Horizontal cooperation and information sharing between suppliers in the manufacturer–supplier triad

In this paper, we analyse a collusion and information-sharing problem between two suppliers in a manufacturer–supplier triad. The manufacturer treats one supplier as a strategic supplier and the other as a backup. While the strategic supplier offers modules of good quality but longer lead times, the backup supplier offers modules with inferior quality but shorter lead times. If there are urgent orders, the manufacturer must turn to the backup supplier. However, it is difficult for the manufacturer to estimate whether the urgent supplier has put extra effort into their production. We formulate this problem by assuming that the urgent supplier has either low or high production costs. To take advantage of the competition between two suppliers, the manufacturer can design a contract menu that defines total payment and lead times, under which both suppliers may be worse off. Meanwhile, it is possible for the suppliers to tacitly form a coalition, and to even share the private cost information. We study this problem by formulating it as a three-stage game. Furthermore, we investigate the variation of profits for each part of the supply chain. We find that the manufacturer is worse off when suppliers cooperate or share private information. Both suppliers, however, can benefit from cooperation and information sharing.     

Strategically decentralise when encroaching on a dominant supplier

A manufacturer may encroach on his suppliers by developing substitutable components. In the presence of encroachment, the manufacturer could assemble products using (high-end) components purchased from the supplier, and assemble products using (low-end) components produced in-house. Thus, the manufacturer must deliberate on how to manage the expanded organisation consisting of competing product divisions. In this paper, we examine the quintessential organisational structure decision – the centralisation versus decentralisation choice – from the perspective of the manufacturer. Our model assumes that the supplier is a dominant player, moving first by pricing the high-end component, and consumers have a higher willingness-to-pay of the product containing the high-end component. In such a context, we find that the manufacturer may encroach on the supplier even if producing the low-end component costs more than producing the high-end one. The supplier should strategically price to deter or accommodate downstream encroachment contingent on the manufacturer’s organisational structure decision. If the unit cost of low-end components is high enough, product-based decentralisation is preferred to centralisation due to the supplier’s lower wholesale price. Furthermore, the manufacturer’s strategic decentralisation always hurts the supplier, always benefits the customers and could benefit or hurt the entire supply chain under certain conditions.     

Incentives for quality improvement efforts coordination in supply chains with partial cost allocation contract

In this paper, we consider quality improvement efforts coordination in a two-stage decentralised supply chain with a partial cost allocation contract. The supply chain consists of one supplier and one manufacturer, both of which produce defective products. Two kinds of failure cost occur within the supply chain: internal and external. The supplier and the manufacturer determine their individual quality levels to maximise their own profits. We propose a partial cost allocation contract, under which the external failure cost is allocated between the manufacturer and the supplier at different rates based on information derived from failure root cause analysis. If the quality levels of the supplier and the manufacturer are observable, we show that the partial cost allocation contract coordinates the supply chain, provided that the failure root cause analysis does not erroneously identify the manufacturer’s fault as the supplier’s, and the supplier does not take responsibility for the manufacture’s fault. In the single moral hazard model, where only the quality level of the supplier is unobservable, the optimal share rates require the supplier to take some responsibility for the manufacture’s fault. However, in the double moral hazard model, where quality levels of the supplier and the manufacturer are unobservable to each other, the optimal share rates require the supplier not to take responsibility for the manufacturer’s fault. It is noted that the root cause analysis conducted by the manufacturer may have its disadvantage in attributing the fault to the supplier when both sides are at fault. We also propose a contract based on the dual root cause analysis to reduce the supplier’s penalty cost. Numerical results illustrate that the partial cost allocation contract satisfies the fairness criterion compared with the traditional cost allocation contract.     

供应中断风险下供应链恢复能力投资决策及协调

摘要： 〖HTSS〗为了减缓供应商生产运营中断对制造商带来的供应中断风险,制造商需要在突发事件前优化供应链恢复能力投资水平。引入CVaR来刻画供应链在突发事件下的应急目标,建立了一定置信水平控制下的供应链恢复能力投资的决策模型,进而揭示了制造商风险规避程度对供应链最优恢复能力投资水平的影响。分权供应链下,制造商运用基于绩效的契约来激励供应商投资合适的恢复能力,以协调供应链。结论表明,CVaR可以恰当描述供应链恢复的能力投资行为,当风险规避程度越高,供应链最优恢复能力投资越多;当单位中断时间的惩罚系数的条件期望值等于单位中断时间的商誉成本的条件期望值时,供应链进入协调状态。     

