能源局15条新政纾困分布式光伏允许直接售电

9月4日,国家能源局印发《关于进一步落实分布式光伏发电有关政策的通知》,明确政府对分布式光伏的长期支持态度,并针对屋顶使用协调难、贷款融资困难、售电收益不确定、并网时间长以及符合长期稳定性难以保证等多重难题开出“全额上网”电站享受标杆电价、增加发电配额、允许直接售电给用户、提供优惠贷款、按月发放补贴等一系列新政。     

基于优化LCOE的光伏平价上网可行性分析

平准化度电成本(LCOE)是国际上通用评价发电技术的主要经济性指标。在原有LCOE评估模型基础上,增加了考虑折旧抵税后的税收成本和损耗带来的额外成本,进一步优化成本模型,并考虑清洁发展机制(CDM)的收入因素,提出更准确、更完整的优化LCOE模型,并结合其他投资指标提出适应我国现状的光伏发电效益模型。以南京某3 MW分布式光伏电站项目为例进行敏感性分析,进一步探讨未来光伏平价上网的可行性,提出提高光伏系统单位造价和提高发电量是实现平价上网的主要途径。     

商业建筑分布式光伏发电投资效益研究

对商业建筑分布式光伏发电的相关政策进行了研究,利用技术经济学原理,对未来商业综合体光伏项目各种运营模式下的投资回收期、静态总收益等参数进行估算,并以泰安某商业建筑为例,对其投资效益进行了比较分析。研究表明,"自发自用"运营模式投资效益最好;"全部上网"投资效益较低;"自发自用,余量上网"投资效益介于前两种模式之间,主要适用于上网电量较少的发电项目。在当前退补大趋势下,上网补贴已对项目盈利影响较小。未来,产品创新发展与技术更新将成为提高分布式光伏项目盈利水平的重要因素。     

建筑屋面分布式光伏发电项目设计探讨

以南京苏宁雨花仓改数据中心屋顶分布式光伏发电项目为例，对建筑屋顶分布式光伏发电项目在夏热冬冷地区的设计要点进行分析和探讨。本期工程装机容量共为4.1 MW,工程运行期25年，总上网电量9 791.4万kW·h,年均上网电量391.7万kW·h,采用隔墙售电，项目投资财务内部收益率为5.56%,投资回收期14.17年。本项目可节约大量燃煤，减少有害物质排放和污水排放，减轻环境污染，助力建筑行业绿色低碳转型和可持续发展。     

能源互联网背景下分布式光伏发电的经济效益研究

以互联网推动分布式光伏系统发展为切入点,结合合同能源管理机制和供需互动平台分析了节能服务公司运营分布式光伏系统的模式;建立了分布式光伏系统的成本收益数学模型;考虑负荷与电源时序性的匹配度,结合大数据分析,选取餐饮业为分布式光伏发电的应用市场,进行效益分析和敏感性分析。结果表明,充分考虑分布式光伏出力的时序性,并与可控负荷搭配,有利于激发其潜在市场;基于信息共享与大数据分析的能源互联网有利于分布式光伏系统商业化,促进能源投资与能源利用的有效性;进一步降低组件的衰减率是技术方面较为可行的保证分布式光伏系统收益的有效措施。     

风力发电的成本效益分析——以张家口为例

中国风能资源十分丰富,推行风力发电在我国具有普遍适用性和可行性。成本收益是影响可再生能源推广应用的重要因素,因此采用全生命周期法将风力发电项目划分为融资建设期、运营维护期、回收报废期三个阶段,再通过动态平直供电成本法对风电项目的成本效益进行分析。如果不考虑政府干预因素,风力发电效益根本上取决于风电上网电量的多少和上网电价的高低。风力发电成本由非系统成本和系统成本构成,同时也会产生增值税、企业所得税和教育费附加等税费,因此,项目的经济效益=售电收益+补贴-系统成本-非系统成本-应纳税总额。风电项目不能单纯考虑经济收益,要更加注重环境收益,由于风电机组在运行期内基本不排放污染物,为环境治理节约了成本,所以环境效益也要考虑在内。以张家口为例,Ⅱ类风资源区风电的度电成本在0.4264～0.4294元/(kW·h)之间,风电上网电价为0.45元/(kW·h),风电大规模上网具有经济性。整个寿命周期内,度电环境收益约为1.571元/(kW·h)。通过敏感性分析,得出对成本效益影响最大的是上网电价,设备成本和风能资源量的影响次之。投资者应综合考虑经济收益和环境收益,努力降低投资成本,延长设备使用寿命;政府应保持上网电价的稳定性。     

