无线多跳网络中基于博弈论的协作激励机制研究

无线多跳网络中网络传输性能容易受到自私节点的影响。本文首先对目前的节点协作激励机制进行了总结,然后,针对分簇路由中簇间路由场景,运用博弈论中非合作博弈的思想,建立博弈模型以激励簇内节点通过协作通信的方式帮助簇头进行数据包的转发,最后给出了基于非合作博弈的激励机制中纳什均衡解的求解过程。     

基于博弈论的车联网双重激励数据转发机制

车联网中自私节点为节省自身能源消耗倾向于拒绝为其他节点转发数据包,为克服这种降低网络整体性能的自私性,常采用基于信誉权限和价格的激励机制来促进合作。在以信誉权限机制处罚自私行为的基础上,提出了对协作节点给予信用度奖励的双重激励机制。在该机制中,设置了信誉重建模型以完善基于信誉的惩罚机制,并基于单跳博弈模型对节点行为进行经济学分析。最后对提出的双重激励机制进行了理论分析,该激励机制在保证节点协作的同时提高了网络吞吐量。仿真实验表明,所提机制在大规模情形下可使得网络具有快速收敛的丢包率和极高的节点转发率。     

Ad hoc网络寻路阶段的合作激励机制研究

如何激励属于不同利益最大化实体的自私节点合作是当前Adhoc网络研究中的一个热点问题.现有的自私节点检测和激励机制主要针对数据传输阶段,不能适应寻路阶段的特点.文中基于邻居节点中继和生成的路由请求包之间的统计关系,提出了一种适用于按需路由协议寻路阶段的自私行为检测和惩罚机制,并利用博弈论工具将其建模为噪声环境下的重复囚徒困境博弈,对算法激励合作的有效性进行分析.理论分析和仿真结果显示,该算法能够有效地惩罚寻路中的自私行为,促进节点合作.     

无线传感器网络入侵检测的重复博弈建模研究

通过分析无线传感器网络节点影响网络可用性及其整体性能的自私行为,提出了一种无线传感器网络入侵检测的重复博弈模型,集中于检测和响应传感器节点的自私行为以加强网络节点的协作性能,利用节点与其邻居节点进行的重复博弈过程,广播节点的效用变化,即时检测出网络节点的自私行为。通过对网络节点的自私行为引入惩戒机制,从而大大降低了节点背离协作的可能性。仿真结果表明,对节点的自私行为实施惩戒机制,可以大大增强节点间相互协作,从而保证网络的连通性。     

无线传感器网络自私节点检测的仿真研究

研究无线传感器网络安全问题.在无线传感器网络中,节点协作需要消耗能量,由于节点能量有限,并不是所有的节点都愿意参与协作,而出现自私节点.自私节点对整个网络中吞吐量和全网通信延时的产生影响,会使网络存在严重的安全性问题.为了检测及预防网络中节点的自私行为,提高无线传感器网络的安全性,提出了一种博弈论无线传感器网络自私行为检测方法.通过检测无线传感器网络的自私节点,并对拒绝协作行为进行惩罚,通过节点与其邻居节点进行的不断博弈过程,广播节点的效用变化加强网络中节点的协作性能进行仿真.仿真结果表明,对无线传感器节点的自私行为实施惩罚机制,大大增强节点间的相互协作,节省了不必要的能耗,提高了自私节点检测的准确率,延长了整个网络的生命周期,为网络的安全性提供了有效保证.     

自私节点下无线多跳网的节能博弈拓扑研究

在构建高连通性、低能耗、低干扰且具有合理路由的多跳无线网络中,面对自私节点之间的冲突和彼此之间的协调关系,博弈理论是一种很好的解决工具。利用博弈理论构建网络拓扑结构控制解决方案,采用的方法为设计合理新颖的收益函数。在非合作博弈理论的基础上创建了一个新的收益函数模型,研究表明,利用这种收益函数能够将网络控制在一个稳定的理想状态。最后,对模拟算法的性能进行评估,最终的仿真结果表明,将博弈拓扑结构应用于无线多跳网络能够明显节能。     

无线传感器网络路由中合作性重复博弈模型的研究

无线传感器网络中,节点能耗、路径可靠度以及节点的死亡时间是传感器网络路由需要考虑的关键因素.为了提高能量利用率和传感器网络收益,在节点理性且自私的条件下,运用博弈论方法提出了一种基于节点合作的数据包发送/转发的重复博弈模型,设计了一个与路径连通度和节点能量消耗有关的收益函数,采用惩罚机制使重复博弈模型存在子博弈精炼纳什均衡,降低了自私节点背叛的可能性.实验结果表明:采用惩罚机制的重复博弈能够提高网络的收益,同时也提高了网络吞吐量,任何自私节点的不合作行为都导致节点的能量浪费和节点的整体收益下降.     

