资金约束下的非对称信息供应链协调研究

供应链金融能够有效解决无核心资产的中小企业资金约束的问题。针对制造商、分销商和零售商组成的三级供应链,考虑了零售商自有资金的不同对融资利率变化的影响,研究了在完全信息下采用融资前后联合契约供应链的收益变化,实现供应链协调的参数和各成员收益的变化,将零售商销售成本信息不对称下的情况作为对比,分析零售商私有信息对供应链的影响,通过算例进行了数值分析。结果表明,在完全信息下零售商存在资金约束时,融资服务能够增加供应链各成员的期望收益,回购契约与收益共享契约组成的联合契约能够协调采用融资后的供应链,在非对称信息下,供应链的效率有所减少,而资金充足的零售商会因私有成本信息获得更多的收益,但是在资金约束时,私有信息却失去了价值。     

信息非对称下考虑制造商回收行为的闭环供应链协调

研究信息非对称下考虑制造商回收行为的闭环供应链协调问题,其中回收率随时间动态变化,制造商的再造品成本为私有信息.通过构建分散决策模型,得到制造商与零售商的最优均衡解,并引入批发价格契约以促使制造商传递真实的成本信息.运用伊藤过程刻画回收率的随机演化过程,通过数值仿真分析信息隐匿度和回收率等参数对供应链的影响.研究表明:...     

非对称信息下基于委托代理模型的供应链协调

针对供应链中分销商与制造商之间关于如何降低成本的信息不对称,运用委托代理模型研究供应链中分销商的成本控制问题。根据改进的联合确定基数法,建立了制造商与分销商的目标函数,确定了制造商的最优自报成本,并建立了非对称信息下分销商期望效用最大化模型。最后,运用进化规划算法作了仿真实验。     

非对称信息下基于委托代理模型的供应链协调

针对供应链中分销商与制造商之间关于如何降低成本的信息不对称，运用委托代理模型研究供应链中分销商的成本控制问题。根据改进的联合确定基数法，建立了制造商与分销商的目标函数，确定了制造商的最优自报成本，并建立了非对称信息下分销商期望效用最大化模型。最后，运用进化规划算法作了仿真实验。     

基于多agent的供应链信息协调建模与仿真*

从核心制造企业的信息需求出发,采用基于多agent的供应链建模与仿真方法,研究在订单执行过程中,生产计划和采购计划等决策活动中的信息协调。利用面向agent的系统分析方法,提出了基于多agent的供应链信息协调框架模型,对其中的功能agent进行算法描述。结合Swarm平台构建了供应链仿真模型,对生产计划和采购计划等决策活动中的信息协调进行了模拟和分析,初步验证了模型的有效性。     

非对称信息条件下APT攻防博弈模型

针对目前缺少对高级持续威胁（APT）攻击理论建模分析的问题,提出了一种基于FlipIt模型的非对称信息条件下的攻防博弈模型。首先,将网络系统中的目标主机等资产抽象为目标资源节点,将攻防场景描述为攻防双方对目标资源的交替控制;然后,考虑到攻防双方在博弈中观察到的反馈信息的不对称性以及防御效果的不彻底性,给出了在防御者采取更新策略时攻防双方的收益模型及最优策略的条件,同时给出并分别证明了达到同步博弈与序贯博弈均衡条件的定理;最后通过数例分析了影响达到均衡时的策略及防御收益的因素,并比较了同步博弈均衡与序贯博弈均衡。结果表明周期策略是防御者的最优策略,并且与同步博弈均衡相比,防御者通过公布其策略达到序贯博弈均衡时的收益更大。实验结果表明所提模型能够在理论上指导应对隐蔽性APT攻击的防御策略。     

线性时变需求的二级供应链协调模型

考虑由一个供应商和一个零售商构成的二级供应链系统,在线性时变需求、产品的零售价格与其存储时间有关、货栈容量有限且不允许缺货的情形下,研究了供应商如何利用全数量折扣计划来激励零售商合作从而实现自身利润最大化和供应链系统完美协调的问题。从理论上证明和分析了模型最优解的存在性,同时提供了求解最优解的简单方法,并通过算例对上述结论进行佐证。     

非对称信息下供需链中供应商的回购决策分析

为了解决供需链中下游实体的成本是私有信息的情况下，上游供应商的回购决策问题，运用委托—代理模型研究了供应商的最优回购策略，得到了供应商的最优决策方案，与对称信息的情况相比，信息结构的非对称导致下游实体的订货量低于系统的最优订货量，使得供需链无法达到协调，供需链的总利润和供应商的利润降低，零售商的利润增加，在非对称信息下，供应商提供的契约菜单值随着下游实体成本的增加而增大。     

非对称信息下供应链库存系统Pareto优化模型

运用委托代理理论,研究了非对称信患条件下,由单供应商单分销商组成的供应链Pareto优化问题.在假定分销商所面临的需求是与销售价格有关的随机变量,以及供、销双方关于分销商销售价格信息不对称这两个前提下,将供应商作为委托人,分销商作为代理人,给出了供应商为吸引销售商选择对自己最有利的销售价格而设计的最优激励合同,比较了在不同信息条件下供销双方的最优决策.最后,给出了应用实例和灵敏度分析.     

Production planning and backup sourcing strategy of a buyer-dominant supply chain with random yield and demand

This paper studies the backup sourcing strategy of the buyer and the production planning of the supplier in presence of both random yield and random demand. Since the production is susceptible to the randomness of yield beyond the control of the supplier, the buyer may access to a backup sourcing option for the finished items. We analyse the value of backup sourcing for both the decentralised and centralised channels. Backup sourcing strategy of the buyer may lower the supply chain's performance. We show that the order quantity of the buyer does not change the stocking factor of the supplier's input. Meanwhile, compared with the centralised operation, the decentralised operation is more dependent on the backup sourcing to reduce supply shortage of the contracting supplier. From the channel's perspective, an incentive scheme is developed to facilitate the coordination of both the buyer and the contracting supplier, we show that the proposed option contract can allow the supply chain members to share the respective risks involved in the production and selling processes. Finally, we also provide qualitative insights based on numerical examples of the centralised and decentralised solutions.     

