Theorizing gender in the face of social change: Is there anything essential about essentialism?

The authors examine how beliefs about the stability of the social hierarchy moderate the link between sexism and essentialist beliefs about gender and how the expression of essentialist beliefs might reciprocally affect the social structure. Studies 1 (N = 240) and 2 (N = 143) presented gender-based inequality as stable, changing, or changed. In both studies, sexism was positively associated with essentialism only among men and only when inequality was presented as changing. Study 3 (N = 552) explored the possible consequences of expressing essentialist theories for social change. Exposure to essentialist theories increased both men's and women's acceptance of inequality. Exposure further increased men's support for discriminatory practices and boosted their self-esteem. These patterns demonstrate that although essentialism is linked to prejudice, this link is itself not essential. Rather, essentialism may be invoked strategically to protect higher status when this is threatened by change and may be successful in so doing. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Review of The mind in context.

Reviews the book, The mind in context edited by Batja Mesquita, et al. (see record 2010-09987-000). The purpose of this edited volume is to challenge a predominant tendency toward an error of essentialism, or the attempt to explain psychological phenomena in terms of internal, static mental entities that are independent of and seemingly hermetically sealed from the outside world. Instead the introductory chapter of The mind in context advances the context principle: that mental processes and behaviour emerge from a profound and complex interaction between person and environment. It is important to note at the outset that a reader seeking an abstracted, sterilized, encyclopaedic list of essential elements making up this perspective would be well advised to look elsewhere. Rather, and in keeping with the theme of the book, the editors have assembled a lively collection of exemplars: chapters by prominent scholars each exploring the influence of context in a focused area of interest. The disadvantage of this approach is that the book can feel somewhat overextended. The significant advantage, however, is that the reader experiences each chapter in the context of the others, a juxtaposition that allows for the emergence of resonances, themes, and common principles across domains. In elaborating on the context principle the contributors to this book emphasise the mind’s mechanisms, situation-sensitivity, and agency over its content, permanence, and passivity. While written in large part by and for social psychologists, the volume should be of interest to any scholar fascinated by the mind’s ecological nature. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Genetic essentialism: On the deceptive determinism of DNA.

This article introduces the notion of genetic essentialist biases: cognitive biases associated with essentialist thinking that are elicited when people encounter arguments that genes are relevant for a behavior, condition, or social group. Learning about genetic attributions for various human conditions leads to a particular set of thoughts regarding those conditions: they are more likely to be perceived as (a) immutable and determined, (b) having a specific etiology, (c) homogeneous and discrete, and (d) natural, which can lead to the naturalistic fallacy. There are rare cases of “strong genetic explanation” when such responses to genetic attributions may be appropriate; however, people tend to overweigh genetic attributions compared with competing attributions even in cases of “weak genetic explanation,” which are far more common. The authors reviewed research on people's understanding of race, gender, sexual orientation, criminality, mental illness, and obesity through a genetic essentialism lens, highlighting attitudinal, cognitive, and behavioral changes that stem from consideration of genetic attributions as bases of these categories. Scientific and media portrayals of genetic discoveries are discussed with respect to genetic essentialism, as is the role that genetic essentialism has played (and continues to play) in various public policies, legislation, scientific endeavors, and ideological movements in recent history. Last, moderating factors and interventions to reduce the magnitude of genetic essentialism, which identify promising directions to explore in order to reduce these biases, are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

In Genes We Trust: The Biological Component of Psychological Essentialism and Its Relationship to Mechanisms of Motivated Social Cognition.

Three studies analyzed the biological component of psychological essentialism (laypeople's belief that social categories have an underlying nature/natural foundation) as it pertains to mechanisms of motivated social cognition. A new scale assessing the belief in genetic determinism is introduced as a measure of the biological component of essentialism. Results speak to the reliability and validity of the scale and show that essentialist beliefs are associated with basic social-cognitive motives and are also related to processes of stereotyping and prejudice. An experimental study found that rendering essentialist information salient elicits increased levels of prejudice and in-group bias, particularly in persons holding chronic essentialist beliefs. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Why Fodor’s Theory of Concepts Fails

Fodor’s theory of concepts holds that the psychological capacities, beliefs or intentions which determine how we use concepts do not determine reference. Instead, causal relations of a specific kind between properties and our dispositions to token a concept are claimed to do so. Fodor does admit that there needs to be some psychological mechanisms mediating the property–concept tokening relations, but argues that they are purely accidental for reference. In contrast, I argue that the actual mechanisms that sustain the reference determining concept tokening relations are necessary for reference. Fodor’s atomism is thus undermined, since in order to refer with a concept it is necessary to possess some specific psychological capacities.     

