粮仓环境监测系统设计

随着科学技术的发展,粮食行业信息化发展得到了强有力的科技支撑。为满足粮库整体信息化建设的要求,打破"信息孤岛"现状,实现资源整合、数据共享,为大数据分析和数据应用提供数据基础,设计一款能够实时采集粮仓内温湿度、氧气、二氧化碳气体浓度、粮堆高度的数据集成系统。系统采用分层分布式结构,由数据集中器和多种传感器模块组成,数据集中器与各传感器模块间通过RS485总线进行数据通讯,并由数据集中器通过网络专线传输汇总的环境监测数据,通过专用软件进行数据处理和挖掘,从而实现粮仓环境监测和预警等功能。     

China’s ‘old’ and ‘new’ Mekong River politics: the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation from a comparative benefit-sharing perspective

This article analyzes China’s Mekong River politics before and after the establishment of the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) from a comparative benefit-sharing perspective. China’s pre-LMC approach focused too much on the creation of economic benefits from and beyond the river while neglecting ecological benefits to the river. Moreover, despite the problems this ‘old’ approach caused for China and its downstream neighbours, China’s current LMC strategy seems to essentially replicate its former approach. While sustainable water resources management is identified as a priority area, actual cooperation and benefit sharing in this field remain insufficient.     

Ex post demand information sharing between differentiated suppliers and a common retailer

We consider ex post demand information sharing in a two-echelon supply chain in which two suppliers sell differentiated products through a common retailer. We model three scenarios of information sharing to characterise the conditions under which information sharing may benefit or hurt different players: (1) no supplier is informed; (2) only one supplier is informed; and (3) both suppliers are informed. We find that the retailer may voluntarily share the low demand information when the product differentiation and demand magnitude satisfy certain conditions. In contrast, the retailer has no incentive to share the high demand information, even though this information benefits the suppliers. To achieve information sharing, we propose a side payment mechanism, which allows benefitted players to subsidise hurtful players. Finally, we extend our model by considering a situation where the suppliers have limited capacity and may invest to ramp up production capacity to satisfy a high demand.     

Fake news and COVID-19: modelling the predictors of fake news sharing among social media users

Fake news dissemination on COVID-19 has increased in recent months, and the factors that lead to the sharing of this misinformation is less well studied. Therefore, this paper describes the result of a Nigerian sample (n = 385) regarding the proliferation of fake news on COVID-19. The fake news phenomenon was studied using the Uses and Gratification framework, which was extended by an “altruism” motivation. The data were analysed with Partial Least Squares (PLS) to determine the effects of six variables on the outcome of fake news sharing. Our results showed that altruism was the most significant factor that predicted fake news sharing of COVID-19. We also found that social media users’ motivations for information sharing, socialisation, information seeking and pass time predicted the sharing of false information about COVID-19. In contrast, no significant association was found for entertainment motivation. We concluded with some theoretical and practical implications.     

Analysis of the risk-sharing ratio in PPP projects based on government minimum revenue guarantees

Public-private partnership (PPP) projects have been widely applied in infrastructure construction. A suitable risk distribution strategy is crucial for promoting negotiations between the government and investors. The government usually provides guarantees to investors to distribute risk. However, an excessive guarantee increases the government's financial burden, whereas an insufficient guarantee reduces the confidence of the investors participating in the project. In a minimum revenue guarantee (MRG), the government subsidizes the investors the difference between the actual revenue and the government guarantee line if there is a loss. In PPP power plant and highway projects, investors' revenues come from two sources: government guarantees and the project company's self-sale. To support project companies and to optimize the projects' benefits, the government should set a reasonable benchmark for purchase amounts. Based on the traditional principal-agent model, this paper introduces the reciprocal preference theory to analyze the risk-sharing ratio most suitable for the government. Then, an optimal incentive mechanism is established to guarantee the project's income. The results indicate that by setting a different guarantee strategy for different participants, the government can utilize reciprocal preference to incentivize investors to exert more effort during a partnership and avoid moral hazard.     

Data sharing mechanism of various mineral resources based on blockchain

Basins with various mineral resources coexisting and enriching often occupy an important strategic position. The exploration of various mineral resources is repetitive at present due to unshared data and imperfect management mechanism. This situation greatly increases the cost of energy exploitation in the country. Traditional data-sharing mode has several disadvantages, such as high cost, difficulty in confirming the right of data, and lack of incentive mechanism, which make achieving real data sharing difficult. In this paper, we propose a data-sharing mechanism based on blockchain and provide implementation suggestions and technical key points. Compared with traditional data-sharing methods, the proposed data-sharing mechanism can realize data sharing, ensure data quality, and protect intellectual property. Moreover, key points in the construction are stated in the case study section to verify the feasibility of the data-sharing system based on blockchain proposed in this paper.     

Stochastic characterization of the spectrum sharing game in ad-hoc networks

This work focuses on infrastructure-less ad hoc wireless networks where multiple transmitter/receiver pairs share the same radio resources (spectrum); transmitters have to choose how to split a total power budget across orthogonal spectrum bands with the goal to maximize their sum rate under cumulative interference from concurrent transmissions. We start off by introducing and characterizing the non-cooperative game among transmitter/receiver pairs when the network topology is deterministically given. The corresponding Nash equilibria are derived, highlighting their dependency on the topological parameters (distances between wireless nodes, propagation model, and background noise power). The analysis is then extended to the case of random network topologies drawn from a given spatial stochastic process. Tools of stochastic geometry are leveraged to derive a statistical characterization of the equilibria of the spectrum sharing game. Finally, a distributed algorithm is proposed to let the players of the spectrum sharing game converge to equilibria conditions. Numerical simulations show that the proposed algorithm drives the users to stable points that are close to the equilibria of the game requiring limited information exchange among nodes.     

工程实施阶段的风险规避——解读2013版《建设工程工程量清单计价规范》之合同价款调整

分析工程实施阶段影响合同价款调整的风险因素及风险分担的有关规定和风险出现时合同价款调整的计算方法。条理清晰,示例通俗易懂,可操作性强。