基于合作博弈分析的供应链结构的比较研究

利用合作博弈分析的理论和方法, 研究了Shapley值作为供应链合作成员收益分配机制的有效性,在此基础上利用Myerson值对不同供应链结构情况下的供应链成员的获利能力做出进一步分析.研究结果表明, 企业在进行供应链合作时,其自身的获利能力不仅取决于它对供应链利润的贡献,还取决于企业自身所在供应链的结构形式及其在供应链中所处的位置.     

基于改进核心法的合作博弈在供应链中的应用

针对供应链的特点,以博弈论为工具分析了供应链上节点企业成员的行为,由此建立供应链节点企业间的非零和动态合作博弈模型,接着介绍了博弈模型中求解的两种常用方法即Shapley值法和核心法,文中特别针对核心法的不足,提出了改进的核心法,同时对采用改进的核心法所求解结果作为收益分配方案的合理性和稳定性进行了论证,以此形成在供应链中建立联盟公积金制度的理论基础,最后举例进行了分析说明.其研究结果在供应链的管理应用中应该具有一定的实用价值.     

三级供应链VMI收益及Shapley值分配仿真研究

考虑需求放大、订货及库存成本变动等因素,构建三级供应链在分散式、上游段、下游段及集成式VMI四种情况下的收益模型,通过仿真定量说明VMI对于上、下游企业收益及风险的不同影响,并得出结论:下游段VMI实施后,集成式VMI将成为激励相容,而上游段VMI的实施将阻碍集成式VMI的实现,证实了VMI的实施顺序对供应链管理的重要影响。后采用Shapley值法分析各企业特征函数,确定Shapley值计算公式,进行收益分配,解决了收益与风险不对等所导致的VMI合作不稳定问题,促进集成式VMI的形成与长期稳定。     

基于位置值的四级供应链创新联盟及收益分配

以具有限制联盟结构的四级供应链为研究对象,该供应链由单个供应商、制造商、分销商和零售商构成。在具有限制联盟结构的条件下,对供应链上的参与者可能形成的八种创新联盟情形进行了分析,并且运用Shapley值、位置值和AT解三种不同的收益分配方法对合作所产生的收益进行了分配。结果表明,供应链上所有的参与者均加入创新联盟时该供应链的总收益最大,且采用位置值进行联盟收益分配最能突出参与者在供应链中的特殊地位,因而该分配方法更具合理性。     

联盟博弈下基于Shapley值法的三层供应链协调机制

本文针对制造商、分销商和零售商组成的三层供应链系统,研究了价格敏感型需求下的联盟博弈和收益分配问题.理论分析表明独立决策下的的供应链系统利润最低,小联盟决策能提高系统利润,但是未入小联盟的成员收益涨幅则更为明显,智猪博弈的结果会致使小联盟解散,而运用Shapley值法协调后的大联盟相对更为稳定,其成员利润均比非合作决策...     

运用Shapley值法分配供应链合作收益存在的问题及对策

根据对现有文献和Shapley值法基本原理的分析,结合算例,指出了Shapley值法在运用过程中存在忽视风险偏好、适用环境模糊、收益标准单一、分配权重欠合理和实际操作困难等5个方面的问题,提出了解决的对策和措施。对进一步运用Shapley值法对合作收益进行分配具有一定的参考意义。     

基于Shapely修正的供应链协同产品创新收益分配

针对供应链协同产品创新成员企业收益分配问题,建立了Shapely修正的收益分配模型。该模型综合考虑了供应链协同产品创新收益分配原则,在Shapely值基本模型基础上,将影响收益分配的投入创新资源贡献率、风险分摊系数、产品创新任务执行度和额外贡献度4个因素引入模型,并提出了模型参数的确定方法。通过实例分析验证,修正后的Shapely值能够满足各方协同产品创新合作形成的条件,并且较好反映了供应链协同产品创新中各方价值创造的实际情况。     

供应链合作伙伴评价小组的权力指数模型

企业往往会成立评价小组来评审其供应链合作伙伴.评价小组的成员来自多个部门,各成员的投票权重一般不一样.利用Shapley值方法建立供应链合作伙伴评价小组的权力分配模型,以计量各成员对评审结果的影响力,即权力指数.通过算例,使用该模型计算出各成员的权力指数,结果发现权力指数相对于投票权重发生了偏离:投票权重高的成员的权力指数会被放大;投票权重低的成员的权力指数会被缩小.给出解决此问题的建议.     

