供应链协调机制的库存成本优化能力分析

本文在一个供应商和一个采购商的二阶供应链条件下,对传统供应链、寄售、供应商管理库存三种协调机制在集中决策和分散决策情况下的库存成本优化能力进行对比分析.得出结论:在集中决策情况下,供应链总成本是相同的;在分散决策情况下,任何协调机制的供应链总成本总不会优于集中决策下的供应链总成本;VMI是各种协调机制中最优的;传统供应链和寄售的供应链总成本优劣依赖于其成本分担的比例,并详细计算出该比例值.为企业选择供应链协调机制提供决策依据.     

未知需求分布下提前期可控的整合库存模型研究

考虑了单供应商单采购商的生产一库存联合优化问题,采购商面临未知分布的随机需求,供应商的提前期可以控制.采用Minimax方法建立了供应商和采购商联合期望总成本最小化模型,模型中允许采购商缺货,并且部分缺货延期交付,部分缺货发生销售损失,同时也考虑了运输成本,并且假设运输成本依赖于订货量和提前期.给出了求解联合最优生产批...     

随机需求条件下供应链的补货及折扣策略研究

研究一个供应商和多个零售商围绕单品种商品组成的供应链体系中,以供应商为核心的供应链库存管理,目标是通过直接降低供应商的库存成本,从而降低供应链的总成本.假设每个零售商面对服从随机正态分布的提前期客户需求,在不考虑交货时间的情况下,供应商在固定的时间间隔满足零售商的补货需要,并以价格折扣的方式补偿零售商的成本增加.由此得到较优的补货间隔,并给出了求解方法.最后,通过仿真验证了该解法的可行性并评估了该策略对各方的影响.     

多供应商条件下集成供应商订货模型研究

针对集成化供应策略,建立了用于分析多供应商条件下集成供应商订货问题的非线性规划模型。该规划的目标是使物流总成本达到最小,约束条件包括各个供应商的供应量约束和集成供应商的库容约束。提出了模型的求解方法,并用实例加以说明。利用该模型可以确定集成供应商的年订货量在各供应商之间的分配及针对不同供应商的经济订货批量。     

基于风险防范的供应商数量优化决策

在公开透明的市场环境下,从制造商采购原材料的采购总成本出发,建立了一个基于风险防范的供应商数量优化模型。该模型描述了影响采购总成本的各个因素,并引入了风险规避系数,将供应商的供应风险定量化、成本化。通过算例,分析了风险规避系数、供应中断概率以及中断后造成的企业财务损失等风险因素对最优供应商数量的影响。     

BTO供应商的交货期承诺问题研究

以BTO供应链生产环境为研究背景,在供应商生产能力有限的前提下,对一个由制造商和其上游供应商组成的BTO供应链生产运作系统进行建模,假设该供应链运作系统中各环节均对时间敏感,建立了一个供应商的交货期承诺模型,分析了供应商的服务水平、订单到达率、承诺交货期和总成本之间的关系,得出供应商对制造商的最优承诺交货期,力求最终实现供应链整体成本最小化.     

考虑供应链中断风险的最优供应商数量决策北大核心CSSCI

针对存在供应链中断风险的供应商数量选择问题,分析了由交易成本、风险损失、采购成本构成的采购总成本与供应商数量的关系。首先考虑到供应商的供应风险和市场的需求风险,引入数量弹性契约,对供应链中断风险进行了考察。然后在此基础上,构建了以采购总成本最小化为目标的考虑供应链中断风险的最优供应商数量决策模型。最后,通过算例分析验证了该模型的可行性,并探讨了机会主义成本、合作程度、市场需求均值、弹性系数、供应风险概率等相关参数对最优供应商数量的影响。     

考虑供应链中断风险的最优供应商数量决策

针对存在供应链中断风险的供应商数量选择问题,分析了由交易成本、风险损失、采购成本构成的采购总成本与供应商数量的关系。首先考虑到供应商的供应风险和市场的需求风险,引入数量弹性契约,对供应链中断风险进行了考察。然后在此基础上,构建了以采购总成本最小化为目标的考虑供应链中断风险的最优供应商数量决策模型。最后,通过算例分析验证了该模型的可行性,并探讨了机会主义成本、合作程度、市场需求均值、弹性系数、供应风险概率等相关参数对最优供应商数量的影响。     