DHT网络基于债务关系的公平文件交换

P2P(peer to peer)网络中,节点的自私行为极大地降低了系统的可用性.基于债务关系的文件交换网络,构建了一种促进合作的激励机制.同时,该机制保证了文件交换的公平性.激励机制的关键在于DHT(distributed hash table)网络邻居有限的固有特征,因而节点间的交互易于形成重复博弈.DFFE(debt relationship based fair file exchange in DHT network)协议只需维护很少的本地节点交互信息,协议开销小、网络扩展性好.网络路由采用基于一跳信息的贪婪算法.理性节点间的博弈存在纳什均衡,其策略选择的近似算法具有渐进收敛性.仿真实验表明了激励机制的有效性和在动态网络中性能的稳定性.     

一种P2P网络的重复博弈激励机制

P2P网络中节点的自私行为极大地降低了系统的可用性,相应解决方案是建立有效的激励机制。在借鉴博弈理论的基础上,并结合P2P网络的特点,提出了一种基于重复博弈的激励机制,构建了该模型的有限状态自动机。该模型通过引入对自私节点的惩罚机制,同时制定相关的行为规则,来激励理性节点为使其自身收益最大化而向整个网络贡献资源。仿真结果与分析表明该模型能有效地惩罚自私节点,威慑其放弃自私行为。     

基于博弈的MANETs信任模型研究

移动Ad-Hoc网络(MANET)是由一组带有无线收发装置的移动节点组成的无须固定设置支持的临时性的通信网络.MANETs具有开放的媒质、动态的拓扑结构、分布式的合作和受限的网络能力等基本特点.在MANETs中,节点之间相互信赖路由和转发数据包,节点间的合作是非常重要的.但是由于自私节点为了储存能量和其他资源,而不参与转发数据.由于MANETs通信没有第3方的中心认证,所以集中于强制合作是不适应的.基于博弈研究MANETs中的节点行为,根据节点的信誉度来获得资源,刺激节点共享资源和转发数据.提出了基于博弈理论的信任模型,鼓励包转发,约束自私节点.仿真结果表明该信任模型能够识别自私节点并且能在信任节点之间建立信任,提高了整个网络效率.     

无线传感器网络中基于效用的节点合作机制

在无线传感器网络中,由于能量和资源有限,不是每个节点都愿意为邻节点提供转发服务。讨论了无线传感器网络中自私节点的问题,提出了一个博弈模型,设计了一个基于节点信誉和能量的效用函数来监测恶意节点和自私节点,并鼓励节点中有更多的合作。在所提算法中,每个节点维护有邻节点的信誉表,参与转发的节点可以获得信誉作为奖励,而表现自私的节点则会丢失信誉作为惩罚。同时,转发会消耗节点能量,节点的信誉值和剩余能量必须都大于阈值才能在网络中共存。这样,恶意节点最终会被排除网络,自私节点则可以在激励下通过调整转发概率来避免被孤立。     

A secure routing scheme based on social network analysis in wireless mesh networks无线网状网中一种基于社会网络分析的安全路由机制

As an extension of wireless ad hoc and sensor networks, wireless mesh networks (WMNs) are employed as an emerging key solution for wireless broadband connectivity improvement. Due to the lack of physical security guarantees, WMNs are susceptible to various kinds of attack. In this paper, we focus on node social selfish attack, which decreases network performance significantly. Since this type of attack is not obvious to detect, we propose a security routing scheme based on social network and reputation evaluation to solve this attack issue. First, we present a dynamic reputation model to evaluate a node’s routing behavior, from which we can identify selfish attacks and selfish nodes. Furthermore, a social characteristic evaluation model is studied to evaluate the social relationship among nodes. Groups are built based on the similarity of node social status and we can get a secure routing based on these social groups of nodes. In addition, in our scheme, nodes are encouraged to enter into multiple groups and friend nodes are recommended to join into groups to reduce the possibility of isolated nodes. Simulation results demonstrate that our scheme is able to reflect node security status, and routings are chosen and adjusted according to security status timely and accurately so that the safety and reliability of routing are improved.     

Incentive mechanism for selfish nodes in wireless sensor networks based on evolutionary game

A Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) is made up of a mass of nodes with the character of self-organizing, multi-hop and limited resources. The normal operation of the network calls for cooperation among the nodes. However, there are some nodes that may choose selfish behavior when considering their limited resources such as energy, storage space and so on. The whole network will be paralyzed and unable to provide the normal service if most of the nodes do not forward data packages and take selfish actions in the network. In this paper, we adopt a dynamic incentive mechanism which suits wireless sensor networks based on the evolutionary game. The mechanism emphasizes the nodes adjust strategies forwardly and passively to maximize the fitness, making the population in the wireless sensor network converge to a cooperative state ultimately and promoting the selfish nodes cooperating with each other such that the network could offer normal service. The theoretical analysis and simulation results show that the proposed model has better feasibility and effectiveness.     