需求信息不对称下的双渠道供应链合作广告投资决策分析

研究制造商主导的Stackelberg 博弈下双渠道供应链的合作广告策略, 分析信息不对称及双渠道对供应链合作广告投资决策的影响. 研究表明, 零售商在具有需求信息优势时会谎报需求信息, 并且在一定条件下其谎报决策会降低制造商的利润, 但能提高供应链的利润, 这种情况下制造商无法通过激励合同促使零售商共享信息. 另外, 在最优合作广告策略下, 当直销渠道与分销渠道所占市场份额的分配比例小于一定值时, 制造商采取双渠道会使供应链参与者均受益.

     

供需链管理中合同定量研究及其发展

描述了供需合同在供需链分布决策中所起的作用，分析了几种常用合同策略的激励机制及相互关系．从合同策略形式、供需链结构建模、市场需求建模、采购供应过程建模、信息建模5个方面对供需合同问题的研究进展作了总结．最后分析了当前该领域存在的不足，指出了今后可能的研究方向．     

Pricing and collecting decisions in a closed-loop supply chain with symmetric and asymmetric information

The optimal decision problem of a closed-loop supply chain with symmetric and asymmetric information structures is considered using game theory in this paper. The paper aims to explore how the manufacturer and the retailer make their own decisions about wholesale price, retail price, and collection rate under symmetric and asymmetric information conditions. Four game models are established, which allow one to examine the strategies of each firm and explore the role of the manufacturer and the retailer in four different game scenarios under symmetric and asymmetric information structures. The optimal strategies in closed form are given under the decision scenarios with symmetric information; moreover, the first order conditions that the optimal retail price, optimal wholesale price, and optimal collection rate satisfy are given under the decision scenarios with asymmetric information. The results obtained under symmetric and asymmetric information conditions and some key model parameters used in this paper are analyzed using a numerical approach by which some managerial analysis are given.     

不对称信息和风险规避下的能力期权契约模型

针对物流服务供应链中物流能力订购与投资决策问题提出一种基于能力期权契约的协调机制,建立不对称成本信息和存在风险规避者情形下的双效规划模型,并通过优化方法研究Stackelberg主从博弈结构下的最优契约设计。研究结果表明：物流集成商提供的能力期权契约既能揭示物流分包商的真实成本信息,又能使自身有效规避市场风险,从而实现物流服务供应链效率的Pareto改进,但其效果取决于集成商抵抗市场风险的能力。进一步通过仿真算例说明了该能力期权契约的有效性。     

A cooperation model based on CVaR measure for a two-stage supply chain

In this paper, we introduce a cooperation model (CM) for the two-stage supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. In this model, it is supposed that the objective of the manufacturer is to maximise his/her profit while the objective of the retailer is to minimise his/her CVaR while controlling the risk originating from fluctuation in market demand. In reality, the manufacturer and the retailer would like to choose their own decisions as to wholesale price and order quantity to optimise their own objectives, resulting the fact that the expected decision of the manufacturer and that of the retailer may conflict with each other. Then, to achieve cooperation, the manufacturer and the retailer both need to give some concessions. The proposed model aims to coordinate the decisions of the manufacturer and the retailer, and balance the concessions of the two in their cooperation. We introduce an s* ? optimal equilibrium solution in this model, which can decide the minimum concession that the manufacturer and the retailer need to give for their cooperation, and prove that the s* ? optimal equilibrium solution can be obtained by solving a goal programming problem. Further, the case of different concessions made by the manufacturer and the retailer is also discussed. Numerical results show that the CM is efficient in dealing with the cooperations between the supplier and the retailer.     

Ordering and returns handling decisions and coordination in a supply chain with demand uncertainty

We develop a newsvendor model to study the retailer's order quantity, the manufacturer's returns handling strategy, and channel coordination. The manufacturer chooses one of two returns handling strategies: manufacturer handling or retailer handling under the coordinated and decentralized scenarios, respectively. Under the coordinated scenario, we find that when consumer's returns handling cost under manufacturer handling or the manufacturer's returns handling cost is small, consumer returns should be handled by the manufacturer. Under the decentralized scenario, when the retailer's returns handling cost or the consumer's returns handling cost under retailer handling is low, the manufacturer will choose manufacturer handling; both the manufacturer and the retailer may be better off using manufacturer handling (a win–win situation). The impact of the returns handling strategy on the retailer's ordering quantity largely depends on its effect on the consumer's returns handling cost. Finally, we also design buyback contracts to coordinate the supply chain and find that both wholesale price and buyback price under manufacturer handling are higher than those under retailer handling.     

基于联盟区块链的供应链信息协同博弈研究

针对传统供应链信息不对称引发的额外库存成本及需求预测准确性差等损害各主体利润的问题,结合区块链去中心化、去信任、可追溯及信息无法窜改等优势,以制造商、销售商及两个第三方物流企业组成的三级供应链为研究对象,考虑采用区块链技术和不采用区块链技术两种情形建立链上企业间的博弈模型,分析博弈模型下各节点企业的最优策略。通过对比采用区块链技术前后的最优收益,明确区块链技术在供应链中的应用策略和应用条件,为供应链上下游企业间的合作共赢创造有利环境。最后通过数值分析验证了结论的正确性。