整数比时间协调的VMI补货策略

针对确定性需求下单供应商两分销商的VMI供应链,运用整数比时间协调方法,即供应商的补货周期分别是两个分销商的补货周期的整数倍,建立了使供应商和两个分销商订单处理成本、生产准备成本、库存持有成本等总成本最小的系统优化模型,并对模型进行了求解,获得了供应商的最优补货策略组合。最后,用算例验证了理论建模与求解。     

基于库存所有权的转移定价策略研究

考虑供应链渠道内的资本收益和运用价格加成方法,研究了ROI(分销商拥有库存所有权)和WOI-d(供应商拥有库存所有权)假设下的转移定价决策,并通过比较利润函数,得到了当Ir与Is(分销商、供应商单位资金的年均机会成本)不相等时,不同的转移定价和进货批量决策可以创造套利的机会,这是产生转移定价和订货批量决策扭曲现象的重要原因。     

采购商-供应商满意度模型的构建与应用研究

在高效供应链体系中,融洽的采购商-供应商合作关系很大程度上决定着供应链的稳定性和供应链的运作成本。本文从采购商、供应商两方面考虑他们对对方在协作时表现的满意程度,建立了采供关系满意度模型,并利用此模型分别对采供双方在感受一致与不一致的情况下,采供双方可能采取的行为及其产生的后果进行了全面的分析。该满意度模型的重要应用就是用以评价供应链伙伴的合作关系,以此反映供应链运作绩效,本文对此给出详细的评价指标与评价方法。     

基于时间段决策视点的ERP供应商选择模型

结合ERP实施风险特点,从战略、战术和应用的时间段决策视点出发,把ERP软件供应商的选择风险划分为:长期合作风险、供应商服务风险、软件质量风险和供应商费用风险,建立了ERP软件供应商选择风险评价模型;通过调查问卷,运用因子分析方法进行实证分析;利用未确知测度提出了企业选择ERP软件供应商的评价方法.     

Pricing decisions for a supply chain with refurbished products

This paper considers a supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer where a fixed portion of new products sold will be returned to the retailer and then be repaired and resold as refurbished products at a lower price. Using the utility model, we formulate how consumers will make their choices when facing both new and refurbished products. Then, using the divide-and-conquer method, we derive the supplier and retailer's equilibrium decisions, including the supplier's wholesale price and the retailer's prices for both the new and refurbished products. The main findings include the following. First, refurbished products will be sold in the market only when the refurbishing cost is small. In this situation, as the refurbishing cost increases, most of the negative impact on the retailer will be transferred to the supplier. Second, in the same condition, as the refurbishing cost increases, the wholesale price and retail price of the new product will change in opposite directions. This result contrasts with the traditional pass-through effect. Third, when the repair cost is moderate, the retailer will eventually not sell refurbished products, but its profit can be significantly improved and the double marginalisation effect can be mitigated.     

Incentives for quality improvement efforts coordination in supply chains with partial cost allocation contract

In this paper, we consider quality improvement efforts coordination in a two-stage decentralised supply chain with a partial cost allocation contract. The supply chain consists of one supplier and one manufacturer, both of which produce defective products. Two kinds of failure cost occur within the supply chain: internal and external. The supplier and the manufacturer determine their individual quality levels to maximise their own profits. We propose a partial cost allocation contract, under which the external failure cost is allocated between the manufacturer and the supplier at different rates based on information derived from failure root cause analysis. If the quality levels of the supplier and the manufacturer are observable, we show that the partial cost allocation contract coordinates the supply chain, provided that the failure root cause analysis does not erroneously identify the manufacturer’s fault as the supplier’s, and the supplier does not take responsibility for the manufacture’s fault. In the single moral hazard model, where only the quality level of the supplier is unobservable, the optimal share rates require the supplier to take some responsibility for the manufacture’s fault. However, in the double moral hazard model, where quality levels of the supplier and the manufacturer are unobservable to each other, the optimal share rates require the supplier not to take responsibility for the manufacturer’s fault. It is noted that the root cause analysis conducted by the manufacturer may have its disadvantage in attributing the fault to the supplier when both sides are at fault. We also propose a contract based on the dual root cause analysis to reduce the supplier’s penalty cost. Numerical results illustrate that the partial cost allocation contract satisfies the fairness criterion compared with the traditional cost allocation contract.     

紧急订单成本信息不对称下的激励契约设计

在正常订单和紧急订单供应商共存情况下.分析制造商的最优订货策略.正常订单供应商采购提前期较长.需在销售期前进行订货.紧急订单供应商交货期较灵活.但交货期长短与成本相关且该成本信息为其私有信息.考虑在此条件下制造商的订货策略(与正常订单供应商)和激励合同设定问题(与紧急订单供应商).最后,比较了紧急订单供应商的存在与否对制造商的订货以及利润的影响.     

