Ex post demand information sharing between differentiated suppliers and a common retailer

We consider ex post demand information sharing in a two-echelon supply chain in which two suppliers sell differentiated products through a common retailer. We model three scenarios of information sharing to characterise the conditions under which information sharing may benefit or hurt different players: (1) no supplier is informed; (2) only one supplier is informed; and (3) both suppliers are informed. We find that the retailer may voluntarily share the low demand information when the product differentiation and demand magnitude satisfy certain conditions. In contrast, the retailer has no incentive to share the high demand information, even though this information benefits the suppliers. To achieve information sharing, we propose a side payment mechanism, which allows benefitted players to subsidise hurtful players. Finally, we extend our model by considering a situation where the suppliers have limited capacity and may invest to ramp up production capacity to satisfy a high demand.     

Quantity decisions in a supply chain with early returns remanufacturing

Consider a supply chain where the retailer faces a stochastic demand and orders from the supplier, while the supplier manufactures new products and also remanufactures early returns to meet the order. The order and manufacturing quantity decisions are studied under three decentralised cases: (1) the Stackelberg case, where the manufacturing quantity is determined by the supplier after realising the order quantity from the retailer; (2) the Nash case, where the manufacturing and order quantities are determined simultaneously; (3) the inaccessible return information case, where the retailer does not have the distribution information of upstream returns. We find that in the Stakelberg case the order and manufacturing quantities are larger than in the inaccessible return information case, and the profits for the supplier and retailer are also higher. In contrast, the quantities and profits in the Nash case are the lowest of the three cases when the returns are negatively correlated to the demand. The centralised system is also explored by solving a two-step dynamic program. Computational results are reported to show the effects of system parameters.     

Joint pricing and inventory strategies in a supply chain subject to inventory inaccuracy

This paper focuses on pricing strategies, inventory policies for a supply chain when Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology is adopted to cope with inventory inaccuracy. The supply chain consists of one supplier and one retailer, in which the RFID tag price is shared between the supplier and the retailer. We present and compare the performance differences between a wholesale price contract and a consignment contract when the retailer is the Stackelberg leader and the supplier is the follower. Based on the optimal pricing and inventory decisions, an interesting observation of contract selection is that there are two critical values of inventory available rate such that when the inventory availability is less than the lower value, both the supplier and the retailer prefer a consignment contract; when the inventory availability is greater than the upper value, a wholesale price contract is their best choice; when the inventory availability is between the two values, the supplier prefers a wholesale price contract and the retailer prefers a consignment contract. Additionally, there exist threshold values of RFID tag price and sharing rate to determine the contract preference for the retailer. Furthermore, the profits of both the supplier and the retailer are independent of the RFID tag price sharing rate in a wholesale price contract, and the supplier has the incentive to invest in RFID tag cost in a consignment contract.     

Supply chain management using put option contracts with information asymmetry

We study the problem of hedging demand uncertainty in a supply chain consisting of a risk-neutral supplier and a risk-averse retailer under a buyback contract. We use semi-variance of the possible profit values as a measure of the retailer’s risk attitude. We first study the setting where the supplier can observe the risk type of the retailer and find that in this case the supplier can design a buyback contract that extracts the maximum profit for the supplier. When the retailer’s type is unobservable, a new contract needs to be designed (the ‘option buyback contract’) and we show that in this case the retailers will self-select and chose an order quantity that maximises the total supply chain profit. Through numerical computations, we analyse the dynamics between the benefits of hedging risk, information rent and the retailer’s type, and outline cases when, depending on the shape of the reservation utilities of the retailers, it is too costly for the supplier to manage risk. In conclusion, our results show that whereas semi-variance has appealing properties as a measure of risk, its use introduces analytical challenges that can only be overcome through numerical computation.     

损失厌恶供应链应对突变风险的收益共享契约

研究一个风险中性的供应商和具有损失厌恶特性的零售商组成的二阶供应链,在供应链遭遇突变风险的情况下,收益共享契约能否协调该供应链的问题。利用损失厌恶模型对零售商的损失厌恶程度进行了刻画,分别讨论了突变风险发生后分散和集中控制的情况下供应链的整体利润。研究发现,收益共享契约能够协调该供应链,并且零售商的损失厌恶程度越强,契约参数的上下限越大。通过数值算例的方法对上述结论进行了验证,且发现当突变风险导致需求发生变动时,零售商的效用和供应商的利润呈反方向变化。     

