EFFECTS OF A RATIONING RULE ON THE AUSUBEL AUCTION: A GENETIC ALGORITHM IMPLEMENTATION

The increasing use of auctions as a selling mechanism has led to a growing interest in the subject. Thus both auction theory and experimental examinations of these theories are being developed. A recent method used for carrying out examinations on auctions has been the design of computational simulations. The aim of this article is to develop a genetic algorithm to find automatically a bidder optimal strategy while the other players are always bidding sincerely. To this end a specific dynamic multiunit auction has been selected: the Ausubel auction, with private values, dropout information, and with several rationing rules implemented. The method provides the bidding strategy (defined as the action to be taken under different auction conditions) that maximizes the bidder's payoff. The algorithm is tested under several experimental environments that differ in the elasticity of their demand curves, number of bidders and quantity of lots auctioned. The results suggest that the approach leads to strategies that outperform sincere bidding when rationing is needed.     

多AUVS协作分布式控制

多水下机器人系统中机器人之间的协调、协作问题的解决是多机器人系统走向实际应用的基本前提之一.针对多机器人协作问题,讨论了一种称为"市场"框架的多水下机器人系统分布式控制方法,给出了基本的假设、概念和优化过程,并在理论上对该框架的收敛性以及计算复杂度控制等基本特性进行了分析和证明.数值模拟主要针对该框架的优化能力、计算复杂度控制以及容错能力等方面进行了深入的试验分析.其结果与基于GA的集中式控制方法对比表明,基于"市场"框架的多水下机器人分布式控制方法与传统的集中控制方法相比具有更好的优化结果和更短的解算时间.     

PJM输电权运行机制及其在我国区域电力市场阻塞管理中的应用

PJM电力市场采用节点边际电价(LMP)进行阻塞管理,利用点对点的金融性输电权(FTR)作为金融工具来分摊阻塞盈余、规避节点电价不稳定带来的市场风险。主要介绍了PJM电力市场中输电权的种类、输电权拍卖市场的特点、出清机制和结算方法。在此基础上,对我国区域电力市场的阻塞管理及输电权市场的设计提出了一些建议。     

基于代理和BPEL4WS的Web服务合成与实现

Web服务的交互和实现被推荐通过软件代理来实现.Web服务目前还不能很好地支持动态、自适应的服务组合和分布式业务流程.软件代理在建模、知识表达和交互等技术上的优势,能够强化Web服务的交互和动态应用能力.基于代理和面向流程建模的BPEL4WS,可以实现Web服务面向业务应用的合成与执行,支持多个协同的业务流程及其动态配置.系统分析了代理、BPEL4WS和Web服务整合的技术与实现方案,利用JADE平台开发了相关的测试模型,并且以网上拍卖为案例,验证了所提方案及实现.     

Multi-stage sequential uniform price auction mechanism for divisible goods

In this paper, we study the problem of auctioning a kind of continuous homogeneous divisible goods, and present a multi-stage sequential auction mechanism of divisible goods under uniform price. In this mechanism, the auction process is divided into multiple stages, all bidders satisfy the sequential rationality conditions, all bidders are asymmetric, every bidder is allowed to submit a nonincreasing continuous demand function in each round bidding, every bidder’s valuation to per unit of the goods is independent private information, and if a bidder does not obtain the quantity he wants in former stage auction, he still have another opportunity to obtain some quantity in the later stage auction. For this mechanism, we explore the formation process and composition of equilibrium points in each stage auction, and discuss the optimal strategy selection for bidders, then give the detail steps and an application example to show how to implement this multi-stage sequential auction mechanism. The conclusions can be drawn that our auction mechanism is an efficient incentive mechanism, and can effectively reduce many underpricing equilibrium and can yield higher expected income than a single uniform price auction for the auctioneer. It also can avoid the occurrence of failure auction (equilibrium does not exist), and effectively extend and improve the traditional single stage uniform price auction mechanism.     

基于JXTA的P2P实例的研究与实现

对JXTA做了比较深入的研究,介绍JXTA的概念、协议、框架,描述JXTA平台拍卖系统的设计和实现,最后对拍卖模型等关键部分进行设计分析。     

多无人机分布式协同异构任务分配

研究异构无人机对不同类型目标执行侦察、打击和评估任务的协同任务分配问题.采用信息论中熵的变化量对侦察与评估任务中所获取的信息量进行度量,将无人机对不同类型目标的打击能力抽象为对目标的毁伤概率,并考虑各个任务之间的相互关联,建立异构多无人机协同任务分配模型.设计了基于相邻局部通信的分布式拍卖算法,实现了多无人机协同任务分配问题的优化求解.仿真结果表明了所建模型的合理性和求解方法的有效性.     

Reducing mechanism design to algorithm design via machine learning

We use techniques from sample-complexity in machine learning to reduce problems of incentive-compatible mechanism design to standard algorithmic questions, for a broad class of revenue-maximizing pricing problems. Our reductions imply that for these problems, given an optimal (or β-approximation) algorithm for an algorithmic pricing problem, we can convert it into a (1+?)-approximation (or β(1+?)-approximation) for the incentive-compatible mechanism design problem, so long as the number of bidders is sufficiently large as a function of an appropriate measure of complexity of the class of allowable pricings. We apply these results to the problem of auctioning a digital good, to the attribute auction problem which includes a wide variety of discriminatory pricing problems, and to the problem of item-pricing in unlimited-supply combinatorial auctions. From a machine learning perspective, these settings present several challenges: in particular, the “loss function” is discontinuous, is asymmetric, and has a large range. We address these issues in part by introducing a new form of covering-number bound that is especially well-suited to these problems and may be of independent interest.     

An energy trading system with consideration of CO2 emissions

Abatement of CO₂ emission is one of the most important issues in the 21st century regarding preservation of the earth environment. This paper addresses a utility operations planning problem for distributed energy management systems (DEMSs), where we are to obtain optimal plans that minimize both costs and CO₂ emissions. A DEMS consists of multiple entities that seek their own economic profits. In this paper, we give a mathematical formulation of the utility operations planning problem for each entity, and propose an energy trading market, which utlizes a multi‐attribute auction protocol in order to deal with both a price and a CO₂ emission rate. Experimental results show that collaboration among entities through the market provides a more profitable plan for each entity and abatement of CO₂ emission is also achieved. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Electr Eng Jpn, 162(4): 54–63, 2008; Published online in Wiley InterScience ( www.interscience.wiley. com ). DOI 10.1002/eej.20418     

基于英式拍卖的RMFS货位指派研究

目的 构建英式拍卖模型，以待指派商品品项(SKU)群的最低周转率为媒介，通过逐步提升最低周转率来实现待指派SKU与待指派区域货位数量的匹配。方法 针对移动机器人拣货系统(RMFS)中的货位指派，提出基于英式拍卖机制的货位指派方法，提升仓库拣货效率。结果 与随机指派相比，在不同仓库规模、订单规模、订单偏度的RMFS中采用英式拍卖货位指派机制，机器人行走路程下降比率在大型仓库中达30.17%，中型仓库的下降比率为27.31%，小型仓库的下降比率为24.13%。结论 采用英式拍卖机制在RFMS中进行货位指派可大幅度提高工作效率。