Improving delivery performance for asymmetric Laplace distributed delivery time in a two-stage supply chain

This paper investigates strategies for improving supply chain delivery timeliness when the delivery time follows an asymmetric Laplace distribution. Delivery performance is measured using a cost-based analytical model which evaluates the expected cost for early and late delivery. This paper presents a set of propositions that define the effect of changes to the parameters of the delivery time distribution on the expected penalty cost for untimely delivery when a supplier uses an optimally positioned delivery window to minimise the expected cost of untimely delivery. The scale parameter increases the expected penalty cost, skewness decreases the cost and the location parameter has no effect on the expected penalty cost. The effects are illustrated in a numerical example with real-world supplier data. The results can be used in developing strategies for improving delivery performance from a supplier’s perspective and define how the delivery time distribution parameters can be modified to decrease the expected penalty cost of untimely delivery. The paper proposes a general approach to modelling delivery performance improvement and can be applied to other delivery time distribution forms. The approach can serve as guidance for practitioners undertaking a programme to improve delivery performance.     

The optimal operation planning of Kanban to minimize the total operation cost†

This paper derives two formulae to calculate the average inventory yielded by fixed interval withdrawal Kanban and supplier Kanban, respectively, in a just-in-time production system. By using the formulae, another two formulae to determine the minimum number of Kanbans to be required for the fixed interval withdrawal Kanban and the supplier Kanban are also shown. An algorithm to obtain the optimal order interval is proposed to minimize the total operation cost composed of the inventory cost and the withdrawal cost for the Kanban system     

Effects of green supply chain integration and green innovation on environmental and cost performance

This paper argues that mechanisms such as information sharing and collaboration used in green supply chain integration (GSCI) to improve information processing capacity can reduce uncertain outcomes of green product and process innovation. Based on data from a survey of Chinese (Hong Kong) firms, the paper tests whether the three dimensions of GSCI (green internal, customer and supplier integration) improve environmental performance and cost reduction by facilitating green product and process innovation. The results show that green customer integration improves cost and environmental performance through green process innovation (not green product innovation). Both green product and process innovations are facilitated by green customer integration (not green supplier integration), while both green customer and supplier integration significantly depend on green internal integration. These suggest that the distinctive information processing capacity created by green internal and customer integration can facilitate the green process innovation required to improve environmental and cost efficiency, while green product innovation and green supplier integration cannot create such efficiencies.     

The impact of contract parameters on the supply chain performance under different power constellations

Reporting forecast data is a common method used to improve the functioning of supply chains (SCs) and to reduce supply shortages. Customers tend to report the maximum possible demand as a forecast if restrictions are missing. Such a forecast is useless for suppliers. Hence, special contracts are needed to enhance the value of forecast data and therefore the cooperation between SC partners. In this paper, such a contract is presented. It encourages the customer to report a more realistic forecast. Deviations from the reported forecast are punished in different ways: If the customer reported too much and wants to release less than what was reported, he has to pay a penalty. On the other hand, the customer has the flexibility to purchase more than reported to meet the demand on his outlet but at the cost of an additional fee. This paper analyses how different contract parameters affect the performance of the SC, in particular when the bargaining power of customer and supplier is not equally distributed. Results show that the supplier and therefore the SC is better off if the supplier leaves the contractual cost parameters untouched but hides the true value of flexibility, especially when the customer is less powerful than the supplier.     

寄售合同的设计与拍卖研究

分析了零售商面对多个供应商竞争有限销售渠道资源时的供应商选择策略以及收益分配机制.供应商的产能成本参数为供应商的私有信息,产能成本参数独立同分布.供应商以寄售模式销售某产品,负责产品的补货,零售商仅承担产品库存管理费用.为识别产能成本最低的供应商,零售商将分享总销售收益的比例设计为供应商产能成本的函数,并将包含此函数的寄售合同当作物品在多个供应商间进行拍卖.供应商对此寄售机会进行估价,并以自己的估价进行竞标,竞标价最高的供应商将提前支付一笔进场费给零售商,从而赢得此寄售机会.这种寄售合同拍卖机制能够同时解决供应商选择与确定理想的分享收益比例的问题,对实践中采用的进场费的确定问题给出了解释.最后通过数值算例分析了相关参数对零售商以及获胜供应商的期望收益的影响.