建立主从关系的用户博弈模型分析河流水资源分配,基于个体效益不能达到帕累托最优状态,采用合作博弈方法,建立水资源用户合作博弈模型。合作博弈增加了总效益,但使得上游用户的效益比非合作时减少,有必要对上游用户进行效益补偿:引入微观经济学的无差异曲线与合作联盟形成的条件构建合作效益分配的可行解集,并提出基于边际贡献的效益分配方法在可行解集中挑选唯一的效益分配解。研究结果表明,合作博弈总效益大于非合作博弈的总效益,达到帕累托最优状态;通过合作效益分配,处于先动优势的上游用户的分配效益大于非合作的效益,有利于行动占先者加入合作联盟。  相似文献   

2.
跨界水冲突博弈分析   总被引:6,自引:1,他引:5  
摘要:基于博弈论和最优化方法,考虑冲突参与人的非合作与合作行为、水资源的量与质、以及河道最小生态需 水要求,建立了二人博弈分析模型。以官厅水库流域张家口市和北京市跨界的水量和水质冲突为例,探讨冲突过 程中参与人决策的相互影响以及达到合作所需要的利益分配格局。研究结果表明:张家口和北京跨界水冲突的均 衡结果是 (非合作, 非合作) 的劣解,为改进到 (合作,合作) 的帕累托最优解,可对合作增加利益的公平分配实现:P=50%水文年型下,均衡结果的上游盈利为8.03亿元/a,下游为0元/a,通过下游给上游的旁支  相似文献   

3.
从福祉经济学角度给出了外部性的定义,通过分析河流上游地区生态环境破坏或保护活动的边际价值,指出外部性如何阻挠全社会帕累托最优状态的形成,得出了最优状态时上游地区生态环境破坏或保护活动的合理水平.为了达到帕累托最优状态、实现社会总福祉最大的目标,提出了单边税收与补贴、双边税收与补贴、谈判以及政府管制4种消除流域生态环境外部性影响的方法.  相似文献   

4.
流域水资源产权的基本特性与我国水权制度建设研究   总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3  
水资源是一种具有多重特性的稀缺资源。它的外部效应特性、共有资源属性以及水资源使用者的长期合作博弈性质,要求将水资源的产权安排充分反映出来,并在此基础上建立水资源管理的基本制度———水权制度,以使水资源配置真正达到帕累托最优。  相似文献   

5.
流域水资源产权的基本特性与我国水权制度建设研究   总被引:6,自引:0,他引:6  
水资源是一种具有多重特性的稀缺资源。它的外部效应特性、共有资源属性以及水资源使用者的长期合作博弈性质,要求将水资源的产权安排充分反映出来,并在此基础上建立水资源管理的基本制度——水权制度,以使水资源配置真正达到帕累托最优。  相似文献   

6.
永定河流域水量分配生态补偿标准研究   总被引:4,自引:2,他引:2  
跨流域跨区域的水量分配是水资源管理的重要内容,是利益竞争、社会公平、合作博弈的共同结果。以永定河流域为例,基于社会公平机制对用水联盟水量分配进行研究,给出基于参数区间最优、合作博弈理论的流域内部水量公平分配的最优决策过程。通过对合作博弈的沙普利值进行计算,构建永定河流域整体用水部门的效益最大化水量分配模型。计算结果表明:在2007年永定河山西段、河北段下泄水量为1.48亿m3的前提下,流域下游的北京市应向上游的山西、河北省共补偿4 655万元。  相似文献   

7.
基于帕累托最优的新安江流域生态补偿标准   总被引:9,自引:1,他引:8  
从福祉经济学的角度,借助边际价值的概念,认为由于生态环境保护活动存在的外部性,将会导致流域的经济、环境不能自动达到帕累托最优状态,因此需要对流域上游保护区进行补偿。分析了3种实现帕累托最优的方法:对上游给予补贴、在对上游给予补贴的同时对下游征税、谈判。以新安江流域为例,对1990—2004年流域上、下游环境保护投入和经济发展水平的数据进行计算,结果表明:当对上游给予补贴的同时对下游征税,为使上、下游地区达到各自利益的最大化,流域达到帕累托最优状态,上游地区应获补贴最小为5.2亿元,同等条件下下游地区缴税5.2亿元;通过谈判的方式实现新安江流域的生态补偿,则为使流域整体最优,上、下游可在5.2亿元以上选择合适的补偿量。建议采用谈判的方式在补偿方式和补偿额度上达成一致,使全流域的经济、环境达到帕累托最优状态。  相似文献   