基于Shapley值法的供应链上游段VMI的利益分配机制

实施VMI后如何分配利益直接关系到各参与者的积极性及VMI的实施效果,学术界长期立足于供应链下游段对此问题进行探讨.选取上游段VMI为研究对象,考虑实施VMI前后供应链参数的变化情况,建立经济效果模型,基于利益分享契约视角,利用Shapley值法构建上游段VMI的利益分配机制,并进行算例分析.结果表明:该机制使得由于实施上游段VMI而产生的利益在各参与者之间合理的分配,解决了供应商由于承担过多库存成本而利益受损的问题,实现了共赢.在实际操作中,该机制可通过各参与者在实施上游段VMI前共同制定利益分享契约而实现.     

基于多权重Shapley值的联盟利益分配机制

利益分配机制是影响联盟合作成功的关键因素.传统的含权Shapley值模型在解决联盟利润分配问题时,仅从联盟整体的角度赋予成员单一的权重,而忽视了成员在不同联盟活动中可能存在议价能力和贡献的差异.为此,提出一种多权重Shapley值模型,以反映成员在多项联盟活动中的不同权重.通过对联盟合作对策进行Shapley等价分解,...     

Manufacturers’ coalition under a price elastic market – a quadratic production game approach

The paper addresses a supply network design problem in which a set of enterprises decides to organise itself as a multi-stage supply network by resource sharing and production coordination. A biform game theory formulation of the problem is obtained by combining the cooperative sub-game in the manufacturing network with the strategic sub-game of the Stackelberg type between the retailer and the manufacturers’ network. As a result of the interaction between these two sub-games, a new type of cooperative game, the quadratic production game, is formulated to describe the supply network design problem under anticipated price elastic demands from the market. The key problem of coalitional stability is addressed through the properties of rationality and fairness of the profit sharing agreement. We prove that the game is non-convex in general and thus, the fair solution given by the Shapley value allocation is not always rational. It is proposed to reinforce the coalition stability by selecting a minimal set of partner enterprises achieving the maximal expected profit and applying a profit sharing policy with guaranteed fairness restricted to the member enterprises.     

碳限额及交易下低碳补贴和低碳宣传成本分摊的双渠道供应链联合减排策略

为了研究碳限额及交易下考虑低碳补贴和零售商低碳宣传的双渠道供应链联合减排策略问题,构建由一个制造商和一个零售商组成双渠道供应链,分别建立碳减排补贴与低碳宣传的双渠道供应链集中式决策模型以及无碳减排补贴且无低碳宣传成本分摊、有碳减排补贴但无低碳宣传成本分摊、碳减排补贴且低碳宣传成本分摊的双渠道供应链分散式决策模型,分析其最优决策,并指出政府碳减排补贴、碳减排成本和低碳宣传成本分摊能够实现双渠道供应链协调。研究结果表明,在碳限额及交易下,最优碳减排率、最优低碳宣传水平和双渠道供应链利润与政府补贴比例、低碳偏好对需求的影响系数、低碳宣传对线上消费者需求的影响系数、低碳宣传对线下消费者需求的影响系数都成正向变化关系;最优碳减排率、最优低碳宣传水平和双渠道供应链利润与低碳宣传成本系数、最优碳减排成本系数成反向变化关系;最优碳减排率与碳排放交易价格成正向变化关系,而最优低碳宣传水平、双渠道供应链利润与碳排放交易价格成反向变化关系。     

Coordinating decentralised assembly systems with random yield and random demand

We study coordination of assembly systems with random supplier yields and random customer demand. We propose four contracts which are combinations of well-known contracts in the literature and show that the contracts can coordinate the chain under forced compliance. Our contracts have less payment schemes than the existing contracts given for coordination of assembly systems in the literature. We show that arbitrary profit allocation between the levels of the supply chain (the manufacturer or the suppliers) is possible. We also provide sufficient conditions which enable arbitrary profit allocation among the suppliers and illustrate the profit allocation with numerical examples.     

