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1.
水冲突协调中博弈论方法研究受到重视,针对水量冲突协调中较少考虑水质因素,本文以博弈论和最优化方法为指导,考虑冲突参与人的非合作与合作行为、水资源的量与质、水资源量的不确定性、河道最小生态需水要求,建立了二人博弈分析模型;并以官厅水库流域张家口市和北京市跨界的水量和水质冲突为例,探讨冲突过程中参与人决策的相互影响以及达到合作所需要的利益分配格局。研究结果表明:张家口和北京跨界水冲突的均衡结果是(非合作,非合作)的劣解;为改进到(合作,合作)的帕累托最优解,可对合作增加利益的公平分配实现;P=50%水文年型下,均衡结果的上游盈利为8.03×108元/a,下游为0×108元/a,通过下游给上游的旁支付10.41×108元/a,结果可改进到上游盈利为15.61×108元/a,下游为7.59×108元/a;P=95%水文年型下,下游给上游的旁支付为3.32×108元/a,合作后盈利分别改进到7.97×108元/a和0.28×108元/a。  相似文献   

2.
水资源短缺和水质恶化是当今众多发展中国家所面临的两个严重问题。而水质和水量的管理通常涉及众多的利益相关者。在缺乏完善的水资源市场和产权制度时,水资源开发利用上的冲突不可避免。博弈论是解决这类冲突的一种有效方法。本文以南水北调中线工程所涉及的不同利益相关者的水冲突为例,采用非合作与合作博弈分别对水资源的冲突进行了模拟。统计学和经济计量学的回归分析法用来构建博弈各方的效益函数,成本效益分析法用来比较不同战略下的博弈结果。研究结果显示, 非合作虽然使局中人2、3和4分别获利约0.15-0.32亿元、0.59-0.36亿元、0.08-0.29亿元的收益,但却使整体受损约662.01-1218.33亿元,而合作的结果恰恰相反。因此,如果能够把合作所带来的部分净收益从赢利方转向损失方,以补足损失方的损失,博弈各方均能受益。此模拟方法及结果不仅有利于博弈各方,而且在水资源的合理分配﹑水价的制定﹑生态补偿等方面也为水资源管理部门提供决策支持。  相似文献   

3.
晋江流域上下游生态补偿机制   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
为加强晋江流域水资源与水环境保护,有必要建立流域上下游生态补偿机制。依据"谁受益谁补偿"的原则确定了晋江上游地区为补偿对象,晋江下游地区为补偿主体。依据上游地区的湿地和水体生态系统提供的水源涵养、废物处理服务总价值,核算补偿标准为8 327万元/a,出资方式为泉州市政府出资1/4,其余部分由晋江下游各县市区按所分配水量的比例分摊。资金在上游地区依据对下游下泄水量贡献比例进行分配。生态补偿资金主要用于上游地区的环保基础设施建设、面源污染治理、生态保护、水土保持等方面。将上游地区的水功能区达标率和水质作为考核指标,考核结果作为安排补偿资金的依据。  相似文献   

4.
水资源短缺和水质恶化是当今众多发展中国家所面临的两个严重问题。与这两个问题有关的水资源管理通常涉及众多的利益相关者。这些利益相关者因为不同的兴趣和利益常常发生冲突。在缺乏水市场和专有财产权利时, 冲突是不可避免的。博弈论是模仿和解决这类冲突的一种有效方法。以汉江流域水资源管理中所涉及的不同利益相关者的冲突为例,展示如何用非合作与合作博弈来模拟和解决水资源冲突。在本研究中,统计学和经济计量学的回归模型法用来构建博弈各方的效益函数,成本效益分析法来比较不同战略下的博弈结果。博弈模拟结果显示,非合作虽然可使某方赢利,但却使整体受损;相反,合作虽然可给某方带来损失,但是却给各方带来整体利益。所以,如果能够把合作所带来的部分净收益从赢利方转向损失方,以补足损失方的损失,博弈各方均能受益。此模拟方法及结果不仅可使水资源不同利益相关者受益,而且在水资源合理分配﹑水价制定﹑生态补偿等方面也可以为水资源管理部门提供决策支持。  相似文献   

