étude des rechutes constatés dans une cohorte de personnes jugées inptes à subir leur procés ou acquittées pour cause d'aliénation mentale.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 20(2) of Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science Revue canadienne des Sciences du comportement (see record 2007-09831-001). The abstract accompanying the original article was incorrect; the correct abstract (in French) is presented in the erratum.] We know little about individuals who are declared unfit to stand trial and/or not guilty by reason of insanity. The few existing studies are characterized by methodological weaknesses, notably by short follow-up periods and a lack of external validity. The present investigation, which aims to evaluate and explain readmissions that occurred during a seven- to nine-year period, corrects only some of these weaknesses. Sixty-one per cent of the subjects were rehospitalized during the period of study. It proved difficult to identify the factors associated with readmission. However, males with a diagnosis of schizophrenia and who had committed violent crimes were found the most likely to be readmitted. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A Recent Court Experience.

Because of the recent interest in the testimony of the psychologist as an expert witness, I would like to share a recent court experience with APA members. A patient murdered his estranged wife during the time he was being evaluated for treatment at the Hamm Memorial Psychiatric Clinic, a privately endowed community clinic. He was seen once in May, 1955, by the psychiatric social worker and the psychiatrist; but he did not return until November of the same year, at which time he again saw the psychiatrist, who referred him to me for psychological evaluation. Eight days after I saw him, he shot and killed his wife. The entire psychiatric team was subpoenaed by the defense attorney to testify in the Ramsey County District Court as to the patient's mental condition prior to and at the time of the murder. In addition, the defense attorney requested that the psychiatrist, as well as myself, evaluate him in the jail as to his mental condition subsequent to the murder. The first professional member called to the witness stand was the psychiatric social worker, who was questioned rather briefly as to her impressions of the defendant at the time he was first referred. I was called to testify immediately afterwards and was subjected to questioning and cross-examination for a five-hour period. One hour was spent in qualifying me as an expert in terms of education, experience, academic appointments, and the like. The remainder of the time was devoted to an analysis of the psychological tests, as well as my clinical opinions as to the psychological condition of the patient. No attempt was made by the prosecuting attorney to harass me personally, although he would occasionally intersperse such comments as, "You are not a qualified psychiatrist, are you?" or, "You do not have an MD degree, is that right?" At the same time, he did not raise objections when the defense attorney asked for my diagnostic impression or opinion as to whether or not the patient knew right from wrong at the time of the shooting. Following my testimony, the psychiatrist was called to the witness chair and gave essentially the same picture based on his evaluation of the patient. The jury deliberated six hours and the defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree which carries a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. An informal polling of the jurors after the trial by the attorney for the defense revealed that the jury at no time questioned my expertness and fully accepted me as a professional member of the community. The majority agreed that the patient was psychotic but apparently did not feel he was insane. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"étude des rechutes constatées dans une cohorte de personnes jugées inaptes à subir leur proces ou acquittées pour cause d'aliénation mentale": Erratum á Hodgins.

Reports an error in the original article "étude des rechutes constatées dans une cohorte de personnes jugées inaptes à subir leur proces ou acquittées pour cause d'aliénation mentale" ("Reevaluation of defendants declared unfit to stand trial or not guilty by reason of insanity"), by Sheilagh Hodgins (Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science/Revue canadienne des Sciences du comportement, 1987[Oct], Vol 19[4], 441-453). The French abstract (but not the English abstract) accompanying the original article was incorrect; the correct abstract (in French) is presented in the erratum. (The following abstract of this article originally appeared in record 2007-09815-001.) We know little about individuals who are declared unfit to stand trial and/or not guilty by reason of insanity. The few existing studies are characterized by methodological weaknesses, notably by short follow-up periods and a lack of external validity. The present investigation, which aims to evaluate and explain readmissions that occurred during a seven- to nine-year period, corrects only some of these weaknesses. Sixty-one per cent of the subjects were rehospitalized during the period of study. It proved difficult to identify the factors associated with readmission. However, males with a diagnosis of schizophrenia and who had committed violent crimes were found the most likely to be readmitted. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Commonsense justice and jury instructions: Instructive and reciprocating connections.

"Commonsense justice" (CSJ) and "jury instructions" are conjoined to illustrate their instructive and reciprocating (i.e., diagnostic and therapeutic) connections, and, when taken together, their instructive potential for the law. It is argued here that "jury nullification," which appears as the antithesis of connectedness, is more likely the failure of "jury instructions," rather than the "failing of jurors." Insanity jurisprudence is the main venue for demonstrating the instructive and reciprocating connections, an area replete with insanity test instruction failures. What emerges from the empirical findings are CSJ's sophisticated constructs and prototypes, where types and gradations of culpability are found, yet where jurors' distinctions schemes that afford no opportunity for jurors to register their distinctions. With such a schema is created and tested, it succeeds. The implications of these instructive and reciprocating connections between CSJ and jury instructions—for other nettlesome areas of the law—are suggested. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Describing jurors' personal conceptions of insanity and their relationship to case judgments.

