基于BitTorrent的激励机制的研究与改进

BitTorrent系统面临着严重的搭便车问题。研究BitTorrent系统的搭便车问题及其激励机制,对P2P文件共享系统有重要意义。介绍当前BitTorrent系统激励机制的研究现状,分析BitTorrent文件共享系统的搭便车现象及其激励机制,提出了一个种子带宽分配策略。通过模拟实验实现了该策略,并分析了模拟实验的结果。     

Integrated capacity and marketing incentive contracting for capital-intensive service systems

Capacity investment and capacity allocation have always been critical management decisions, especially in the presence of agency issue for capital-intensive and congestion-prone service organizations. Prior research has often modeled only one aspect of the issue, such as proposing internal pricing scheme for capacity allocation ignoring demand uncertainty and the influence of the manager, optimizing capacity alone ignoring the agency issue, or incentive contract design ignoring capacity limit and service delay. We show that simply employing a traditional incentive contract (which often ignores service delays) for the manager responsible for promoting a center's services will provide incorrect incentives and lead to a more congested and less profitable system. When firms focus on optimizing operational capacity alone, ignoring the impact of managers on service demand, they are able to maintain the optimal utilization and service quality by balancing capacity and delay costs. However, they forgo profit-increasing opportunities, as they ignore the impact of the optimal incentive contract and do not motivate the managers enough to boost demand. To tackle the management challenges faced by modern service centers, we take an integrated capacity-contracting approach by incorporating operational delays and capacity decisions within the incentive contract design. Embedding a queuing model in a general incentive contracting framework, we present a novel approach to deriving the optimal compensation contract and operational capacity for a service center. We illustrate in numerical examples that a Pareto improvement can be achieved with our integrated contracting approach because every party, from the firm to the manager, to customers, to equipment and software vendors, benefits.     

A notary group-based cross-chain mechanism

As an emerging distributed technology, blockchain has begun to penetrate into many fields such as finance, healthcare, supply chain, intelligent transportation. However, the interoperability and value exchange between different independent blockchain systems is restricting the expansion of blockchain. In this paper, a notary group-based cross-chain interaction model is proposed to achieve the interoperability between different blockchains. Firstly, a notary election mechanism is proposed to choose one notary from the notary group to act as a bridge for cross-chain transactions. Secondly, a margin pool is introduced to limit the misconduct of the elected notary and ensure the value transfer between the involved blockchains. Moreover, a reputation based incentive mechanism is used to encourage members of the notary group to participate in cross-chain transactions. Ethereum-based experiments demonstrate that the proposed mechanism can provide an acceptable performance for cross-chain transactions and provide a higher security level than ordinary cross-chain mechanisms.     

Special knowledge sharing incentive mechanism for two clients with complementary knowledge: A principal-agent perspective

In this paper, we study how the firm share the special knowledge of two knowledge-complementarity clients by implementing a large and complex project which the firm out-sourced. Firstly, incentive mechanism for complementarity special knowledge sharing are designed for clients being risk-neutral and risk-averse respectively under the asymmetric information. Further, knowledge complementary effects and other relevant factors on the optimal incentive coefficient are analyzed. Lastly, the numerical results are reported.     

An incentive-based heuristic job scheduling algorithm for utility grids

Job scheduling in utility grids should take into account the incentives for both grid users and resource providers. However, most of existing studies on job scheduling in utility grids only address the incentive for one party, i.e., either the users or the resource providers. Very few studies on job scheduling in utility grids consider incentives for both parties, in which the cost, one of the most attractive incentives for users, is not addressed. In this paper, we study the job scheduling in utility grid by optimizing the incentives for both parties. We propose a multi-objective optimization approach, i.e., maximizing the successful execution rate of jobs and minimizing the combined cost (incentives for grid users), and minimizing the fairness deviation of profits (incentive for resource providers). The proposed multi-objective optimization approach could offer sufficient incentives for the two parties to stay and play in the utility grid. A heuristic scheduling algorithm called Cost-Greedy Price-Adjusting (CGPA) algorithm is developed to optimize the incentives for both parties. Simulation results show that the CGPA algorithm is effective and could lead to higher successful execution rate, lower combined cost and lower fairness deviation compared with some popular algorithms in most cases.     

Primary Incentive Plan Design Considerations According to a Review of Key Influential Works

Abstract

One of the key challenges engineering managers face is how to enhance the level of performance of their employees. Existing guidelines and tools regarding the implementation of an incentive plan do not cover the primary design considerations sufficiently. This research identifies thirteen primary incentive plan design considerations (PICs), the most important considerations that must be taken into account in the design or development of an incentive plan, through a systematic and structured identification process. The thirteen PICs are a unique amalgamation from influential research papers that deal with incentives and motivation from various disciplines. These considerations can be used by engineering managers, in conjunction with existing guides or toolkits, as an aid during the design, review, or implementation of an incentive plan.     

Investment under RPI-X: Practical experience with an incentive compatible approach in the GB electricity distribution sector

Regulatory price controls on the British (GB) electricity distribution sector have been a marked success. Charges to customers have been reduced, network reliability has improved and companies have made above average returns along the way. Nonetheless, each review brings new challenges. This article describes one of the main innovations introduced at the fourth electricity distribution price review (DPCR4) – an incentive compatible approach to setting capex allowances. We set out the rationale for its adoption, the practicalities in applying the mechanism and its position in the broader context of regulatory developments in the sector.     

国际光伏发电激励政策的变化和启示

2008年很多国家都修订或颁布实施了新的光伏发电激励政策。在全球金融危机和光伏激励政策变化的共同影响下,2008年第4季度全球光伏市场陷入了危机之中。本文着重介绍了全球主要光伏市场国家——西班牙、德国、美国和日本等光伏激励政策的变化和内容,总结分析了全球光伏激励政策的走势,并在此基础上提出了对我国光伏激励政策的思考和建议。     

如何用经济增加值来提升企业管理水平

经济增加值 (又称EVA)管理模式是一种财务度量指标与激励机制和公司法人治理相结合的管理方法 ,在国外已是成熟的模式 ,国内尚处在推广期。本文就EVA的理论基础、实践、效果、作用和关键因素进行了分析与论述 ,同时就国内应用等问题进行了探讨。