Risk, risk aversion and the optimal time to produce

This paper studies the order-fulfillment process of a supplier producing a customized capital good. When they decide at what time to begin production, suppliers in these industries typically face the following dilemma. On the one hand, their customers expect them to be responsive and the time that they are prepared to wait for the product is much shorter than the time needed to produce and deliver it. On the other hand, it is risky for the suppliers to start production before the customers confirm their orders due to inventory holding costs and the possibility of order cancellation. We offer a model to help understand this dilemma and investigate the comparative statics effects of lead time, lead time uncertainty and the risk aversion of the supplier. Relative to existing work, our model has two novel components: demand distribution updating and the supplier's risk attitude. Previous empirical studies reveal that the supplier is very conservative when commencing the order fulfillment. The studies attribute this to high holding and cancellation costs relative to the delay cost. Our model provides two alternative explanations. First, other than costs, when the supplier starts to produce depends also on how the distribution of the demand arrival time is updated as time progresses. Second, although the effect of increasing risk aversion of the supplier on the optimal time to produce is ambiguous, we show that it plays a major role in the decision and thus it alone may have caused the supplier to be conservative.     

Ex post demand information sharing between differentiated suppliers and a common retailer

We consider ex post demand information sharing in a two-echelon supply chain in which two suppliers sell differentiated products through a common retailer. We model three scenarios of information sharing to characterise the conditions under which information sharing may benefit or hurt different players: (1) no supplier is informed; (2) only one supplier is informed; and (3) both suppliers are informed. We find that the retailer may voluntarily share the low demand information when the product differentiation and demand magnitude satisfy certain conditions. In contrast, the retailer has no incentive to share the high demand information, even though this information benefits the suppliers. To achieve information sharing, we propose a side payment mechanism, which allows benefitted players to subsidise hurtful players. Finally, we extend our model by considering a situation where the suppliers have limited capacity and may invest to ramp up production capacity to satisfy a high demand.     

A basic model for co-ordinating a four-level supply chain of a product with a vendor,multiple buyers and tier-1 and tier-2 suppliers

This paper investigates the co-ordination of order quantities amongst the players in a four-level supply chain with a centralised decision process. The first level of the supply chain consists of multiple buyers, the second level of a vendor (manufacturer), the third level consists of multiple tier-1 suppliers, and the fourth level consists of multiple tier-2 suppliers. Each supplier supplies one or more items that are components of the product produced by the manufacturer. The model developed in this paper guarantees that the local costs for the players either remain the same as before co-ordination, or decrease as a result of co-ordination. A mathematical model is developed, with numerical examples presented and results discussed.     

Controlling a supplier’s subcontracting decisions through contractual enforcement or economic incentives

Suppliers often subcontract part of their workload to other suppliers, and manufacturers might suffer severe consequences if they do not anticipate their suppliers’ incentives to subcontract. In this paper, we study the case where a manufacturer outsources two tasks to a top-tier supplier. The manufacturer must decide whether it should design a contract that enforces that the different tasks are completed by the appropriate suppliers, and when it is preferable to use economic incentives to manipulate the top-tier supplier’s subcontracting behaviour. We find that when the cost difference between suppliers of different tiers is small and the correlation between the risks associated with the two tasks is minimal, the manufacturer can benefit from designing a contract that ensures the preferred subcontracting behaviour, if the cost of enforcing such a contract is not too high. However, when such enforcement cost is substantial, the manufacturer might be better off manipulating the top-tier supplier’s economic incentives.     

A branch-and-bound algorithm for the concave cost supply problem

Effective supplier selection and allocation of order quantity among multiple suppliers are indispensable to the success of a manufacturing company. While companies have begun to turn into a comprehensive multi-criteria approach, most buyers still consider purchasing cost to be their primary concern in selecting their suppliers. In this paper, we consider the concave cost supply problem where a manufacturer seeks to select the suppliers and simultaneously procure the quantity of material/component required for production at the minimum total cost during a standard production period. We provide and validate an effective and efficient branch-and-bound algorithm that is finite and that finds the global optimal solution of the problem without any restrictions on the cost functions or on the set of input parameters used in the problem. Numerical experiments are conducted to evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithm.     

消费者绿色偏好、参考价格效应与供应链绿色创新

在竞争性的市场环境中引入消费者绿色偏好和参考价格效应,考虑这两种消费者行为特征如何交互作用于供应链上下游的绿色创新活动,进而影响绿色创新活动的绩效结果和利润分配。通过构建集中决策、分散决策和成本分担情境下的供应链绿色创新微分博弈模型,分别求得均衡条件下的供应链成员最优绿色创新努力水平与利润,并通过数值仿真结果进一步探讨消费者行为特征与供应链成员绿色创新努力水平之间的关系。研究表明,消费者偏好特征变化是激发供应链成员作出绿色创新努力的重要因素。制造商可以通过对供应商进行成本补贴来激发其绿色创新积极性,且当供应商边际利润与制造商边际利润的关系达到一定阈值,这种绿色创新成本补贴的激励效果更加显著,因而更有可能实现绿色创新基础上的供应链系统利润最优。     