基于质变与量变的供应链利润分配机制设计

设计的供应链合作利润分配机制定量模型由两部分构成,一是合作利润结构性分配,其是机制中的主体分配框架,具有分配中"质变"的性质,结构性分配是通过合作利润分配博弈模型来解得;二是合作利润运行性分配,其是按照利润分配机制设置的三个特征(理性、效用转移性、协商性)、根据合作利润增量转移量模型来设计的,其是基于结构性分配来完善的,具有分配中"量变"的性质,从而使分配机制具有质变与量变的互动功能;最后,通过一个算例来验证所建模型的科学性、可行性.     

Quantity discount coordination for allocation of purchase orders in supply chains with multiple suppliers

Studies about supply chain coordination have emphasised maximising the profit of the overall supply chain, but the profit changes of individual members in the supply chain have often been overlooked. It has been shown that profit increment of the whole supply chain may not be beneficial for every individual member. Therefore, the use of quantity discounts to achieve the coordination of a supply chain is discussed in this article. A two-echelon selling system with a single buyer and multiple suppliers is considered to enhance profitability for both sides at the same time. An acceptable quantity discount condition for both the buyer and the suppliers to determine an appropriate order quantity allocation to produce more profits in the supply chain is proposed. Furthermore, the profit distribution between the buyer and each supplier is studied. Finally, the results of the numerical application show that the buyer should focus on managing the procurement costs to decrease the acquiring costs, and the suppliers should focus on the fixed costs of management to reduce the production costs in machine operations.     

Contract negotiation and risk preferences in dual-channel supply chain coordination

This study employs profit-sharing contracts to coordinate dual-channel supply chains and examines the selection of profit-sharing parameters and the allocation of extra system profit gained from coordination. We characterise the Pareto-optimal contracts for the two- and three-stage dual-channel supply chains, by developing and maximising system utility function related to risk preferences and negotiating power. Under the optimal profit-sharing parameter in a two-stage supply chain, both members are reluctant to cooperate; however, in a three-stage supply chain, under the optimal two profit-sharing parameters selected by optimising the system utility function, the retailer is always reluctant to cooperate, but the distributor or the supplier may have incentives to deviate from cooperation. In this case, the distributor and the supplier will negotiate again as in a two-stage supply chain so that all three members can benefit from coordination with profit-sharing contracts. Besides acting independently, the distributor, in the process of contract negotiation, may choose to form an alliance with the upstream supplier or the downstream retailer, which means the relationship among the three members involving profit allocation after coordination is quite different from that for a two-stage supply chain and is not necessarily interest-contrary. In the contract negotiation, in any kind of scenario, risk aversion and negotiation power have a significant impact on the selection of optimal profit-sharing parameters and the allocation of extra system profit. One member’s risk aversion or its negotiation power may be advantageous to the other. Mathematical examples are illustrated to clarify the contract negotiation process.     

考虑随机市场需求和不同博弈地位的双渠道供应链策略分析

为研究供应链成员不同博弈地位下双渠道定价及随机库存问题,分别构建制造商主导、零售商主导及双方同等博弈地位的双渠道供应链博弈模型,考察随机市场需求对定价、库存及利润的影响,分析具有不同博弈地位的供应链策略差异,并通过数值仿真探讨最佳响应策略。结果表明,主导方凭借地位优势拥有更强的价格把控权及库存调配能力,获得更高收益;制造商主导型供应链具有更强的渠道整合能力,供应链的整体利润水平高于零售商主导型;同等博弈地位情形的博弈双方可根据共同市场信息及竞争对手策略更新自身策略,具有较低的库存风险,渠道定价越低,但双重边际效应降低了双方收益;市场需求波动越大,渠道定价、库存量及供应链利润均越大,此时主导方利润增幅大于追随者。     

Allocation flexibility for agribusiness supply chains under market demand disruption

This paper develops a multi-commodity multi-period optimisation model to analyse market demand disruption risk in agribusiness supply chains. It investigates the role of allocation flexibility and the effectiveness of multiple risk management strategies for achieving allocation flexibility. A robust optimisation formulation is used to obtain risk-averse solutions for an objective combining expected profit and risk. Numerical results are presented for a real-life case study of Zespri’s kiwifruit supply chain. The results show that allocation flexibility is effective for mitigating market demand disruption risk. Three proposed risk management strategies, namely diversified demand market, backup demand market and flexible rerouting, improve both expected profit and risk measures. While diversified demand market and backup demand market strategies are equally important for all decision-makers, flexible rerouting is especially significant for less risk-averse decision-makers.