改进夏普利值法的热电机组调峰补偿费用分摊

针对"三北"地区电网热电机组比重大、纯凝等非供热机组为其调峰的问题,提出了热电机组调峰补偿费用的分摊方法。首先,引入合作博弈理论建立了热电机组之间调峰费用分摊的合作博弈模型,利用夏普利值法求解分摊结果。然后,在原算法基础上结合热电比系数赋予新的分配权重,研究夏普利值分摊改进算法以及热负荷变化对电网调峰费用、费用分摊的影响。改进算法能够从经济利益上刺激热电机组提高自身热电比,进而提高系统的生产效率。最后通过算例分析证明了该调峰补偿费用分摊方法的合理性。     

基于合作博弈论和工程方法的调峰费用分摊

枯水期,水电装机比重较大的水火电系统的调峰任务基本上由水电承担。然而,在市场机制尚没有建立的前提下,水电调峰价值没有细化在政府核定的上网电价中。以我国西北电网枯水期的调峰问题为研究背景,基于合作博弈论提出水电机组调峰费用分摊方法,分析了分摊机制的单调性、超加特性、凸博弈特性,提出若干方法克服Shapley值计算中的组合爆炸问题;基于工程方法提出水电机组调峰费用分摊方法,该机制在统计机组调峰里程的基础上给出对各机组的调峰费用分摊。最后,通过对某4机8节点系统以及西北电网的仿真分析验证了分摊方法的有效性。     

市场条件下的机组启动费问题

机组在启动过程中需要耗费高额的启动费，这部分启动费是应由电网公司在制定日计划时予以考虑，还是应由发电公司在报价时自行考虑？针对这一问题，作者以对比机组启动费用与发电效益为出发点，提出了根据机组的启机效率，使用寿命以及国家现阶段的政策导向等多方面因素，由电力市场调度交易中心和发电公司以及市场监管部门兼顾各方利益，共同核定机组的含有技术和经济双重性的参数－“最小经济运行小时数”，并由发电公司依据机组自身特性和市场状况，自行处理启动费；而调度交易中心在制定竞价上网发电计划及结算时则不再单独考虑和支付机组启停费用的观点：文中同时还提出了分摊机组启动费的两种方法－平均分摊法和负荷比例分摊法，并对比了这两种分摊方法对双方经济性的影响。     

阻塞费用的计算和分摊方法

在电力市场条件下，阻塞定价已成为阻塞管理的核心。最近，阻塞费用分摊方面的研究工作相当活跃。基于此，总结了各种交易模式下阻塞费用的计算方法，并对阻塞费用的分摊方法，即平均分摊法和责任分摊法，进行了综述。在责任分摊法中，阐述了使用程度分摊法和裁减量分摊法。     

双边交易模式下基于Aumann-Shapley值的阻塞费用分摊方法研究

在阻塞管理中，费用分摊法已成为阻塞定价中的一种重要方法，然而在阻塞费用对阻塞线路的分摊中，目前提出的影子价格法和边际微增法仍存在一些不合理的地方。为了克服这些方法的缺点，该文针对双边交易提出了一种基于Aumann-Shapley值的阻塞费用分摊法，该方法利用无限多局中人联盟博弈中的Aumann-Shapley值，计及了所有阻塞消除顺序，通过Gauss积分法较为简单和精确地计算出分摊结果，真正实现了阻塞费用在阻塞线路上的公平分摊，通过算例分析，证明了基于Aumann-Shapley值的阻塞费用分摊法优于影子价格法和边际微增法。     

基于贡献因子理论的动态阻塞管理费用分摊方法

将阻塞费用分为静态阻塞费用和动态阻塞费用两部分，并提出了一种动态阻塞费用分摊方法。分析了在动态阻塞管理过程中调整机组有功出力对系统暂态稳定性的影响，计算出机组对暂态稳定指标的贡献因子，并依此分摊动态阻塞费用。以新英格兰39节点典型系统为例进行了分析，计算结果证明了本文方法的有效性和可行性。     

基于合作博弈成本分摊理论的电力系统备用容量分配的研究

为探求公平有效的电力系统备用容量分配方法,以某大区域实际电力负荷和机组参数数据为例,运用基于合作博弈的成本分摊理论进行分析计算,并指明各算法的不同适用范围。算例结果表明核仁分摊法和Shapley值法分配备用容量较现有比例分配法更具公平性、合理性。     