5.
以黄河上、中、下游的宁夏、陕西和山东为例,通过2008—2017年冬小麦水足迹的计算和对比分析,提出协同调整3个省(区)农业种植结构在黄河流域水资源节约利用的重要意义。结果表明:(1)3个省(区)冬小麦水足迹存在显著差异,上游地区冬小麦水足迹(2.74 m3/kg)明显高于中游地区的(1.29 m3/kg)和下游地区的(0.89 m3/kg);(2)2008—2017年,3个省(区)冬小麦水足迹虽然在不同年份有所波动,但未出现明显变化趋势;(3)从流域农业结构协同调整的角度看,应增大黄河中下游地区冬小麦种植面积,减小上游地区的种植面积;(4)在减小黄河上游水资源缺乏地区冬小麦等水足迹较大作物种植面积的同时,应适度增大水足迹低、收益高的作物种植面积,以节约水资源和提高经济收益,推动黄河流域生态保护和高质量发展。  相似文献   

6.
利益相关者的水资源配置博弈   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
水资源的准公共产品属性及其在开发利用中存在的外部性使河流自然流态受到严重的扰动,本文基于非合作博弈博弈论,建立主从关系的用户博弈模型分析河流水资源分配,基于个体效益不能达到帕累托最优状态,采用合作博弈方法,建立水资源用户合作博弈模型。合作博弈增加了总效益,但使得上游用户的效益比非合作时减少,有必要对上游用户进行效益补偿:引入微观经济学的无差异曲线与合作联盟形成的条件构建合作效益分配的可行解集,并提出基于边际贡献的效益分配方法在可行解集中挑选唯一的效益分配解。研究结果表明,合作博弈总效益大于非合作博弈的总效益,达到帕累托最优状态;通过合作效益分配,处于先动优势的上游用户的分配效益大于非合作的效益,有利于行动占先者加入合作联盟。  相似文献   

7.
付湘  陆帆  胡铁松 《水利学报》2016,47(1):38-43
水资源的准公共产品属性及其在开发利用中存在的外部性使河流自然流态受到严重的扰动,本文基于非合作博弈博弈论,建立主从关系的用户博弈模型分析河流水资源分配,基于个体效益不能达到帕累托最优状态,采用合作博弈方法,建立水资源用户合作博弈模型。合作博弈增加了总效益,但使得上游用户的效益比非合作时减少,有必要对上游用户进行效益补偿:引入微观经济学的无差异曲线与合作联盟形成的条件构建合作效益分配的可行解集,并提出基于边际贡献的效益分配方法在可行解集中挑选唯一的效益分配解。研究结果表明,合作博弈总效益大于非合作博弈的总效益,达到帕累托最优状态;通过合作效益分配,处于先动优势的上游用户的分配效益大于非合作的效益,有利于行动占先者加入合作联盟。  相似文献   

8.
跨界水资源冲突的动因分析   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
李浩  刘陶  黄薇 《中国水利》2010,(3):12-14,18
跨界水资源冲突的主要表现形式为跨界水污染、取水、水利工程、河道采砂冲突。以区域利益为视角,运用经济学理论分析发现,跨界水资源冲突的主要动因有:(1)不同区域水资源利用的收益与成本函数的差异;(2)水资源空间性、流动性导致区域差异的循环累积;(3)水资源循环性导致区域水资源产权不明晰;(4)取水、污染和水利工程的外部性导致水资源的过量开发利用;(5)水资源准公共品性质导致区域存在加大本地区开发利用程度,而限制其他区域开发利用的内在冲动。在未来的流域水资源管理中应积极探索"流域管理与区域管理相结合"的新模式,注重研究水资源开发利用中的区域利益及其相互关系,并加强流域水资源冲突管理。  相似文献   

9.
对我国现行的水资源冲突管理制度体系展开了述评。主要梳理了国家制定的水资源冲突管理制度、国务院组成部门的水资源冲突管理制度,以及上述两类制度的主要内容;分析了水量冲突管理制度、水质冲突管理制度以及跨界水资源冲突管理制度存在的不足之处。在此基础上,提出了完善我国水量冲突管理制度、水质冲突管理制度、跨界水资源冲突管理制度方面的有益建议,可为水资源冲突管理部门和相关决策机构系统构建我国的水资源冲突管理制度提供参考与借鉴。  相似文献   