In a series of studies, prototype theory was applied to describe the nature, variability, and effect of jurors' conceptions of insanity. Specifically, (a) 80 jurors described the features of their prototypes of insanity, (b) 5 jurors combined similar features to develop a core set of features to measure individual differences, and (c) 135 jurors and 236 undergraduates completed measures of individual differences in prototypes and attitudes toward the insanity defense and the criminal justice system and rendered insanity case judgments. Results suggest that (a) jurors' prototypes of insanity cannot be reduced to legal or psychiatric constructs; (b) although there are marked individual differences in prototypes, there are 3 identifiable groups of jurors with prototypes that emphasize severe mental disability, "moral insanity," and mental state at the time of the offense; and (c) these prototypes are associated with case-relevant attitudes and affect the way in which jurors interpret case information and render verdicts. Implications for future research, legal reform, and the presentation of expert evidence are analyzed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Clinician Variation in Rates of Legal Sanity Opinions: Implications for Self-Monitoring.

How often do forensic psychologists find that a defendant meets criteria for legal sanity? Do clinicians vary in terms of how frequently they offer opinions supportive of insanity? If so, how might a conscientious clinician determine whether unusually high or low rates of insanity opinions reflect bias? The authors present the first available data regarding how individual clinicians vary in rates of insanity opinions, drawing from 59 clinicians who conducted 4,498 evaluations. Most clinicians found 5%-25% of defendants met criteria for legal insanity. However, some clinicians opined that no defendants met criteria for legal insanity, whereas others opined that as many as 50% of defendants did. The authors (a) provide suggestions to help practicing clinical-forensic psychologists monitor their patterns of psycho-legal opinions and (b) examine carefully whether unusual rates may reflect clinician bias. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The psychologist as an expert witness on the issue of insanity.

Psychologists have made assertions in the courtroom "that do not have the blessings of the entire professional psychological community, and these assertions have brought court opporpribum to them and perhaps to the psychologist in general." Testimony from a District Court of the District of Columbia is presented; it provides "psychologists who rely on projective tests with information on how such evaluations may be treated by an opposing and often hostile attorney, or how they may be interpreted in a court of law which permits cross examination of witnesses, including expert witnesses." (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Developing services for insanity acquittees conditionally released into the community: Maximizing success and minimizing recidivism.

This article evaluated factors related to failure to maintain conditional release in a large sample (N = 363) of individuals who were found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) and subsequently released into the community. We evaluated extensive demographic, diagnostic, criminal history, and aftercare information from NGRI acquittees. Results from a logistic regression demonstrated that a diagnosis of substance abuse, previous revocation of conditional release, and mental health symptoms requiring inpatient hospitalization were all related to revocation of conditional release. From a policy perspective, community-based services must be intensive, focused on both mental health and alcohol and drug-abuse problems, and provide a continuity of mental heath services from the hospital to the community. With intense community-based services, NGRI acquittees can be successfully reintegrated into the community with few difficulties. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Issues of Legal Process.

Comments on 3 articles in the November 1964 issue of the American Psychologist which deal with issues of legal process. The articles are: "Psychology and the legal process: Testimonial privileged communications" (see record 1965-06324-001) by R. L. Geiser and P. D. Rheingold, "The psychologist as an expert witness on the issue of insanity" (see record 1965-06327-001) by R. Jeffery and "The psychiatrist and tests of criminal responsibility" (see record 1965-06329-001) by R. Leifer. The commenter notes that of the three, only Jeffery's paper gives the reader a concrete look at samples of what is currently done in the legal system. Jeffery presents samples of testimony as actually presented by psychologists in open court, that allows the reader a glimpse at what is, and provides the reader the opportunity to formulate alternative approaches to the problems. Leifer's (1964) discussion on criminal responsibility, while enlightened to a certain degree by Szasz' new look at psychiatric mythology, but the commenter notes two blind spots. Geiser and Rheingold (1964), in their discussion on privileged communication, manage to be informative to an audience of psychologists and, at the same time, add proposals that stem fro'm their own view points. However, the commenter questions their blanket assumption that psychological services that go beyond the classical dimensions of psychotherapy or psychodiagnostics should not be covered by privileged communication. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Testimony of an Expert Witness.

Having testified as an expert witness in about half a dozen jury trials where the question of legal insanity was at issue, C. R. Shearn was quite astonished by the examples of psychologists' testimony in similar situations, as given by R. Jeffery ("The Psychologist as an Expert Witness on the Issue of Insanity"; see record 1965-06327-001). Shearn offers four suggestions for psychologists called to testify as expert witnesses. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)