风电接入费用分摊机制综述及机理探讨

长距离大规模风电输送使电力系统面临若干挑战,风电接入费用的分摊问题是影响风电发展的潜在障碍之一.以国际上风电接入费用分摊机制的基本情况为背景,以解决我国风电接入费用分摊主体不明和补偿办法不合理为目的,提出了我国风电接入费用分摊机制存在的主要问题,总结出了各国风电接入费用主要在三类利益相关方之间分摊,其差异体现在各自占比不同的基本原则.文中以甘肃酒泉千万千瓦级风电基地一期工程为例,初步估算了长距离大规模风电输送的成本,通过实例分析提出我国应该借鉴国际经验,加快建立行之有效的风电接入费用分摊机制来支持风电的健康可持续发展.     

计及调峰影响系数的费用分摊及随机经济调度

为提高机组参与调峰过程的积极性，提出一种计及调峰影响系数的费用分摊机制及随机经济调度模型。考虑火电深度调峰煤耗特性，并将煤耗成本非均分严格分段线性化，建立了考虑燃煤机组深度调峰煤耗特性的随机经济调度模型。以市场主体上网电量为基准，并结合不同电源峰谷差率，提出了考虑调峰影响系数的费用分摊方法。以修改后的IEEE6机30节点系统为例进行仿真，结果表明，考虑市场主体的调峰影响系数进行费用分摊能有效提高机组的调峰积极性。相关结论可为火电机组参与深度调峰辅助服务的费用分摊机制提供参考。     

电力系统发电侧和负荷侧共同碳责任分摊方法

在低碳电力的背景下,电力系统碳责任在各利益主体之间的分摊研究具有重要的理论和现实意义。发电机组和负荷作为电力系统的重要组成部分,两者都应该承担起电力系统节能减排的责任。文中提出将电力系统碳责任在发电侧和负荷侧进行共同分摊,将该问题建模成一个基于合作博弈的成本分摊问题,并采用Aumann-Shapley法进行具体地分摊求解,将双侧碳责任分摊机制与仅在发电侧碳责任分摊和仅在负荷侧碳责任分摊机制进行比较。算例结果显示在双侧碳责任分摊机制中,发电机组和负荷都承担了电力系统节能减排的责任,能激励发电机组和负荷的节能降耗行为,降低系统碳排放。     

Allocation of unit start-up costs using Cooperative game theory

This paper discusses a three-part generation offer strategy that enables generators to put in unbundled variable operating costs and fixed start-up/no-load costs. We then propose methods based on cost sharing axioms to allocate fixed start-up/no-load costs among electricity consumers/load/retailers that take into account equity and rationality considerations. We focus on the single period cost allocation first. We apply three well-known game theoretic axioms: the core, the nucleolus, and the Shapley value. We discuss the relative merits and demerits of each criterion and also explore certain theoretical conditions for the existence of the core and the Shapley value lying inside the core. Finally, the multiperiod start-up cost allocation problem is studied. Allocations based on individual periods vis-a/spl grave/-vis composite allocation for all periods are compared and contrasted. Numerical examples are used to illustrate all theoretical concepts.     

Transmission Cost Allocation Based on Data Envelopment Analysis and Cooperative Game Method

Transmission cost allocation is a traditional but challenging problem in electric power industries. Many factors can affect the transmission cost allocation. But most traditional allocation methods focus on just one point. The Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) approach has the characteristic of multi-criterion. It can overcome the drawbacks of traditional allocation methods. This paper combines the game theory and DEA approach to solve the problem of transmission cost allocation. In order to take various key points of power transmission into account, three criterions are proposed. These criterions reflect the effect of load demand, transmission line usage and marginal cost on transmission cost allocation. Nucleolus and Shapley value are used to solve the DEA game programming. For measuring the fairness of the transmission cost allocation methods, this paper proposes an algorithm to evaluate the satisfaction of users with the different allocation methods. The DEA game approach is applied to IEEE 14-bus system. The results which are compared with that of other three traditional allocation methods demonstrate the applicability of the proposed method.     

Unit commitment by genetic algorithm with specialized search operators

An approach for solving the unit commitment problem based on genetic algorithm with new search operators is presented. These operators, specific to the problem, are mutation with a probability of bit change depending on load demand, production and start-up costs of the generating units and transposition. The method incorporates time-dependent start-up costs, demand and reserve constraints, minimum up and down time constraints and units power generation limits. Repair algorithms or penalty factors in the objective function are applied to the infeasible solutions. Numerical results showed an improvement in the solution cost compared to the results obtained from genetic algorithm with standard operators and other techniques.     

