政府干涉下闭环供应链的回收渠道选择策略

了提高回收效率,在政府对制造商的回收行为进行干涉下建立了制造商回收、零售商回收和混合回收决策模型,分别从消费者、政府、制造商、零售商和供应链整体五个角度研究了回收渠道的选择策略。结果表明,零售商总是希望参与回收;从其他四个角度来看,回收渠道选择主要受回收渠道竞争强度的影响,政府干涉对渠道选择影响不大。     

具有延保服务的闭环供应链回收渠道选择

针对具有延保服务的闭环供应链（CLSC）回收渠道选择问题，构建了3种回收渠道（制造商回收、零售商回收、第三方回收）和2种延保服务提供者（制造商、零售商）组合而成的6种分散决策CLSC模型，基于博弈论方法研究了每种情形下的最优回收渠道选择及其对CLSC决策的影响。结果表明，无论是制造商还是零售商提供延保，零售商都是产品回收最有效的承担者，此时制造商、零售商和整个CLSC都可以获得最大的利润，且产品回收率也最高。     

考虑政府补贴和不同回收渠道的再制造闭环供应链最优决策研究

为研究政府分别实施再制造补贴和回收补贴下不同回收渠道对再制造闭环供应链的决策影响,建立以制造商为领导者,零售商和回收商为跟随者的闭环供应链的Stackelberg主从博弈模型,对比分析两种补贴方式下不同回收渠道的最优定价和回收策略。结果表明,补贴金额的多少会降低产品价格和批发价,刺激消费,提高回收率,增加闭环供应链上所有参与方的利润,而与补贴类别无关;当存在双回收渠道时,回收商与零售商之间回收的竞争强度影响产品售价、回收率和制造商的利润,而回收转移价格仅与补贴类型有关。最后,通过实例分析探讨不同补贴与不同回收渠道对闭环供应链的影响。     

考虑横向公平的双渠道销售闭环供应链定价策略与协调研究

考虑双渠道零售商和制造商组成的闭环供应链,分别构建了制造商直接回收、委托第三方回收模式下的动态博弈模型,以公平中性时的均衡策略为参照,对比分析了线下零售商的横向公平偏好对双渠道闭环供应链中各决策主体定价策略及利润的影响。研究表明,无论零售商是否存在横向公平关切行为,制造商直接回收模式都优于委托第三方回收。在直接回收模式下,线下零售商的横向公平偏好使得在正向供应链中的两零售商为提高市场占有率会竞相降低零售价格,制造商为鼓励竞争会降低批发价,并且价格均与横向公平关切系数负相关。在逆向供应链中,制造商会提高废旧产品的回收率;相比公平中性的情况,此定价策略使制造商和整个供应链系统效用增加,而两零售商收益递减。制造商作为渠道管理者为鼓励零售商之间竞相降价,可通过一个三方收益共享的契约实现协调,达到帕累托最优。     

考虑再制造成本的闭环供应链回收渠道决策

当前考虑再制造产品成本对其回收渠道选择影响的研究相对缺乏。将再造品成本作为内生变量,分别讨论了制造商回收、零售商回收和回收商回收三种模式下新产品与再造品的产量以及废旧产品的回收量决策,并分别基于企业收益、消费者剩余和回收率视角展开回收渠道偏好分析。研究表明:从企业收益角度考虑,制造商的回收渠道偏好与再制品成本有关,而零售商始终偏好零售商回收渠道;从消费者剩余角度考虑,为满足消费者剩余最大化,不同的再制品成本会导致不同的回收渠道偏好;从回收率角度考虑,制造商回收渠道下的废旧产品回收率始终高于另外两种渠道。研究结论对再制造闭环供应链各方的定价决策以及回收渠道选择具有一定的参考价值。     

电子商务背景下“一对二”供应链的渠道竞争

电子商务的普及推动了供应链上零售商渠道和制造商直销渠道并存模式的发展。随着电子商务实施程度的增大,考虑顾客服务水平存在差异时,借助博弈论工具探讨"一对二"供应链上的强势零售商、弱势零售商和制造商的竞争特性,包括服务水平差异、电子商务实施程度的变化对竞争结果的影响等,并推出制造商开辟网络直销渠道的条件。得出结论是,不开辟网上直销渠道时,强弱势零售商的服务水平差别越大,则强势零售商的销售价格越高,市场份额越大;弱势零售商的销售价格越低,批发价格越低,市场份额越小。开辟网络直销渠道时,随着电子商务实施程度增大,制造商网上直销的市场价格逐渐减小,弱势零售商的批发价格逐渐减小,且制造商的网上直销价格与弱势零售商的服务水平无关等。     