10.
永定河流域水量分配生态补偿标准研究   总被引:4,自引:2,他引:2  
跨流域跨区域的水量分配是水资源管理的重要内容,是利益竞争、社会公平、合作博弈的共同结果。以永定河流域为例,基于社会公平机制对用水联盟水量分配进行研究,给出基于参数区间最优、合作博弈理论的流域内部水量公平分配的最优决策过程。通过对合作博弈的沙普利值进行计算,构建永定河流域整体用水部门的效益最大化水量分配模型。计算结果表明:在2007年永定河山西段、河北段下泄水量为1.48亿m3的前提下,流域下游的北京市应向上游的山西、河北省共补偿4 655万元。  相似文献   

11.
全球气候变化无疑会影响河流的来水过程和供水过程,改变河流的水质、水量和水系统运行,使当今跨国水体可持续管理复杂化。然而,目前大部分跨国水体协议缺少处理应对气候挑战的重要措施,没有充分考虑不断变化的气候、社会、经济和状况。跨国水体的分享可能会导致两国或多国之间发生冲突,但也可以成为合作和谈判的源泉。共同应对气候的挑战,为未来的跨国水体管理找到新的方法提供了一个平台。尽管各流域国之间存在政治和社会差异、利益冲突等,但制定灵活而又有效的跨国水体协议以减轻气候变化的不利影响是极其需要且完全有可能的,措施有:①灵活的水分配策略;②精确的数据和信息交换;③综合的水质管理;④应对极端事件的策略;⑤对原有跨国水体协议的修订;⑥联合管理委员会的成立和完善。  相似文献   

12.
The political boundaries between the Palestinian and Israelismake the water issues critical and sensitive. Groundwater is theprimary source for the Palestinian in the West Bank. Although, there are many studies on the shared surface resources (Jordan River Basin), there are few studies on the groundwater shared resources between the Palestinians and Israelis.There are three primary groundwater basins underlying the West Bank (Eastern, Northeastern and Western Basins) as shown in Figure 1. Both the Northeastern and Western basins are shared between Israelis and Palestinians. The Palestinians have a limited access to the Northeastern Basin and strictly limited access to the Western Basin. In addition to the quantity of available water resources, thequality of water is emerging as a critical issue. Threats to ground water quality include disposal of untreated wastewater, increasing salinity due to agricultural activities and intrusion of native groundwater of poor quality. Widespread use of herbicides and pesticides also represent a threat to drinking water supplies.The Declaration of Principles, signed in Washington D.C in 1993,was a major step toward resolution of the political conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians. However, the water issue is part of the final status negotiations, which still unresolved.As resolution to political conflict is pursued, it is clear that water resources management issues remain at the forefront becauseof the transboundary nature of the hydrologic regime. Cooperative management on the technical level appears to be the only alternative to further conflict and degradation of the region's scare water resources. This article will study the impact of the transboundary resources on both sides and explore some of the most significant groundwater management issues facing both the Palestinians and Israelis.  相似文献   

13.
与传统的定量分析方法和最优化方法相比,博弈论能更好地识别和模拟水资源冲突主体的决策机制,并考察不同冲突间的相互作用机制。通过梳理和归纳有关文献,分别从水资源配置冲突、跨界水污染冲突和水资源冲突协调机制3个方面,对博弈论在解决水资源冲突中的运用进行了综述,并在此基础上提出了研究展望。鼓励运用市场经济宏观调控机制解决流域水资源水量和水质双重利用冲突;流域初始水权分配定量化有待深入研究。  相似文献   

14.
Hao  Cailian  Yan  Denghua  Gedefaw  Mohammed  Qin  Tianling  Wang  Hao  Yu  Zhilei 《Water Resources Management》2021,35(6):1731-1756