考虑零售商过度自信的供应链决策与协调

将过度自信引入到供应链中,通过构建由一个供应商和一个过度自信的零售商组成的二级供应链模型,分析了过度自信的零售商与供应商的决策。结果表明,零售商过度自信能够实现供应链协调,但供应商的回购契约会破坏这种协调;当零售商接收到市场不利信息时供应商的回购契约失效,当零售商接收到市场有利信息时供应商利润随过度自信程度增加而减少。进一步在模型中引入收益共享契约,使得订购量和供应商的利润均增加,并实现了供应链协调。最后,通过数值算例验证并阐明了相关结论。     

Trust-embedded coordination in supply chain information sharing

This paper studies supply chain coordination with trust-embedded cost-sharing contract. In a two-tier supply chain, a retailer (she) and a supplier (he) make their private demand forecasting individually. The retailer places soft-orders, which are costless, non-verifiable and cancellable before shipping, to the supplier. After that, the supplier relies on the retailer’s ordering information to update his demand evaluation and prepare his capacity. How much the supplier relies on the retailer’s ordering information is specified by trust, which is a kind of psychological feeling and affected by multiple factors. When the supplier does not fully trust the retailer, he tends to prepare a conservative capacity to avoid over-production. To coordinate the supply chain, a two-stage coordination process is proposed. At the first stage, the supplier and retailer negotiate a cost-sharing rule to bind soft-orders. At the second stage, the retailer places a soft-order and decides whether or not to bind it referring to the cost-sharing rule. After that, the supplier determines his optimal production capacity. We show that the retailer and supplier value trust differently in the experimental studies. We also find that there is a threshold of negotiation power for the supply chain partners which means the supplier’s/retailer’s expected profit drops down if his/her negotiation power exceeds certain thresholds. The experimental studies also show that the proposed the two-stage coordination is effective.     

Benefits of retailer–supplier partnership initiatives under time-varying demand: a comparative analytical study

This paper aims to help supply chain managers to determine the value of retailer–supplier partnership initiatives beyond information sharing (IS) according to their specific business environment under time-varying demand conditions. For this purpose, we use integer linear programming models to quantify the benefits that can be accrued by a retailer, a supplier and system as a whole from shift in inventory ownership and shift in decision-making power with that of IS. The results of a detailed numerical study pertaining to static time horizon reveal that the shift in inventory ownership provides system-wide cost benefits in specific settings. Particularly, when it induces the retailer to order larger quantities and the supplier also prefers such orders due to significantly high setup and shipment costs. We observe that the relative benefits of shift in decision-making power are always higher than the shift in inventory ownership under all the conditions. The value of the shift in decision-making power is greater than IS particularly when the variability of underlying demand is low and time-dependent variation in production cost is high. However, when the shipment cost is negligible and order issuing efficiency of the supplier is low, the cost benefits of shift in decision-making power beyond IS are not significant.     

寄售合同的设计与拍卖研究

分析了零售商面对多个供应商竞争有限销售渠道资源时的供应商选择策略以及收益分配机制.供应商的产能成本参数为供应商的私有信息,产能成本参数独立同分布.供应商以寄售模式销售某产品,负责产品的补货,零售商仅承担产品库存管理费用.为识别产能成本最低的供应商,零售商将分享总销售收益的比例设计为供应商产能成本的函数,并将包含此函数的寄售合同当作物品在多个供应商间进行拍卖.供应商对此寄售机会进行估价,并以自己的估价进行竞标,竞标价最高的供应商将提前支付一笔进场费给零售商,从而赢得此寄售机会.这种寄售合同拍卖机制能够同时解决供应商选择与确定理想的分享收益比例的问题,对实践中采用的进场费的确定问题给出了解释.最后通过数值算例分析了相关参数对零售商以及获胜供应商的期望收益的影响.     

Coordination of dual-channel supply chains under demand disruptions management decisions

This paper examines optimal decisions and coordination models for a dual-channel supply chain when the two end competition market demands are simultaneously disrupted. Firstly, we developed the pricing and production decisions models without demand disruptions and propose a revenue sharing contract to coordinate the dual-channel supply chain where the manufacturer is a Stackelberg leader and the retailer is a follower. We derived the conditions under which the maximum profit can be achieved in detailed. We compared the profits under normal case and disrupted case and quantified the information value of knowing demand disruptions. We proposed an improved revenue sharing contract to coordinate the dual-channel supply chain with demand disruptions. The results indicate that the adjusting prices and production quantity are the optimal decisions whether the demand disruptions case or normal case. We also find that the original revenue sharing contract is a special case of improved revenue sharing contract and the market scale change, channel substitutability and deviation cost affected the improved revenue sharing contract under demand disruptions. Finally, we further conduct numerical experiments to show how the demand disruption affects the decisions.     