基于能量敏感的无线传感器网络信任度计算模型

由于无线传感器网络开放性、动态性等特点,导致整个网络易受攻击而极为脆弱,给传统安全机制带来严峻挑战,从而限制了无线传感器网络的发展。作为对基于密码体系的安全手段的重要补充,信任管理在解决来自网络的内部攻击,识别恶意节点、自私节点及低竞争力节点方面有着显著的优势。本文将节点的能量信息引入节点信任度计算模型中,提高了系统安全性、可靠性和公平性。通过仿真分析说明,模型以较少的资源消耗对网络的资源配置、性能、安全和通信进行统一的维护和管理,能够保证网络正常有效地运行,既缓解了WSN的管理困难,也为信任应用研究开辟了新的途径。     

A Distributed Mechanism for Handling of Adaptive/Intelligent Selfish Misbehaviour at MAC Layer in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks

Medium access control(MAC) protocols such as IEEE 802.11 are used in wireless networks for sharing of the wireless medium.The random nature of the protocol operation together with the inherent difficulty of monitoring in the open poses significant challenges.All nodes are expected to comply with the protocol rules.But,some nodes in order to gain greater benefits misbehave by not complying with the rules.One such selfish misbehavior is waiting for smaller back-off intervals when compared to the other node...     

Energy-efficient topology control in wireless ad hoc networks with selfish nodes

In wireless ad hoc networks there is no fixed infrastructure or centralized controller to enforce cooperation between nodes. Therefore, nodes may act selfishly in running network protocols for conserving their own energy resources. In this paper, we consider the “topology control (TC) game” as the problem of creating an energy-efficient topology in wireless ad hoc networks in the presence of selfish nodes. We define a new TC game in which nodes are able to dynamically adjust their transmission power in a per-packet manner, and try to minimize their energy usage through considering both traffic load and transmission power parameters. After analyzing the problem, we propose several algorithms to find stable topologies in an environment composed of selfish nodes, using two types of global and local connectivity information. Finally, we evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithms by simulations. Our simulation results show that using appropriate local information can interestingly result in more efficient topologies than global information.     

基于贝叶斯博弈模型的无线多跳网络激励机制

节点智能性的提高使无线多跳网络的应用更为多样化,但也使网络的安全问题变得更为突出。为了有效控制自私节点和恶意节点给网络带来的不良影响,在博弈论的基础上结合跨层优化思想,构建了物理层与链路层部分信息共享的贝叶斯博弈模型。利用贝叶斯博弈理论对节点的交互信息构建策略空间并进行推导分析,形成有效激励节点合作的互监督机制。最后,分别通过典型案例与计算机仿真实验验证了该网络模型的可行性和公平性。     

WMN基于理性博弈的惩罚机制*

在借鉴已有P2P网络激励机制的基础上,结合WMN的特点,提出了一种基于理性博弈的惩罚机制,并构建了该机制的有限自动机模型.惩罚机制能有效地理性惩罚自私节点,威慑其放弃自私行为.仿真结果验证了机制的有效性.     

PReSENt: A Collaboration Framework for Resource Sharing in Wireless Mesh Networks

Many protocol particulars developed for the wireless mesh networks, such as multi-path routing, channel assignment, topology control, assume that a network-wide collaboration is available to establish connections to the network outside. However, the collaboration can be easily discouraged in the presence of selfish behaviors, referred to as free-riding. In this paper, we propose a framework, PReSENt, to promote and make more secure the practices of collaboration among nodes by securing a compensation to the collaboration. When the PReSENt is enabled in wireless mesh networks, a node accumulates credits, an amount quantifying its resource provision when it provides its resource for other nodes. The nodes consuming the resource publish rewards, an amount quantifying their resource usage. The credits are used to guarantee the resource sharing for the provider from the customers in the future, whose amount is proportional to its relative contribution to the network-wide collaboration. The rewards are used to validate their corresponding credits in order to prevent false accumulations of the credits in selfish nodes. We formally define the underlying security model of the PReSENt and prove that the PReSENt is secure in the random oracle model. We then implement the PReSENt in J-Sim to illustrate its operational behaviors with respect to correct and secure resource sharing.     

P2P网络激励兼容的声誉评价及服务分配

由自私节点组成的P2P网络常常采用基于声誉的机制激励节点间的合作。当前已经提出了一类基于声誉的方案,但其中大部分方案都忽视了方案的分布式实现中惩罚的激励兼容性问题。在社会学或生态学领域,该问题常被称为二阶搭便车问题:拒绝低声誉节点的服务请求会降低惩罚者自身的声誉,因此对于自私节点而言,这种惩罚并不总是有利的选择。以P2P文件共享为例对该问题进行了分析,提出了一种连续型二阶声誉评价模型及两种服务分配规则,即概率分配规则和比例分配规则,实验表明只有概率分配规则是激励兼容的。