A Cooperative Game Analysis of Transboundary Hydropower Development in the Lower Mekong: Case of the 3S Sub-basins

Hydropower development has enormous economic, environmental, and social impacts at a local, national, and trans-national level. It has been suggested that transboundary water conflicts, such as those that may arise from hydropower development, may be addressed through benefit sharing. This study attempts to investigate the net benefits of hydropower development and water resources utilization in transboundary sub-basin, the Sekong, Sesan and Srepok (commonly known as 3S) sub-basin, in the Mekong River Basin using a game theory approach. This study proposes a methodology for analyzing complex transboundary river-basin issues using the game theory concepts, such as core stability and incentive compatibility. A wide range of parameters have been incorporated to define models and methodologies, and an adaptation strategy for the area has been proposed. The results suggests that benefit sharing and cooperation among the riparian countries would lead to benefits to all. It is observed that the greater the cooperation, the higher is the total benefits. External funding and optimal usage of funds will also play a critical role in this context in the near future. The results of the study will provide a basis for local policy decisions and regional planning in the Mekong River and beyond.     

Water, Food, and Energy Security: An Elusive Search for Balance in Central Asia

The development and use of water resources in the Amu Darya Basin remain under debate in the face of increasing population and associated scarcities in water, food, and energy. The upstream riparian, the mountain nation of Tajikistan, wishes to develop its hydropower potential. Three downstream states wish to sustain or increase their economic benefits from water used for irrigation. Growing tensions among the riparian countries on the Vakhsh River, a tributary of Amu Darya, have halted development of Tajikistan’s proposed Rogun Dam. This paper examines the potential for mutually beneficial water development and allocation of water resources to sustain demands for water, food, and energy. Using long-term data on the Basin’s energy potential, water supplies, irrigated land, and crop water demands, this paper analyzes total economic welfare for a future 20-year time horizon. Two water supply scenarios for each of two policy choices are examined. Results show that a constrained economic optimization operation of the Dam has the potential to increase farm income for each riparian country, while producing considerable benefits in hydropower for Tajikistan. Political negotiation among the riparian states and much better data will be needed to discover and implement potential gains indicated by this study.     

Regional cooperation and benefit sharing for sustainable water resources management in the Lower Mekong Basin

Benefit sharing is a concept associated with regional cooperation for sustainable water resources management. To this end, the present study analyses how implementation of this concept may contribute to economic growth and the promotion of sustainable livelihoods in the Lower Mekong Basin (LMB). It focuses on the balance between economic and human development, national interests, and the procedures used to manage water resources in the basin. It was found that: (a) Benefits obtained from the Mekong River are not equally shared between riparian countries because of inadequate regional cooperation, with economic and social development in the LMB being uneven, with Thailand and Vietnam achieving better human development, poverty reduction and food security outcomes than Laos and Cambodia; (b) Lack of shared national interests, or a common development agenda, has resulted in unsustainable water resource management outcomes; and (c) Procedures for water resources management agreed by the four LMB countries are well‐aligned with the conceptual framework for benefit sharing defined by Sadoff and Grey (2002, Water Policy, 4, 389), although while these procedures have the potential to facilitate a more cooperative agenda for equitable sharing of social, economic and environmental benefits from the water resources of the Mekong River, implementation of the 1995 Mekong Agreement currently remains controversial. The five procedures for water resource management developed by the Mekong River Commission have not resulted in satisfactory outcomes, due in part to the institution lacking regulatory authority.     

The politics of water transfer between South Africa and Lesotho: Bilateral cooperation in the Lesotho Highlands water project

Abstract

This paper demonstrates that cooperation over international rivers can be achieved through situations where benefits of river development create bilateral dependence between basin states. The case study of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, a bilateral water transfer in the Orange River basin between South Africa and Lesotho, is examined. Historical analysis of the negotiations leading to the project treaty agreement show that issues of apartheid and the Cold War heavily influenced the riparian relations between the two states. At times, the project faced the threat of abandonment due to deteriorating diplomatic conditions. However, the project was realized because South Africa and Lesotho not only shared the material benefits of the project, but also gained politically from committing to it. These political benefits are influential in creating interdependence between the basin states in order to ensure the reliability of bilateral cooperation.     