Transmission cost allocation by cooperative games and coalition formation

The allocation of costs of a transmission system to its users is still a pending problem in many electric sector market regulations. This paper contributes with a new allocation method among the electric market participants. Both cooperation and competition are defined as the leading principles to fair solutions and efficient cost allocation. The method is based mainly on the responsibility of the agents in the physical and economic use of the network, their rational behavior, the formation of coalitions, and cooperative game theory resolution mechanisms. The designed method is applicable to existing networks or to their expansion. Simulations are made with sample networks. Results conclude that adequate solutions are possible in a decentralized environment with open access to networks. Comparisons with traditional allocation systems are shown and cooperative game solutions compare better in economic and physical terms.     

输电系统固定成本分摊问题

在电力市场环境下，输电固定成本需要公平、合理地分摊给所有电网使用者。合理的分摊方法可以引导对现有输电设备的有效和合理的使用，并为将来的发电规划和负荷选址提供经济信号。文中对现有的输电固定成本分摊方法进行了全面而系统的综述，按照所分摊的成本、承担成本的主体、所基于的系统状态、冗余容量成本的分摊、对反向潮流的收费、对无功功率的处理、分摊的原则与方法等方面，对现有的输电成本分摊方法进行了详细的分析，论述了每一种方法的特点，并对各种方法进行了比较和讨论。     

输电系统固定成本分摊问题(续完)

(上接本刊 2 0 0 3年第 15期第 89页 )5　对反向潮流的收费不同的用户在同一条线路上产生的潮流方向可能是不同的。与线路实际潮流 (或称净潮流 )方向相同的潮流一般称为正向潮流 (netflow ,positiveflow或dominantflow) ,而与线路实际潮流方向相反的潮流一般称为反向潮流 (negativeflow或counterflow)。大多数分摊方法包括如何对引起反向潮流的用户进行收费的问题[7,8,2 6 ,2 9] ,但方法各异。5 .1　对引起反向潮流的用户给予奖励这种方法只向引起正向潮流的用户收费 ,而对引起反向潮流的用户给予奖励[18] 。其合理性在于 :反向潮流能够增…     

输电网合作投资费用的计算与分摊

电力市场环境下,输电费用的计算和分摊成为必须解决的问题之一。而此时各发电厂和用户都将成为独立行为的个体,他们具有合作的潜力以降低成本或获得最大利益。利用输电网的合作特性．给出了由发电厂投资修建输电网的计算方法,并提出结合合作博弈理论,采用核心、核仁、夏普利值三种方法将成本分摊到各个用户。     

Hydro unit start-up costs and their impact on the short termscheduling strategies of Swedish power producers

This paper is about start-up costs of hydro power units. In the introduction we address three questions about start-up of hydro power units: what causes the costs in the start-up? How much does a start-up cost? How do start-ups effect the short-term scheduling strategies of power producers in Sweden? In order to answer these questions, we have interviewed employees working with generation planning at the eight largest power producers in Sweden. We found five aspects causing start-up costs: loss of water during maintenance; wear and tear of the windings due to temperature changes during the start-up; wear and tear of mechanical equipment during the start-up; malfunctions in the control equipment during the start-up; and loss of water during the start up. The aspects causing the largest costs are maintenance due to the wear and tear and the unavailability and personnel costs due to malfunctions in the control equipment. The cost of lost water is usually small. Our conclusions are the following: start up cost will depend on the nominal power of the unit and the unit model; the majority of the power producers consider start-ups in their planning; there is a need for better knowledge about start-up cost; and there is a need for planning software which considers start-up costs of hydro units     

考虑输电阻塞的电网固定成本分摊核仁法

探讨了电力市场环境下多区域互联电网固定成本的分摊问题，给出了固定成本分摊的合作博弈模型。针对输电固定成本分配的核仁模型未考虑输电阻塞的情况，提出了一种区域核仁算法。首先根据系统潮流分布情况确定出现阻塞的线路，再根据节点边际价格的差异将输电网划分成多个输电区域，每个输电区域所有节点边际价格基本一致，区域内部线路没有阻塞；然后采用等值双边交易法将输电固定成本分配给各输电区域；最后在区域内部采用核仁模型将成本分配到用户。该方法考虑了阻塞并减小了将多区域互联电网作为一个整体求核仁解时的计算量。以IEEE14节点系统为例的仿真结果表明了该方法的可行性。