Incentive mechanism for allocating total permitted pollution discharge capacity and evaluating the validity of free allocation

In this paper, the validity evaluation method of free allocation is studied under the background of allocating the total permitted pollution discharge capacity (TPPDC). First, the free allocation method’s localization and players’ strategic behaviors are analyzed. Second, an incentive mechanism for allocating TPPDC is proposed based on the uniform price auction of divisible goods, and an evaluation model to evaluate the validity for the free allocation of TPPDC is established, and the feasibility and reasonableness of this evaluation model are proved. Third, the evaluation criterion and the evaluation process are given. Finally, this evaluation model is applied to the environmental planning of Han River basin, and the validity evaluation result of free allocation is obtained by analyzing the statistical data of chemical oxygen demand (COD) in 14 counties and cities of Hubei Province, China. The results of our study will provide the government environmental management departments with theoretical basis and scientific methods to effectively implement the pollutant gross control system and design the related environmental policies.     

产品概念设计可制造性评价方法研究

随着新产品开发技术的发展,人们对产品使用性能和外观艺术的要求越来越高。但概念设计不仅仅体现艺术性,更应符合工业产品的制造特点和使用特性。认为产品概念设计方案的可制造性决定于概念设计的工业设计阶段,并针对工业设计因素建立概念设计评价体系。认为产品概念设计可制造性评价是一个多层次、多属性的决策问题,建立概念设计评价模型,并基于多属性决策的理论知识给予了解决。     

一种新的三角模糊数型多属性决策方法

针对模糊群体多属性决策问题,提出一种模糊群体多属性决策方法．首先,定义了任意专家的中心决策矩阵;其次,利用任意2个规范化决策矩阵之间的相似度获得专家的综合重要性程度;再次,通过专家的综合重要性程度得到方案的平均可信度,进而得到方案的排序结果;最后,实例分析表明了所提出方法的可行性和有效性．     

基于ASP.NET技术的网上拍卖系统的设计

采用Browser/Server软件结构,运用ASP.NET技术及SQL Server数据库开发网上拍卖系统,实现网上拍卖。阐述了系统的框架结构、数据流程分析、功能模块设计以及数据库设计。系统为拍卖交易双方提供了一个稳定运行的平台,并实现即时报价、管理拍卖商品、用户管理、反馈价格、拍卖商品等主要功能。     

基于模糊多属性决策的多维时序信用风险评价建模

针对属性权重完全未知且数据为多维时序的信用风险评价问题,提出基于多属性决策与模糊聚类相结合的混杂信用风险评价建模方法.该方法使用离差最大化方法和二次规划模型得出指标属性的综合权重,对受评样本在各时点上进行多属性决策得到决策评分,再通过决策评分矩阵进行模糊聚类,并对结果进行了有效性验证.最后通过实例验证,证明该方法具有可行性和有效性.     

一个新的分布式安全电子拍卖协议

基于Shamir的（t＋1,n）门限方案和公钥加及数字签名提出一个适于分布式松耦合发布／预约系统使用的安全电子拍卖协议。协议除满足了安全分布式拍卖的基本需求外,还保证了代理拍卖服务器的不可否认性及投标者的匿名性。与先前工作相比,新协议具有较多的安全特性,而且更适合于分布式大规模拍卖。松耦合发布预约结构广泛使用于可扩展 自适应的分布式系统中,它的灵活性使之为许多应用所采用。但是,在不安全的通信环境中,这种结构缺乏容错性和安全支持,新协议可以在分布式松耦合发布／预约系统中实现安全性和容错性,同时具有适当的运行效率。最后,我们对协议设计的正确性和效率进行了详尽分析。     

A theoretical and empirical investigation of multi‐item on‐line auctions

In this paper we explore and analyze the structure of Internet auctions from an analytical and an empirical perspective. Such web‐based auctions are rapidly emerging as a mercantile process of choice in the electronic marketplace. We observe current Internet auctions for one‐time products, such as rapidly aging hardware, and analyze them within the framework of the existing auction theory. While traditional auction theory focuses on single‐item auctions, we observe that a majority of on‐line auctions are multi‐item auctions. A significant contribution of this work is the theoretical derivation of the structure of the winning bids in multi‐item progressive on‐line auctions. Additionally, for comparative purposes, we explore the structural characteristics of alternative multi‐item auction mechanisms proposed in the auction theory. We derive hypotheses based on our analytical results and compare two different types of auction mechanisms. We test the traditional auction theory assumption regarding the homogeneity of bidders and present the first ever empirically derived classification and performance‐comparison of on‐line bidders. We test our hypotheses using real‐world empirical data obtained by tracking a premier web‐based auction site. Statistical analysis of the data indicates that firms may gain by choosing alternative auction mechanisms. We also provide directions for further exploration of this emerging but important dimension of electronic commerce. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

一种面向政府采购的多属性反向拍卖模型

为了对政府采购中电子反向拍卖系统的适用性进行改善.利用多属性决策理论和相关算法,对多属性反向拍卖的步骤和模型进行研究.对只按价格来选取供应商的方式进行了改进,建立了多属性选取供应商的反向拍卖系统.系统实现了选取供应商的自动化,能达到综合属性的最优,满足政府采购中以反拍方式进行采购的需求,提高了采购效率,降低了采购成本.     

FAIRNESS IN RECURRENT AUCTIONS WITH COMPETING MARKETS AND SUPPLY FLUCTUATIONS

Auctions have been used to deal with resource allocation in multiagent environments, especially in service‐oriented electronic markets. In this type of market, resources are perishable and auctions are repeated over time with the same or a very similar set of agents. In this scenario it is advisable to use recurrent auctions: a sequence of auctions of any kind where the result of one auction may influence the following one. Some problems do appear in these situations, as for instance, the bidder drop problem, the asymmetric balance of negotiation power or resource waste, which could cause the market to collapse. Fair mechanisms can be useful to minimize the effects of these problems. With this aim, we have analyzed four previous fair mechanisms under dynamic scenarios and we have proposed a new one that takes into account changes in the supply as well as the presence of alternative marketplaces. We experimentally show how the new mechanism presents a higher average performance under all simulated conditions, resulting in a higher profit for the auctioneer than with the previous ones, and in most cases avoiding the waste of resources.