首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
文章检索
  按 检索   检索词:      
出版年份:   被引次数:   他引次数: 提示:输入*表示无穷大
  收费全文   22篇
  国内免费   8篇
  完全免费   2篇
  水利工程   32篇
  2017年   4篇
  2016年   3篇
  2015年   2篇
  2013年   1篇
  2012年   1篇
  2011年   4篇
  2010年   1篇
  2009年   5篇
  2008年   6篇
  2007年   2篇
  2006年   1篇
  1995年   2篇
排序方式: 共有32条查询结果,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
跨界水冲突博弈分析   总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0  
摘要:基于博弈论和最优化方法,考虑冲突参与人的非合作与合作行为、水资源的量与质、以及河道最小生态需 水要求,建立了二人博弈分析模型。以官厅水库流域张家口市和北京市跨界的水量和水质冲突为例,探讨冲突过 程中参与人决策的相互影响以及达到合作所需要的利益分配格局。研究结果表明:张家口和北京跨界水冲突的均 衡结果是 (非合作, 非合作) 的劣解,为改进到 (合作,合作) 的帕累托最优解,可对合作增加利益的公平分配实现:P=50%水文年型下,均衡结果的上游盈利为8.03亿元/a,下游为0元/a,通过下游给上游的旁支  相似文献
2.
Water diversions from the great lakes is a complex problem because the five lakes are a common property resource, since hydropower production and commercial navigation are a function oflakes level.Game theory is used to analyze the dependency among eight states and two provinces. The decisions concerning water diversion affect the state of the system in future periods and several scenarios with different restrictions on the lakes where diversions can be carried. This was done with respect to a one player (Social planner), two players (U.S.versus Canada) and independent actions taken by states and provinces which can sum up to ten players.The results suggests that states do not divert water necessarily because they stand to gain but because they may lose more if they do not. This is a situation not unlike the prisoner's dilemma case.  相似文献
3.
黄河水资源配置博弈均衡模型   总被引:1,自引:1,他引:1  
彭祥  胡和平 《水利学报》2006,37(10):1199-1205
本文以黄河流域水资源配置为案例,通过构建水资源配置博弈均衡模型,运用非合作博弈理论证明了由于制度的缺陷和个体理性的存在,开放式用水仍然是现状流域各省区的自主选择;并根据流域用水存在的合作潜力,利用合作博弈理论对未来黄河水资源配置提出初步的制度安排。  相似文献
4.
博弈论模型在解决水资源管理中利益冲突的运用   总被引:1,自引:1,他引:1  
本文运用非合作与合作博弈的方法,对南水北调中线工程水资源管理中的有关利益冲突进行模拟和分析。其中,以统计学和经济计量学的回归分析法构建博弈各方的效益函数,以经济价值评估法折算水资源的价值和水污染的损失,用成本效益分析法比较不同战略下的博弈结果。模拟结果显示,若以北京为博弈的甲方,则非合作结果使局中的乙方、丙方和丁方分别获得0.15~0.32亿元、0.59~0.364亿元和0.08~0.29亿元的利益,但整体却遭受662.01~1218.33亿元的损失,而合作的结果恰恰相反。因此,如果能够把合作所带来的部分净收益从赢利方转向损失方,以补足损失方的损失,博弈各方均能受益。此模拟方法及结果不仅有利于博弈各方,而且也为水资源管理部门提供决策支持。  相似文献
5.
付湘  陆帆  胡铁松 《水利学报》2016,47(1):38-43
水资源的准公共产品属性及其在开发利用中存在的外部性使河流自然流态受到严重的扰动,本文基于非合作博弈博弈论,建立主从关系的用户博弈模型分析河流水资源分配,基于个体效益不能达到帕累托最优状态,采用合作博弈方法,建立水资源用户合作博弈模型。合作博弈增加了总效益,但使得上游用户的效益比非合作时减少,有必要对上游用户进行效益补偿:引入微观经济学的无差异曲线与合作联盟形成的条件构建合作效益分配的可行解集,并提出基于边际贡献的效益分配方法在可行解集中挑选唯一的效益分配解。研究结果表明,合作博弈总效益大于非合作博弈的总效益,达到帕累托最优状态;通过合作效益分配,处于先动优势的上游用户的分配效益大于非合作的效益,有利于行动占先者加入合作联盟。  相似文献
6.
Water allocation along the Syr Darya River may be affected by climate change. Here we statistically model cooperation strategies, country profits, and sensitivity of cooperation, showing that the hydrological regime affects transboundary cooperation. Climate change in the twenty-first century may reduce glacial cover, and reducing stream flows, decreasing chances of cooperation and potentially raising conflicts. Comparison with other transboundary catchments in Central Asia indicates moderate-to-high risk of conflicts for the Syr Darya. A template is provided for assessment of the stability of cooperation in the Syr Darya basin, and in catchments similarly dependent on water availability.  相似文献
7.
Hydropower development may result in water conflicts among the riparian nations, which, however, can be resolved by benefit sharing. An optimization framework is proposed for a transboundary sub-basin following a cooperative game theoretical approach. A broad range of factors at different levels of cooperation between the riparian countries has been used in the optimization model. As an illustration, the framework is implemented in the Sesan and Sre Pok sub-basins of the Lower Mekong Basin. Higher levels of cooperation lead to greater total net benefits as well as greater benefits to individual countries.  相似文献
8.
In China, water conflicts have been traditionally framed as the external costs of economic development and tackled with technocratic measures. This study examines water conflicts through the lens of water diversion, water allocation and water functional zoning. It reframes water conflicts as a result of coordination problems nested in complex inter-jurisdictional interactions. With a game-theoretic illustration, it identifies that individual and group heterogeneities are two challenges to effective coordination. It argues that China’s state-centric water institutions are tailored to optimize overall social utilities, yet they constrain coordination due to insufficient costs and benefits redistribution mechanisms at the local level.  相似文献
9.
流域区际生态利益失衡,从根本上说是相关利益主体基于个体理性的博弈导致集体非理性的结果。以闽江流域为例,基于博弈论视角的分析指出,建立激励和约束融合机制是促使横向、纵向政府间由非合作博弈转向合作博弈的关键,也是完善流域生态补偿机制的重要政策着力点。  相似文献
10.
 博弈论日趋完善,在各个领域的应用越来越广,将博弈论应用于城市用户群节水策略的制定。对城市水价和城市用户群“精神收益”进行博弈分析,结果表明,政府提高水价,只有一部分用水户会采取节水策略,如果同时采取提高水价和提高“精神收益”策略,那么,“理性的”用水户都会采取节水策略,从而实现城市用户群节水的目标。  相似文献
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号