Genetics and human agency: Comment on Dar-Nimrod and Heine (2011).

Dar-Nimrod and Heine (2011) decried genetic essentialism without denying the importance of genetics in the genesis of human behavior, and although I agree on both counts, a deeper issue remains unaddressed: how should we adjust our cognitions about our own behavior in light of genetic influence, or is it perhaps not necessary to take genetics into account at all? I suggest that the genetics of behavior does have important implications for how we understand ourselves, the differences among us, and the ethical implications of our actions, but that the usual metric for these considerations, the heritability coefficient, is not the correct one. I propose an alternative. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Essentialism goes social: Belief in social determinism as a component of psychological essentialism.

Individuals tend to explain the characteristics of others with reference to an underlying essence, a tendency that has been termed psychological essentialism. Drawing on current conceptualizations of essentialism as a fundamental mode of social thinking, and on prior studies investigating belief in genetic determinism (BGD) as a component of essentialism, we argue that BGD cannot constitute the sole basis of individuals' essentialist reasoning. Accordingly, we propose belief in social determinism (BSD) as a complementary component of essentialism, which relies on the belief that a person's essential character is shaped by social factors (e.g., upbringing, social background). We developed a scale to measure this social component of essentialism. Results of five correlational studies indicate that (a) BGD and BSD are largely independent, (b) BGD and BSD are related to important correlates of essentialist thinking (e.g., dispositionism, perceived group homogeneity), (c) BGD and BSD are associated with indicators of fundamental epistemic and ideological motives, and (d) the endorsement of each lay theory is associated with vital social-cognitive consequences (particularly stereotyping and prejudice). Two experimental studies examined the idea that the relationship between BSD and prejudice is bidirectional in nature. Study 6 reveals that rendering social-deterministic explanations salient results in increased levels of ingroup favoritism in individuals who chronically endorse BSD. Results of Study 7 show that priming of prejudice enhances endorsement of social-deterministic explanations particularly in persons habitually endorsing prejudiced attitudes. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

女性主义与建筑学

性别因素的影响存在于空间生产或建筑话语的任何层面。试图从女性主义的社会性别差异论和社会性别构成论两方面探讨其对建筑学的影响，并探讨了新的建筑学基础的可能性。     

Lay theory of race affects and moderates Asian Americans' responses toward American culture.

People may hold different understandings of race that might affect how they respond to the culture of groups deemed to be racially distinct. The present research tests how this process is moderated by the minority individual's lay theory of race. An essentialist lay theory of race (i.e., that race reflects deep-seated, inalterable essence and is indicative of traits and ability) would orient racial minorities to rigidly adhere to their ethnic culture, whereas a social constructionist lay theory of race (i.e., that race is socially constructed, malleable, and arbitrary) would orient racial minorities to identify and cognitively assimilate toward the majority culture. To test these predictions, the authors conducted 4 studies with Asian American participants. The first 2 studies examine the effect of one's lay theory of race on perceived racial differences and identification with American culture. The last 2 studies tested the moderating effect of lay theory of race on identification and assimilation toward the majority American culture after this culture had been primed. The results generally supported the prediction that the social constructionist theory was associated with more perceived similarity between Asians and Americans and more consistent identification and assimilation toward American culture, compared with the essentialist theory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Biological conceptions of race and the motivation to cross racial boundaries.

The present studies demonstrate that conceiving of racial group membership as biologically determined increases acceptance of racial inequities (Studies 1 and 2) and cools interest in interacting with racial outgroup members (Studies 3-5). These effects were generally independent of racial prejudice. It is argued that when race is cast as a biological marker of individuals, people perceive racial outgroup members as unrelated to the self and therefore unworthy of attention and affiliation. Biological conceptions of race therefore provide justification for a racially inequitable status quo and for the continued social marginalization of historically disadvantaged groups. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)