Supply chain coordination with two-part tariffs under information asymmetry

Supply chain coordination literature indicates that two-part tariff contracts cannot coordinate a supply chain with a supplier and a retailer under information asymmetry, but can coordinate the channel under full information, while leaving the retailer zero profit. Motivated by the practice of Costco Business Centres, we incorporate customer heterogeneity, near-saturated retail market and asymmetric information into a stylised model. The retailer has the knowledge of customer heterogeneity while the supplier does not. The supplier, on the other hand, designs a menu of two-part tariffs for the retailer to choose from. We have found that two-part tariffs can coordinate the supply chain under asymmetric information, while leaving the retailer a positive profit. In addition, a one-size-fits-all two-part tariff can coordinate the supply chain at equilibrium, i.e. there is no need for the supplier to design different two-part tariffs for the retailer who may possess different types of information.     

谎报行为下生鲜农产品供应链协调研究

目的研究存在生产商谎报生鲜农产品鲜活度信息的情况下,生鲜农产品供应链的协调问题。方法由单一生产商和单一零售商构成生鲜农产品供应链,其中产品的鲜活度信息为生产商私有信息;基于单周期报童模型,构建供应链各方的利润函数;应用Stackelberg博弈的基本思想,分析供应链上的定价订货决策,并引入收益共享契约进行供应链协调,同时用Matlab软件做数值仿真,以验证结论的有效性。结果生产商的谎报行为会损害供应链系统各方的利润,且谎报因子越低(谎报度越高)对供应链利润的影响越大。引入的收益共享比例在一定范围内时,收益共享契约可以有效地协调生鲜农产品供应链。结论收益共享契约不仅可以有效地协调生鲜供应链,也可以抑制生产商的谎报行为,实现帕累托改进,提高供应链的稳定性。     

资金约束下基于零售商竞争的融资模式对比研究

以单供应商与多个零售商的供应链为研究背景,供应商是供应链上的核心企业,而零售商面临着资金约束,与供应商签订收益共享契约。供应商为中小企业提供两种融资方式：保兑仓融资和延迟支付融资。本文研究两种融资对供应链绩效以及供应链各方的影响,构建单供应商和多零售商的Stackelberg博弈模型,发现保兑仓融资模式能增加零售商的订货量,这两种融资模式在分散型供应链下,供应商都可以设置合适的收益分配系数和批发价格实现在集中型供应链下的协调,并能够保证供应商利润最大化。     

单供应商面对具有多个销售点的零售商时的VMI模型研究

在供应商管理用户库存（VMI）环境中,当面临的具体条件不同时,供应商和零售商的利润分配是不同的,论述了当一个供应商面对具有多个销售点的零售商时的VMI模型,此时供应商负责库存决策,他可以在各个销售点之间转运（Transshipment）库存.建立了供应商和零售商的一个Stackelberg博弈,零售商作为领导者是通过决定销售价格来体现的.结果显示最终供应商和零售商可以达到一个子博弈精练纳什均衡,零售商在该模式下获得了很大的利润份额.给出了一个算例计算了均衡时的库存量和销售价格.     

Analysis of order timing tradeoffs in multi-retailer supply systems

We analyse the implications of order timing decisions in multi-retailer supply systems in a single period, newsvendor setting. Specifically, we investigate a supply chain with multiple retailers and a single supplier where one of the retailers is considered a preferred or primary customer of the supplier. In the base model (delayed commitment), customers order after observing demand and the supplier rations its production quantity to retailers according to a generalised uniform allocation rule. In the early-commitment model, the primary retailer commits to an order quantity prior to the selling season and receives her order in full. We compare the expected supplier and retailer profits under each of these strategies and specify conditions under which a particular commitment scheme benefits the supplier, the primary retailer, and the entire system. Our findings indicate that the supplier prefers early commitment under mild conditions, whereas the primary retailer's preference depends on the tradeoff between the supply risk and demand risk. We also compare our findings with a single-retailer system, and observe that both the supplier and the primary retailer benefit from the existence of additional customers under delayed-commitment in many contexts.     