8.
水冲突协调中博弈论方法研究受到重视,针对水量冲突协调中较少考虑水质因素,本文以博弈论和最优化方法为指导,考虑冲突参与人的非合作与合作行为、水资源的量与质、水资源量的不确定性、河道最小生态需水要求,建立了二人博弈分析模型;并以官厅水库流域张家口市和北京市跨界的水量和水质冲突为例,探讨冲突过程中参与人决策的相互影响以及达到合作所需要的利益分配格局。研究结果表明:张家口和北京跨界水冲突的均衡结果是(非合作,非合作)的劣解;为改进到(合作,合作)的帕累托最优解,可对合作增加利益的公平分配实现;P=50%水文年型下,均衡结果的上游盈利为8.03×108元/a,下游为0×108元/a,通过下游给上游的旁支付10.41×108元/a,结果可改进到上游盈利为15.61×108元/a,下游为7.59×108元/a;P=95%水文年型下,下游给上游的旁支付为3.32×108元/a,合作后盈利分别改进到7.97×108元/a和0.28×108元/a。  相似文献   

9.
徐雨妮  付湘 《人民长江》2019,50(6):211-218
水资源的竞争性和非排他性导致水库管理者基于个体利益进行发电调度,使得水库在满足个体利益的同时往往忽略了系统的整体效益。为了在保证个体利益的基础上实现系统总效益的最大化,建立了梯级水库群发电调度合作博弈模型;采用改进后的水循环算法对模型进行分层求解。以金沙江两库与三峡梯级构成的梯级水库群为研究对象,选取典型年进行实例计算。计算结果表明:梯级水库群发电调度的合作博弈模型在获得系统最大效益的同时使得个体利益达到Pareto最优状态,实现水库群总效益和单库个体效益的双赢,既优于联合优化调度模型又优于单库优化调度模型。该合作博弈模型及其新解法可为水库群调度决策分析开创一种新思路。  相似文献   

10.
梯级水库汛期运行水位协同浮动调度模型方法   总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0       下载免费PDF全文
水库汛期运行水位协同浮动旨在不增加防洪风险前提下,挖掘中小洪水利用潜力,提升流域水资源利用水平和供水保障能力,已成为防洪与水资源高效利用领域的研究热点和难点。从防洪库容置换与风险防控出发,基于动态预见期和预泄能力约束,嵌套运用预泄预蓄法和库容补偿法,解析了梯级水库汛期运行水位协同浮动关系;考虑帕累托最优解集和最优前沿的动态变化特性,建立了面向动态多目标的梯级水库汛期运行水位协同浮动调度模型;把环境变化检测、随机再生种群和基于参考点的帕累托前沿预测策略引入智能算法,提出求解调度模型的动态多目标智能算法,基于风险效益评价指标以评估调度方案,为梯级水库汛期运行水位协同浮动运用提供技术支撑。  相似文献   

11.
The impact of a water demand management plan on a water system and its users is investigated within a comprehensive cooperative water allocation framework. In particular, a demand management plan is incorporated into a two-step multi-period fair water allocation model. A modified cooperative game is designed for the sharing of additional net benefits under the scenario having water demand management. The results indicate that cooperation among water users can yield more net benefits, and a water demand management plan is able to lead to a further increase of the aggregated net benefits by means of water transfers from less productive users to more productive ones. By utilizing the modified cooperative game, fair sharing of additional net benefits ensures that every water user can expect to receive more net benefits and thereby water users are motivated by incentives to implement a water demand management plan which in turn improves water use efficiency. The results demonstrate that the demand management plan can be of great assistance in some arid and semi-arid regions.  相似文献   

12.
In this paper, a new solution concept, called Fuzzy Variable Least Core (FVLC), is developed for fuzzy cooperative games. The FVLC is able to incorporate fuzzy input variables and result in fuzzy benefit shares of players participating in a coalition. This solution concept is used for water and benefit allocation to water users in inter-basin water transfer systems considering the uncertainties associated with their benefit coefficients. In the proposed water allocation methodology, an Integrated Stochastic Dynamic Programming (ISDP) model is developed to obtain the water rights of players and economic water allocation policies. In the next step, the total net fuzzy benefit of the system is reallocated to water users in an equitable and rational way using a FVLC-based model. In this model, a new algorithm is proposed for converting a multilateral cooperative game with fuzzy variables to some fuzzy bilateral cooperative games, which are solved using the FLVC solution concept. The applicability and efficiency of the proposed methodology is examined by applying it to a large scale inter-basin water transfer project in Iran.  相似文献   

13.
Optimal Inter-Basin Water Allocation Using Crisp and Fuzzy Shapley Games   总被引:3,自引:3,他引:0  
In recent years, uneven distribution of available water resources as well as increasing water demands and overexploiting the water resources have brought severe need for transferring water from basins having sufficient water to basins facing water shortages. Therefore, optimal allocation of shared water resources in water transfer projects, considering the utilities of different stakeholders, physical limitations of the system and socioeconomic criteria is an important task. In this paper, a new methodology based on crisp and fuzzy Shapley games is developed for optimal allocation of inter-basin water resources. In the proposed methodology, initial water allocations are obtained using an optimization model considering an equity criterion. In the second step, the stakeholders form crisp coalitions to increase the total net benefit of the system as well as their own benefits and a crisp Shapley Value game is used to reallocate the benefits produced in the crisp coalitions. Lastly, to provide maximum total net benefit, fuzzy coalitions are constituted and the participation rates of water users to fuzzy coalitions are optimized. Then, the total net benefit is reallocated to water users in a rational and equitable way using Fuzzy Shapley Value game. The effectiveness of this method is examined by applying it to a large scale case study of water transfer from the Karoon river basin in southern Iran to the Rafsanjan plain in central Iran.  相似文献   