Models for supplier selection and risk mitigation: a holistic approach

According to a study conducted by PwC and the Business Continuity Institute in 2013, 75% of companies experience at least one major supply chain disruption a year and majority of the disruptions were caused by supply-related problems. With an increasing emphasis on upstream risk, risk management in supplier selection has become a critical issue faced by companies. Although previous studies proposed different methods and tools for effective and efficient supplier selection, only few approaches have attempted to incorporate risk mitigation strategies in supplier selection decisions. Our study aims to fill this gap by considering a wide range of quantitative and qualitative risk factors in supplier selection and evaluates the efficacy of alternative risk mitigation strategies in this context. Moreover, we suggest that both upstream and downstream strategies should be utilised simultaneously rather than relying on a single type of strategy. We further suggest that it is critical to align upstream and downstream risk mitigation strategies to reduce risk. We employ multi-objective optimization-based simulation in developing a decision model and consider data from an automotive parts manufacturer to demonstrate the application of our approach.     

Procurement decisions and information sharing under multi-tier disruption risk in a supply chain

We consider a manufacturer's procurement decision in a three-tier supply chain (SC) under disruption risk. The manufacturer sources components from a single first-tier supplier (FT). The FT, in turn, sources raw materials from a single second-tier supplier (ST). Suppliers in both tiers are unreliable, i.e. prone to disruption risk. Increasing SC visibility through information sharing is a potential disruption management strategy for the manufacturer. While the manufacturer can obtain disruption risk information for the FT, disruption risk information for the ST is not easily accessible to the manufacturer except through the FT, who may not be willing to share ST information. We study different mechanisms under which the manufacturer can obtain ST information, and its impact on manufacturer's and FT's decisions and potential profits. We show that information sharing makes the manufacturer's procurement decisions more conservative, i.e. carrying more inventories, but the FT's procurement decision is contingent on the ST's reliability; more proactive (conservative) when ST is unreliable (reliable), i.e. carrying less (more) inventories. We demonstrate that there are two ways to induce the FT to share its information, and numerically show that their effectiveness is contingent on multiple factors, including FT and ST reliabilities and information sharing costs.     

Supplier selection problem revisited from the perspective of product configuration

Collaboration with suppliers is essential for developing and producing a competitive product and it begins with selecting the right suppliers. This article addresses the supplier selection problem from the perspective of product configuration. We discuss first how the conventional decision models of supplier selection should be extended, considering the fact that supplier configuration requires supplier selection for each subsystem of a product. We then highlight the need to consider interrelationships between suppliers, namely, supplier–supplier relationships during the selection process of the combination of suppliers. Finally, we introduce the supplier configuration graph in order to provide a clear picture of the problem. Discussions are provided along with an example of a smartphone configuration.     

Ripple effect modelling of supplier disruption: integrated Markov chain and dynamic Bayesian network approach

The ripple effect can occur when a supplier base disruption cannot be localised and consequently propagates downstream the supply chain (SC), adversely affecting performance. While stress-testing of SC designs and assessment of their vulnerability to disruptions in a single-echelon-single-event setting is desirable and indeed critical for some firms, modelling the ripple effect impact in multi-echelon-correlated-events systems is becoming increasingly important. Notably, ripple effect assessment in multi-stage SCs is particularly challenged by the need to consider both vulnerability and recoverability capabilities at individual firms in the network. We construct a new model based on integration of Discrete-Time Markov Chain (DTMC) and a Dynamic Bayesian Network (DBN) to quantify the ripple effect. We use the DTMC to model the recovery and vulnerability of suppliers. The proposed DTMC model is then equalised with a DBN model in order to simulate the propagation behaviour of supplier disruption in the SC. Finally, we propose a metric that quantifies the ripple effect of supplier disruption on manufacturers in terms of total expected utility and service level. This ripple effect metric is applied to two case studies and analysed. The findings suggest that our model can be of value in uncovering latent high-risk paths in the SC, analysing the performance impact of both a disruption and its propagation, and prioritising contingency and recovery policies.     

Credit guarantee mechanism with information asymmetry: a single sourcing model

This study concerns small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) suppliers suffering from cash constraints in operations, money shortages with possible disruptions and cost uncertainty because of the distributor’s supply risk and the information asymmetry. Thus, this study adopts the distributor’s (buyer’s) perspective and applies a credit guarantee mechanism with an incentive contract as a risk management tool. The distributor can adopt incentive contracts to reveal the type of its supplier; the higher the inefficient supplier’s contribution to the distributor, the smaller the gap between procurement contract quantities with the efficient supplier and procurement contract quantities with the inefficient supplier. An insight into practice is that incentive contracts are tools for acquiring ideal suppliers in the supply base and help companies such as Li & Fung enhance their competitive capabilities.     