基于实物期权的光伏电站项目LCOE分析

在分析关于光伏电站项目当前政策的基础上,建立了对标燃煤标杆上网电价的光伏发电平准化度电成本(LCOE)模型,并与实物期权方法相结合,考虑项目延迟期权与放弃期权的复合实物期权价值,构建了全面反映项目竞争力价值的扩展平准化度电成本(extended levelized cost of energy,ELCOE)模型,并以某光伏电站项目为例进行了分析。分析结果表明：平价上网机制下,建立的LCOE模型能够直接对标燃煤标杆上网电价,且ELCOE模型考虑了光伏电站项目未来收益的不确定性与管理灵活性,弥补了LCOE法忽略项目未来不确定性价值的不足,避免决策失误。     

分布式光伏发电项目的投资影响因素研究

为应对全球气候变化,中国提出了碳达峰、碳中和的战略目标。作为中国实现该目标的重要途径之一,分布式光伏发电不仅能够减少和替代化石能源消费,而且有利于构建安全、高效的局域微电网,近年来在政策的影响下得到快速发展。目前,分布式光伏发电项目的投资竞争已经进入白热化阶段,优质的项目资源越来越少,同时又面临产业链上游环节原材料价格的波动和补贴退坡等问题,分布式光伏发电项目的投资决策越发困难。首先对分布式光伏发电系统的优势进行了分析,然后从补贴政策、产业链价格传导、售电收入的不确定性这3个方面对新能源投资企业在分布式光伏发电项目投资决策中需要考虑的几个关键影响因素进行了分析。研究结果可为日后在更加严峻的投资环境中的项目投资决策提供借鉴和参考。     

平单轴支架应用于屋顶分布式光伏项目的经济可行性分析

为了在有限的屋顶面积下实现屋顶分布式光伏项目度电成本最低的目标,利用度电成本的经济性分析模型,选取了11个不同纬度和光照资源条件的地区,对这些地区采用平单轴支架与固定支架2种排布方式的屋顶分布式光伏项目的度电成本进行了对比,并分析了平单轴支架应用于屋顶分布式光伏项目的经济可行性。     

基于动态负荷特性的家用光伏发电系统经济性评价

以家用光伏发电系统为研究对象,基于用户侧动态负荷特性与供给侧光伏发电出力特性的耦合解析,根据分布式光伏系统"自用为主、余电上网"的应用原则,构建家用分布式光伏发电系统经济性评价模型。应用该模型,以上海某家用光伏发电系统为例,分析其运行特性、经济性能及其影响因素。研究结果表明,现行政策下家用光伏发电系统的动态投资回收年限为12.4 a;在中国,促进光伏产业发展最实际、最有效的政策是提高上网电价。     

BP's emissions trading system

Between 1998 and 2001, BP reduced its emissions of greenhouse gases by more than 10%. BP's success in cutting emissions is often equated with its use of an apparently market-based emissions trading program. However no independent study has ever examined the rules and operation of BP's system and the incentives acting on managers to reduce emissions. We use interviews with key managers and with traders in several critical business units to explore the bound of BP's success with emissions trading. No money actually changed hands when permits were traded, and the main effect of the program was to create awareness of money-saving emission controls rather than strong price incentives. We show that the trading system did not operate like a “textbook” cap and trade scheme. Rather, the BP system operated much like a “safety valve” trading system, where managers let the market function until the cost of doing so surpassed what the company was willing to tolerate.     

Global trading versus linking: Architectures for international emissions trading

International emissions trading is widely seen as an indispensable policy pillar of climate change mitigation [Stern, N., 2007. The Economics of Climate Change. The Stern Review. Cambridge University Press, New York]. This article analyzes five different types of trading architectures, classified into two top–down (UNFCCC driven) and three bottom–up (driven by individual countries or regions) approaches. The two types of approaches are characterized by a trade-off between environmental effectiveness and political feasibility, respectively, whereas their relative cost-effectiveness depends on implementation details. Bottom–up architectures constitute imperfect substitutes for top–down architectures in terms of environmental effectiveness, and thus remain mere fallback options. However, especially the ‘formal linking’ architecture can act as complement in terms of cost-effectiveness.     

Carbon trading: Current schemes and future developments

This paper looks at the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading schemes and examines the prospects of carbon trading. The first part of the paper gives an overview of several mandatory GHG trading schemes around the world. The second part focuses on the future trends in carbon trading. It argues that the emergence of new schemes, a gradual enlargement of the current ones, and willingness to link existing and planned schemes seem to point towards geographical, temporal and sectoral expansion of emissions trading. However, such expansion would need to overcome some considerable technical and non-technical obstacles. Linking of the current and emerging trading schemes requires not only considerable technical fixes and harmonisation of different trading systems, but also necessitates clear regulatory and policy signals, continuing political support and a more stable economic environment. Currently, the latter factors are missing. The global economic turmoil and its repercussions for the carbon market, a lack of the international deal on climate change defining the Post-Kyoto commitments, and unfavourable policy shifts in some countries, cast serious doubts on the expansion of emissions trading and indicate that carbon trading enters an uncertain period.     