溯源供应链系统的回收模式选择

溯源系统的引入不仅为回收提供便利，还可进一步提高消费者的信任度，从而提高回收量。但不同回收模式下的回收量因受供应链各级成员溯源水平的影响会出现差异，这使得回收模式选择及供应链决策变得更加复杂和困难。因此，开展以制造商为领导者的制造商回收、零售商回收、制造商和零售商混合回收三种模式下的溯源水平、定价策略和回收量的最优决策研究具有重要的应用和学术价值。研究发现：溯源水平与溯源成本边际系数、回收成本节省和回收模式竞争程度有关。溯源水平的提高会提高批发价和销售价，降低回收价。制造商应根据消费者溯源偏好、溯源对回收的影响程度和成本弹性系数设置溯源水平。当竞争程度较低时，制造商会选择混合回收模式，否则选择自行回收；当消费者偏好高于一定阈值时，混合回收模式下回收量的提高更加明显，对环境也更加有利。     

考虑零售商公平关切的双渠道供应链合作广告决策分析

针对零售商公平中性和公平关切两种情形,分析了制造商主导的Stackelberg博弈下零售商公平关切对双渠道供应链合作广告决策的影响。研究结果表明:当制造商考虑零售商公平关切时,零售商广告投入水平与其公平关切程度正相关,且总是高于零售商公平中性下的广告投入水平;而制造商广告成本分担率随着零售商公平关切程度的增大先增大后减小。此外,对零售商公平关切程度以及广告投入水平对制造商网上直销渠道需求的影响比例对零售商、制造商和供应链系统利润的影响进行了数值仿真。     

不确定需求下制造商渠道入侵与信息收集披露激励

研究单个零售商和制造商组成的二级供应链,零售商通过调查获取市场不确定需求信息,而制造商可能建立直销渠道与零售商展开销售竞争。分别在集中决策和分散决策下刻画零售商最优收集、披露策略以及制造商的最优入侵策略;在此基础上设计了促进零售商收集并且披露需求信息的固定报酬激励机制。研究表明:当收集成本、渠道替代率以及固定入侵成本处于合适阈值区间时,需求信息收集和披露会改善双方收益;零售商信息披露可以影响制造商的入侵决策;制造商入侵在一定条件下有利于供应链整体收益,但总是不利于零售商;在制造商率先决定入侵时,零售商接受激励政策可以实现双方共赢。最后通过算例验证了理论的正确性和有效性。     

不同市场结构下绿色闭环供应链决策分析

为了分析不同市场结构对绿色闭环供应链成员决策以及绩效的影响,引入环保参数,采用Stackelberg博弈法,比较了三种市场结构下渠道成员的决策、利润和渠道总利润。研究结果表明：制造商主导市场时批发价、零售价和制造商利润最高;零售商领导市场时回收水平、单位利润和零售商利润最高;环保水平和渠道总利润在垂直纳什市场结构下最高。理论上无领导者的垂直纳什结构最理想,但考虑实际情况,零售商控制市场时较好。     

商业信用与促销努力下垄断制造商和竞争性双寡头零售商的协调

在垄断制造商和竞争性双寡头零售商构成的两级供应链中,通过考虑零售商所做的促销努力和制造商提供的商业信用,建立两个零售商之间Nash均衡、合谋和Stackelberg均衡3种情况下的供应链分散和集中决策模型,分析供应链成员和整个渠道的绩效,得到信用期限和促销努力的最优值。在此基础上,同时考虑供应链成员的竞争与协调,通过兼顾供应链成员的个体利益和渠道整体利益,确定实现协调的契约参数与条件。最后通过数值算例对模型进行比较和验证。结果表明,所建立的协调机制既能保证供应链成员的参与,又提高了渠道的整体利益,从而实现供应链的协调。     

The value of buyback contract under price competition

We investigate the value of buyback contract by analysing a supply chain with one manufacturer and two competing retailers. Three scenarios, depending on whether buyback contracts are offered to neither, one, or both of the retailers, are considered. We first study the case when the manufacturer can only determine his buyback price. We show how the demand uncertainty, the competition level and the handling cost of buyback contract influence the profits of the manufacturer, the two retailers and the whole supply chain. Interestingly, contrary to the conventional wisdom that the buyback contract may intensify competition between the retailers, we show that offering the buyback contract to two competing retailers can benefit every channel member even if the competition level is high. Next, we study the return contract, a special type of buyback contract, and show the effect of competition level and industry outlook on supply chain parties' choices on return contract. We extend Padmanabhan and Png [1997. “Manufacturer's Returns Policies And Retail Competition.” Marketing Science 16 (1): 81–94] to the case with an asymmetric contract structure, i.e. one return contract and one whole-sale contract. We show that an asymmetric contract structure may better off both the retailers and the whole supply chain.     

The impact of retailers’ alliance on manufacturer’s profit in a dual-channel structure

When a manufacturer adds a direct sales channel to its existing retail channel, retailers may cooperate with one another to respond to this new competition. Our study develops a Cournot competition model in a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and multiple retailers. In a Stackelberg decision model, the manufacturer first sets the direct sales quantity and wholesale price, and then the retailers decide the order quantities. The results indicate that forming an alliance is not always beneficial for retailers. When direct sales cost is high, there is less likelihood for retailers to collaborate. On the other hand, retailers will form an alliance when direct sales cost is sufficiently low. This will likely reduce the manufacturer’s profit. As such decreasing direct sales cost is not necessarily beneficial for the manufacturer because of the retailers’ possible collaborative efforts. In addition, the study finds that when demand fluctuation increases or the manufacturer’s information accuracy decreases, it is more likely that retailers will form an alliance. After relaxing the assumption of homogeneous retailers, our numerical study validates the possibility of partial alliance. If some retailers’ marginal costs are sufficiently high, we could see the formation of a partial alliance.     

