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1.
改进的仲裁器PUF设计与分析   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1       下载免费PDF全文
介绍Daihyun等设计的仲裁器物理不可克隆函数(PUF)方案,指出其不足之处。在此基础上提出一种改进方案,设计并分析基于 D触发器的仲裁器PUF,在FPGA平台上实现并测试该方案的性能。实验结果表明,改进方案在输出的0, 1平衡性方面优于Daihyun的PUF方案。  相似文献
2.
基于物理不可克隆函数的RFID双向认证   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
在物联网应用中,基于传统加密手段的无线射频识别(RFID)认证协议计算量较大,在资源有限的设备中不具有可操作性.为解决该问题,提出一种基于物理不可克隆函数的RFID双向认证协议.分析RFID系统协议的安全需求,根据物理不可克隆函数设计轻量级的双向安全认证协议,利用形式化分析语言证明协议的安全性.分析结果表明,与随机化Hash-Lock、轻量级认证协议等相比,该协议不仅能够有效防止假冒、重放、追踪攻击,也能抵抗物理克隆攻击.  相似文献
3.
传统的基于环形振荡器物理不可克隆函数(RO-PUF)因温度、电压、器件老化等影响,存在着物理不可克隆函数(PUF)输出不稳定的可靠性问题以及振荡器频率不随机分布的安全性问题.针对PUF可靠性问题,提出一种类斜率频率补偿方案.该方案通过测量出温度与振荡器频率的线性关系,再选择与不稳定输入输出响应对(CRP)中相同线性关系的其他振荡器相互补偿,使得不稳定CRP输出可靠响应.针对PUF的安全性问题,提出一种基于平均值绝对差的方案.该方案首先测量出每块芯片上振荡器的平均频率,其次再多次过滤相应振荡器的平均值得到随机的剩余频率,最终PUF的输出响应能够服从随机分布.分析与实验结果表明,该方案能有效提高RO-PUF安全性与可靠性.  相似文献
4.
Kardas等人提出的轻量级无线射频识别(RFID)认证协议(2011年LightSec会议论文集)若遭遇侧信道分析、物理刺探等攻击会导致密钥泄漏,从而使整个协议认证失败。为此,通过将四步认证改为三步认证、引入密钥恢复机制以及改进密钥的使用方式,使协议效率提高,并且便于在多标签环境中扩展。理论分析结果表明,新协议可以防止读写器与标签之间产生异步,抵抗伪造攻击、重放攻击、消息阻塞攻击、中间人攻击,与原方案相比,认证效率更高。  相似文献
5.
贺章擎  郑朝霞  戴葵  邹雪城 《计算机应用》2012,32(3):683-685,698
已提出的针对低成本RFID系统的安全机制,要么存在安全缺陷,要么硬件成本太高.为此设计了一个基于物理不可克隆功能(PUF)的RFID安全认证协议,利用PUF和线性反馈移位寄存器(LFSR)实现了阅读器和标签之间强的安全认证,解决了已有安全协议存在的问题.安全性分析表明:该协议成本低、安全性高,能够抵抗物理攻击和标签克隆,并有极强的隐私性.  相似文献
6.
张龙翔 《计算机应用》2012,32(8):2280-2282
基于不可复制功能(PUF)的射频识别(RFID)认证协议是近年来的研究热点.2011年,Bassil等在TST国际会议上提出了一种新的基于PUF的RFID认证协议(BASSIL R,EL-BEAINO W,KAYSSI A,et al.A PUF-based ultra-lightweight mutual-authentication RFID protocol[C]//2011 International Conference on Internet Technology and Secured Transactions.Piscataway:IEEE,2011:495-499).分析了该认证协议的安全性,通过假设敌手参与协议,指出其不能抵抗密钥泄露攻击、跟踪攻击,也不能抵抗阅读器冒充攻击以及同步破坏攻击;同时描述了这些攻击的细节,并给出了它们的成功概率和计算复杂度.  相似文献
7.
马昌社  王涛  王立斌 《计算机工程》2011,37(21):249-251
对一个基于PUF构造的低成本RFID安全协议进行分析,发现该协议不能保护标签的隐私性,即任何一个攻击者通过重放协议消息就可以跟踪同一个标签。并且由于识别标签的时间复杂度和通信复杂度都与标签个数呈线性关系,因此协议不具有扩展性。为此,提出一个改进的RFID协议,使得协议在效率和安全性两方面得到改善。  相似文献
8.
介绍Daihyun等设计的仲裁器物理不可克隆函数(PUF)方案,指出其不足之处。在此基础上提出一种改进方案,设计并分析基于 D触发器的仲裁器PUF,在FPGA平台上实现并测试该方案的性能。实验结果表明,改进方案在输出的0, 1平衡性方面优于Daihyun的PUF方案。  相似文献
9.