14.
Hydropower development may result in water conflicts among the riparian nations, which, however, can be resolved by benefit sharing. An optimization framework is proposed for a transboundary sub-basin following a cooperative game theoretical approach. A broad range of factors at different levels of cooperation between the riparian countries has been used in the optimization model. As an illustration, the framework is implemented in the Sesan and Sre Pok sub-basins of the Lower Mekong Basin. Higher levels of cooperation lead to greater total net benefits as well as greater benefits to individual countries.  相似文献   

15.
南水北调东线水资源供应链定价模型   总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3  
把南水北调东线供水工程作为一个水资源的供应链,交易主体由水供应商和分销商组成,从交易主体市场资金运营的角度,建立了合作博弈的联合定价模型,并设计了政府最高限价的两部制(基本水价与计量水价相结合的水价制)动态定价约束.通过数值算例验证了模型的有效性.其结果表明,联合定价模型所获得的供应链整体利润比Stackelberg博弈模型高,并且在联合定价下通过利润分配因子的设计可实现供应链整体、生产商、分销商的多赢.  相似文献   

16.
This paper presents a new game theoretic methodology for water and discharge permit allocation to agricultural zones in shared rivers. The methodology consists of four main steps: (1) initial allocation of water rights and pollutant discharge permits, (2) forming possible coalitions and optimal water and discharge permit reallocation to water users participating in a coalition to increase their total net benefit, (3) equitable benefit reallocation by utilizing some solution concepts in cooperative game theory, and (4) identifying the best water and pollutant discharge permit allocation strategies by minimizing the maximum regret in the system. A new linear form for crop water production function is used in the objective function of the water allocation optimization models. To show the efficiency and applicability of the methodology, it is applied to the Karoon-Dez river system in Iran.  相似文献   

17.
In this paper, two new solution concepts for fuzzy cooperative games, namely Fuzzy Least Core and Fuzzy Weak Least Core are developed. They aim for optimal allocation of available water resources and associated benefits to water users in a river basin. The results of these solution concepts are compared with the results of some traditional fuzzy and crisp games, namely Fuzzy Shapley Value, Crisp Shapley Value, Least Core, Weak Least Core and Normalized Nucleolus. It is shown that the proposed solution concepts are more efficient than the crisp games. Moreover, they do not have the limitation of Fuzzy Shapley Value in satisfying the group rationality criterion. This paper consists of two steps. In the first step, an optimization model is used for initial water allocation to stakeholders. In the second step, fuzzy coalitions are defined and participation rates of water users (players) in the fuzzy coalitions are optimized in order to reach a maximum net benefit. Then, the total net benefit is allocated to the players in a rational and equitable way using Fuzzy Least Core, Fuzzy Weak Least Core and some traditional fuzzy and crisp games. The effectiveness and applicability of the proposed methodology is examined using a numerical example and also applying it to the Karoon river basin in southern Iran.  相似文献   

18.
An increased need for water, combined with a scarcity of water resources, has resulted in serious challenges regarding water resource management. Those issues have always been a major concern of most research regarding the management and operation of water resources. Various qualitative and quantitative methods, Game Theory (GT) being an example, have been proposed for managing common pool water resources. This study adopts GT to address a case of common pool water resource management, including consideration of the interference of a regulator. Urmia lake in north‐western Iran was chosen as an illustration of a common source of water shared between two provinces acting as littoral stakeholders to the lake. Due to a non‐cooperative behaviour of the stakeholders, the lake is most likely to dry up. To change the game situation, a regulator was inserted into the game as a third player. The game among players is investigated in terms of two static and dynamic game methods. Two strategies are defined for each player. The equilibrium point will be achieved according to the strategies adopted by the players. For static games, a low‐level equilibrium under non‐cooperation conditions is obtained. Dynamic games among players are more likely to occur, rather than static games. The equilibrium of high‐level productivity will be obtained under cooperative conditions among the players.  相似文献   

19.
黄河水资源配置博弈均衡模型   总被引:4,自引:2,他引:2  
彭祥  胡和平 《水利学报》2006,37(10):1199-1205
本文以黄河流域水资源配置为案例,通过构建水资源配置博弈均衡模型,运用非合作博弈理论证明了由于制度的缺陷和个体理性的存在,开放式用水仍然是现状流域各省区的自主选择;并根据流域用水存在的合作潜力,利用合作博弈理论对未来黄河水资源配置提出初步的制度安排。  相似文献   

20.
基于多目标遗传算法的水资源优化配置   总被引:6,自引:0,他引:6  
文章基于进化计算思想提出了水资源优化配置的多目标遗传算法,建立了基于并列选择多目标遗传算法的水资源优化配置模型.并结合实例分析,求出水资源优化配置问题的Pareto最优解.优化结果表明,该算法应用在水资源优化配置中是合理、有效的.  相似文献   

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