两个零售商环境下数量柔性契约研究

在综合国内外研究成果的基础上,借鉴以单个供应商和单个零售商组成的两级供应链的研究,形成以单个供应商与两个零售商的两阶段供应链为基本研究对象,通过数字解析方法和量本利分析方法对供应链契约中常用的数量柔性契约进行分析。证明了这种灵活订货模型可以协调供应商和零售商之间的决策行为,使得供应链的整体利润达到最优,为多零售商的复杂供应链的研究提供参考。     

基于存货促销的供应链协调问题的研究

讨论了零售阶段需求依赖于货架展示量的供应链的协调问题,特别地,由于货架空间的稀缺,零售商的存货持有成本假设为非线性的成本函数。在一个零售商的情况下,给出了决策变量及供应链利润分配的显式解。当存在两个相同的零售商竞争时,给定市场份额按比例分配原则．证明此时存在唯一对称的Nash均衡解,供应商可以用相同的合同协调供应链。最后通过数值算例说明所得结果。     

Equilibrium analysis of distribution channel structures under power imbalance and asymmetric information

This paper investigates the problem of channel choice game in two power-imbalanced supply chains consisting of the leader supply chain and the follower supply chain. We assume that there exists symmetric and asymmetric cost information between the two supply chains, and that the two chains as well as the two members in each chain follow the Stackelberg game setting. We analyse four competition scenarios: both chains are decentralised, where individual members of both supply chains maximise their own profits by independently selecting their price policies; both chains are integrated, where manufacturers and retailers coordinate their decisions to maximise supply chain profits; the leader chain is decentralised and the follower integrated; the leader is integrated and the follower decentralised. The primary objective of this paper is to investigate the influence of power imbalance, information asymmetries, and the degree of product substitutability under channel choice equilibrium. We find that, in contrast to earlier literature where all manufacturers share equal or balanced decision-making power, an integrated distribution channel is the dominant strategy for the leader under symmetric and asymmetric information Stackelberg game. As the degree of product substitutability increases, the follower will gradually switch from integrated distribution channel to decentralised distribution channel; the follower can gain from constructing a decentralised distribution channel as the prediction accuracy of the leader increases.     

基于Bertrand闭环供应链的企业价格博弈模型

设计了一个具有供应商和两个零售商组成的Bertrand双寡头价格博弈的主从闭环供应链系统,给出了分散和集中两种模式下批发价、零售价、回收价以及各方利润的具体表达式并进行了比较,研究了供应链整体利润与产品和废弃品替代率的关系。最后,在此基础上分析了分散模式下零售商和生产商的具体对策,提出了两阶段数量折扣协调策略实现帕累托改进,并求出了折扣率和补贴率的具体范围,为进一步研究更一般的闭环供应链系统打下理论基础。     

三级竞争供应链的渠道选择研究

在供应链链间竞争的背景下,研究三级竞争供应链的纳什均衡结构。利用非线性规划、纳什博弈和Stackelberg博弈理论,分析了2条三级竞争供应链的渠道选择问题,求解了3种情景：全分布式结构;全一体化结构和混合结构（一条供应链为一体化,另一条为分布式）下的决策变量的最优解,并分别依据3种决策标准,即制造商利润最大化、渠道利润最大化和供应链系统利润最大化,分析了不同决策标准下供应链纳什均衡结构。研究表明,三级竞争供应链的纳什均衡结构,依赖于产品之间的替代系数及决策标准,并且当供应链链间的竞争强度较大时,无论何种决策准则下,全分布式结构均为供应链的纳什均衡结构。     

Competition and cooperation in a supply chain with an offline showroom under asymmetric information

Offline showrooms develop rapidly to resolve consumers’ uncertainty about whether products fit their needs when they purchase online. This paper considers a supply chain where an offline showroom provides experience service for an existing online retailer and intends to introduce a new competing online retailer to satisfy consumers’ heterogeneous demand. The offline showroom has better knowledge of demand information due to closer to offline consumers. We examine the impact of competition and the offline showroom's optimal channel cooperation strategy under asymmetric information and analyse the equilibrium results under the optimal strategy to shed light on channel cooperation and information strategy for supply chain members. We find that under asymmetric information competition prompts the offline showroom to conceal information which generates signal cost (negative information effect) and to increase experience service level which creates value (positive service effect). The optimal channel cooperation strategy depends on the trade-off between these effects. We also find that competition increases the existing online retailer's profit in some conditions. Besides, in some conditions information asymmetry harms all supply chain members, which suggests the offline showroom to share information with the online retailers; in some conditions, information asymmetry harms the offline showroom but benefits the online retailers.