History of co-operation in the Nile basin

A significant feature of the River Nile is its trans-boundary nature. The basin is shared among 10 riparian states. This trans-boundary character of the Nile presents a great challenge. At the heart of such a challenge is the imperative of poverty eradication. The sustainable development of the River Nile can help alleviate poverty by providing enhanced food, power and water security and associated employment creation. Co-operation in the Nile basin started in the form of bilateral agreements at the beginning of the last century. As an example of bilateral co-operation, in November 1959 Sudan and Egypt signed an agreement for the utilization of the shared waters of the River Nile. This agreement considers the rights of other riparian countries to the Nile waters. Countries of the Nile basin have been engaged in regional co-operative activities over the past 30 years: ‘HYDROMET’, 1967–1993; ‘TECCONILE’, 1993–1999; and ‘NBI’, 1998–present. The transitional mechanism was officially launched in February 1999 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, by the Council of Ministers of Water Affairs of the Nile Basin States under the title of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI). The NBI provides a unique forum for the countries of the Nile to move forward a co-operative process to realize tangible benefits in the basin and build a solid foundation of trust and confidence. The Nile basin countries have invested significant time, effort and resources into launching and sustaining the NBI. The NBI provides a transitional institutional mechanism for co-operation, an agreed vision and basin-wide framework, and a process to facilitate substantial investment in the Nile basin. It is based on the recognition that the basin has a shared past and a shared future, and that there is an urgent need for development and for the alleviation of poverty. It represents deep commitment by the Nile riparian countries to foster co-operation and pursue jointly the sustainable development and management of Nile water resources for the benefit of all.     

Modelling Equitable and Reasonable Water Sharing in Transboundary Rivers: the Case of Sirwan-Diyala River

There are over 260 transboundary river and lake basins in the world that many of them are facing great challenges of water sharing between riparian countries concerned. The 1997 UN Watercourses Convention, entered into force in 2014, includes articles and factors on water sharing which have not been completely used for modelling of the basins yet. In this paper, legal aspects (i.e. Articles 5, 6, 7 and 10 of the Convention) are integrated with a technical approach for water allocation in transboundary rivers. For this purpose, a new conceptual model is developed for quantification of the Convention provisions concerning equitable and reasonable water sharing. The method is applied to the Sirwan-Diyala transboundary river shared by Iran and Iraq. Some indicators are developed and quantified for determination of water shares of the riparian countries and different scenarios considering extreme and equal weights of the factors are defined. The basin is simulated by WEAP model to evaluate effects of the scenarios on up- and downstream of the basin. Five demand management alternatives comprising increasing of irrigation efficiency and eliminating second cultivation are proposed as appropriate measures for elimination or mitigation of possible significant harm. The proposed technical-legal approach paves the way for enhancing bargaining potentials of the riparian countries and increasing their cooperation to achieve a win-win solution in using waters of transboundary rivers.     

莱茵河水污染事件回顾与启示

中石油吉林石化公司双苯厂发生爆炸事故，造成大量苯类污染物进入松花江水体．引发重大水环境污染事件。而19年前在瑞士巴塞尔附近施韦策哈勒的火灾事故，同样对莱茵河水质和生态系统造成了巨大的影响。其后开展的保护行动使一度被称为“欧洲下水道”的莱茵河成为一条清澈的河流。莱茵河保护委员会1986年度关于该事件的报告，其综合性的治理措施以及沿岸国家的合作，对我国开展松花江污染事件的后续治理行动以及其他河流的开发、利用和保护具有现实意义。     

Transboundary water cooperation on the Yarlung Zangbo/Brahmaputra – a legal analysis of riparian state practice

The Yarlung Zangbo/Brahmaputra, shared by China, India, Bhutan and Bangladesh, lacks a comprehensive legal framework. Following an overview of the basin, the paper analyses state and treaty practice through a legal lens, comparing the riparian state positions, based on their approaches to sovereignty. Finding fragmented transboundary water cooperation across the basin, two possible approaches that might help are explored. Taking inspiration from the hydropower projects on parts of the watercourse, and from existing multilateral environmental agreements, it is queried whether future cooperation might be fostered through legal arrangements for joint exploitation, or through joint protection under multilateral environmental agreements.     

Meso-level Cooperation on Transboundary Tributaries and Infrastructure in the Ferghana Valley

The river basin management approach in the Syr Darya basin fragmented after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. However, this approach had already created dependencies between riparian states, such as transboundary water control infrastructure. At the national level, these states hardly cooperate, but at the province and district level, especially in the Ferghana Valley, which is shared by Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, cooperation continues. This paper analyzes transboundary cooperation in the Ferghana Valley. On the periphery, conflict and cooperation still take place on both water management infrastructure and water sharing. The greatest hindrance to cooperation—border control—is outside the realm of water management, but is key given the property rights to water management infrastructure in the neighbouring riparian states.     

Bankruptcy to Surplus: Sharing Transboundary River Basin’s Water under Scarcity

In this article a three-stage framework is proposed for allocating water and welfare in transboundary river basins under water scarcity. The proposed allocation framework combines the bargaining theory with resource allocation and bankruptcy games. The water bankrupt Euphrates River was taken as a case study to demonstrate the applicability of the allocation framework. The results showed that the total monetary welfare that can be generated by reallocating the water in order of decreasing water productivity value of each riparian country is greater by 43.43% of total monetary warfare that can be made if each country were to utilize the water allocated to it independently. The proposed allocation framework rewarded Turkey, Syria and Iraq with welfare assignments which are 41.5%, 42.1% and 57.45% greater than what they could have achieved by unilaterally utilizing the water allocated to them. Generally, the proposed water allocation, water reallocation and welfare assignment framework provide some insights for allocating transboundary water in a way which is efficient, fair and sustainable.