Virtually all applications which provide or require a security service need a secret key. In an ambient world, where (potentially) sensitive information is continually being gathered about us, it is critical that those keys be both securely deployed and safeguarded from compromise. In this paper, we provide solutions for secure key deployment and storage of keys in sensor networks and radio frequency identification systems based on the use of Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs). In addition, to providing an overview of different existing PUF realizations, we introduce a PUF realization aimed at ultra-low cost applications. We then show how the properties of Fuzzy Extractors or Helper Data algorithms can be used to securely deploy secret keys to a low cost wireless node. Our protocols are more efficient (round complexity) and allow for lower costs compared to previously proposed ones. We also provide an overview of PUF applications aimed at solving the counterfeiting of goods and devices.
Geert-Jan SchrijenEmail:

Jorge Guajardo   is a senior scientist in the Information and System Security Department at Philips Research Europe. There he lead the efforts to design new and efficient methodologies to secure RFID systems and since 2007 has focus on the design of new anti-counterfeiting methodologies based on Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and their applications to secure key storage and wireless sensor networks. Previous to joining Philips Research, Jorge worked for GTE Government Systems, RSA Laboratories, cv cryptovision gmbh, and Infineon Technologies AG. His interests include: the efficient implementation of cryptographic algorithms in constrained environments, the development of hardware architectures for private and public-key algorithms, provable security of cryptographic protocols under various assumptions, and the interplay of physics and cryptography to attain security goals. Jorge holds a B.Sc degree in physics and electrical engineering and M.S. in electrical engineering from Worcester Polytechnic Institute and a Ph.D. degree in electrical engineering and information sciences from the Ruhr-Universitaet Bochum obtained under the supervision of Prof. Christof Paar. Boris Škorić   received a PhD in theoretical physics from the University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands, in 1999. From 1999 to 2008 he was a research scientist at Philips Research in Eindhoven, working first on display physics and later on security topics. In 2008 he joined the faculty of Mathematics and Computer Science of Eindhoven Technical University, the Netherlands, as assistant professor. Pim Tuyls   studied Theoretical Physics at the Katholieke Universiteit of Leuven where he got a Ph.D. on Quantum Dynamical Entropy in 1997. Currently he works as Chief Technologist at Philips Intrinsic ID in the Netherlands where he is leading the crypto development activities. Since 2004, he is also a visiting professor at the Cosic institute in Leuven. His main interests are in Key Extraction from Noisy Data (Physical Unclonable Functions and Private Biometrics, Quantum Cryptography) and in applications of Secure Multi-Party Computation. Sandeep S. Kumar   is a Senior Researcher at Philips Research Europe. Kumar received both his B.Tech. and M.Tech. degrees in Electrical Engineering from IIT-Bombay, India in 2002. He received his Ph.D. degree in Communication Security from Ruhr University Bochum, Germany in 2006. His research interests include hardware and software architectures for implementations of cryptographic systems, in particular elliptic-curve cryptography on constrained devices. At Philips Research he has been working on hardware implementations of physically unclonable functions for anti-counterfeiting and presently on identity management systems for lifestyle applications. He is a member of the IACR. Thijs Bel   studied Chemical Differentation at the IHBO of Eindhoven. He obtained his certificate in 1984. In 1985 he joined Philips Research, first working on lithography for IC’s and later on lithography for several kinds of displays. In 2007 he joined the group Thin Film Facilities, where he has been working on PUFs and in 2008 he joined the group Device processing Facilities, working on OLEDs. Antoon H. M. Blom   studied electro technology at the Technical High School of s Hertogenbosch, where he graduated in 1978.In 1979 he joined the Philips Company at the mechanization department of the Volt site in Tilburg, a production site for wire wound components. After an intermediate period at the laboratory for tuning units and transformers within the consumer electronics department in Eindhoven, he joined the centre for manufacturing technologies, which has recently been merged with the Philips Applied Technologies department, where he is working in the Optics & Sensors group of the Process Technology department. Geert-Jan Schrijen   obtained his M.Sc. degree in Electrical Engineering from the University of Twente (Enschede) in December 2000. During his studies he specialized in digital signal processing and active noise cancellation. In April 2001 he joined Philips Research. As a research scientist he became interested in the fields of cryptography and information theory and worked several years on security technologies like Digital Rights Management (DRM) systems, low-power authentication protocols and private biometric systems. From 2005 he has been involved in the work on Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs). Geert-Jan was appointed Chief Algorithm Development at the Philips Intrinsic-ID lab venture in April 2007, where he is focusing on the development of signal processing algorithms and security architectures around PUFs.  相似文献
10.
We present a tamper-proof and lightweight challenge-response authentication scheme, based on 2-level noisy Physically Unclonable Functions (PUF). We present a security reduction, which shows the scheme to be secure against passive attacks, provided that it is hard to learn a threshold of halfspaces under the uniform distribution. Furthermore, we provide an extensive analysis of PUFs. In particular, we thoroughly derive a linear model for delay based PUFs, and finally we explore extensions of PUFs to produce efficient and tamper-resilient n-to-n mappings.  相似文献
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