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基于时间最短的足球机器人进攻路径规划   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
足球机器人采取基于路径最短的进攻规划的不足之处主要体现在时间上不能满足比赛环境实时性和高度动态性的要求.提出理想的进攻路径曲线应为时间最短的平滑路径,结合足球机器人的运动特点,采用基于Bezier曲线的方法拟合出该曲线.最后通过C 程序代码实现了该方法,并在仿真实验平台FIRA Simurosot5vs5上验证了其可行性和有效性.  相似文献
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In multiagent semi-competitive environments, competitions and cooperations can both exist. As agents compete with each other, they have incentives to lie. Sometimes, agents can increase their utilities by cooperating with each other, then they have incentives to tell the truth. Therefore, being a receiver, an agent needs to decide whether or not to trust the received message(s). To help agents make this decision, some of the existing models make use of trust or reputation only, which means agents choose to believe (or cooperate with) the trustworthy senders or senders with high reputation. However, a trustworthy agent may only bring little benefit. Another way to make the decision is to use expected utility. However, agents who only believe messages with high expected utilities can be cheated easily. To solve the problems, this paper introduces the Trust Model, which makes use of trust, expected utility, and also agents’ attitudes towards risk to make decisions. On the other hand, being a sender, an agent needs to decide whether or not to be honest. To help agents make this decision, this paper introduces the Honesty Model, which is symmetric to the Trust Model. In addition, we introduce an adaptive strategy to the Trust/Honesty Model, which enables agents to learn from and adapt to the environment. Simulations show that agents with the Adaptive Trust/Honesty Model perform much better than agents which only use trust or expected utility to make the decision  相似文献
3.
An integrated approach for reactive power price and control is developed. Reactive power price is divided into fixed and variable parts. The fixed part is the operational cost of reactive power service. The variable part of reactive power price is determined based on capability and contributions to the improvement of system performance such as security, reliability and economics. These contributions can be evaluated by computing sensitivity of objective function with respect to reactive power support. The optimal power flow (OPF) approach is used to carry out this purpose. For VAr planning (or control) purposes, three parallel indices are first presented to determine the sites of new VAr sources. They are benefit-to-cost ratio index, voltage reactive sensitivity index, and the bus voltage security index. The analytic hierarchical process is then used to comprehensively consider the effect of the three indices and the network topology for each candidate VAr source site. The proposed approach was tested on an IEEE 30-bus system with satisfactory results.  相似文献
4.
Competitive facility location problems have been investigated in many papers. In most, authors have applied location models with two competitors. In this paper three companies, which are mutually competitive, intend to locate their facilities in a linear market. It is well-known that Nash equilibrium solution for location problem does not include three competitive facilities. In this paper we present the optimal location strategies for three facilities. In our model we assume that the demands are continuously distributed in a linear market and the facilities are locating according to a specific order of sequence, A, B and C. We apply the Stackelberg equilibrium solutions for competitive location problems with three facilities. In our model, we consider the decision problems in three stages. In the first stage, we decide the optimal location of facility A, which is located optimally in respect to the remaining two facilities B and C. In the second stage, we determine the optimal location of facility B which is optimally located in respect to facility C, by utilizing the information on the location of facility A. Finally in the third stage problem we decide the location of facility C, optimally located by utilizing the information on the location of A and B. In the first stage, we need the optimal solutions of the second and third stages. In the second stage we need the optimal solution of the third stage problem. Therefore, first we solve the third stage problem which is the simplest. After that, we solve the second stage problem utilizing the optimal solution strategy of the third stage problem. In this paper we present the optimal location strategies for three facilities.  相似文献
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考虑由电商平台和制造商组成的双渠道供应链, 制造商存在网络销售效率问题, 消费者存在损失厌恶心理, 在不同竞争环境下, 分析网络销售效率、损失厌恶对企业定价和收益的影响. 结果表明, 在Nash均衡博弈、制造商主 导Stackelberg博弈和电商平台主导Stackelberg博弈下, 网络销售效率的下降导致网络销售价格和电商平台收益上 升, 制造商收益和供应链收益下降, 网络销售价格在电商平台主导Stackelberg博弈下最大, 在制造商主导Stackelberg 博弈下最小; 损失厌恶的增大导致网络销售价格、企业和供应链收益均下滑, 企业收益在自身企业主导Stackelberg 博弈下最大, 在对方企业主导Stackelberg博弈下最小; 供应链收益在供应链集中下最大, 在电商平台主导Stackelberg 博弈下最小.  相似文献
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