碳排放交易现状及其在中航工业的发展展望

介绍碳交易的起源、基本原理及碳交易的市场机制,分析了国内外碳交易市场现状及未来发展方向,阐述减少碳排放已经成为全球共同减缓气候变暖的原因,并对碳交易在中航工业的应用进行了展望。     

Price floors for emissions trading

Price floors in greenhouse gas emissions trading schemes can guarantee minimum abatement efforts if prices are lower than expected, and they can help manage cost uncertainty, possibly as complements to price ceilings. Provisions for price floors are found in several recent legislative proposals for emissions trading. Implementation however has potential pitfalls. Possible mechanisms are government commitments to buy back permits, a reserve price at auction, or an extra fee or tax on acquittal of emissions permits. Our analysis of these alternatives shows that the fee approach has budgetary advantages and is more compatible with international permit trading than the alternatives. It can also be used to implement more general hybrid approaches to emissions pricing.     

Banning banking in EU emissions trading?

Admitting banking in emissions trading systems reduces overall compliance costs by allowing for inter-temporal flexibility: cost savings can be traded over time. However, unless individual EU Member States (MS) decide differently, the transfer of unused allowances from the period of 2005–2007 into the first commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol, i.e. 2008–2012, will be prohibited. In this paper, we first explore the implications of such a ban on banking when initial emission targets are lenient. This analysis is based on a simulation which was recently carried out in Germany with companies and with a student control group. The findings suggest that a EU-wide ban on banking would lead to efficiency losses in addition to those losses which arise from the lack of inter-temporal flexibility. Second, we use simple game-theoretic considerations to argue that, under reasonable assumptions, such a EU-wide ban on banking will be the equilibrium outcome. Thus, to avoid a possible prisoners’ dilemma, MS should have co-ordinated their banking decisions.     

The coal question that emissions trading has not answered

Can emissions trading assist with the task of placing a limit on coal production and consumption in Australia? This paper outlines a critical political economy perspective on coal and a flagship ‘market mechanism’ for emissions reduction. The prospects for an effective emissions trading scheme in coal-dominated economies are considered in light of its theoretical justifications as well as recent attempts to price carbon in Australia. Emissions trading is a weak instrument that does not address real-world failures of coal governance. At their theoretical best, carbon prices produce marginal changes to the cost structure of production. In practice, the Australian case demonstrates emissions trading is an attempt to displace the emissions reduction task away from coal, through compensation arrangements and offsetting. In light of the urgent need to rapidly reduce global emissions, direct regulation and democratisation of coal production and consumption should be flagship climate policy.     

Option value of gasification technology within an emissions trading scheme

Investment analysis is mostly implemented with Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) methods, such as the Net Present Value (NPV). The problem in a typical application of these methods is the limited ability to value real options, management's ability to adapt to changing market conditions or to revise decisions. This paper presents a simulation model, in which the investment is regarded as a single-firm problem in an operating environment with multiple exogenous and stochastic prices. The simulation model is used to explore the impact of emissions trading, and in particular the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), on investments in Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC) plants. Two real case studies are presented: modifications of an existing condensing power plant and a new combined heat and power plant. The benefit of the selected approach is that it can take into account the value of multiple simultaneous real options better than a standard DCF analysis. The results show that a straightforward application of DCF analysis can lead to biased results in competitive energy markets within an emissions trading scheme, where a number of uncertainties potentially combined with several real options can make quantitative investment appraisals very complex.     

The hedge value of international emissions trading under uncertainty

This paper estimates the value of international emissions trading, focusing on a here-to-fore neglected component; its value as a hedge against uncertainty. Much analysis has been done of the Kyoto Protocol and other potential international greenhouse gas mitigation policies comparing the costs of achieving emission targets with and without trading. These studies often show large cost reductions for all Parties under trading compared to a no trading case. We investigate the welfare gains of including emissions trading in the presence of uncertainty in economic growth rates, using both a partial equilibrium model based on marginal abatement cost curves and a computable general equilibrium model. We find that the hedge value of international trading is small relative to its value in reallocating emissions reductions when the burden sharing scheme does not resemble a least cost allocation. We also find that the effects of pre-existing tax distortions and terms of trade dominate the hedge value of trading. We conclude that the primary value of emissions trading in international agreements is as a burden sharing or wealth transfer mechanism and should be judged accordingly.     

Environmental regulations and emissions trading in China

This paper begins with the international context concerning climate change and how China fits into this context. Concentration is then turning into the emissions control system in China including environmental planning, legislation, policy instruments and measures as well as institutional setting in China’s environmental governance system. Special attentions also being paid to emissions control in China’s power sector. It should be noted that the pollution discharge permit system in China only exists superficially in many places. Insufficient resources are applied to the implementation of the said permit system, which in turn means that the system is applied according to differing standards in different parts of the country. The findings of this paper suggested that emissions trading programmes are usually introduced alongside the existing policies. The power sector usually has numerous other policy objectives and therefore the design and implementation of emissions trading programmes in the sector will have to address concern about the compatibility of existing industry policies.