面向动态任务合作求解的联盟模型

多Agent系统中,Agent间通过形成联盟达到提高任务求解能力,获取更多收益的目的。主要关注联盟模型的改进和联盟形成阶段的改进,基于ARG(agent,role,group)元模型和学习机制提出了一种采用角色和学习机制的新联盟模型CLAR(coalition model based on learnin gagent and role);在采用合同网协议的CLAR联盟模型中提出了两阶段联盟形成机制;通过捕食者问题实验验证了角色和学习机制的作用,以及两阶段联盟形成机制在减少通讯代价上的作用。     

理性密钥共享的扩展博弈模型

理性密钥共享体制通过引入惩罚策略使得参与者不会偏离协议,常采用的惩罚是一旦发现有人偏离就立即终止协议.这种惩罚策略有时导致惩罚人自身利益严格受损,从而降低了对被惩罚人的威慑.为了克服这一弱点,本文以扩展博弈为模型分析了理性密钥共享体制.首先给出(2,2)门限的理性密钥共享体制,证明了所给的协议是该博弈的一个序贯均衡,即经过任何历史之后坚持原协议仍然是每一个参与者的最优选择.特别地,在发现有人偏离后,协议所给出的惩罚策略既可以有效惩罚偏离者又能够完全维护惩罚人的利益.这是本文对前人设计的理性密钥共享体制的一个重要改进.然后针对将协议扩展到(t,n)门限情形,实现密钥分发人离线,达到计算的均衡等相关问题给出了一般的解决方案.     

图像识别技术在3D-RPG游戏开发中的应用

基于OGRE(Object-oriented Graphics Rendering Engine)设计开发一个3D-RPG(Role-Playing Game)游戏引擎RPGGE(RPG Game Engine)。在RPGGE中融入图像识别技术,使玩家可以通过摄像头识别手势来增加游戏交互。RPGGE开发包括渲染系统、输入输出系统、声音系统、识别系统。     

基于Moran过程的竞争性舆情信息的网络传播博弈模型

新的媒体环境下,在享受不同形式在线社交网络提供便捷信息互动渠道的同时,需要加强对信息传播的管理与引导,防止其发展成为负面舆情信息肆意滋生的温床。结合传统演化博弈论与复杂网络理论,提出了竞争性舆情信息的网络传播博弈模型,并理论分析了正面舆情信息传播占优的收益条件及群体规模;随后,结合实际案例,通过仿真实验对比分析三种博弈环境下网络舆情的演化特征。三种博弈环境下,正面舆情信息传播策略占优条件均与收益有关,弱选择情境对收益参数的要求最为严格;强、弱选择情景下策略占优的条件还与群体规模有关,且强选择情景对群体规模的要求更为严格。     

Searching minimax game trees under memory space constraint

Games such as CHESS, GO and OTHELLO can be represented by minimax game trees. Among various search procedures to solve such game trees,- and SSS^* are perhaps most well known. Although it is proved that SSS^* explores only a subset of the nodes explored by-, - is commonly believed to be faster in real applications, since it requires very little memory space and hence its storage management cost is low. Contrary to this folklore, however, this paper reports, using the OTHELLO game as an example, that SSS^* is much faster than-. It is also demonstrated that SSS^* can be modified to make the required memory space controllable to some extent, while retaining the high efficiency of the original SSS^*.This research was partially supported by the Ministry of Education, Science and Culture of Japan, under a Scientific Grant-in-Aid.     

The Peer’s Dilemma: A general framework to examine cooperation in pure peer-to-peer systems

The exploration of social dilemmas is being considered a major foundation for encountering the enforced necessities of cooperation in self-organizing environments. Such environments are characterized by self-interested parties and the absence of trusted third parties. Recent approaches apply evolutionary socio-inspired games to formally prove the existence and further prolongation of cooperation patterns within communities. For instance, the Prisoner’s Dilemma game has thus provided a rich opportunity to examine self-interested behaviors in pure peer-to-peer networks. However, assuming a total absence of coalitions, incentives and punishment mechanisms, several works argue against a durable maintenance of cooperation neither at single-shot nor repeated-scenarios. In this article, we formally and experimentally demonstrate a counterexample for the latter by applying evolutionary game theory and a particular instance of the Rock–Scissors–Paper game. Our framework proves that the cyclic dominance of certain type of nodes within a P2P system has an impact and introduces a strategic aspect to the evolution of the overall community.     

无线多跳网络中基于博弈论的协作激励机制研究

无线多跳网络中网络传输性能容易受到自私节点的影响。本文首先对目前的节点协作激励机制进行了总结,然后,针对分簇路由中簇间路由场景,运用博弈论中非合作博弈的思想,建立博弈模型以激励簇内节点通过协作通信的方式帮助簇头进行数据包的转发,最后给出了基于非合作博弈的激励机制中纳什均衡解的求解过程。