Blockchain adoption or contingent sourcing? Advancing food supply chain resilience in the post-pandemic era

In the post-pandemic era, food supply chains and firms therein are facing unprecedented severe challenges, because once infection is detected, numerous products must be recalled or abandoned, and both suppliers and retailers in the supply chain suffer enormous loss. To survive under the pandemic, retailers have adopted different sourcing strategies, such as contingent sourcing, which, in turn, affect the upstream suppliers and hence the resilience of the whole supply chain. With the rapid development of digital technologies, retailers nowadays can utilize blockchain as a reliable and efficient way to reduce product risk and hence advance the resilience of food supply chains by improving product traceability and inspection accuracy, and making sourcing transparent. In this paper, we develop a game-theoretic model to investigate the interrelation between the retailer’s decisions on blockchain adoption and sourcing strategies. We consider that a retailer originally orders from a risky supplier while conducting an imperfect inspection to detect infected products before selling. The retailer may speculatively keep on ordering from the risky supplier or adopt contingent sourcing by ordering from an alternative safe supplier. The retailer also has an option to implement blockchain to improve the inspection accuracy and product traceability. We derive the optimal retail prices under different sourcing strategies with and without blockchain adoption and then analyze the incentives for sourcing strategy and blockchain adoption. Then, we identify the conditions of an all-win situation for food retailer, supplier, supply chain resilience, and consumers with/without government subsidy. Finally, we extend to consider the situation that some consumers have health-safety concerns and preferences for blockchain adoption.     

The optimal technology licensing strategy under supply disruption

We study the problem of whether and how a patent-holding firm (supplier S1) should license its technology patent to a potential rival (supplier S2). If the license is given, the two suppliers both produce a critical component for their downstream manufacturer simultaneously (sequentially) when the manufacturer adopts a dual (contingent) sourcing mode. However, both suppliers face risks of complete supply disruptions. In the study, we examine how the supply risk affects S1's technology licensing willingness and under which conditions royalty or fixed-fee licensing is its optimal strategy. The results show that when the manufacturer adopts contingent sourcing, S1 is always willing to license its technology to S2 and fixed-fee licensing is the optimal strategy. However, when dual sourcing is adopted, either royalty and fixed-fee licensing could be S1's optimal licensing strategy, depending on the reliability degree of the suppliers’ productions. Our findings extend the conclusion from previous researchers about royalty and fixed-fee licensing in a Cournot duopoly model.     

装配供应链上合作新产品开发管理研究

以装配供应链为研究对象,构建包含两个供应商和一个制造商的合作新产品开发成本分摊模型。讨论了供应商之间在定价和创新方面的相互影响,制造商的研发成本分摊策略以及整合成本对合作开发的影响。结果表明:任一供应商的研发投资行为,将导致另一供应商借机提高价格;任一供应商的创新能力增强,将激励另一供应商加大研发投入;制造商通过分摊研发成本能够有效激励供应商创新,最优成本分摊比例随整合成本系数递减,最大不超过二分之一。     

Integrated planning in supply chains with buy-side and sell-side marketplaces

In this paper we develop a quadratic programming model for partner selection and planning in integrated supply chain networks embedded with both sell-side and buy-side electronic marketplaces. Such a scenario arises in several practical applications. In particular, we consider a contract manufacturer who procures components from suppliers through a component marketplace and sells its manufactured sub-assemblies to original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), through a sub-assembly marketplace. In these web-enabled supply chains, embedded with upstream and downstream electronic marketplaces, we need methods for online supply-chain partner selection based on pricing and delivery schedules. In this paper, we develop and present such a model that selects partners, synchronizes supply chain activities and optimizes the profit through optimal revenue pricing and cost minimization.     

Effects of social capital on operational performance: impacts of servitisation

Studies on servitisation have largely overlooked the roles of social capital with suppliers and knowledge management. We propose a moderated mediation model to investigate the impacts of servitisation on the mechanisms through which social capital with suppliers improves operational performance. The hypotheses are empirically tested using structural equation modelling and data collected from 276 manufacturing firms in China. The results show that social capital improves operational performance both directly and indirectly through knowledge management, and the relationships are influenced by servitisation. In particular, social capital improves operational performance directly and indirectly through knowledge combination in servitised firms, whereas social capital only improves operational performance indirectly through knowledge acquisition in traditional manufacturers. The findings contribute to the literature by revealing that the effects of social capital with suppliers on operational performance are partially mediated by knowledge acquisition and knowledge combination and the mediation effects are moderated by servitisation, and by providing insights into how to design purchasing and production systems to profit from servitisation.