Supplier credit guarantee loan in supply chain with financial constraint and bargaining

This paper adopts a multiunit bilateral bargaining framework on financial decision. In a two-echelon supply chain, the supplier sells products through a financial constraint retailer. If needed, the retailer gets a short-term financing from a bank by supplier credit guarantee loan (CGL). Through applying the Nash bargaining framework, we formulate two-level game models, i.e. Retailer-Supply System negotiation and Supplier-Bank negotiation. In this paper, we study and discuss the equilibrium order quantity which is affected by initial working capital and interest rate, the retailer-supply system negotiation and upstream wholesale price effects for supply chain performance, the supplier-bank negotiation and interest rate decisions with different capital markets. The results show: (i) there exists loan size limit for financial constraint retailer under CGL. (ii) The upstream wholesale price increase will weaken retailer’s bargaining position, and the supply system may gain or lose depending on the bargaining power. (iii) There exists unique equilibrium sharing ratio in supply system, which means CGL can achieve risk sharing. (iv) Within a supply system, the upstream wholesale price advantage will weaken bank’s profit, whereas supplier may gain or lose depending on his bargaining power.     

Retailer’s sourcing strategy under consumer stockpiling in anticipation of supply disruptions

We study a retailer’s sourcing strategy under consumers’ stockpiling behaviour and the factors associated with the selection of an optimal strategy in multi-tier supply chains in the presence of supply disruption risk. Stockpiling behaviour occurs when consumers attempt to mitigate the negative impact of a supply shortage. We prove that those behaviours become stronger if consumers have experienced similar problems before and weaker as more inventories are hoarded. Based on these findings, numerical analysis is carried out to compare the superiority of single sourcing versus dual sourcing from retailer’s perspective. Our results suggest that the superiority is highly dependent on factors such as supplier’s volume flexibility, retailer’s purchasing price, and supplier reliability.     

信息不对称下具有损失规避者参与的供应链决策与协调

在市场需求不确定下,假设制造商和零售商之间关于风险态度的信息不对称,研究由单个风险中性制造商和损失规避零售商组成的两级供应链系统。运用Stackelberg博弈分析分散系统下的决策行为,并用收益共享契约来实现集中系统下的供应链协调。研究结果表明,在分散决策系统下,双方风险态度信息的不对称导致供应链效率在“双边际效应”的基础上进一步损失;集中系统下收益共享契约可以消除信息不对称的影响,从而提高损失规避型零售商的最优订购量。算例分析显示,信息共享可以有效提高供应链参与双方的期望效用.     

Information sharing in supply chains: Incentives for information distortion

The existing literature on supply chain information sharing assumes that information is shared truthfully. Unless each party can verify the authenticity of the other party's information, manufacturers and retailers may divulge false information for their own benefit. These information distortions may reduce the benefit levels or even stop information sharing in supply chains. We analyze the incentives for manufacturers and retailers within a supply chain to distort information when they share it and propose a mechanism that results in truthful information sharing. We consider a make-to-order supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer. The manufacturer and the retailer set prices based on their private forecasts of uncertain demand. If both parties share their forecasts truthfully, the manufacturer always benefits; however, the retailer benefits only if the manufacturer sets a lower wholesale price when information is shared compared to when information is not shared. However, we show that the manufacturer and the retailer, respectively, have an incentive to overstate and understate their forecasts while sharing information. The information distortion phenomenon is the direct result of each party exploiting its private information to appropriate the gains from information sharing. We show that the incentives to distort information are eliminated and both parties benefit from information sharing if the manufacturer and the retailer can agree on their relative profit margins prior to information sharing.     

Mitigating supply disruption with a backup supplier under uncertain demand: competition vs. cooperation

In case of supply disruption following major disasters, many supply chains tend to break down due to stock-outs and take a long time to recover. However, by keeping emergency sources of supply, some supply chains continue to function smoothly even after a major disaster. In this work, using a game-theoretic-framework, we consider a two-suppliers-one-retailer supply chain with price-dependent stochastic demand in which suppliers are prone to disruption. To investigate the impact of supply disruption we consider two models: SC model, in which the retailer does not maintain any emergency sources of supply against any supply disruption, and SCB model, in which the retailer maintains a backup supplier to mitigate the impact of supply disruption. We mainly focus on the pricing strategies of the suppliers and the mitigating strategies of the retailer under supply and demand uncertainty. We address two coordinating mechanisms to enhance supply chain performance. Our results indicate that in the presence of supply disruption, even with lower probabilities, the retailer would always prefer to take the advantage of a backup supplier and the optimal reserve quantity increases with disruption probabilities. We further investigate the scenario in which the suppliers would always prefer to cooperate with each other.