In China, under the premise that the water quantity allocation and water quality control targets for transboundary rivers have been determined, ecocompensation between upstream and downstream areas is urgently needed in management practice when targets cannot be met in the transboundary section. A dynamic accounting method for ecocompensation standards needs to be established at the scientific level. However, the accounting method of the existing ecocompensation standards is not sufficient. The purpose of this study is to propose a transboundary compensation standard accounting method based on water quantity allocation and water quality control targets and to establish ecocompensation standard accounting formulas for the Shaying River watershed. The accounting process is as follows: the water quantity compensation standard in different water quantity scenarios is calculated from the perspective of the water resource value. By using the comprehensive pollution index method, the water quality compensation standard is calculated in different water quality scenarios, and the ecocompensation standard calculation formulas for watersheds are determined. As an application, 27 types of ecocompensation standard formulas for the Shaying River watershed were determined for 3 hydrological frequencies (50%, 75% and 95%), 3 water quantity scenarios (equal-quantity, excess-quantity and reduced-quantity discharging) and 3 water quality levels (equal-quality, inferior-quality and better-quality discharging). The results not only provide a compensation standard for the Shaying River but also provide a reference for the calculation of ecocompensation standards for other transboundary rivers in China with definite water quantity and water quality management objectives.

  相似文献   

15.
This article reviews the state of the art of transboundary water governance in the Euphrates–Tigris river basin, which is characterized by both political confrontation and cooperative institutional development. First, research on the physical characteristics of the basin is presented, with references to the literature on large-scale water development projects that underpin transboundary water interactions. Then, contending approaches to transboundary water governance are discussed, with specific references to the evolution of institutions. Finally, bearing in mind that transboundary water governance in the basin occurs in volatile political circumstances, current issues such as control of the water infrastructure by non-state violent actors and protection of water during armed conflict are scrutinized.  相似文献   

16.
从河流功能出发,结合跨界河流的特性,将跨界河流安全具体划分成河流水量安全、河流水质安全、河流水生态安全、防洪安全和国土安全5个子类。考虑到跨界河流的特殊性,认为跨界河流安全的主体是国家,因此国家经济、社会的可持续发展不因跨界河流安全问题而受到威胁和中断,以及国家主权不因为跨界河流等问题受到削弱和侵犯是跨界河流安全概念外延。在此基础上,还分析了影响跨界河流安全的主要自然因素和人文因素。  相似文献   

17.
This paper identifies the vulnerabilities and risks linked with China’s transboundary waters through an analysis of hydrological data and the legal and institutional settings. The risks and vulnerabilities arise in three areas: (1) serious issues of water security arise, both internally and externally, relating to water quantity and water quality; (2) transboundary waters management is hampered by weak capacity across the region; and (3) underdeveloped legal regimes, including procedural requirements for the exchange of information, prior notification and early warning mechanisms, make it difficult to realize effective international transboundary water cooperation.  相似文献   

18.
Border areas comprise inevitably problematic fields especially when the countries are bound to share common water resources. The conflict potential is rather high and quite often countries are directed to the negotiation table in order to form tranboundary agreements. These agreements aim to the settlement of tensions and conflicts originating from the management of shared water resources. Often a starting point of the conflict resolution is the water allocation scheme between the interested parts. The definition of entitlements over shared water resources in not an easy task and it requires the use of specific decision tools in order to reach the maximum level of objectivity. According to the Water Framework Directive (WFD) 2000/60, management of transboundary catchments shall be based on existing structures set by international agreements, such as the UN Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes. The main aim of this paper is the implementation of a water allocation tool based on representative indicators characterizing the involved parties while placing emphasis on environmental protection. The variables used are proposed by the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses incorporating both natural and socio-economic aspects. These factors are quantified for each country and a weight factor is assigned to each one depending on its importance and suitability for describing the environmental and socio-economic situation in each country. As an illustration example the transboundary river Nestos/Mesta case is presented.  相似文献   

19.
Karina Vink 《国际水》2013,38(5):743-754
Vulnerable people require additional measures to ensure their water capabilities, as they have certain characteristics making them more vulnerable than others. As pointed out by recent studies, transboundary water access laws and policies do not sufficiently address the needs of vulnerable people. The prevailing legal arrangements often only address extrinsic vulnerability and forgo focusing on intrinsic vulnerability, which creates the need for different transboundary water legislation. This paper shows how international treaties can address the right to certain water capabilities by considering not merely the current but also future global populations into the creation of their transboundary agreements.  相似文献   

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